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Introduction 
 
Public finance is said to lie in between politics and economics. The 
accusation of discrimination against a State or a particular region in a 
federal economy like India requires to deal with the question of politics as 
well as economics i.e., economic factors as well as non-economic factors. 
However, the question immediately arises in our mind why one or more 
than one States or regions are subject to discrimination and others are 
favoured. What factors lead the Central government to discriminate 
against a particular State? Is there any correspondence or strong positive 
connections between political opposition and discrimination or the volume 
of transfers among different States i.e., favouring better region against 
poorer region mainly determined by economic considerations. Despite the 
fact that Finance Commission and Planning Commission have been 
constantly searching for suitable criteria or formula (distribution of Central 
assistance through Gadgil formula by Planning Commission since 1969) 
for distribution of resources among the States for attaining regional 
balance. It also remains to be seen whether such discrimination faced by 
the States in general and less developed States in particular is a part of 
over all regional inequality of Indian federation or it is just a deliberate 
move against a particular State. 
 
The Indian federation is said to have undergone qualitative change over 
time. Broadly speaking the first three decades after Independence, were 
the period of consensus and non-antagonism so far as Centre-State 
relations in India were concerned owing to the existence of one Party 
system (‘in which power was shared between the Centre and States under 
the control of the ruling Congress Party’). Though some underlying 
conflicts were there but it was sought to be resolved informally without 
letting such contentious issues come to the fore. After the fourth general 
election (1969) several States of the Indian federation experienced non-
Congress government. Thereafter, the conflict between the two levels of 
government came to the fore much frequently and intensely than before. 
Subsequently several attempts were undertaken by the States as well as 
the Centre to review the existing order of federal fiscal relations radically. 
Authors such as Ray & Kincaid (1988) commented on the outcome of a 
second generation strain on the Indian federal system. They said that, 
“...thus strain originate from a redefinition of the demand on the structural 
change of the India’s federation rather than reinforcing constitutional 
restraints on national government.”  
 
However, the first generation of the Indian federation is said to have 
existed until the late-1960s. During the period of the first generation a 
major part of demands of the States ‘was directed towards reinforcing 
constitutional restraints on the national government’. And it was only 
confined to the functional aspect of federal fiscal relations. For example, 
many States voiced their concern against the growing importance of the 
Planning Commission as non-Constitutional body over the Finance 
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Commission as a Constitutional body. Contrary to that  during the period of 
second generation many State governments and political parties (see also 
Maheswari B.L, ‘ Centre-State Relations Issue Awareness and Party 
Positions’, EPW, June 12, 1971) demanded structural changes in the 
Indian federation which was expected to secure more power and 
autonomy to the States.  
 
Over time the tension between the Centre and the States has been 
cropping up as regards distribution of fiscal power between the States and 
the Centre. Eventually this area started attracting scholarly attention and 
several macro and micro studies were undertaken as regards the general 
problem of federal fiscal relations of India. These studies can be broadly 
divided into two areas. One is related to the general description of  federal 
fiscal relations, structure and functions of multiple resource transfers 
agencies, different types of fiscal power distribution between the Centre 
and the States at par with the Constitutional assignment. These studies 
also addressed the qualitative deterioration as regards distribution of fiscal 
power that took place between these two levels of government due to 
legislation passed by the Centre. In the course of time this eventually 
broadened the fiscal power of the Centre and limited the fiscal power of 
the States. It was pointed out that Constitutional rules regarding resource 
distribution between the Centre and the States are being violated by 
undermining the functions of statutory body like Finance Commission and 
allowing non-statutory body like a Planning Commission take upper hand 
over the Finance Commission. Of the several significant studies which we 
may mention here, National Institute of Public Finance and Policy (1981), 
Rao & Chelliah (1991), Prakash, Om (1996) and recently  Vithal & Sastry ( 
2001). 
 
Another type of studies of literature of federal fiscal relations was related to 
operational failure of Indian federal fiscal relations which leads to ever 
widening regional disparities in the Indian federation. This area also 
attracted adequate scholarly attention. Among the relevant publications 
are, Rao (1981), George & Gulati (1988), Rao & Govinda (1996). Recently 
several micro studies revealing the effect of New Economic Policy,1991 on 
unequal distribution of budgetary transfers among the States and 
consequently further accentuation of regional imbalance were also 
undertaken by Chakravarty (1999), Kurian (1999) and Kurian (2000). 
 
George and Gulati (1988) probably made the first attempt to undertake a 
macro work related to the emerging problem of regional imbalance in the 
Indian federation.  All States in the Indian federation, in accordance to this 
study, were broadly divided into three groups such as high, middle and low 
income States. Likewise total budgetary transfers from the Centre to the 
States were also broadly divided into statutory, Plan and discretionary 
transfers. Considering the period from 1951-81 the effect of such transfers 
among these three different groups of the States were noticed. It emerged 
that high and middle income States always received almost all types of 
transfers of a greater magnitude than low income States. Considering 
different types of transfers it was observed by this study that discretionary 
transfers which are channelled through Centrally sponsored schemes and 
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Plan transfers channelled through Planning Commission clearly have a 
more regressive tendency than statutory transfers channelled through 
Finance Commission. It was also observed that high income States always 
managed to receive discretionary and Plan transfers not only higher than 
low income States but also middle income States. Furthermore,  the most 
disheartening feature is that the degree of inequality of distribution of 
discretionary and Plan transfers among these three major groups was 
much higher than that of statutory transfers. Statutory transfers have 
relatively more equalising effects than other budgetary transfers. 
Therefore, of all transfers it was inferred that statutory transfers have less 
regressive tendency than discretionary and Plan transfers. But such 
limited progressivity was offset by the fact that overtime discretionary and 
Plan transfers have been gaining importance over statutory transfers in 
terms of both magnitude and number.  
 
George & Gulati (1988) made an attempt to include institutional transfers 
channelled through Centrally controlled financial institutions and scheduled 
commercial banks  in the purview of federal fiscal transfers. So far total 
budgetary transfers disbursed by Central multiple resource transfers 
agencies (Finance and Planning Commission) and Centrally sponsored 
schemes only had attracted scholarly attention in the literature of federal 
fiscal relation. The inclusion of institutional transfers in the study of George 
& Gulati (1988)  was legitimised by the fact that on the one hand after the 
nationalisation of commercial banks (1969) credit and investment 
disbursed among the States by scheduled commercial banks were subject 
to control exercised by the Centre and on the other hand the share of 
institutional transfers in total transfers i.e. budgetary and institutional taken 
together was very high and accounted for near by 50 per cent of all States 
average during 1969-76.  
 
However, the most disquieting feature is that institutional transfers with 
such a higher proportion in total transfers shows the most regressive 
tendency among all transfers. This clearly accentuates regional 
imbalances in the Indian federation further. Considering the period from 
1973-80 it was noticed that per capita share of total institutional transfer of 
high income States (Rs. 690) was almost more than three times higher 
than per capita share of institutional transfers of low income States (Rs. 
205). Considering such highly regressive trend of the institutional transfers 
in the Indian federation George & Gulati feel that a high degree of 
progressiveness in the inter-State distribution of Central budgetary 
transfers should be introduced in order to make up for the regressiveness 
of institutional transfers. Furthermore,  among the different types of 
budgetary transfers a much larger role should be played by a statutory 
body like Finance Commission. In order to establish the equity among 
different States not only greater role of Central budgetary transfers is 
required but also a greater role of statutory transfers should be ensured.  
 
Rao (1981) also made an attempt to indicate widening regional imbalance 
in the Indian federation and wanted to redefine the level of backwardness 
and development of the States by constructing separate indices of 
development  as well as composite index of development of the States. In 
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the first place separate indices of development were constructed which 
include, agricultural development, industrial development, index of banking 
development, development index of education. Eventually an attempt was 
made to construct a State-wise composite index of development instead of 
constructing different development indices by considering different 
economic indicators separately in order to incorporate overall development 
of the States. Having constructed such index of development the study 
categorised all States under three different groups such as developed 
States, average States and backward States. As far as Central budgetary 
transfers among the States per se was concerned the study covering the 
period from 1957-61 to 1969-73 concluded developed States and average 
States in general managed to receive more of almost all types of 
budgetary transfers than backward States. In reasoning along this line the 
study concluded that Central budgetary transfers could not achieve the 
goal of redressing the regional imbalance of Indian federation which has 
been increasing over time instead of being narrowed down.     
 
Rao & Sen (1996) widened the area of the discussion of regional 
imbalance in the Indian federation. The study was not confined to direct 
effect of Central budgetary transfers among the Centre and the States and 
the States inter se but also incorporated the indirect effect of Central 
policies in general which has significant adverse effect on the budgetary 
position of the  States. Vertical fiscal overlapping functions in the Indian 
federation are said to have an indirect adverse effect on State’s fiscal 
capacity. Unilateral decisions taken by the Centre to increase administered 
prices have eventually made the current cost of ongoing schemes 
undertaken by the States much higher than before thus reducing their 
actual fiscal capacity. Needless to say poor and middle income States get 
much more affected than the rich income States on account of vertical 
fiscal overlapping functions because these States are not only favoured as 
far as Central budgetary transfers are concerned but they are also 
enjoying higher resource mobilisation potential and can find out other 
means to compensate their loss.    
 
Furthermore, the study also included other areas which affect the fiscal 
potential of the backward States more than rich income States such as 
pre-existing disharmony in Indian tax system in general and sales tax 
system (which is one of the major and buoyant sources of revenue of the 
States) in particular. Such disharmony leads to not only varying bases of 
sales tax (i.e., first point, double point and multi-point sales taxation) in the 
States but also multiple sales tax rates on the same commodity across the 
States. The complicated sales tax structure eventually produced a 
conducive environment for sales tax competition by reducing sales tax in 
respective jurisdiction to divert sales from other States or providing 
incentive to potential investors. This clearly reduces the resources of less 
developed States without any commensurate gain. Furthermore, such 
disharmony of the sales tax system also results in exportation of tax 
burden from rich income States to poor income States. Therefore, in the 
Indian federation poor income States are subject not only to the regressive 
structure of the budgetary resource distribution mechanism but are also 
exploited by rich income States. Evidently, unequal budgetary transfers, 
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indirect effect of Central fiscal policies i.e.,  vertical fiscal overlapping 
functions and lack of harmonisation of sales tax systems in India affects 
the poor income States more adversely than rich income States hence 
widening the regional disparities in the Indian federation.  
  
Moreover, in the Indian federal structure interest groups play an important 
role in diverting public as well as private investment into the respective 
region. But if one overemphasises political factors one would risk losing 
the overall perspective. Conversely if one concentrates only on the 
problem of the broader perspective of regional inequality one may 
overlook the nuances of political or non-economic factors that may have 
an influence in this area. Furthermore, it is difficult to prove any politically 
motivated discrimination convincingly. But that does not necessarily mean 
there is no discrimination, however, negligible it may be.  
 
Whenever there is a wonderful correspondence between economic 
development (i.e., when better economic situation and infrastructural 
provision is conducive for attracting investment)  and the same political 
Party both ruling at the Centre as well as at the State level there is no 
question that this region would attract a comparatively greater share of the 
national cake.  But the question arises as to whether political factors alone 
can play any important role in determining the share and if so, then to what 
extent.  
 
It seems that the influence of other factors namely historical as well as 
present development of different regions of India also needs to be taken 
into account. Different types of land settlement policies pursued, unequal 
distribution of public investment among different Provinces and degree of 
commercial penetration into different regions during the pre-Independence 
period might have an enormous impact on future development of different 
regions during the post-Independence period. This legacy which included 
the structural disposition of various industries (i.e., export orientation or 
devoted to import substitution) would be differentially affected by the post-
Independence Planning as it did not emphasise export led growth but 
stressed production for the home market. Furthermore the dominance or 
absence of the locally committed industrialists seem to play an important 
role in shaping the development of a particular region and the privileged 
position it could gain in the Indian federal structure. It seems that political 
opposition could play a catalyst role under such condition but can not be 
only determinant of distribution of all types of resources i.e., budgetary 
(transfer of resources from the Centre to the States) as well as institutional 
(financial assistance disbursed by centrally controlled financial institutions 
and commercial banks) resources and share of allocation of industrial 
licences among the different States  a point which has been raised by the 
Left Front Government in West Bengal since 1977.  
 
West Bengal’s economy experienced a dramatic turn during the last 
several decades. Being initially high income State eventually the State 
started losing it’s pre-eminence in terms of almost all economic indicators 
and registered a sharp decline since the mid 1960s. Such deterioration of 
West Bengal’s economy gave rise to the feeling of being discriminated 
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against. Several studies  undertaken reflected this feeling. Of them Ghosh 
(1971) and Roy (1971) are worth mentioning.  Both of these studies put 
the blame on the Centre for the present deteriorated condition of the State 
and projected the idea that the State was discriminated against by the 
Centre or Centrally controlled financial institutions while other States were 
favoured.    
 
However, the period covered by these studies (i.e., from 1947 to late 
1960s) rules out any possibility of politically motivated discrimination. From 
1947 to late the 1960s the Congress Party enjoyed absolute majority in the 
State and during that time the Centre was also ruled by the same 
Congress Party. Thus the question arises why the State was discriminated 
against. Until the early 1960s the State was far ahead of all States and 
was provided a major share of the national resources by siphoning off 
money accumulated in the rest of India for it’s industrial development, as 
observed by different studies undertaken from time to time. Afterwards, the 
Indian economy experienced a downturn since mid 1960s and West 
Bengal was hard hit by this economic recession. Pre-existing structural 
constraints of it’s economy coupled with State-specific factors made it’s 
economy more recession prone than other States during the economic 
down turn. Consequently the State was left with a comparatively lesser 
share of resources since the late 1960s and more acutely since mid 1970s 
both compared to her previous achievement and compared to other 
States. Therefore, it seems to us that the deterioration of her economy 
caused by several structural factors went hand in hand with the volume of 
resources allocated to the State as was also concluded by Bengal 
Chamber of Commerce and Industries (BCCI) in the different studies 
undertaken during late 1960s till mid 1970s. Thus studies undertaken by 
Roy (1971) and Ghosh (1971) lack an adequate explanation of the 
reasons behind the accusations made by them that the State was subject 
to discrimination.  
 
Likewise, Ray and Sato (1987) in their study covering the period from 
1947 to mid 1980s also followed the rationale that West Bengal was 
discriminated against by the Centre all along. But they did not say that it 
was politically motivated discrimination. Instead the study concluded 
whichever government came to power in West Bengal whether it was in 
opposition to the party ruled at the Centre or the same party both ruling at 
the State as well at the Centre, discrimination against the State was 
always there.  However, even though Ray and Sato (1987)  did not 
mention any politically motivated discrimination there is a strong undertone 
that  West Bengal has been subject to discrimination due to it’s political 
opposition particularly since 1977. But the reasons behind such 
discrimination neither during the pre-Left Front era nor during the post-Left 
Front era were clearly explained. The study mentions that the State has 
been subject to discrimination as far as budgetary and institutional 
transfers was concerned along with a low share of allocation of industrial 
licences. These are the areas in relation to which the Left Front 
Government also feels like being discriminated against.  
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Concerning budgetary transfers recommended by the Finance 
Commission, it is observed that the criteria selected for resource 
devolution have been subject to criticism for not containing enough 
progressivity. It has also been pointed out that the gap-filling approach of 
the Finance Commission leaves richer States with higher budget surpluses 
than poor States. This approach is geared to the covering of the gap 
between resource transfers and anticipated State expenditure. Several 
studies have undertaken from time to time covering the post-
Independence period till to date observed that the effect of such transfers 
is unequal and has failed to redress regional imbalance.   
 
On the other hand it must be stressed that total allocation of Plan outlay of 
a State consists of Central assistance for State Plans and own resource 
mobilisation. Until 1969 there was a discretionary element in the Central 
assistance for State Plans. But since 1969 with the introduction of the 
Gadgil formula regressive trends in Central assistance for State Plan have 
been reduced. Nevertheless the unequal allocation of total Plan outlay 
among the States continued. Quite evidently low income States lag far 
behind richer income States in terms of the capacity of own resource 
mobilisation. Hence total Plan allocation of rich income States continued to 
be much higher than low income States widening regional disparities in the 
Indian federation.        
 
Therefore, we fail to understand why budgetary transfers should 
discriminate against a particular State, as argued by Ray & Sato (1987). 
The State may simply share the same fate with the whole group of the less 
developed States. These States might be victimised due to the wrong 
criteria chosen for resource devolution and also due to the low potential for 
resource mobilisation. Consequently the regressive trend of resource 
allocation in the Indian federation, as concluded by different studies, can 
benefit some richer States and discriminate against less developed States 
in general. But it can hardly discriminate against a particular State.  
 
Regarding other transfers mentioned by Ray & Sato (1987) such as 
financial transfers disbursed by Centrally controlled financial institutions 
and allocation of low level of industrial licences to the State which are 
supposed  to be major areas of discrimination against the State. The 
studies undertaken by BBCI shows that the deterioration in terms of  these 
factors started long before than the Left Front government came to power. 
Furthermore, there is a strong positive connection between development 
of a particular State and institutional transfers as well as allocation of 
industrial licences which have also been shown by different studies.  
 
Of all types of transfers, as it is observed, the transfers made by Centrally 
controlled financial institutions and commercial banks contain the most 
regressive tendency. These institutions are mainly guided by optimal 
return rather than any egalitarian principles of redressing regional 
imbalance. Even though one of the professed goals of nationalisation of 
commercial banks in 1969 was to ensure sectoral as well as regional 
diversification of bank credit. This has not been attained. Therefore, any 
attempt at singling out a particular State from the overall regressive 
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structure of resource allocation in the Indian federation risks losing the 
broader perspective of the problem. Moreover, any interpretation of the 
cause of continuous and sharp decline of West Bengal’s economy or 
comparative unprivileged situation in terms of discrimination made against 
the State in particular seems to overlook other factors that could play 
determining role in this regard.  
 
The present study aims at addressing the problem of sharp deterioration of 
West Bengal’s economy and consequent feeling of being discriminated 
against since 1977 i.e., the period when the Left Front came to power, 
from the State-specific structural, historical and economic perspectives. 
Such factors coupled with regional inequality existing in the Indian 
federation need to be addressed. Without having such integrated 
approach of addressing the feeling of being discriminated we would either 
get caught in a macro perspective of inter-State imbalance of Indian 
federation and would miss the State specific problems or we would be pre-
occupied with the State specific problem that would obviously lack a 
broader perspective. The State in a Indian federation is subject to mainly 
four types of constraints.  Firstly, the Indian federation has a strong 
centripetal bias and imbalance of fiscal power between the States and the 
Centre, Secondly, the State belonging to the less developed group has 
added disadvantage of being discriminated against while rich income 
States are favoured. Thirdly, the State belonging to a poor region namely 
the eastern region has other typical handicaps due to both historical 
development and the post-Independence development of this region. And 
finally, there are some State-specific constraints which are also partly the 
legacy of the pre-Independence period and partly the outcome of the post-
Independence development. Such State-specific factors also seem to play 
an important role in determining the course of development of a State and 
the benefits which can accrue to the State. 
 
However, several studies undertaken since Independence indicated that 
regional imbalance in the Indian federation seem to have aggravated over 
time instead of getting narrowed down. The States are constantly engaged 
in free-riding behaviour and are in conflict with each other for getting the 
maximum share. Net loser of this game are obviously the less developed 
States. Economic liberalisation introduced in 1991 reduced the role of the 
Centre and allowed the market to play much larger role in determining 
investment pattern and all types of resource allocation. The market would 
follow where the return is highest. Therefore, the intra-State imbalance 
have widened more sharply during 1990s than in the previous decades.  
 
Thus it seems that even the best criteria for devolution of funds could only 
scratch the surface of deep-seated regional inequality. The studies 
undertaken from time to time as regards regional imbalance in the Indian 
federation repeatedly emphasised the fact that not only more allocation of 
financial resources but also financial power of the poor income States 
should be enhanced so that an equality in varying stages of development 
among the States could be achieved. Thus there is a urgent need of 
radical approach of Finance Commission and Planning Commission to 
deal with the regional imbalance which has been existing for several 
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centuries and has caused variation of the revenue raising potential of 
different States. 
 
Deep-seated regional inequality which has historical roots necessitated the 
analysis of the long term development of Provincial finance of Bengal. This 
might help us to understand how Bengal Province was treated and 
affected against the backdrop of evolution of Imperial-Provincial financial 
system of British India. Thus the feeling of being discriminated is of very 
old standing. Bengal felt that it was denied it’s due share all along against 
it’s contribution to the Imperial exchequer which was much higher than that 
of other Provinces. First chapter of this study brings out the historical 
development of Bengal federal finance and deals with perceived 
discrimination of  Bengal during the pre-Independence days. Needless to 
say that the course of financial development of pre-Independence Bengal 
had enormous impact on the State’s development during the post-
Independence days. 
 
The feeling of being discriminated against underwent qualitative change in 
West Bengal in the post-Independence period. Therefore the study of 
politics of discrimination since 1977 requires to deal with the 
conceptualisation of discrimination during the pre-Left Front period as well 
as during the post-Left Front period.  Second chapter of this study mainly 
tries to address this issue from this broader perspective. Which aims at 
describing the discontent regarding Centre-State financial relations during 
the pre-Left Front era i.e., during the Congress regime and also outlines 
political economy of federalising process of West Bengal and perceived 
discrimination during the Left Front era i.e.,  since 1977. 
 
We have already mentioned that an individual State in the Indian 
federation is subject to four different types of constraints. Therefore, while 
discussing allocation of all types of resources to the States and 
consequent feeling of being discriminated against we need to see the 
problem from the integrated approach. The third and fourth chapters of this 
study try to address this issue from the integrated approach. Thus the third 
chapter of this study deals with the historical constraints constituted on 
West Bengal’s economy which eventually gave rise to the feeling of being 
discriminated against in the later period. While the fourth chapter 
describes institutional mechanism of transferring resources from the 
Centre to the States and it’s regressive tendency in general. 
 
The fifth chapter deals with parameters of discrimination as was felt by the 
Left Front government since 1977. And describes how far such 
discrimination is time specific, State specific and politically motivated 
discrimination and to what extent it is part of overall regional imbalance of 
the Indian federation. 
 
However the integrated approach of dealing with the problem of feeling of 
discrimination felt by a particular State seems to overlook other factors 
which are no less important. One of these factors  is inability of the State 
to manage its economy efficiently and economically coupled with fiscal in-
discipline and profligacy exercised by the State. Such factors seem to 
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have affected its economy further and caused a meagre allocation of 
resources. The sixth chapter of this study intends to throw some light in 
this area  i.e., deals with fiscal prudence and discipline pursued by the 
State during the last two decades (1980-00) in order to find out the extent 
to which the State has been responsible for its present financial crisis. 
 
While complaining about discrimination the State never thinks of its failure 
to widen its resource base efficiently by exploiting its resource mobilisation 
potential by complete utilisation of the limited fiscal power assigned to the 
States in the Indian federation.  
 
The State failed to generate resources from the advancement of 
agricultural growth during the post-Left Front era. The agricultural sector of 
the State registered impressive growth since the early 1980s through 
structural and institutional change of the rural economy coupled with 
reactivating local governments. But the State not only failed to tap 
unexploited local resources by decentralising fiscal power to local 
governments but also seems to have placed severe fiscal burden on the 
State government finances by making these local governments dependent 
on the State government for their existence. Seventh chapter of this study 
aims at describing the State-local government financial relations.  The 
chapter tries to describe how far the Left Front government which always 
stands for more decentralisation of financial power in the arena of the 
Centre-States financial relations, is committed to devolve financial power 
to local governments in order to make them function as self government. 
The debate always is about Centre-State relations whereas State-local 
government relations are neglected. Resource mobilisation should start 
from below, but there is a political fear that devolution would reduce the 
power of the State government which is in a strong position as long as 
local governments depends on it for funds.  
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Chapter: 1 
 
Bengal Provincial Finance and Feeling of Discrimination during the 
Pre-Independence Period 
 
Our study regarding feeling of discrimination so far Bengal Province was 
concerned during the pre-Independence period could be broadly divided 
into two periods. One, the pre-Meston award (1765-1920) and the another, 
the post-Meston (1921 to 1937 until the  implementation of Government of 
India Act 1935). Pre-Meston award period could be further subdivided into 
four periods viz., period of absolute independence of three Provinces (1765-
1773), beginning of centralised system in British India (1774-1833), period 
of complete centralisation (1834-1870) and period of decentralisation with 
divided heads (1871-1921). Post-Meston award period, however, was 
characterised by the period of abolition of divided heads and complete 
separation of Provincial and Imperial revenue heads (1921-1937). (See 
Chart: 1) Against the backdrop of such evolution of federal finance in British 
India the problem of Bengal Provincial finance needs to be considered.    
 
Bengal one of the oldest Provinces was first conquered by British and was 
subjected to highest form of exploitation or extraction of wealth to meet the 
ambitious schemes of territorial expansion of East India Company as well 
as the deficits of other Provinces. Thus, Bengal was considered mother of 
all Provinces from whose resources the prosperity and well being of the rest 
of India were heavily dependent. But “this drain of wealth1 from Bengal”, as 
felt by one scholar, “was not compensated for by any increased prosperity 
of her trade and industries which on the contrary received a severe blow 
during the period 1757-1772”. (Sinha, 1927, p. 106) 
 
Such continuous over extraction of wealth from Bengal for meeting the 
urgent need of expansion and consolidation of British empire had given rise 
to a feeling that Bengal was discriminated against. Thus, discrimination 
against erstwhile Bengal and now West Bengal has been a long standing 
phenomenon which continues till date.2The feeling of being discriminated 
                                                          
1 Drain of wealth from Bengal for meeting different needs of British India as well as 
appropriation of wealth of Bengal by East India Company’s servants in the form of 
‘investment’  was acknowledged by different scholars. Of them Dutt (1956), Furber (1948, 
p. 311) and Marshall (1987, p. 165) need to be mentioned.  
2 The studies undertaken by Furber (1948), Marshall (1987) observed that Bengal’s wealth 
was utilised for expansion and consolidation of British power and meeting deficits of other 
Provinces during the early phase of British empire. Roy (1971) felt that “Bengal, the real 
pagoda tree was fleeced to help them out...the surplus was credited to Bombay and 
Madras to enable them to meet their “needs”. Bengal existed for Britain-and for Bombay 
and Madras. Bengal thus began suffering from centralised management of public finance in 
India. She continues to suffer on this account.” (Roy, R, The Agony of West Bengal A 
Study in Union-State Relations, New Age Publishers Private Limited, Calcutta, 1971, p. 
21). In Roy’s (1971) opinion, even after Independence the rest of India was benefited at the 
expense of West Bengal. For instance, introduction of freight equalisation policy (1956) 
was meant to favour other States and discriminate against West Bengal and the whole 
eastern region. Therefore, West Bengal had to carry the legacy of being at the service for 
other States and for the rest of India and the drain of wealth from West Bengal continued 
till date. The study undertaken by  Ray & Sato (1987) also concluded that West Bengal 
was always discriminated against irrespective of the Party ruled at West Bengal though “it 
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against became very apparent during the mid-19th century among the 
Bengal academia, the common people and government officials. The 
predominant feeling was that Bengal was made to pay more than its due 
share. Such contention got intensified and received massive support when 
public expenditure gained momentum after the Mutiny of 1857. It was 
alleged that  Bengal received lesser share of public expenditure particularly 
in irrigation, compared to other Provinces. The counter argument was that 
the demand for more public expenditure of a particular Province should be 
made against the contribution each Province offers in the form of land 
revenue to the Imperial exchequer. (Bhattacharyya,1971, p.268)   
 
The Permanent Settlement, 1793 of land revenue, had rendered per head 
almost the lowest in Bengal compared to other Provinces during in the 
following decades. Having tried different forms of land revenue system, 
Permanent Settlement was established in order to extract bulk of the 
revenue from land with complete certainty and regularity necessary for the 
ongoing conquest of East India Company. Paradoxically, Permanent 
Settlement, which made it possible to ensure flow of funds incurring a very 
low cost of collection and helped to expand and consolidate British empire, 
had become the major source of contention for it inhibited Bengal 
government from realising large amount of land revenue in the later period. 
Furthermore, productivity of agriculture which depended on rural 
infrastructural development was severely affected on account of low level of 
local cess3 collection from land revenue from Bengal. Because local cess 
was imposed with a view to finance local infrastructural development. This 
in turn had adverse impact on buoyancy of land revenue--one of the major 
sources of revenue until the early part of the 20th century. Therefore, in the 
subsequent decades Permanent Settlement had far reaching impact on 
revenue base and hence on economic prosperity of Bengal. 
 
The adverse consequence of Permanent Settlement again came to the fore 
with the introduction of Meston Settlement (1921) During the Meston award 
Bengal came up as an industrial Province and large proportion of income 
tax and custom duty was generated in the Province. Bengal was most hard 
hit by this scheme while income tax and customs duties were kept under 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
was quite possible that the Centre was not deliberately planning discriminatory measures. 
Perhaps the Centre was simply engaging in thoughtless actions, and West Bengal’s 
difficulties inclined it to interpret these actions as patently discriminatory.” (Ray, J. K & 
Sato, H, Centre-State Financial Relations in India A Focus on West Bengal, Institute of 
Developing Economics, Tokyo, 1987, p. 121) 
 
 
 
 
3 Local cess earmarked for local improvement was also quite low in Bengal. However, 
local cess on land came to the fore with the introduction of decentralised scheme 
introduced by Lord Mayo (1871). When all other Provinces took the initiative to impose 
cess on land, in Bengal local cess was perceived as a betrayal against Bengal’s landlord 
on account of Permanent Settlement. Consequently such local cess imposed on land 
faced stiff opposition and was perceived as an extra tax burden and hence illegitimate. 
Evidently, local cess for local purposes (such as road, irrigation, education, ) on land of 
Bengal was the lowest and it was of great difficulty to impose further tax on land for public 
expenditure. We would turn on to this area later in this study. 
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the Imperial head. And land revenue which lost it’s buoyancy in Bengal was 
kept under the Provincial head. Naturally, Bengal demanded abolition of the 
Meston Settlement and along with it wanted different forms of privileges and 
compensation. However, it was argued by some scholars namely Shah 
(1921),Thomas (1939), Misra (1942), that Bengal so far had already got 
privilege proportionate with its low level of contributions to the Imperial 
exchequer in the form of decreasing share of land revenue during the last 
several decades. All these subsequently resulted in an unequal burden of 
taxation among different Provinces. 
 
Evidently, the debate among the intellectuals of Bengal centred around why 
Bengal should suffer for Permanent Settlement which was introduced in 
order to meet the immediate need of the East India Company. Therefore, 
Bengal’s demand of being treated specially should be judged on the basis 
of the totality of contribution the Province made in the past. It was argued 
that Bengal contributed more during the early phase of British rule in the 
form of land revenue through Permanent Settlement. During the initial 
decades of Permanent Settlement the land revenue was fixed at very high 
rate. Moreover, since the early 20th century its contribution to the Imperial 
exchequer in the form of income tax and custom duty was much larger than 
any other Provinces. Particularly, economic depression of 1930s and 
consequent adversities of Bengal finance gave rise to the demand of 
sharing the proceeds from jute export duty. Being the sole jute producing 
Province, Bengal complained that all other Provinces got benefited at its 
cost by denying its share of the proceeds from jute export duty.  
 
However, it remains to be seen whether Bengal was subject to 
discrimination as it was alleged from time to time by the intellectuals of 
Bengal or the Province simply was subject to the innocent victim of the 
schemes undertaken by British Indian empire from time to time and was 
subject to exploitation and extraction of wealth as a part of the colonial 
penetration. It also remains to be seen how far the distribution of public 
expenditure among different regions of British India since the mid 19th 
century was the outcome of pragmatic consideration rather than an act of 
favouritism to some Provinces or to a particular Province.  
 
 
Adverse impact on Bengal’s finance during the early phase of the 
Company’s Days  
 
Investment 
 
The Grant of Diwani in 1765 by the Emperor in Delhi marked the beginning 
of East India Company’s (EIC) political career that empowered the 
Company to trade freely in Bihar, Orissa and Bengal. Though the grant of 
Diwani provided financial powers but gave no administrative authority to the 
East India Company. The collection and management of revenue was 
entrusted with the Company but the administration, justice and preservation 
of law and order continued to be entrusted to the Nawab of Murshidabad. At 
the very outset the system of double government was established in Bengal 
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leading to complication in its administration and destruction of its indigenous 
economic structure.  
 
During the continuance of the dual system in Bengal, interference of British 
Parliament often helped to minimise its adverse effects. The Company used 
to pay large sum of money from time to time to the British Treasury in 
consideration of privileges granted by the Parliament to continue their 
expansion and activities in India. (Banerjea,1928, p.22) However, while 
British Parliament often intervened in some matters relating  to injustice to 
India, there were other evils that Parliament failed to check. One of such 
evil is the so called ‘investment’ which was considered the most serious evil 
of the dual system of Bengal after the acquisition of Diwani4. The term 
‘investment’ was used by the EIC for the amount sent to India for buying 
goods to be sent home. Once the EIC got hold of the revenues of Bengal 
the investment could be covered by revenue income. Thus a certain portion 
of the territorial revenue of Bengal was utilised to purchase goods for 
exportation to England. The amount of wealth taken away from Bengal in 
the name of ‘investment’ kept on increasing every year since the acquisition 
of Diwani.5  From time to time protest made by the Governor of Bengal6 
                                                          
4 Marshall (1987) observed that “It was presumed that the Diwani had created a much 
more favourable environment for trade and that the large surplus of taxation which was 
anticipated could be used to purchase a greatly increased ‘investment’ of Bengal goods”. 
(Marshall, P.J, The New Cambridge History of India II Bengal: The British Bridgehead 
Eastern India 1740-1828, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987, p. 104). Furber 
(1948) was of the same opinion and said  “As de facto political sovereign of the provinces 
of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, the Company collected a revenue which was supposed to 
cover the expenses of government and leave a surplus available for investment in India 
goods for shipment to London”. (Furber, H, John Company At Work A Study of European 
Expansion in India in the Late Eighteenth Century, Harvard Historical Studies, Vol. LV 
1948,  p. 22) 
 
 
 
5  According to an estimation given by Marshall (1987) “The settling value of the sums laid 
out for Bengal goods rose from some 400,000 pound sterling at the time of the granting of 
the Diwani to well over 1,000,000 pound in the late 1770s. Thereafter growth was to be 
restricted. In good years, as in the early 1780 or for part of the 1790s, export costing more 
than 1,000,000 would be dispatched to London on the Company’s ships, but for most of the 
next 50 years investments were at rather lower levels. It was only in the late 1820s when 
the Company was about to cease trading altogether that it consistently applied more than 
2,000,000 a year to Bengal goods for London”.  (Marshall, P. J, The New Cambridge 
History of India II Bengal: The British Bridgehead Eastern India 1740-1828, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1987,  p. 105) 
The total investment from Bengal from 1766 to 1780 as estimated by Banerjea (1928) 
amounted to 12,360,264 pounds. For yearwise detail  see Banerjea, P, Indian Finance in 
the Days of the Company,1928, p. 25 
 
6 In 1767 Government of Bengal launched protested against such evil and wrote to the 
Court of Directors: “Under these difficulties you must expect the complaints of natives and 
of foreigners will grow louder every day, unless you should determine to sacrifice the 
essential point to your interest, the remitting home, by large investments, the benefits of 
your late acquisitions” (letter dated 25th November 1767; Appendix No. 7 to the Ninth 
Report of the Select Committee Quoted in Banerjea, P, Indian Finance in the Days of the 
Company,1928, pp. 24) The Governor of Bengal Verlest also expressed his dissatisfaction 
from time to time against such extraction of wealth in the name of ‘Investment’ from Bengal 
as would be evident from below. Therefore, the financial stress of Bengal was so acute that 
in 1768 Governor Verlest wrote “The great demand which have been made on this 
 25
against such drain of wealth from Bengal is to be noted. Later on when the 
EIC ceased to be a trading company with the new charter of 1833 
‘investment’ became irrelevant.  
 
Deficits of other Provinces were met by Bengal  
 
Till the year of 1833 the finances of three Presidencies were kept separate. 
The government of Bombay and Madras were largely independent of the 
government of Bengal in exercising their financial authority. The Governor-
General in council in the case of Bengal, and the Governor in Council in 
Madras and Bombay, possessed authority to impose taxes and duties and 
incur expenditure, subject to the control of the Court of Directors and the 
India Board. The revenue of one Presidency, however, was often used to 
meet deficits of the other Presidencies.  
 
During the four years (1761-1764) immediately preceding the grant of 
Diwani the revenue collected from Bengal by the Company averaged 
655,158 pounds a year, while average expenditure was 683,301 pounds. 
Whereas the average revenue and expenditure of the Madras Presidency 
during this period were 191,731 pounds and 403,025 pounds respectively. 
Bombay showed a revenue of 69,713 pounds and an expenditure of 
229,709 pounds. (Banerjea, 1928, p.78) Therefore, both Madras and 
Bombay incurred much larger expenditure than revenue compared to 
Bengal and hence Bengal incurred relatively lower level of deficits 
compared to the other two Presidencies. 
 
The acquisition of Diwani (1765) in Bengal, however, changed the situation 
dramatically. “...the Company’s assessment since 1765 showed a steady 
increase without reference to what Zeminders or the ryots could 
pay”.(Mookerji, 1940, p. 89) Average annual revenue from Bengal had 
increased substantially from 655,158 pounds during 1760-64 to 2,202,207 
pounds during 1765-1771 i.e. it increased, by 236 percent after the 
acquisition of Diwani  (table1). Such over extraction from Bengal led to 
dreadful famine in 1770. But collection of revenue from Bengal kept on 
increasing despite this famine7 and continued to exceed its expenditure 
during the subsequent years.  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Presidency from every quarter have reduced your treasury to a very low state, and alarm 
us for the consequences which must inevitably attend such a vast exportation from this 
country.“ Quoted in Banerjea, P, Indian Finance in the Days of the Company,1928, p. 79) 
And in 1783 Governor of Bengal Verlest wrote, “The impatient demand upon Bengal as an 
inexhaustible mine of wealth, super-added many other causes of decline to those which 
already oppressed the laborious inhabitants. Each year brought orders from Europe to 
enlarge the company’s investment” (View  Of Bengal, pp. 84). Quoted in Banerjea, P, 
Indian Finance in the Days of the Company,1928, p. 24) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 “Warren Hestings stated that the net collections of 1771 exceeded those of 1768 in spite 
of famine intervening in 1770. And yet the Quinquennial Settlement of Waren Hestings for 
the period 1772-1777 was marked by over-assessment based on bids by farmers ousting 
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The average revenue and expenditure in Bengal, Bombay and Madras 
Provinces during the subsequent years of acquisition of Diwani will be 
evident from table 2. While there were substantial surplus realised in Bengal 
both Madras and Bombay had large deficits. From this period on Bengal 
uninterruptedly showed surplus in its budget until 1828-29, while other two 
Provinces continuously had deficits in their accounts.8 (table 2) 
 
 
 
Table: 1  
Annual Average Revenue and Expenditure of Different Provinces in British India  
Between 1760-64 and 1778-79  
                                                                                                                                   (In Pounds) 
              Bengal            Bombay               Madras Year 
 Average 
Revenue 
Average 
Expenditure 
Average 
Revenue
Average 
Expenditure 
Average 
Revenue 
Average 
Expenditure 
1760-1764 655,158 683, 301 69,713 229,709 191,731 403,025 
1765-66 to 
1770-71 
2,202,207 1,504,934 76,057 306,319 405,191 595,920 
1771-72 to 
1778-79 
2,626,519 1,435,789 169,452 396,451 496,476 468,390 
Source: Banerjea, P, Indian Finance in the Days of the Company, 1928, pp. 78-100 
 
 
 
Table: 2 
Annual Average Surplus (+) and Deficits (-) of Different Provinces  
Between 1760-64 and 1814-29 
                                                                                   (In Pounds) 
Year Bengal Bombay Madras 
1760-1764 (-) 28,143 (-) 159,996 (-) 211,294 
1765-66 to 1770-71 (+)  697,273 (-) 230,262 (-) 190,729 
1771-72 to 1778-79 (+) 1,190,730 (-) 226,999 (+) 280,86 
1792-93 to 1808-1809 (+) 1,612,299 (-) 1,081,514 (-) 658,463 
1814-15 to 1828-1829 (+) 1,891,635 (-) 1,081,595 (-) 205,758 
Source: Banerjea, P, Indian Finance in the Days of the Company, 1928, pp. 78-100 
 
But this prolonged surplus in Bengal’s finance was completely changed with 
the outbreak of Afgaan War in 1838. The next ten years, i.e., 1839-40 to 
1848-49 were the period of uninterrupted warfare. During this period though 
revenue expanded progressively, mounting expenditure incurred on wars 
surpassed increased level of revenue. Considering the financial position of 
the different Provinces, we find that Bengal and Bombay exhibited deficits 
throughout the period (1839-1849) and Madras Province exhibited three 
years of deficit and seven years of surplus. However, it was noticed that 
“the deficits of Bengal were due to the fact that entire expenditure of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
the Zeminders. The period presents a story of “huge deficits, defaulting Zeminders, 
deserting ryots and absconding farmers”. All the District Officers were at once in reporting 
that the country was over-assessed. Middleton considered over-assessment and public 
auction of farms as causing the famine of 1770 and insisted on “ a universal remission of 
revenue”. (Mookerji, R.K,Indian Land-System Ancient,Mediaval and Modern (With Special 
Reference to Bengal), Government of Bengal, Land Revenue Commission, 1940  p.89) 
8 For year wise revenue and expenditure for different Provinces see Dutt, R, The 
Economic History of India in the Victorian Age, 1956,  pp. 405-407 
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Central Government was charged to this province. But so far as the 
provincial accounts proper were concerned, an annual surplus was 
exhibited by Bengal” (Banerjea, 1928, pp. 106-107). It was also noted that 
during this period. i.e., during the early part of the 19th century the mounting 
deficits of British India caused by different wars were largely met by a 
recourse to loans. And the largest portion of the debt was raised in Bengal. 
“But the whole of Bengal’s debt,” as was pointed out by the Court of 
Directors, “was not really due by that Presidency. Calcutta being the central 
point in the administration of the country, the other Presidencies often 
raised their loans in that city. Besides, as the charges of the other 
Presidencies considerably exceeded their revenues, it is be presumed that 
a part of the loans of Bengal must have been raised in aid of the wants of 
Bombay and Madras”.(Banerjea, 1928, pp. 114-115) 
 
Banerjea (1928), Gupta (1931), Furber (1948) and Marshall (1987) 
observed that Bengal’s revenue until the early19th century was more than 
sufficient to meet its own expenditure. But year after year its surplus was 
utilised to meet the deficiencies of the other Presidencies (see table 3).  
And also to finance most of the schemes of conquest undertaken by the 
East India Company. As Furber (1948) observed that the Company’s 
income in Bombay and Madras “was insignificant in comparison to its 
regular day-to-day expenditure either in war or peace”. (Furber 1948, p. 22) 
Therefore, Bombay and Madras were mainly dependent on Bengal for their 
regular needs. Thus separately considering the Province of Bombay it was 
revealed that “Bombay government’s finances necessitated huge transfers 
from Bengal”. (Furber,1948, p. 216). Furthermore, “The Bombay governor 
could not meet his current military and civil expenditure without a subsidy of 
at least 35 lakhs of Bengal current rupees...”. (Furber,1948, p. 217) 
 
As far as Madras Presidency was concerned, Furber (1948) observed that 
“As a debtor Government, Bombay, like Madras had to draw on Bengal to 
make up its deficit”. (Furber, 1948, p. 207) Such dependence of Madras on 
Bengal government was mentioned by Furber (1948), Marshall (1987) in 
several occasions in the studies undertaken by them.9 But despite receiving 
                                                          
9 Furber (1948) further observed “Since the two sides of the Company’s Madras ledger 
could never come within measurable distance of each other without the aid of a huge 
subsidy from Bengal, the Madras government’s chief concern was the arrangement of the 
transfer of this subsidy, a task which could be accomplished only with the facilities provided 
by the great agency houses. During the trading season of 1786-87, for example, 
approximately one crore of Bengal government’s current rupees were transferred to 
Madras, forty-four lakhs in Bengal government bonds, fifty lakhs in bills of exchange, and 
the balance of six lakhs in rice.”(Furber, H, John Company At Work A Study of European 
Expansion in India in the Late Eighteenth Century, Harvard Historical Studies, Vol. LV 
1948, p. 195). He went on to say that “Throughout the war, the Bengal government made 
heavy transfers of funds to Madras by the sale of bills of exchange and cargoes of rice”. 
(ibid., , p. 251) 
 According to Marshall’s observation, “ ‘Bengal is in itself an inexhaustible fund of riches’. 
Clive assured the governor of Madras, ‘and you may depend on being supplied with money 
and provisions in abundance’ “. (Marshall, P.J, The New Cambridge History of India II 
Bengal: The British Bridgehead Eastern India 1740-1828, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1987, p. 84 ) 
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huge funds from Bengal regularly, Madras government could not be able to 
make both ends meet. (Furber,1948, p. 196) Sir Eyre Coote, the 
Commander-in-Chief wrote to the Governor General and his Council in 
1780 that, the treasury of Madras was empty, and that, ”by the nearest 
computation he could make, the future disbursements at Fort St. George 
would rather exceed seven lakhs of rupees per month, every cowrie of 
which must come from Bengal, as he found there were no resources from 
which a single pagoda could be expected”.(Quoted in, Banerjea, 1928, p. 
84)  
 
Table:3  
Amount Received From Bengal to other Presidencies Between  
1771-72 and 1780-81 
Year Amount Received From Bengal 
(Pounds Sterling) 
1771-72 233,879 
1772-73 161,932 
1773-74 164,926 
1774-75 340,219 
1775-76 293,441 
1776-77 184,022 
1777-78 219,101 
1778-79 181,460 
1779-80 273,547 
1780-81 111,738 
Source: Banerjea, P, Indian Finance in the Days of The Company, Macmillan  
and Co. Ltd., 1928, p. 81 
 
Therefore, it was observed that during the early phase of British  expansion 
in India, Bengal being the main commercial centre, had to bear the major 
burden of carrying out civil, administrative and military expenditure of British 
India. After the acquisition of Diwani of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa in 1765, 
the East India Company got a firm foothold there and were not disturbed in 
that area by any serious warfare. They, however, undertook extensive wars 
of conquest in other parts of India outside Bengal. These wars had to be 
financed chiefly with money raised from Bengal. Therefore, cost of British 
conquest in different parts of India as well as in different parts of the world10 
and deficits of different Presidencies, were mainly met by the revenue 
extracted from Bengal. Besides, as mentioned earlier, Bengal was the worst 
victim of the administrative chaos created shortly after the acquisition of 
Diwani (1765). Such administrative disorder made a fertile ground for 
extraction of wealth from Bengal in the name of so called ‘investment’.  
Thus it was felt that “ever since the grant of Dewani Bengal ‘seems to have 
been the milch cow from which  the other Presidencies drew their support’.” 
(Sinha,1927, p. 106). Calcutta based popular magazine Hindoo Patriot also 
commented that Bengal “has always been treated as the milch cow for the 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
10 Bengal’s money was not only required for meeting other Province’s deficits it was also 
required in meeting the expenditure incurred in Bencoolen & St. Helena and in purchasing 
investment. (Banerjea, P, Indian Finance in the Days of the Company, Macmillan and Co. 
Limited, London, 1928, p. 79) 
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benefit of the whole empire.“ (Hindoo Patriot, 11th July, 1870, quoted in 
Bhattacharyya, 1971. p. 266) Thus from the very early phase of British 
expansion in India, Bengal was burdened with other commitments that 
prevented Bengal’s finance from being stronger and had far reaching 
impact on Bengal’s economy in many years to come.11   
 
Permanent Settlement as means of regular extraction of wealth from 
Bengal and the consequent effect on Bengal’s finance  
 
Bengal was first conquered by the East India Company through Plassey 
battle in 1757. Having won the war at Plassey, the East India Company 
consolidated its position in the Buxar war in 1764. The later part of the 
eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth century were the 
periods of conquest and consolidation of British power. Therefore, the main 
objective of the East India Company was realisation of large amount of 
revenue, necessary for financing wars in which the Company was engaged. 
These wars, as was expected, had to be financed mainly with money raised 
from Bengal in the form of land revenue. The excessive taxation on land in 
Bengal after the acquisition of Diwani, as we have mentioned earlier, led to 
a severe famine in 1770 in which at least 50% of the cultivators perished. 
Yet extraction of land revenue from Bengal continued and even exceeded 
pre-famine period. (Mookerji, 1940, p.89; see footnote 7) 
 
However, since the severe famine of 1770, in which the population of 
Bengal got reduced drastically, untimely realisation of land revenue was of 
great concern for the Company. Simply because the number of cultivators 
ran in scarcity. Often Zemindars complained about absconding peasants 
                                                          
11Total burden imposed on Bengal during the early days of British expansion was 
summarised in  Marshal’s (1987) study: “.....the company’s interest in the resources of 
Bengal was being sharpened by it’s own financial difficulties. The burden which Bengal 
was forced to bear in the early phases of British rule over India were being laid on it very 
early indeed. In the first place, it remained what it had been since early in the 18th century, 
the main centre of the Company’s commercial operations. Exports of textiles and saltpetre 
were now to be increased, financed as far as possible from local resources, not from 
bullion shipped from Britain. Bengal was also called upon to finance the trade of the other 
Company settlements in Asia especially the purchase of tea at Canton in China. Secondly, 
its own army of sepoys and Europeans was being recruited and was to expand very 
rapidly, while huge sums were spent on the new fort at Calcutta. Finally, Bengal must 
support the war effort of the Company’s settlements in Bombay and Madras against the 
French or Indian powers... The pressing demand of it’s own trade, its army and needs of 
other settlements were to throw the finances of British Bengal into repeated crises for many 
years ahead”. (Marshall, P.J, The New Cambridge History of India II Bengal: The British 
Bridgehead Eastern India 1740-1828, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987, p. 
84)  
Study undertaken by  Banerjea (1928) also mentioned such burden borne by Bengal.  The 
letter written in 1792 to the India House the Commander-in-Chief pointed out that, “both the 
army and the inhabitants, in the state in which the country then was, being maintained 
chiefly by supplies from Bengal”. (Quoted in, Banerjea, P, Indian Finance in the Days of the 
Company, Macmillan and Co. Limited, London,  1928, p. 84). “They can place but little 
dependence on any resource but that of Bengal for carrying on the war; and as to the 
expenses of the civil department, they have slender hope of procuring any answer from 
any quarter”. (Fourth Report of the Committee of Secrecy, 1782. The Select Committee 
wrote to the Directors in 1780 Quoted in, Banerjea, P, Indian Finance in the Days of the 
Company, Macmillan and Co. Limited, London,  1928, p. 84) 
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whenever they had to meet revenue demand which in turn made it difficult 
for the Company  to realise regular collection of land revenue necessary for 
ongoing war.12 
 
Since the Diwani the Company tried various methods of direct collection but 
it eventually proved ruinous. On the other hand the expenditure incurred on 
different schemes and other obligations of the East India Company kept on 
increasing.13 Permanent Settlement was perceived as the best source of a 
predictable and regular source of revenue while incurring the lowest cost of 
collection which was again one of the most important considerations of that 
time. Thus there was no other alternative but to have Permanent Settlement 
when all other experiments had eventually failed. (Mookerji,1940,  p.103) 
 
The discussion of Provincial finance of Bengal remains incomplete without 
describing the far reaching impact of the Permanent Settlement on Bengal’s 
finance, infrastructure and overall economy. In the Permanent Settlement 
regulation of 1793, the Zemindars were declared to be proprietors of the 
areas over which they collected the revenue subject only to the payment of 
the annual land revenue. The actual rent paid by the tenants at that time 
were made the basis of assessment, and the government demanded ten-
elevenths leaving to the Zemindars the remaining one-eleventh as his 
remuneration for the trouble they took. The Zemindars  were bitterly 
opposed to the new system as it proved ruinous to them while the land 
revenue was fixed as high as possible and was quite high for the then 
period. Within a few years of the settlement most of the Zemindars were 
unable to pay and were sold out for arrears. The revenue was not realised 
regularly and punctually due to the failure of cultivators to pay up in time. 
                                                          
12 In this regard the observations made by Rothermund (1993) can be mentioned: “The 
population of Bengal had been decimated by the severe famine of 1770. There was a 
scarcity of tillers of the soil and the zaminders complained about ‘absconding peasants’ 
whenever they had to meet the British revenue demand”. (Rothermund, D, An Economic 
History of India From Pre-Colonial Times to 1991, Routledge, London & New York, 1993, 
pp. 20). Kulke & Rothermund (1990) further reveals that “Since the great famine of 1770 
there had been a shortage of cultivators; vagrant peasants roamed around searching for 
land which they could get on better terms. Zaminders were competing with each other for 
the services of these itinerants, and when the time came for paying the land revenue they 
usually complained about absconding peasants from whom they had been unable to collect 
anything. These complaints were sometimes mere pretexts for paying less revenue; often, 
however, they corresponded to the facts. In any case, the British authorities were unable to 
discover the facts. The Regulation of 1793 cut this Gordian knot..” (Kulke, H & 
Rothermund, D, A History of India, Routledge, London & New York, 1990, p. 246) 
Permanent Settlement of 1793 was thus considered as a solution to the problem of 
uncertainty in realising land revenue necessary for ongoing warfare. Thus “the permanent 
settlement of 1793 must be seen in the context of this dilemma of rising military 
expenditure and the uncertainty of revenue collection from absconding peasants.” (Kulke, 
H & Rothermund, D, A History of India, Routledge, London & New York, 1990, p. 247) 
Rothermund (1993) went on to say that “Warfare in Southern India had to be financed by 
the company and therefore it was in dire need of a predictable revenue income. The 
Permanent Settlement was the best solution of the immediate problem. The zamindars 
now had the exclusive responsibility for meeting the revenue demand and his estate would 
be auctioned if he did not pay up in time”.(Rothermund, D, An Economic History of India 
From Pre-Colonial Times to 1991, Routledge, London & New York, 1993, p. 20)  
13 For details see Mookerji, R.K, Indian Land System Ancient, Mediaeval and Modern With 
Special Reference to Bengal, Land Revenue Commission, Government of West Bengal, 
1940, p. 103  
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Consequently large areas of land were periodically exposed to sale by 
auction for recovery of outstanding balances. Most of the older families of 
landlords were swept away.14  Eventually, two measures were taken up in 
order to get rid of this disastrous situation. Firstly, by bringing the wasteland 
under cultivation15 which had eventually paid of while all future increments 
of income from land was vested in Zemindars by the Regulation of 1793.16 
 
Secondly, necessary regulations were enacted to facilitate the collection of 
revenue by Zemindars from the tenants. However, the infamous ‘Haptam’ 
(Regulation VII of 1799) placed the Zemindars in a position of unfair 
advantage as against the tenants but they proved successful in punctual 
realisation of the land revenue. The arrears outstanding at the end of each 
                                                          
14 The period after the Permanent Settlement in Bengal has been described in the report of 
the land Revenue Commission of Bengal as follows: “The period immediately after the 
Permanent Settlement and indeed for three or four decades was one during which the 
zemindars were struggling for their existence against the sale law. At that time,....was 
uncultivated; and the only way in which the zemindars could improve their assets was by 
bringing waste land under cultivation. The competition was not for land but for tenants to 
cultivate it. Consequently if the ryots withheld their rent, or abandoned their holdings the 
zemindars was hard put to it to pay a revenue amounting to ten-elevenths of his assets. 
The records of that period and the Fifth Report show that more than half the estates in 
Bengal were sold for arrears of revenue; many of the large zemindars were dismembered 
and most of the original zemindars reduced to poverty.” (Quoted in Das Gupta, B, 
Provincial Taxation Under Autonomy, Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press, 
London, 1948, p. 271) 
 
 
 
 
15 The country at the time of the Permanent Settlement was for the most part wholly 
uncultivated. There were extensive jungles but not sufficient tillers. It was the zemindars 
who courted peasants to undertake cultivation, enticed away tenants by offering lower 
terms often stipulated that there would be no rent for a certain number of years necessary 
in cleansing jungles and provided for their maintenance during the period of cultivation. 
There was no other agency than the landlords who did all this not because they had 
surplus money but because their very existence depended on promotion of cultivation. 
(Note of Dissent by Sir Bijay Chand Mahatab, Raja of Bardwaman and Mr Brajendra 
Kishore, Member of Land Revenue Commission, Government of Bengal, 1940, Vol. I pp. 
214-215) “As regards the Zamindars’ role in promoting the extension of cultivation which 
was according to the Commission ‘one of the avowed objects of the Permanent 
Settlement’- the Association (Bengal landholders’ Association) claimed that ‘deserted 
Bengal (was) turned into a rich plain by landlords’. The evidence of James Mill, Holt 
Mackenzie and Ram Mohan Roy in 1831 was quoted to prove that cultivation had 
improved since 1793. the area under cultivation in 1793 in Bengal and Bihar was 31, 000, 
000 acres according the Colebrooke, whereas in 1884 it was 70,000,000 acres”. 
(Banerjee, A.C, The Agrarian System of Bengal, Vol. 2: 1793-1955, K.P Bagchi & 
Company, Calcutta, 1981, p. 360)  
 
 
 
16Zeminders were to be given the benefit of any future increase in the value of the state’s 
share which might result from the extension of cultivation or from other causes and the 
state promised not to make any demand for the augmentation of the public assessment in 
consequence of the improvement of their respective estates. In other words the state 
declared that it would for ever afterwards be content with the sum then assessed as the 
cash revenue of each estate and the property.  
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year greatly reduced and the sale of lands for the recovery of arrears 
became less frequent. The land revenue system was thus at last grounded 
a stable footing. The Bengal Land Revenue Commission, 1940 observed 
that though “Economically, the period commenced disastrously for the 
zemindars; but as a feeling of security developed, and large areas of jungle 
and waste land were brought under cultivation, the zemindar’s margin of 
profit increased, and by the middle of the nineteenth century they were far 
less vulnerable to the sale law”.(quoted in Das Gupta, 1948, pp. 273-274)   
 
Gradually it was realised that while the Permanent Settlement had fully 
assured the immediate revenue position of the government, but certain 
limitations of the Permanent Settlement increasingly became apparent in 
course of time. Firstly, land revenue being the single most important tax 
during the whole 18th and 19th century and early part of the 20th century 
made the situation further worse. The proceeds from land revenue in total 
revenue of the state varied between 69.0 per cent in 1793-94 to 66.5 per 
cent in1850-51. Since later part of the 19th century importance of land 
revenue started declining. But nevertheless it accounted for 49.7 per cent of 
total revenue in 1861-62 and declined to 39.9 per cent in 1913-14 and then 
drastically reduced to 21.8 per cent during 1933-34.(Das Gupta, 1948, pp. 
285-287) Thus comparative inelasticity of land revenue of Bengal on 
account of Permanent Settlement “..destined to prove a permanent obstacle 
to the growth of the state resources” (Banerjea,1930, p. 403). Furthermore, 
this land revenue being fixed in the Permanent Settlement and by excluding 
the possibility of taxing future improvements of lands, the Bengal 
government suffered from significant amount of loss of revenue in the later 
period. (Desai,1968, p. 56) In contrast Zemindars derived substantial 
benefit during the subsequent periods by appropriating the surplus 
generated in land through further reclamation of land. Secondly, when the 
expenditure of the government subsequently increased, the pressure of 
taxation fell heavily upon the temporarily settled land.  A fixed revenue 
structure in Permanently Settled areas and a consequent lower burden of 
taxation borne by this areas compared to that of temporary settled areas 
resulted in not only unequal burden of taxation among different Provinces 
but also between Zeminders and other classes of Bengal (Misra, 1942, p. 
155; Thomas,1939, p. 19) Over time in Permanently Settled Bengal, the 
area under cultivation was largely extended, population increased and rent 
became three fold. So land revenue, which was 90 per cent of the rent in 
1793, became 28 per cent of the rent in 1903. (Desai, 1968, p. 54). 
According to the estimation of the Cess Report of the Revenue Board, the 
Zemindars obtained Rs. 16 crores approximately from the cultivators, of 
which government received less than 4 crores in the form of land revenue 
However, it was promised at the time of the Permanent Settlement that out 
of the total collection from land revenue, the government would receive 90 
per cent and the Zemindars would be entitled to keep 10 per cent of the 
total collection. According to this arrangement, the Zemindars’ share should 
have been Rs. 40 lakhs. Instead they appropriated Rs. 12 ½ crores while 
the cultivators actually paid 30 times more.17 (Misra,1942, p. 155 & also see 
                                                          
17 “In permanently settled province of Bengal, the land revenue, which was fixed nearly a 
century ago, has notoriously become a very small and often hardly appreciable burden. 
There is certainly no important class of persons in any civilised country in the world which 
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Land Revenue Policy of the Indian Government, Government of India, 
Calcutta, 1902, p. 67 & Mukerjee, R,  Land Problems in India, 
Longmans,1930, p. 305)  
 
In sum it can be said that though at the outset Permanent Settlement 
managed to generate considerable amount of wealth and served well to the 
East India Company’s ambitious schemes, as time went on, the adverse 
impact of Permanent Settlement was felt on account of comparative 
inelasticity of land revenue compared to other temporary settled Provinces 
(particularly from the mid 19th century) (See table 4 and 5). Moreover, 
exclusion of the right to impose further taxes on land such as agricultural 
income tax, local cesses for local purposes made it altogether difficult to tax 
the increased income from further improvement of land.18The law of 
economy took its own course. Expenditure on infrastructure, particularly on 
irrigation flowed to those areas where the return was high. Therefore, 
inelasticity of land revenue in Bengal on account of the Permanent 
Settlement not only led to unequal burden of taxation among different 
Provinces and among different classes within Bengal but also had adverse 
impact on public expenditure on irrigation and other rural infrastructural 
development of Bengal. Thus insignificant share of public expenditure on 
irrigation combined with lack of Bengal’s Zemindars’ interest to take the 
initiative for improving the productivity of land and rural infrastructure 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
enjoys such virtual immunity from taxation as the Bengal zemindars, and Bengal, although 
the wealthiest, is the most lightly taxed of all the provinces of the Empire. (Strachey, Sir J & 
Strachey, Sir, R, The Finances and Public Works of India 1869-1881, Gian Publishing 
House, New Delhi, First Reprint, 1986, pp.197-198) Strachey & Strachey went on to say 
that ”..the landlords of Bengal, the richest class in the richest province of the Empire, who 
now pay in taxation almost nothing and in land revenue an amount altogether inadequate”. 
(ibid, p. 209) However, Duttt, R. P also mentioned .. “With the fall in the value of money, 
and the increase in the amount rack rented from the peasantry, the Government’s share in 
the spoils, which was permanently fixed at 3 pound million, became relatively smaller and 
smaller; while the Zeminders’ share became larger and larger. To-day the total rents in 
Bengal under Permanent Settlement are estimated at about 12 million pound, of which one 
quarter goes to the Government and three-quarters to the Zemindars. (Dutt, R.P, A Guide 
to the Problem of India, Victor Gollancz LTD, London, 1942, p.70) 
18 In 1860 members of the British Indian Association representing the interest of the 
Zemindars of Bengal “opposed direct taxes on the zaminders’ income alleging infringement 
of the Permanent Settlement of 1793. In 1861 they urged the Government to increase salt 
duty- a tax which fell mainly on the poor and appeared ’least objectionable’ to members of 
the Association: the Association hoped that higher salt revenue would enable the 
Government to relieve the upper income groups from the ‘oppression’ of income tax. In 
1871 they stood in the way of local improvements with money raised by means of local 
cess (such as Road Cess and Education Cess) and they again invoked the Permanent 
Settlement”. (Bhattacharyya, S, Financial Foundation of the British Raj, Indian Institute of 
Advanced Study, Simla, 1971 p. xxiv) This area would be discussed in detail in the 
subsequent paragraphs of this study.  
Strachey (1911) also noticed that “The zemindars have repeatedly put forward the claim 
that in consequence of the permanent settlement they are entitled to exemption for ever 
from all taxation upon profits derived from land. In 1859 when income tax was first imposed 
on every kind of property throughout India, they protested  that the conditions of the 
settlement were violated.... In 1871, and again in 1877 they demanded, on similar grounds, 
exemption from liability to rates imposed on land and other immovable property for local 
and provincial roads and public works, for sanitation, education and other local objects.”  
(Starchey, Sir, J, India Its Administration & Progress, Macmillan and Co. Limited, London, 
1911,  p.461,) 
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worsened the situation further.19 This low level of public investment in 
irrigation which was undertaken with great momentum after the Mutiny 
(1857) gave rise to the feeling of being discriminated against or being less 
favoured compared to the other Provinces.  In the subsequent part of this 
study we want to turn to the impact of Permanent Settlement on rural 
infrastructural development through imposition of cess on land revenue. 
And also on the distribution of public investment particularly in irrigation 
among the Provinces and as the consequent feeling of being discriminated 
so far Bengal Province was concerned.  
 
 
Table: 4 
Gross land Revenue in the Principal Provinces/Presidencies Between 1856-57 & 1870-71 
(In Rs. Crores ) 
Provinces 1856-57 1870-71 Percentage Increase 
Bengal 3.54 3.76 6 
Bombay 
2.15 2.95 37 
Madras 3.8 4.4 16 
Punjab 1.84 1.97 7 
N.W. Provinces 3.92 4.13 5 
Oudh 0.97 1.32 36 
Central Provinces 0.57 0.6 5 
Source: Bhattacharyya, S, Financial Foundations of the British Raj, Indian Institute 
of Advanced Study, Simla, 1971, p. 299 
 
 
Table: 5 
Land Revenue Per Head of Population Between 19881 and 1920 
1881 1892 1898 1913 1920 Provinces 
Rs.  a.    p.  Rs.   a.      p.   Rs.   a.      p.   Rs.   a.     p. Rs.   a.     p. 
Madras 
1      7     6 1      7       2 1      9        5 1      7       3 1       7      7 
Bombay 1     15    6 1     15      2 2      0        0 2      1       0 2       5      3 
Sind ..... 2     12      9 2      9        1 2      9       0 2      13     3 
Bengal 0     8     11 0      8      10 0      8       11 0      10     0 0      10     6 
United 
province 
1     4     10 1      5       4 1      5        5 1      5       7 1       4     11 
Oudh ...... 1      2        1 1      3        6 1      6       6 ..... 
Punjab 1     1      4 1      4        3 1      4       10 1     15      0 2      5      0 
Central 
Provinces 
0     9     10 0    10        3 0     11      11 0     15      0 ...... 
                                                          
19 The loss of revenue of the government consequent upon Permanent Settlement was 
given away “in return for no service to the state or to the public: the zemindars are merely 
the receivers of rent; with rare exceptions they take little part in the improvement of the 
land, and until not many years ago, they bore virtually no share of the public burdens. 
(Strachey, Sir, J, India Its Administration & Progress, Macmillan and Co. Limited, London, 
1911, p. 455)  While replying to Dutt, R.C, Indian Government (1902) commented  that “Mr. 
Dutt appeals to the munificient gifts of the Bengal zemindars to all public purposes. The 
Lieutenant-Governor again admits, gratefully, the princely generosity which has 
distinguished some of these gifts, but he can not truthfully say that he has observed among 
rank and file of the zemindars a greater disposition to execute improvements on their 
properties, or to subscribe to local needs and local charities..” (Land Revenue Policy of the 
Indian Government, Government of India, Calcutta, 1902, p. 69) 
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Assam 0    11     7 0    12        7 1     2        3 1      3       0 1      5      0 
Source: Vakil, C. N, Financial Development in Modern India 1860-1924, 1924, pp. 372 
4 pice = 1 Anna 
1 Rupee = 16 Annas 
 
 
 
Impact on Public Work due to Permanent Settlement 
 
As we have already discussed that Permanent Settlement in Bengal until 
the early 19th century made collection of large amount of land revenue at 
regular interval, with complete certainty and incurring low cost of collection. 
This, helped the British Indian empire for its colonial expansion and 
consolidation of its rule. But paradoxically, over time land revenue in Bengal 
became inelastic on account of the same Permanent Settlement, which had 
far reaching impact on public works investment, infrastructure and 
buoyancy of revenue at a later period.  
 
There was a debate, during the whole of the nineteenth century and early 
part of the twentieth on whether Bengal should be punished by allocating 
low share of public expenditure for the Permanent Settlement which was 
introduced in order to meet the immediate need of the time. It was alleged 
that Bengal had become the victim of the pragmatic scheme of the 
Permanent Settlement pursued by the East India Company. Thus due 
regard should be paid to the totality of its contribution on account of 
Permanent Settlement in the past rather than in-elasticity of land revenue 
on the later date.20  
 
Since the middle of 19th century when public investment gathered its 
momentum, there had been a common feeling in Bengal that its share of 
public expenditure was quite low compared to Bengal’s contribution to the 
country.  From time to time, in relation to many occasions, such contentious 
issue had been brought to the fore by Bengal’s academics, intellectuals, 
landlords and even the government officials. This issue remained the pre-
dominant discourse during the whole pre-Independence period.21 
                                                          
20 Jessore Landholders Association replied before the Land Revenue Commission while 
answering the question whether Permanent Settlement ‘permanently crippled the 
resources of the country’. They opined that “All through the 15 years from 1795 to 1810 
Bengal land showed a surplus (because of the certainty of land revenue) while Bombay 
and Madras others showed deficits”. Land Revenue Commission Vol. IV,  Reply by Jessore 
Landholder’s Association, p. 19) And they went on to say that Permanent Settlement, “ 
‘yielded the greatest amount of land revenue which was not possible by any other 
settlement, and by ensuring prompt realisation of the unvarying quantum of revenue, it 
rescued the Administration from the risk of uncertain collections and established the British 
Empire in India’. Bengal paid ‘the expenses of ambitious wars and annexations in northern 
and southern India’. Between 1793 and 1837 ‘Madras and Bombay never paid the total 
cost of their own administration’ “ (quoted in Bannerjee, A.C, The Agrarian System of 
Bengal vol. 2: 1793-1955, K.P.Bagchi & Company, Calcutta, 1981, pp. 359-360) 
 
21 We can also recall the comment made by Dutt, R.C and Mokkerji (1940) in order to 
understand how some veteran intellectuals of Bengal then reacted on this ongoing debate. 
“It may also be pointed out that the Permanent Settlement was decided upon as the best 
source of certain revenue which was very much needed in its time by the Company to build 
up British Dominion in other parts of India. The Company had then to finance the cost of 
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Comments made by Mr. Grant  would be relevant in this respect.  In 1886, 
Mr. John Peter Grant, a high official of Bengal Government complained 
“that it was a practice handed over from the beginning of the British Empire 
in India to make Bengal pay much more than its share of the imperial 
revenue and give it back in return not a quarter of it’s share of the imperial 
funds granted for such objects as military protection, police, roads and other 
public works. He found this inevitable practice still in co-operation and took 
the opportunity to draw notice to systematic inequalities so injurious to the 
province with which he was connected”22.  
 
Public works investment was in the stage of infancy before the Mutiny 
(1857). Since the mid 19th century, public works programmes were 
undertaken with considerable importance23 and ushered in an era of inter-
                                                                                                                                                                                  
several wars and other measures which were forced upon them. The Rohilla war, the two 
campaigns against Tipoo Sultan, the prevention of the hostile Maratha demonstration 
against Oudh, the mission despatched to Nepal, reduction of Pondicheri all these brought 
the finances of the Company to a low ebb. R.C Dutt pointed out, ‘in India an Empire was 
being acquired, wars were waged and the administration carried on at a cost of the Indian 
people without the British nation contributing a shilling’.  And the burnt of the cost was 
borne by the people of Bengal upon whose resources other Provinces like Madras and 
Bombay had freely drawn to meet the deficits of their administration. At home at this time 
England was also passing through the worst days with France, Holland, Spain and Italy 
allied against her, the United States alienated, and national debt was mounting up. R.C 
Dutt further stated: ‘it may be said with strict truth that the conquest of Lord Hastings, like 
the conquest of Lord Wellesley were made out of the resources furnished by permanently 
settled Bengal’.” (mentioned in Mookerji, R.K, Indian Land System Ancient, Mediaeval and 
Modern With Special Reference to Bengal, Land Revenue Commission, Government of 
West Bengal, 1940, p. 94)  
 
 
 
 
 
22 Letter from the Government of Bengal, 4th May, 1861, quoted in Gupta, J.N, The Case 
for  Financial Justice to Bengal, Calcutta University Press, Calcutta, 1931, pp. 50-51  
23 However, the question of unequal distribution of public work came to  the fore also 
before the Mutiny. Although public work expenditure was rather rudimentary in the pre-
Mutiny period. Yet inequity in public works expenditure among different Provinces are 
evident from the following table. The outlay on public works in Bengal and in Madras were 
much lower than revenues collected in these Provinces. Such disfavoured treatment of 
some Provinces as against the others was justified by the Imperial government on the plea 
that the favoured Provinces showed surpluses in their accounts. But the federalists pointed 
out that these deficits and surpluses occurred in different Provinces due to the inefficient 
system of account. It didn’t necessarily represent the true picture. (Ambedkar, B.R, The 
Evolution of Provincial Finance in British India A Study in the Provincial Decentralization of 
Imperial Finance, P.S. King & Son, Ltd, London, 1925, pp. 32-33) 
Table 
Outlay on Public Works Average Per Years 1837-38 to 1845-46 
 
Provinces Population  Area in square 
mile 
Revenues 
collected from the 
Provinces in 
hundreds of Rs. 
Expenditure 
on public 
works in 
hundreds of 
Rs. 
Percentage 
of column 5 
to column 4  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Bengal 40,000,000 1,65,443 10,239,500 1,79,812 1.75 
N.W.P 23,200,000 71,985 5,699,200 1,41,450 2.48 
Madras 22,000,000 1,45,000 5,069,500 30,300 0.59 
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Provincial jealousy resulting from uneven regional distribution of public 
works investments. “The Bengal’s journals (Friend of India, 1863) for 
instance, complained that Bombay and Madras were given preferential 
treatment while ‘the wealthiest of the Presidencies (Bengal) is too much 
near the candle to receive its due share of light’.“24    
 
Meanwhile, the idea of decentralisation came to the fore with the initiative of 
Lord Mayo in 1871. Decentralisation was welcomed by the federalists in 
Bengal as well as in other Provinces on consideration that it would minimise 
the iniquitous distribution of revenue burden borne by different Provinces 
and would reduce the distribution of uneveness in public works investment 
among the Provinces. Decentralisation was also welcomed by the Hindoo 
Patriot-(1870), a Calcutta based Journal, which “believed that Bengal was 
being made to pay more than its fare share for imperial purposes”.25  
 
What, however, remains to be seen is, whether unequal distribution of 
public works expenditure was the result of any favouritism to particular 
Province/Provinces at the cost of others or such an inequality was the 
outcome of some pragmatic considerations regarding public works 
investment in British India. Therefore,  due attention should be paid on brief 
discussion on the history of public works in order to understand why some 
Provinces were favoured than others and under which circumstances.  
 
Before 1858, Public Works Secretariat of the Government of India did exist 
but the progress of public works was rather slow (table 6). During this time 
public works was chiefly undertaken for military purposes. Thus for a long 
time construction of military barracks was the prime concern for the British 
Indian government. Construction of road proceeded slowly, irrigation made 
little progress except in Madras and the North Western Provinces (NWP) 
and railway construction was progressing even at slower pace. In 1857 
there was hardly 300 miles of railway tracks in India. Though the need of 
developed communication and irrigation was felt by the East India Company 
but it was reluctant to undertake public works programmes that involved 
large monetary expenditure. At that time any large scheme of public works 
had to be financed by loans but loans were generally raised for 
extraordinary calamities or war under the Company’s rule. (Thomas,1939, 
p. 108) 
 
Table: 6 
Progress of Public Works in British India  Between 1842-43 and 1882-83 
 
Expenditure on 
Public Works Pound 
(millions) 
Total Expenditure 
Pound (millions) 
Proportion of (1) to 
(2) 
Year 
               (1)           (2)         (3) 
1842-43 00 .19 21.43 00.96 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Source: Ambedkar, B.R, The Evolution of Provincial Finance In British India, P.S King & Son, 
Ltd, London, 1925, p. 32 
 
 
24 Fried of India, 24th September, 1863; quoted in Bhattacharayya, S, Financial Foundation 
of British Raj, Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Simla, 1971, p. 267) 
25 Hindoo Patriot 11th July, 1870 quoted in Bhattacharyya, 1971, p. 266 
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1852-53 00.63 25.27  2.53 
1862-63 4.40 37.75 11.58 
1872-73 12.52 56.87 21.96 
1882-83 23.71 73.09 32.48 
Source: Thomas P.J, The Growth of Federal Finance in India, Oxford University 
Press, London, 1939 p. 120 
 
After prolonged neglect, public work was pushed forward amidst two 
interesting development of the mid 19th century. One was the ‘occurrence of 
1857’ after which systematic improvement of communication was earnestly 
taken up. Other one was the “expansion of commercial agriculture and the 
growth of plantation resulting from the rapid increase in the demand for 
Indian primary products in the growing industrial areas of Europe impressed 
the Government with the need for the extension of roads, railways and 
irrigation works. The cotton-grower of Bombay and Berar, the jute grower of 
Bengal and the tea-planter of Assam were badly in need of roads, and this 
demand forced its attention upon the Government.” (Thomas,1939, pp.108-
109) Consequently  construction of strategic rail communication and roads 
were taken up. We will turn to this area later.   
 
Another important consideration which placed severe strain on 
government’s finance during the whole of 19th century was frequent 
outbreak of famine in different parts of India resulting in huge loss of land 
revenue. Famine relief had to be provided by the government of India to the 
famine-stricken areas despite the loss of revenue. Thus, huge loss of 
revenue consequent upon famine coupled with expenditure incurred on 
famine relief put considerable strain on Imperial government’s purse. An 
attempt was taken to localise (to make the Provinces to share famine’s 
relief) the famine fund. Subsequently, it was felt that more effective 
measure against famine would be expansion of irrigation and improved 
communication. The Famine Commission of 1879 urged upon the 
government the imperative need for extending railways and irrigation for 
protecting the country against famine. Though the urgent need for the 
extension of  railways and irrigation was felt, the government was always 
reluctant to borrow money for such purposes. Private companies instead 
were entrusted with this work on a guarantee basis. Evidently due emphasis 
was placed on the self-supporting public works which would ensure return. 
Non-remunerative public works were strongly discouraged and selection of 
public works were chosen in such a manner that should not incur any loss. 
However, railways, irrigation and civil works (i.e., roads and buildings) 
constituted the major bulk of the gross public investment of which railways 
and irrigation together accounted for more than half of the total. It should be 
noted that while investment in roads and buildings was more or less evenly 
distributed among the different Provinces, distribution of the public work 
investment in railways and irrigation among different Provinces was grossly 
uneven.  Which was mainly determined in accordance with the need of the 
market and profitability of the British industries. 26 
                                                          
26 The Study undertaken by Thavaraj (1955) concluded that the uneven development of 
different regions in India could partly be attributed to the uneven distribution of the 
investment in railways and irrigation in the period 1897-98 to 1913-14. However, the public 
investment during 1898-1914 was concentrated in the North Western and North Eastern 
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However, Bengal was one of the lowest recipients of irrigation fund 
particularly during the whole pre-Independence period. There were three 
main constraints regarding receiving funds for irrigation. Firstly, irrigation 
always had to compete for funds with railways. Railways was given 
preferential treatment than irrigation in spite of the fact that irrigation gave 
more positive return than railways even after allowing unproductive and 
protective irrigation works. (Bagchi, 1972, pp.40-41) 
 
Secondly, before the recommendation of the Irrigation Commission (1900), 
non-remunerative, i.e., protective irrigation work was not encouraged.27 
Inelasticity in land revenue coupled with difficulties of imposition of further 
taxation on land resulted in low rate of return from irrigation in Bengal than 
in other Provinces (table 7). Since the decentralisation scheme pursued by 
Lord Mayo (1871), local governments were strongly encouraged to raise 
funds necessary for investment in irrigation. Consequently the financial 
power of the Provincial government was widened in order to cope with this 
situation.28  In Bengal, as mentioned earlier, the state was debarred from 
imposing further taxes on land for meeting the expenditure incurred not only 
on irrigation. As a matter of fact, it was always of great difficulty to impose 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
regions, the former having a larger share in the investment on irrigation and the later 
having a larger share in the investment on railways. (Thavaraj, M.K, Public Investment in 
India, 1898-1914: Some Features, Indian Economic Review, Vol. II, 1955, p. 43)  North 
Western region served well so far as production of raw cotton was concerned and North 
Eastern region produced commercial agricultural crops such as jute and coal bulk of which 
either got exported or absorbed in for export based industries. And also extraction and 
transportation of coal from this region was felt necessary for the industries and railways. 
“This meant” as far public investment in the British was concerned, “an emphasis on the 
Northern plains and the north eastern frontier and a neglect of the South and of the interior 
of India in general”. (Kulke, H & Rothermund, D, A History of India, Routledge London, 
1990, p. 269) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27 The government had been very reluctant to spend money on any works other than 
‘productive’ works. Productive works were defined as those which would meet the working 
expenses, as well as the interest charges on the accumulated capital, within ten years of 
their initiation. (Bagchi, A, Private Investment In India 1900-1939, Cambridge University 
Press, 1972, p. 41)    
28 The idea  prevailing during Lord Mayo’s period was that since the benefit from irrigation 
is limited in a particular area, it is fair to localise responsibility in regard to that. Contrary to 
that the benefit from railway, as Lord Mayo said, transcend the geographical boundary of 
Provinces and benefit of which is not mainly localised i.e., that can be of the main 
responsibility of the Imperial government. Consequently, it was strongly encouraged that 
the burden of raising fund for irrigation should be taken by the Provincial government 
without placing burden on Imperial revenue. He further said that every Province should pay 
for it’s local enrichment for it’s irrigation schemes and it is not expected that one Province 
would pay for others. That is why, Provincial power of undertaking and maintenance of 
irrigation schemes and raising funds through further taxation was enlarged as part of 
decentralisation scheme pursued in 1871. (Thomas, P.J, The Growth of Federal Finance in 
India, Oxford University Press, London,1939, pp. 114-115) 
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taxation further on land be it for meeting the expenditure on irrigation or for 
improving the local sanitation, road and education for all these had always 
stood in the way of investment for productive irrigation. Evidently, until 19th 
century (and even after that period) when non-remunerative (protective) 
irrigation was not encouraged, Bengal received less share than that of other 
Provinces.  
 
Finally, owing to Permanent Settlement it was promised that any future 
increment of income from land  (say as a result of irrigation) in the 
permanently settled areas would be appropriated by the Zemindars29. It 
might be worth recalling in this context that the comment made by Mr. 
(afterwards Sir, William) Muir, Senior Member of the Board of Revenue, 
North Western Provinces. While discussing the merits and demerits of 
Permanent Settlement, one of the major defects of the Permanent 
Settlement, he commented,  ”....increase of revenue from future extension 
of agriculture would be relinquished, especially in the case of Government 
irrigation works.” (Quoted in Banerjea,1930, p. 417) This comment might be 
an answer of the frequently raised question why expansion of irrigation in 
Bengal until the late 19th  century did not take place as it happened in the 
temporarily settled areas where land revenue was subject to periodical 
revision. Another consideration which might have been partly responsible 
for not giving preferential treatment to Bengal on the irrigation front was that 
Bengal was considered as the Province of abundant rainfall hence meriting 
low as far need of irrigation is concerned.30 
 
However, it is evidenced from table 7  that the return on the investment on 
irrigation was quite low on account of the fact that per head land revenue 
was the lowest in Bengal.  Since the investment in irrigation and return from 
land revenue of the particular region was positively related thus total 
irrigated area in Bengal was much less than other Province. As we have 
earlier observed that all public works were carried out mainly from loans 
and it was naturally felt that money should be spent where the return is 
certain. 
 
Table: 7 
Return on Irrigation Investment of Different Provinces in 1879-80 
                                                                             (In Pounds) 
Province Capital Net Revenue Interest at 4 ½  Surplus/Return 
                                                          
29 It is to be noted that whereas in Bengal the area irrigated by Government works was only  
99, 535 acres in 1925-26 in the Punjab the irrigated area increased from 2.3 million acres 
in 1887-88 to an average of 10.4 million acres during 1921-26. Gupta (1931) went on to 
say that “ A consideration which in all probability prevented a proper examination of the 
needs of Bengal in this matter is the existence of the Permanent Settlement in Bengal by 
which the revenue of the State from land is fixed permanently and the state is debarred 
from claiming any portion of the increased income of the cultivators, which suitable 
irrigation schemes may help to produce. “ (Gupta, J.N, The Case for Financial  Justice to 
Bengal, Calcutta University Press, 1931, p. 69) 
  
30 “As regards irrigation there is a general impression that on account of her fairly copious 
rainfall this province is not in need of any important irrigation works like Southern and 
Northern India”. (Gupta, J. N, The Case for Financial  Justice to Bengal, Calcutta University 
Press, 1931, p. 65) 
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per cent (Net Revenue—
Interest Charges) 
Bengal 4,980,000 18,000 220,000 Nil 
North-West 
Provinces 
5,346,000 269,000 237,000 32,000 
Punjab 3,544,000 170,000 155,000 15,000 
Madras 1,720,000 427,000 77,000 350,000 
Bombay 1,333,000 10,000 59,000 Nil 
Total 16,933,000 894,000 748,000 146,000 
Source: Strachey, J & Strachey R, The Finances and Public Works of India, 1869-
1881, Gian Publishing House, New Delhi, 1986, p. 106 
 
 
The expansion of irrigation in Bengal and return on such investment in 
different Provinces was also evident from table 8 which was given by the 
Famine Commission, 1880. Afterwards the Irrigation Commission 1900-01 
reviewed the whole progress made in expansion of irrigation and estimated 
the financial and other results (table 9). These figures are self explanatory 
and probably do not need further elaboration.  
 
Thavaraj (1955) also revealed that while by the end of the 1897-98 the 
share of Bengal, Central Provinces (CP) and North Western Frontier 
Provinces (NWFP) taken together was about 31 per cent of the total 
investment on irrigation, Punjab the largest recipient of investment on 
irrigation alone accounted for 25 per cent. (Thavaraj,1955, p. 41). In the 
subsequent decades Punjab continued to attract larger share of irrigation 
investment  i.e., about 50 per cent of the gross investment in irrigation was 
made in the Punjab alone during 1898-1914, while Bengal, Central 
Provinces (CP) and  North Western Frontier Provinces (NWFP) together 
accounted for only 12 per cent of the total share. Large investment in 
irrigation in Punjab Province was, however, matched by huge returns from 
these irrigation schemes to the state. (Thavaraj, 1955, p. 45)  (table 10)  
 
 
Table: 8 
Expansion of Irrigation in Bengal Compared to Other Provinces in 1880  
Provinces Area Ordinarily 
Cultivated (Acres) 
Area Ordinarily 
Irrigated (Acres) 
Percentage of 
Irrigation to 
Cultivation 
Punjab 21,000,000 5,500,000 26.2 
NWP & Oudh 36,000,000 11,500,000 32 
Bengal 54,500,000 1,000,000 1.8 
Central Provinces 15,500,000 770,000 5 
Behar 6,500,000 100,000 1.5 
Bombay 24,500,000 450,000 1.8 
Sindh 2,250,000 1,800,000 80 
Madras 32,000,000 7,300,000 23 
Mysore 5,000,000 800,000 16 
Total 197,250,000 29,220,000 14.8 
Source: Report of the Indian Famine Commission, 1880, p. 86 
 
 
Table: 9 
Return on Irrigation in Different Provinces in 1900-01 
Province Number of Capital Outlay Percentage of        Average per acre 
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Works (In  lakhs Rs.) net revenue 
on capital 
outlay 
Value of crops 
(Rs.) 
Revenue 
assessed 
(Rs.) 
Punjab 7 10,73.0 10.5 27.5 3.4 
Sind 5 1,79.3 7.7 15.6 1.9 
Bombay 9 1,87.6 1.2 77.2 4.8 
Madras 9 7,29.6 8.5 36.7 4.1 
Bengal 3 6,16.8 0.8 34.4 1.9 
United 
Provinces 
6 8,77.4 7.3 39.2 4.3 
Total 39 36,63.7 7.1 31.6 3.4 
Source:  Report of the Irrigation Commission (1901-03) Vol. I, pp. 21,  
also see Thomas, P.J, The Growth of Federal Finance in India, Oxford University Press, 
London, 1939, p. 253 
 
 
Table: 10 
Percentage Distribution of Investment in Irrigation Between 1898 & 1914 in 
Different Provinces 
 
Year UP Punjab Bombay Madras & 
Orissa 
CP, NWFP & 
Bengal 
Total 
As at the 
end of 1897-
98 
24 25 8 13 31 100** 
During the 
Period 
1898-1914 
7 50 11 20 12 100 
Source: Thavaraj, M.K, ‘Public Investment in India, 1898-1914 Some Features’, Indian 
Economic Review, Vol. II, 1955, pp.41  
** the percentage share of different Provinces together added up to 101 instead of 100. It 
was written following the author.   
 
However, we can again recall the controversy in relation to Bengal’s low 
share of irrigation investment as to how far Bengal should be victimised on 
account of the Permanent Settlement. The controversy was centred around 
whether Bengal would be treated at par and given back its due share on the 
basis of what it contributed in the past or the share of investment on 
irrigation in Bengal should be based on the present rate of return from such 
investment in this Province. It should be noted that in a letter dated the 4th 
May 1861, a government official observed, “ His Excellency in Council 
observes that it is undoubtedly true that Bengal has not received its due 
share of imperial expenditure, ....On the other hand, the people of Bengal 
are certainly not the most heavily taxed in India”. Also noteworthy is the 
comment made by  Mr. Fobes who was the member for Madras in the 
Indian Legislative Council on 3rd May 1861, “when Mr. Grant (Lieutenant 
Governor of Bengal) complains that lower Bengal does not receive it’s fair 
share of public works expenditure, I think he leaves too much out of the 
consideration that the permanent settlement has deprived the Government 
of the inducement to expend money in these provinces as they would 
receive no direct return for their outlay; and although the indirect return 
would be inducement enough if they could do no better, it is not surprising 
that they prefer to expend capital in those parts of the Empire where the 
return is both direct and indirect.”(Quoted in Gupta, 1931, pp. 57-58)  
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The interest groups in Bengal including the then Bengal government argued 
that Bengal’s contribution should be understood on the basis of its past 
contribution on account of Permanent Settlement. Thus while considering 
distribution of public investment  particularly on irrigation among different 
Provinces the total contribution of a particular Province needs to be taken 
into account rather than the present return on the irrigation investment 
incurred which may be low for its comparative in-elasticity of land revenue. 
Therefore, Bengal should be repaid on the basis of its enormous 
contribution it made in the early days of British settlement instead of its 
present contribution to the imperial exchequer. Sir Peter Grant, the then 
Lieutenant Governor, made a reply to Mr. Fobes by saying: “I hope it is not 
intended to maintain a principle of allotment between the several 
Governments of the portion of the general imperial revenues appropriated 
to imperial public works which is really tantamount to unduly taxing the most 
important part of the Empire for the undue advantage of less important parts 
by reference to the permanent settlement. Whatever discussion may be 
raised concerning the settlement in other respects, it’s wonderful financial 
success is beyond all question. The settlement as a whole was a very 
heavy assessment at the time. Let the percentage of increase the gross 
revenue of Bengal from all sources now as compared with that in 1790 
shews, be compared with the corresponding percentage in Madras before 
saying that Bengal works are not to be allowed their share of Bengal 
revenue, because Government cant increase the Bengal land tax” (quoted 
in Gupta, 1931, pp. 58-59) 
 
We can now turn to the question of public expenditure on railways and the 
uneven distribution among different Provinces. So far as public expenditure 
on railways was concerned,  British India was mainly guided by a different 
kind of pragmatism besides considering it as a preventive measure against 
famine. It has already been mentioned that growing demand for Indian 
primary products in the industrial bases of England necessitated 
construction of railways in British India. It was found that a more rapid 
extension of railways in India was required for boosting the export of 
agricultural raw material from key areas of British India to the industries of 
England. Further,  American Civil War (1861-65) interrupted the supply of 
American cotton to British mills and thus created a sudden hike in the 
demand for Indian cotton. Different interest groups related to these 
particular industries urged upon taking necessary steps to build railways in 
India, particularly from Bombay to the key cotton growing areas. The 
location of railways was chosen by strategic considerations of securing the 
best sources of raw materials. Consequently, “The small town of Solapur in 
Southern Maharastra had been reached by the railway in 1860 and it had 
then remained the railhead for about two decades. It emerged as a major 
centre of the raw cotton trade just at the    time of the American Civil War” 
(Rothermund, 2004, Forthcoming). Therefore, Bombay presidency, the 
main supplier of raw cotton received preferential treatment in order to build 
up ‘cotton roads’ and received about 24 per cent of the total ordinary public 
work investment compared to 17 per cent in Bengal presidency and 13.9 
per cent in Madras during the period 1864-66.31(Bhattacharyya, 1971, p. 
                                                          
31 The Study undertaken by Thavaraj (1955) also pointed out that at the end of 1897-98 
Bombay Baroda & Central India (B.B & C.I) received the second largest share of railways 
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267) (table 11) It was alleged that during the second half of the 19th century, 
particularly during 1862-72 Bombay continued to receive more fund than 
other Provinces which could be evident from the table 11. Average annual 
public works expenditure per square mile in 1863-72 remained very high in 
Bombay (Rs. 79) and NWP (Rs.79) compared to Bengal (Rs.34) and 
Madras (Rs.45). Again public works expenditure (ordinary) in 1871-72  per 
head of population was Re. O.53 in Bombay and a meagre Re.0.1 in 
Madras and Bengal32.  
 
Table: 11 
Public Works (Ordinary) Expenditure in the Principal Provinces as Percentage of the Total in 
India Between 1864-66 and 1871-72 
Provinces 1864-66 
    % 
1867-69 
   % 
1870-72 
  % 
1871-72  
Expenditure on 
public works 
(ordinary) per head 
of populations (Rs.)  
Average annual 
public works 
expenditure per 
square mile in 1863-
72     (Rs.) @ 
Bengal 
17 15.7 16.8 0.103 34 
N.W. 
Provinces 
12.9 13.3 13.5 0.19 79 
Punjab 11.9 14.2 13.3 .34 - 
Madras 13.9 13.8 12.2 .106 45 
Bombay 24 20.4 18.4 .53 79 
Source: Bhattacharyya, S, Financial Foundations of the British Raj, Indian Institute of 
Advanced Study, Simla,  1971, p. 311 
@ Ibid.  p. 267 
 
 
Another international development escalated  the demand for jute of Bengal 
and consequently put this region in a position to receive a larger share of 
railways investment. The Crimean war (1854) in Russia interrupted the 
supply of raw jute to the industries of Scotland. The demand for  raw jute of 
Bengal suddenly increased and subsequently it was found that setting up 
jute industry in Bengal was more convenient and profitable than exporting 
raw jute to the jute manufacturing industries located in Scotland.33 In 1858 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
investment 16 per cent as against 31 per cent received by North Western Provinces-the 
largest recipient of the railways investment for military lines because of the ongoing warfare 
in this region. (Thavaraj, M.K, Public Investment in India 1898-1914: Some Features, 
Indian Economic Review, Vol. II, 1955) 
 
32 However, it appears that  the rapid economic development in the city of Bombay was 
also partly responsible for giving preferential treatment to Bombay Presidency in the 
distribution of public works investment. While giving evidence before the Decentralisation 
Commission, Sir Herbert Risley raised the point that Bombay’s standard of administration 
is above the normal standard which necessitated comparatively higher Provincial 
expenditure per 1000 population (excepting Burma). And also Provincial expenditure per 
square mile in Bombay was the highest. (Minutes of Evidence Taken Before the Royal 
Commission upon Decentralisation,  Government of India, Vol. X,1908, pp. 170 & 259) 
33 “....The blow which Crimean War dealt to the export of Russian hemp suddenly 
propelled Indian jute into the limelight. However, when Russian hemp became 
scarce, Scottish traders started supplying raw jute to the infant industry of Dundee 
in Scotland. They soon realised that setting up jute mills in Calcutta would be more 
profitable, the more so as the export of Indian  produce increased and jute textiles 
were in demand as packing material. It would be rather circuitous to ship raw jute to 
Dundee and then jute bags back to Calcutta.” (Rrothermund, D, “The 
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the first jute mill was established in Bengal and in subsequent decades jute 
industries made rapid progress in Bengal. Since that time on Calcutta 
became the centre of export-based jute manufacturing industry. Along with 
jute industries, extraction and transportation of coal, required for railways 
and other industries and tea manufacturing too emerged as one of the main 
important commercial activities in greater Bengal. Such developments also 
put Bengal in a position to receive preferential treatment as far as public 
works investment i.e., construction of railways was concerned. However, 
between the late 19th century and the early part of 20th century public 
expenditure in railways made substantial shift from military lines to 
commercial lines. Throughout the first half of 19th century, different wars in 
which British India was engaged, necessitated large investment in strategic 
military railway lines in the North Western Frontier. But later on when peace 
was restored to certain extent,  investment on railways work was shifted to 
eastern region to promote  newly emerged commercial activities.34  
   
The study undertaken by Thavaraj (1955) concluded that towards the end of 
1897-98 “the Afghan wars, the Burmese wars, and the fear of a Russian 
invasion,... necessitated large scale investment on strategic lines. But even 
though the Afghan war continued during the period under study, (1898-
1914) the requirements of such security lines diminished; and comparative 
peace in the Eastern Frontier and in Burma also resulted in a decline in 
investment of such lines. The lines which assumed greater importance 
during the period were the E. Indian, E. Bengal and GIP systems.” 
(Thavaraj 1955, p. 42) The table 12 below indicates a shift of emphasis 
from military lines to commercial lines with greater Bengal as a emerging 
important commercial centre. Therefore, while at the beginning of the 
period, (as at the end of 1898) North-Western railway Rajputana-Malwa 
(later on absorbed in the Bombay Baroda & Central India) and the Burma 
railways together shared more than 53 per cent of railways investment, their 
share during the period (1898-1914) was only about 33 per cent of the 
gross investment in railways. And on the other hand EI, E. Bengal, Assam 
Bengal and GIP system together accounted for 46.9 per cent  of total 
railway investment during 1898-1914.  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Industrialisation of India”,  in Chowdhury, B (ed.) Economic history of India 18th to 
20th Century, Centre for Studies in Civilisation, New Delhi, 2004, forthcoming) 
 
34Thavaraj (1955) revealed, “... the heavy investment in railways in the North-Eastern 
region was providing external economies to the newly developing industries in that region 
by providing cheap transport and by opening up the internal markets and by opening up the 
internal markets. Here, investment in railways was complementary to the private 
investment undertaken in the industrial sector. The Eastern Bengal Railway strengthened 
the competitive power of the jute industries in Calcutta against Dundee by reducing the 
cost of transporting its raw materials. The tea gardens of Assam and North Bengal also 
received stimulus by the cheap transport provided by the Assam Bengal and the E. Bengal 
Railways. Mining industries, particularly coal industry, made record and uninterrupted 
progress due to the development of transport. Previously the prohibitive costs of transport 
had deprived the coal industry of it s Indian markets. But the development of railways gave 
an enormous impetus to the industry, not only by itself consuming nearly one third of the 
total production of coal in India but also by enabling other Indian industries to give up 
foreign coal in favour of the indigenous coal. “ (Thavaraj, M.K, Public Investment in India 
1898-1914: Some Features, Indian Economic Review, Vol. II, 1955, p. 43) 
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Table: 12 
Percentage Distribution of Investment in Railways During the end of 1897-98 & During the 
Between 1898 and 1914 
 
Year NW EI Assam 
Bengal 
E. 
Bengal 
Tirhoot Oudh 
Rohil-
khund 
SI BB 
&CI 
MSM GIP Bur-
ma 
Total 
As at 
the 
end of 
1897-
98 
31.0 14.2 2.1 7.5 2.0 9.8 5.6 16.0 5.7 - 6.0 100.00 
During 
the 
Period 
1898-
1914 
23.5 19.0 4.3 11.0 3.3 8.9 5.4 8.5 2.8 12.6 1.2 100.00 
Source: Thavraj, M.K, ‘Public Investment in India, 1898-1914 Some Features’, p.41  
NW= North Western Railway; EI = East Indian; E. Bengal = Eastern Bengal;  
SI = South Indian; BB & CI= Bombay  Baroda & Central India; GIP= ? .., MSM= ? 
 
In sum it can be said that there is no distinct observation of discriminating 
one Province/Provinces against others. Some Provinces were given more 
fund than others in order to meet some exigencies from time to time when 
situations demanded. Bengal, due to its structural limitation of raising 
additional land revenue and low level of return on the investment in 
irrigation failed to attract higher sum of irrigation investment compared to 
other Provinces. But on the other hand due importance was given to public 
works investment in railways for the eastern Indian regions in accordance 
with the immediate need felt during that time.  It is quite evident that public 
investment was incurred in order to meet the immediate interest of either 
British industries or British administration for expansion and consolidation of 
their rule. British India failed to provide any systematic, long term and 
planned public works investment programmes for attaining balanced 
development. Such situation prevented the Provinces in general from 
receiving the fruits of public investment in an equitable manner. 
 
Permanent Settlement, cess on land for local purposes in Bengal 
 
The idea of developing local cess for local purposes came up with the 
decentralisation scheme introduced by Lord Mayo in 1871. Such local cess 
was said to be imposed on land for local infra-structural improvement. 
However, that the local wants should be met by local resources had been 
the idea of Indian financiers during the entire period of British India. From 
time to time Provincial governments were informed that in future grant for 
public works would be further reduced. It therefore became a matter of very 
urgent necessity to raise local funds necessary for the local development 
such as maintenance of the existing Provincial and district roads. Thus 
fresh local taxation became necessary. (Ambedkar, 1925, pp. 55-56) Many 
local governments started taking the initiative to begin to develop their local 
resources. Considerable progress was made in local self government since 
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1860. Consequently, local rates and cesses started being imposed but the 
progress made varied from Province to Province. Of all Provinces, Bombay 
made much greater advance in expanding local resources than other 
Provinces. (Thomas,1939, p.189) 
 
In Bengal imposition of new cesses for local purposes were under 
consideration for some time. Lord Lawrence’s government in 1867 and 
1868 recommended that a cess voluntary and otherwise should be imposed 
on land in Bengal for roads and rural education. Strong protest was raised 
from different sections of Bengal against the imposition of the proposed 
cess on the land revenue referring to the promise made at the time of 
Permanent Settlement in 1793. It was, however, long held to be 
questionable whether the terms of the Permanent Settlement precluded the 
right of imposition of cesses or rates on the land revenue in order to provide 
means of extending elementary education and of making and maintaining 
roads. (Dodwell, 1958, p. 32) “The Government of India allege that the 
language of the Permanent Settlement itself, in section vii. of Lord 
Cornwallis’s Proclamation, is large enough to enable them to impose the 
taxes in question; but this argument on close examination proves so utterly 
unsound that the Secretary of State abandons it”. (Dutt, R.C, The Economic 
History of India in the Victorian Age, London, 1956, p. 391)  
 
Lastly, It was under Lord Mayo’s government that the question came up 
for final consideration. The Zemindars protested against that strongly and 
they referred to the distinct and solemn promises of Permanent Settlement 
of 1793 when Lord Cornowalis had mentioned that the rate then assessed 
on their lands was ‘irrevocably fixed for ever’, and they should in all future 
time be free from ‘any further demand for rent, tribute or any other arbitrary 
exaction whatever’. (Dutt,1956, p. 396) As a consequence, an education 
cess proposed by Lord Lawrence in 1868 could not be imposed on Land in 
Bengal. But a Road Cess of 3 1/8  per cent on the rental was imposed in 
1871 (Dutt,1956, pp. 396-397).  
 
Interestingly enough, imposition of road cess on the rental was the 
outcome of another pragmatic consideration. Inefficient estate 
management and the absence of settlement operation of Permanently 
Settled areas created the condition where land was rarely properly 
surveyed. Such situation had provided for considerable degree of latitude 
for both landlords and tenants. Thus most landlords hardly cared about the 
rent rate rather preferred to levy irregular cesses of some kind or the other. 
On the other hand tenants also used to keep landlords in the dark. Having 
taken his charge of Bengal, George Campbell, wanted to ease these 
difficult situation by imposing road cess i.e., subject landlord’s rent rolls to 
official scrutiny. (Rothermund, 1978, pp. 98-101) However, the proceeds of 
this road cess went into the coffers of the District Committee. Evidently 
such imposition of road cess faced stiff opposition like previous attempts 
from the Zemindars and the then intellectuals of Bengal.35 
                                                          
35 The discontent about the ‘Road Cess Act of 1871’. (Bengal District Road Cess Act of 
1871) was evidenced from the comment made by Sri Bipin Chandra Pal “when the Road 
cess was first introduced in Bengal, it was regarded by the people of the provinces as a 
practical violation of the Permanent Settlement obtaining in that part of the country. It was a 
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In Bengal, it was always of great difficulty to impose local cesses for local 
purposes. But such local cess including education cess had already been 
imposed in other parts of India namely Bombay, Madras North Western 
Provinces (NWP). Memorandum on Local Taxation in Bengal,1890 revealed 
that  “Bengal is at present almost the only important Province in India in 
which there exists no direct connection between local rates and primary 
education.... It will thus be seen that all the Provinces in India except Bengal 
are subjected to local taxation for educational purposes. In Northern India 
(with the exception of Bengal) the proceeds from local rates are merged 
together, and a portion of them is then allotted for expenditure on education. 
Bombay is the only Province in India in which education is declared by 
statutory rules to be entitled to a minimum share of local fund revenue, 
although by executive order the same result is attained in other Provinces, 
such as Madras, the Punjab, Burmah and Assam”. (Memorandum on Local 
Taxation in Bengal, Government of India,1890, pp.14-17)  
 
An attempt has been made to compare the per capita burden of taxation 
(Provincial, local and municipal taxes taken together) of different Provinces 
as extracted from the Report of the Administration of Bengal 1872-73. It will 
be seen from the above table 13 & 14 that in Bengal per head burden of  
Provincial local and municipal taxation taken together (table 13) and local 
taxation other than municipal (table 14) was much lighter than in any other 
Provinces in British India in 1872-73. However, the number of local cesses 
and rates was also only one in Bengal namely Road cess in 1870.  (later on 
Public work Cess, 1877 was imposed). But in all other Provinces rates were 
levied for educational and other general purposes. None of them was levied 
in Bengal. The whole road cess funds are not sufficient for the purposes for 
which they were originally assigned. It was disturbing that the Districts 
Boards in Bengal were severely starved. The funds and assets at the 
disposal of the District Board were altogether inadequate to meet the 
responsibilities entrusted to them. (Memorandum on Local Taxation in 
Bengal, Government of India, 1890, p.27) Municipal taxation was also quite 
low in Bengal compared to other Provinces36.(Ibid. p. 30) 
 
Table: 13 
Local Taxation in Different Provinces in 1872-73 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
cess imposed upon land and according to the terms of the Permanent Settlement the 
Government had given an undertaking that no further tax would be imposed upon the 
land.”  (Pal, B.C, ‘Swadeshi and Samaj’, p. 184; quoted in Mukerjee, S.K, Local Self-
Government In West Bengal, Dasgupta & Co. Pvt. Ltd, Calcutta, 1974, p. 15) 
 
36 The following table shows that Bengal is among the lowest municipal tax paying Province. 
 
Municipal Taxation in Different Provinces 1886-87 
Provinces Rs.     A.    P. 
Bombay  1         4       5 
Punjab 1         2       6 
Bengal 0        12      4 
Madras 0        11     11 
North-Western Provinces 0        11      1 
Source: Memorandum on Local Taxation in  
Bengal, Government of India, 1890, p. 30 
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Incidence of Total 
Provincial, Local 
and Municipal 
Taxation Per 
Head of the 
Population 
Provinces Total Population Total Income 
From Provincial, 
Local and 
Municipal 
Taxation (Rs.) 
Rs.    A.       P. 
Bengal 64,000,000 30,12,369 0        0         9 
Madras 31,000,000 69,03,614 0        3       6 1/2  
Bombay 13,250,000 41,17,129 0        4        10 
NWP 31,500,000 85,93,555 0        4       4 1/2 
Punjab 19,500,000 69,29,473 0        5         6 
Oudh 11,500,000 13,51,032 0        1      10 1/4 
CP 8,250,000 14,77,023 0         2         9 
Source: Administration of Bengal, 1872-73, p.  342 
 
 
 
Table: 14 
Local Taxation of Different Provinces other than Municipal Taxation in 1872-73 
Per Head Incidence Provinces Population Local Taxation other than 
Municipal for 1873-74 (Rs.) Rs.      A.          P. 
Bengal 64,000,000 17,13,875 0          0            5 
Madras 31,000,000 58,89,600 0          3            0 
Bombay 13,250,000 27,33,868 0          3            3 
NWP 31,500,000 66,43,421 0          3            4  
Punjab 19,500,000 51,25,921 0          4             2 
Source: Administration of Bengal 1872-73, p. 347 
 
 
However, it was suggested that if in any Province additional taxation is 
justifiable it is in Bengal37 where not only does the land revenue, by virtue of 
the Permanent Settlement, bear a much lower ratio than elsewhere, the 
                                                          
37 Government of Bengal made its position clear about the provincial grant for local 
purposes to District Board. Though certain amount of grant was still being provided but in 
the course of time it was expected that local government would take necessary steps to be 
self sufficient. In nutshell the message was clear: henceforth local infra-structural 
development is going to be entrusted with the District Board. Necessary fund should be 
raised from local sources and if such fund is inadequate they should take recourse to 
additional taxation. There is an urgent need for developing their own resources which is 
impossible without additional taxation. It was said, “a minimum rate is proposed as 
compulsory cess, but the power of raising additional funds required over and above this for 
general purposes will rest with the Boards at their discretion. The responsibility of local 
administration is not only transferred from the shoulders of Government to District Boards, 
but it is now proposed that the responsibility for the provision of further funds for the 
administration of all departments and charges for which specific funds have not been 
assigned should also be delegated. In this way the Local Self-Government agencies in 
Bengal will be vested with real power for the fulfilment of their work”. (Memorandum on 
Local Taxation in Bengal, Government of India,1890,  p.20) 
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incidence of local and Provincial rates on the land too is considerably lower 
than any other Province leading to an unequal burden of taxation among 
different Provinces of British India. (Memorandum on Local Taxation in 
Bengal, Government of India,1890, p.19)  Besides creating an unequal 
burden of taxation among different Provinces, portion of the burden of all 
local cess imposed on land  passed onto the poor cultivators by Zemindars. 
(Strachey & Starchey,1986, p. 209)  
 
Following the outbreak of famine in Bengal in 1874 construction of railway 
and irrigation was considered as anti-famine measures. It was estimated 
that in Lower Bengal the capital outlay incurred by the government on 
canals and railways in operation or under construction would be at least 
8,000,000 pound.  Subsequently, it was decided to impose public work cess 
on land to enable the Provincial government to discharge the interest on 
that capital expended on these works and to meet similar obligations in the 
future.  (Strachey & Strachey,1986, p. 157)  
 
In 1877, a Public Works Cess for Provincial purpose was imposed.38 
Zemindars of Bengal again protested against the proposal of imposition of 
new Public Work Cess. The well known Bengal publicist Kristodas Pal, 
attacked the bill on the same ground, as was mentioned before, that it was 
an act of violation of the principle of Permanent Settlement and so was 
unfair to Bengal’s Zemindars. Furthermore, he said that taxation in Bengal 
                                                          
38 “The provincial Public Work Cess imposed in 1877 is not a local cess in any way, 
although for purposes of administrative convenience it is realised with, and in the same 
manner as, road cess. This tax is provincial as its name implies. It is neither locally 
expended nor locally administered. In section 2, Act II (B.C) of 1877, it was declared that 
the public work cess is ‘to be applied to the construction charges and maintenance of 
provincial public works.’ From one point of view this cess may be considered as portion of 
the famine taxation imposed by Lord Lytton’s Government on the people of India... But 
from another point of view, the provincial public work cess must be considered as a further 
development of the system of provincial finance established in 1871. It enforces the 
responsibility of the Local Government for the cost and management of extra ordinary 
public works, such as railways and canals, which have been paid for with borrowed money 
and not out of the revenues of the year”. (Memorandum on Local Taxation in Bengal, 1890, 
p.18) 
 
 As Sir J.Starchey described it, “the additional cess on the land in Bengal was originally 
imposed in 1877, as a part of the modified financial arrangement under which the provincial 
revenues were required to bear the charges on account of the canals and railways 
constructed for the benefit, and for it’s protection against famine. The Bengal taxation 
differed in this respect from that imposed in Northern India. Its character was provincial and 
imperial; and whereas in other provinces the whole of the proceeds of the new rates on the 
land have gone into the imperial treasury, a large portion of them has, in Bengal been left 
at the disposal of the Local Government, over and above the amount paid to the 
Government of India”. (Strachey,J & Strachey, R, The Finances and Public Works of India 
1869-1881,Gian Publishing House, New Delhi, 1986,  p. 201) 
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was much higher compared to other Provinces but Bengal got only a small 
proportion of the total revenue raised in the Province.39 
 
However, the proceeds from public work cess, 1877 in Bengal like road 
cess mentioned earlier, was inadequate to meet the demand. Therefore, 
Bengal’s burden of local taxation as usual continued to be the lowest 
among the Provinces. Table 15 & 16 indicate the burden of local taxation of 
different Provinces in 1888-89 and in 1915-16 respectively. The 
Memorandum on Local Taxation in Bengal, 1890 concluded that in Bengal 
the total proceeds from public work cess till 1890 always fell short of 
expenditure incurred on the above mentioned public work. And ” ...it (public 
work cess )  is always much less than the sum annually expended by this 
Government on ‘the construction, charges and maintenance of ordinary 
provincial public works’, which now exceeds thirty lakhs of rupees and is still 
deplorably insufficient for the requirements of so large a 
province”.(Memorandum on Local Taxation in Bengal, Government of India, 
1890, p. 18)  
 
Table: 15 
Local Taxation in Different Provinces in 1888-89*  
 
Land 
Revenue 
 
 
 
Provincial 
and Local 
Rates 
 
 
Incidence 
on Land 
Revenue 
 
 
Incidence 
of Rates 
 
 
 
Incidence 
of Land 
Revenue 
and Rates 
 
Provinces Population 
  (Rs.)    (Rs.) Rs.  A.   P. Rs.  A.   P. Rs.  A.   P. 
Bombay 16, 454,000 3,27,94,000 26,85,000* 1     15   9 0      2    7 2      2     4 
Madras 30,836,000 4,75,19,000 68,19,000 1      8     7 0      3     6 1    12     1 
NWP 44,136,000 6,73,82,000 66,29,000 1      8     5 0      2     4 1    10    9 
Punjab 18,842,000 2,21,85,000 39,22,000 1     2    11 0      3    3 1     6      2 
Bengal 66,691,000 3,73,99,000 76,20,000 0     8    11 0      1    9 0    10     8 
* These are figures for 1886-87 : later figures not being available 
Source: Memorandum on Local Taxation in Bengal, Calcutta,1890,  p.19 
 
 
Table: 16 
Per Head Local Taxation and Land Revenue in Different Provinces in 
1915-16 
 
Local Taxation 
Per Head 
Land Revenue 
Per Head 
Provinces 
Rs.        A.          P. Rs.       A.          P. 
Bombay   0          6            3 1           5           7 
Punjab   0          6            9 1          12          1 
Madras   0          6            1 2           8           11
Central Provinces   0          4            6 0          10          0 
Bihar & Orissa   0          3            8 0           7          11   
                                                          
39 Palit. R.C, Speeches and Minutes of the Hon’ble Kristodas Pal, 1882, pp. 165-183. 
Quoted in Thomas, P.J, The Growth of Federal Fiancée in India, Oxford University Press, 
London, 1939, p. 212 
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Bengal   0          3            8 0          15         10  
Source: Thomas, P. J, The Growth of Federal Finance In India, Oxford University 
Press, London,  1939, p.  297 
 
In sum it could be said that as a part decentralisation pursued since the 
later part of 19th century, British Indian government wanted to shoulder off 
some of the local responsibilities and consequently it was expected that 
local requirements would be met by local funds. Few number of local 
cesses and taxes imposed on land in Bengal coupled with low incidence of 
local and municipal taxation compared to other Provinces caused starvation 
of funds for local boards of Bengal entrusted with local development. The 
resource gap was unlikely to be met by grants while grants required for 
local purposes to be received from higher level government, were strongly 
discouraged. So the situation in Bengal urgently called for additional 
taxation. Needless to say, it only remained in proposal while any attempt of 
further taxation in Bengal faced stiff opposition on account of the condition 
of Permanent Settlement. Contrary to that Bombay, with which Bengal was 
always compared, made rapid progress in terms of generating local 
resources and consequent improvement of infrastructure. Bengal’s local 
infra-structural development was severely affected due to this inadequacy 
of local funds which in turn had a negative impact on its economy, 
prosperity and buoyancy of Provincial taxes. The situation was further 
aggravated by Meston Award, commencing from 1921. Before turning to 
this area it would be relevant to trace back to the general development of 
Imperial-Provincial financial relations since the advent of the East India 
Company in order to understand the problem of Bengal Province in the 
overall context.  
 
Historical background of Imperial-Provincial financial relations during 
the pre-Meston  era i.e.,   between 1793 and 1921   
 
There are three stages in the development of centralised system in British 
India. The first till 1773 when the Provinces were absolutely independent 
(including finance) to one another and subordinate only to the Company’s 
governing body in London. The second phase starts from 1774 and lasts 
until 1833 during which time a beginning was made in the direction of 
establishing a supreme government in India. And lastly the period 
immediately following 1833 when a highly centralised system was 
established in India.  
 
The foundation of British rule in India laid at Plassey was further 
strengthened by the victory at Buxar in 1764. From 1765-1773 the East 
India Company had no concerted plan of action or even a unified policy for 
the whole of India. Each Province was like a sovereign state. “Each 
possessed the powers of sovereignty, such as the legislative, the penal, 
and the taxing powers. They were independent in their finance.” 
(Amdbedkar,1925, p .7) Such independence changed with the  East India 
Company Act of 1772 or commonly known as the Regulating Act of 1773. 
This Act introduced a centralised system by bringing independent Provinces 
under the control of the Bengal Presidency. The heads of the Bengal 
Government was termed the Governor-General while the heads of the other 
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two Presidencies i.e., Bombay and Madras were called only Governors. 
Subsequent legislation in 1784 further increased the power of the Governor-
General. The East India Company Act  of 1793 carried the process of 
centralisation one step further. The subordinate Presidencies were to obey 
the order of governor council. The centralisation process reached its 
culmination in the Government of India Act, 1833. The Governor General of 
Bengal was renamed Governor-General of India. And all powers i.e., civil, 
administration and revenues were vested in the Governor General council. 
(Ray, 1967, pp. 25-26). The Act of 1833 marked the beginning of the 
omnipotent system of centralisation and was necessarily accompanied by 
the Imperial system of finance. Till then, the subordinate Presidencies 
managed their own finances and made their own regulations, and the 
supreme government had only a general supervision over them. (Thomas, 
1939,  p. 12) 
 
With the introduction of complete centralisation, complain of unequal 
treatment in distributing funds among Provinces came to the surface.It was 
observed “..the distribution of the funds was not based upon any fixed 
principle, nor on the resources, needs or expenditure of the Provinces but 
according to the relative claims and clamour of each Provincial Government 
on the purse of the Government of India.” (Mishra,1942, p. 39) It was, 
however, alleged that the centralised system of exercising absolute control 
over other Presidencies like Bombay and Madras from Calcutta made it 
altogether difficult to know the exact need and particular condition existing 
in these Presidencies which naturally led to inequality of distribution of 
funds among the Provinces. (Thomas, 1939, p.63) 
  
However, besides creating inequity among the Provinces absolute 
centralised system itself suffered from severe financial inadequacy from its 
very inception. Provincial governments were entrusted with collecting 
revenues but did not have the power to impose any tax.  Consequently such 
divorce of financial power from the administration of collecting revenue led 
to extravagance and uneconomic management of Imperial resources. 
Inefficient system of keeping accounts by the Provincial governments 
coupled with extravagance in expenditure practised by the Provinces led to 
chronic deficits every year during the almost whole period of the absolute 
centralised system. Furthermore, the revenue system was dependent on 
one single tax namely the land revenue. This over-concentration of land 
revenue led to an injurious revenue system and in course of time taxing 
capacity of people started declining. (Ambedkar, 1925, p. 12) The 
precarious condition of the Imperial finance became more acute when 
heavy expenditure had to be incurred by the government due to Mutiny in 
1857.  
 
Decentralisation of Finances: Lord Mayo’s Reform 
 
The evil of the  centralised system of finance started becoming apparent 
and led the Imperial government to allow limited decentralisation in 
Provincial finance in order to give some relief to the Imperial exchequer. 
Lord Mayo is said to have played the instrumental role in introducing this 
decentralisation in 1871. The chief object of Mayo’s proposal was the 
 54
transfer of certain administrative services to the Provinces, with fixed 
revenue assignments in order to meet those charges. The departments thus 
handed over were jail, police, education, registration, medical services, 
printing, roads, civil buildings, and miscellaneous public improvements. 
Evidently, they were services essentially of local character. To enable the 
Provincial governments to meet the financial liabilities for these   
departments properly,  the government of India surrendered to them the 
receipts which generated from these services handed over to them along 
with additional assignments from the Imperial funds. The Imperial 
government also provided some grant to them and the rest was expected to 
be met from the imposition of fresh local  taxation.  
 
However, the chief defect of the system, thus introduced, was that the 
Imperial grants were allotted on the basis of expenditure which had been 
reached by  the unsatisfactory methods of apportionment used in those 
days of Centralisation.  The allotments were not based on actual or future 
needs of the Province or with no regard whatsoever to amounts contributed 
by them. No attempt was made to redress these extant injustices. 
Moreover, as the services transferred were mostly related to nation building 
and the expenditure of these was bound to expand. And the assignments 
made to the Provinces for these services were altogether inadequate. Even 
the favoured Province, Bombay considered its allotment most insufficient. 
(Thomas,1939, p.177) Consequently, some Provinces were benefited 
whereas other Provinces were not. “When the assignments were divided on 
that basis in 1870 the injustice of the division became patent to all. The 
Governments which were favoured before were still favoured, and those 
that suffered before had still to bear their undue burdens with 
patience.”(Thomas, 1939, p. 175) However, Bombay, Central Provinces, 
Burma, and the Punjab were said to be favoured and Madras, North-
Western Provinces and Bengal were neglected. (ibid. p. 175) 
 
Lord Lytton Reform, 1877 
 
In 1877, new financial arrangements were made with the Provinces. More 
departments were transferred to Provincial management. To enable the 
Provincial governments to meet expenditure on them efficiently, certain 
minor heads of revenue were also transferred. The chief motive of transfer 
of revenue was that it would create some interest in generating more 
resources. As the Provincialised receipts were not sufficient to meet the 
whole expenditure on the transferred head, the old system of 
assignments/grants had to be continued.  
 
The main defect of the new system was partly the same as before. The 
transferred revenues were not sufficient to meet the charges and the bulk of 
the Provincial expenditure had to be met by the lump sum assigned by the 
government of India. The Provinces had no share in land revenue, then the 
largest source of revenue in India and therefore, they had no interest in 
administering it. The Provincial government had direct interest only in those 
revenue heads which were transferred to them. Consequently, this led to a 
division of interests in the collection of revenue and resulted in inadequate 
revenue collection.  
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The System of Shared Revenue of 1882  
 
The system of shared revenues or ‘divided heads’ was introduced in 1882. 
The principle of the new system was that instead of giving the Provincial 
government fixed sum to cover the deficit of their budget, a certain 
proportion of the Imperial revenue of each Provinces should be earmarked. 
Certain heads of revenue which are definitely Imperial in nature such as 
customs duty,  revenue from opium, receipts from railways were wholly 
reserved as Imperial. Those essentially of Provincial nature such as 
receipts from post office, receipts from law and justice, police, education, 
medical were reserved as Provincial. Between these, there were certain 
important heads such as receipts from forest, excise, assessed tax (income 
tax), registration, stamp etc. which were divided between Imperial and 
Provincial governments. An attempt was thus taken to make Provincial 
governments responsible for the collection of revenues under divided 
heads. The system of fixed lump-sum grant was abolished. Land revenue 
which was mainly under the Imperial head became the means of meeting 
deficits incurred in the Provincial budget. Thus the proceeds of land 
revenue was utilised to meet the deficit of Provincial government’s budget 
along with some grants. Otherwise, it was decided that any surplus, if 
appears in Provincial budget, would be appropriated by the Imperial 
government.40 The system was revived every five years and fresh 
settlements on these lines were made in 1887, 1892, 1897.  
  
Table: 17 
Resumption of Imperial Government from Provincial Resources in 1887       
(In Pounds) 
 
Increase of annual resources under the principal 
Provincial heads of revenues as estimated on 
comparison of 1882 and 1887 
Provinces 
Land Revenue Stamps and 
Excise 
Total 
Amount by which 
annual Provincial 
resources were 
reduced by the 
revision of 1887 
Central 
Provinces 
2,200 45,500 47,700 15,600 
Burma 4,700 9,200 13,000 - 
Assam 22,300 21,300 43,600 24,600 
Bengal 19,200 171,550 190,750 103,600 
North Western 
Provinces 
8,000 130,150 138,150 100,000 
Punjab 32,800 23,100 55,900 - 
                                                          
40 “The balance of revenues and charges thus made Provincial, being against the Local 
Governments, will be rectified for each Province by a fixed percentage on its Land 
Revenue, (otherwise reserved as Imperial”. (Vakil, C.N, Financial Development in Modern 
India 1860-1924, p. 30) “A certain percentage of land revenue, together with fixed cash 
assignments under the same head, was made over to the provinces to make up their 
deficits.”(Jathar G.B & Jathar, K.G, Indian Economics, Oxford University Press, London, 
11957, p. 349)  
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Madras 
27,750 142,550 150,300 174,400 
Bombay 
99,000 198,550 297,550 221,900 
Total 195,950 741,900 937,850 640,100 
Source: Ambedkar, B.R, The Evolution of Provincial Finance In British India A Study in the 
Provincial Decentralisation of Imperial Finance, P.S King & Son, Ltd, London, 1925, p. 111 
 
 
During the revision of the contracts in 1887, the government of India had 
appropriated large share of the increased revenue managed by the 
Provincial governments which amounted to 640,100 pounds sterling. Out of 
the total amount of contribution made by different Provinces to the Imperial 
exchequer,  Bengal’s share was 103,600 pounds sterling whereas in case 
of Madras and Bombay it was 174, 400 pounds  and 221, 900 pounds 
respectively. Therefore, Bengal was least effected in the revision of contract 
of 1887. (table 17) 
 
In the revision of 1892, the government of India faced a severe financial 
stringency i.e., wanted to resume larger amount from the Provinces. The 
revenue of Provincial governments increased by Rs. 2 crores and the 
Imperial government wanted to resume a fourth of the amount resulting in 
discontents among the Provincial governments. This according to the 
Imperial government, was the only option since any further imposition of 
fresh taxes was inexpedient. But the sharing arrangement of Provincial 
revenues was not implemented in an equitable manner. Table 18 indicates 
the total increase of revenue in the different Provinces and the amount 
realised by the Imperial government. It will be seen from the table 18 that  
Bengal having an increase of over Rs. 5 lakh contributed only Rs. 51,900 
while Madras with an increase of Rs. 3 lakh had to contribute Rs. 1 lakh.  
 
 
Table: 18 
Resumption by the Government of India from Provincial Resources in 1892  
Province Increase of Revenue in 1891-92 
(revised estimate) compared 
with the estimate for the 
contract of 188788 to 1891-92  
(Rs.) 
Amount resumed by the 
Government of India 
(Rs.) 
Madras 3,13,200 1,03,800 
Bombay 3,99,200 1,31,100 
Bengal 5,17,700 51,900 
North western Provinces 
and Oudh 
53,300 56,900 
Punjab 1,95,400 41,000 
Central Provinces 1,19, 200 22,700 
Assam 99,800 - 
Lower Burma 3,34,900 58,900 
Source: Thomas, P.J, The Growth of Federal Finance In India, Oxford University Press, 
London, 1939, p. 257  
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In the last quarter of the 19th century the rapid increase of the world 
production of silver caused a discrepancy in the gold-silver ratio. The British 
experts, however, agreed on to continue maintenance of a silver standard 
elsewhere and gold standard at home. Consequently India became the 
main victim of this double standard. “In 1876 the first drastic fall in the 
exchange rate alarmed the Government of India, but the home authorities 
did not permit any remedial measures. In 1877 India absorbed about 84 per 
cent of the world production of silver and the exchange continued to fall. 
There was a conflict of interest between the home authorities and the 
Government of India. The revenues of India were collected in silver but the 
home charges had to be paid in gold. With every fall in the exchange the 
Government of India found it more difficult to make both ends meet...”  
(Rothermund, 1970, pp. 91-93)  
 
As a result Imperial finances once again had been under severe strain. 
Confronted with this situation, the government of India called upon the 
Provinces to make contribution in the aid of the Imperial exchequer. There 
were again usual protest followed by the same argument that fresh taxation 
was inexpedient. The huge drainage from the Provincial to the Imperial 
exchequer and the system of fixed assignment resulted in mounting deficits 
in the Provincial budgets during the last few years of 19th century. 
(Amendkar, 1925, p. 114) 
 
In course of time, the whole system of the Provincial contracts had become 
unpopular. The Provincial governments repeatedly clamoured that the 
condition imposed on them was unfair. They pointed out that while the 
revenues of the country were expanding their own treasuries did not get an 
adequate share of the bounty which could be utilised for local 
improvements. In case they made economies and fostered revenues much 
of the resulting increase was appropriated by the Imperial government at 
every revision. Moreover, if any Province economised, the reduced 
standard of its expenditure was taken as the basis of the next settlement. In  
consequence, in the last few years of contract Provincial governments tried 
to spend all they could because the surplus of balances was sure to be 
taken away by the Imperial government at successive revisions.41 This 
practice tended to reduce the motive for Provincial economy. (Jathar & 
Jathar 1957, p. 532) 
 
Besides that the revisions had an unsettling effect on Provincial 
expenditure. They breached the continuity of the Provincial administration 
which was especially injurious in the matter of public works. Every revision 
had a disturbing and dislocating effect on the all important public works 
department where continuity was the key. Furthermore, the resumption of 
revenues between the several Provinces was unfair and unequal in which 
                                                          
41  Sir, A. Mackenzie, the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, an ardent critique of such 
quinquennial settlements, said that, ”I deprecate the way in which these quinquennial 
revisions have too frequently been carried out. The provincial sheep is summarily thrown 
on its back, close clipped and shorn of its wool and turned out to shiver till the fleece grows 
again... The normal history is this; two years of resumed energy on a normal scale, and 
one year of dissipation of balances in the fear that, if not spent, they will be annexed by the 
supreme Government at the time of revision.” ( Quoted in Mishra, B.R, Indian Provincial 
Finance 1919-39, Oxford University Press, London, 1942, pp. 46-47)       
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some Provinces had to bear more burden than others. Because the 
distribution of the Imperial burdens among the Provinces through large 
resumption at every revision was not based on any intelligible principle of 
ability, population or resources of the Provinces which led to gross 
inequality. (Shah, 1921, p. 397). However, it was alleged that Madras and 
North Western Provinces bore the brunt of Imperial taxation more than the 
other Provinces. (Thomas, P.J, 1939. p. 260) 
 
The Indian National Congress in it’s Calcutta session in 1886 passed a 
resolution disapproving of the system of Provincial contracts and urging that 
the Provinces should be granted larger financial responsibility. Bengal, 
Madras and Bombay also sent representations against the system before 
the Royal Commission on Indian Expenditure (Welby Commission) 
appointed in 1896. The leaders of the Indian National Congress and 
Provincial governments suggested clean division between Imperial and 
Provincial revenues on the basis of the suggestion put forward by the four 
members of the Finance Committee of 1887. This was ultimately adopted in 
1919.  
  
In his evidence before the Welby Commission, 1896, Mr. Gokhale 
vigorously criticised the system of Provincial finance. Subsequently he 
indicated how disproportionate the burden was on the different Provinces. 
As can be noticed that though the percentage contribution of Bengal (68) in 
the resumption of the increment in the Provincial revenue was highest 
followed by N.W. Provinces (76) until the late 19th century, its contribution to 
Imperial exchequer in terms of per 100 of population (Rs. 1,070) was much 
lower than other Provinces. Thus, per capita burden of resumption by 
Imperial government in Bengal was much lower than other Provinces.(table 
19) 
 
 
 
Table: 19 
Unequal Impact of Resumption  Made by Imperial Government  
As presented by Mr. Gokhale before the Welby Commission, 1896 
 
Provinces The Percentage of 
revenue 
surrendered by 
each Provinces to 
the supreme 
government( year) 
The contribution of 
each Provinces per 100 
of population  
(Rs.) 
Central Provinces 56 710 
Burma 58 3,120 
Assam 51 970 
Bengal 68 1,070 
N.W. Provinces 76 1,770 
Punjab 45 820 
Madras 52 1,230 
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Bombay 46 1,550 
India Districts 26 - 
Source: Shah, T.K, Sixty Years of Indian Finance, Bombay Chronicle Press, Bombay, 1921, p. 
397 
 
 
As Mr. Gokhale said,  the following figures “are sufficient to show the totally 
arbitrary character of the present contracts. The fact is that these 
inequalities are a legacy of the Pre-decentralisation days when the 
expenditure of different provinces was determined ... not by the resources 
of those provinces but by the attention that their governments succeeded in 
securing from the central Governments”. (Quoted in Shah, 1921, p. 397)  
 
The Quasi Permanent Settlement 1904-05 
 
The quasi permanent settlement of 1904 was intended to rectify the 
aforementioned defects, at least partly, and intended to introduce an 
element of permanence into the settlements. Government of India declared 
that settlement made with the Provinces were to be permanent and not 
subject to revision in future, except when with extraordinary calamity and 
found to be unfair to a Province/Provinces. By virtue of this proviso the 
settlement was termed quasi permanent. The share of the Provinces in the 
divided heads were fixed on a semi-permanent basis and the practice of 
resuming the Provincial cash balances was given up. The division of 
revenue into Imperial, Provincial and divided heads still remained. Land 
Revenue, excise, stamps, income tax and forests were under divided heads 
in all the Provinces but the division was effected in different proportion in 
the different Provinces. However, the unequal treatment in the matter of the 
Provincial contracts again came to the fore. “Certain Provincial Government 
pointed out to the Decentralisation Commission (1909) that there was 
considerable inequity in the distribution of tax burdens between the different 
provinces.... Bombay was handsomely treated as compared to the rest of 
India.... Complaints of unequal treatment came chiefly from the United 
Provinces which claimed that it had to shoulder much more burden than its 
legitimate share of the Imperial expenses”.(Thomas, 1939, p. 294) Injustice 
was also done to Madras. Yet the Government of India itself admitted in a 
letter to the Secretary of the State in 1910 that Madras and United Province 
were ‘bearing the burnt of the financial burden of the Empire’. (Thomas,  
1939 p. 294) 
 
Unequal contribution to the Central exchequer in 1910 would be evident 
from the table 20 below. In case of some Provinces such as Punjab and 
Burma, a large part of the revenue thus contributed returned to them. These 
two Provinces made larger proportional contributions but this was made up 
by the government of India spending more generously in those Provinces. 
On the other hand Madras and United Provinces contributed large amount 
to the Central government’s exchequer but the proportion of revenue spent 
within their territories was among the lowest. However, the contributions by 
Bengal and Bombay were least though Bengal and Bombay were the 
wealthiest Provinces in India and during that time and started emerging as 
industrial centres. But these two industrially advanced Provinces bore 
lighter burdens of taxation as the income tax structure was still under-
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developed. The burden of taxation thus, fell more heavily on the poorer 
agriculturists of Madras and United Provinces for land was rather heavily 
taxed particularly in temporary settled regions. Thomas, 1939 pp. 294-295) 
 
Table: 20 
Unequal Distribution of Imperial Burden on Different Provinces in 1910  
 
Provinces Percentage of revenue 
contributed to the Central 
Government   
Percentage of revenue spent in 
the Province 
Madras 49.23 57 
United Provinces 48.77 60 
Punjab 48.10 84 
Bengal 36.86 76 
Burma 35.07 83 
Bombay 34.19 76 
Eastern Bengal and 
Assam 
34.19 72 
Central Provinces 30.94 82 
Source: Thomas, P.J, The Growth of Federal Finance In India, Oxford University Press, 
London, 1939, p. 295 
 
 
Permanent Settlements of 1912    
 
The Royal Commission on Decentralisation (1909) investigated the 
Provincial and Imperial finances. Consequently certain principles of 
allocation of collecting and sharing of revenue and charges between the 
Imperial and Provincial governments was approved by the Commission 
without proposing any radical change in it. However, following the 
recommendation of the Commission, the government of India decided to 
make a few modifications in the existing pattern of allocation of revenue and 
charges and wanted to make the settlement permanent since the year 
1912. 
 
Government of India laid down the principle (endorsed by the 
Decentralisation Commission) that the same share of the chief sources of 
revenue should be given to each Province in order to ensure a reasonable 
equality of treatment. Unfortunately this principle too failed to bring any 
uniformity as regards the share of revenue in each head allotted to the 
Provinces. For instance, while Madras, Punjab and Burma got only one-half 
of the excise revenue, Bengal the United Provinces and the Central 
Provinces got three fourths and the other Provinces received the whole. 
This again resulted in unequal growth of revenue of different Provinces 
during the period of 1912-13 to 1920-21. (table 21)  
 
 
Table: 21 
Percentage of Growth Between 1912-13 and 1920-21 Under the Principal Heads of Revenue of 
the Provinces 
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Provinces Excise General  
Stamps 
Land Revenue  
And other  
Provincial Heads 
All Provincial  
Heads 
Madras 70.24 63.22 11.66 29.06 
Bombay 102.57 119.13 32.00 52.43 
Bengal 35.91 69.49 13.52 22.30 
United Provinces 43.70 45.75 17.13 20.82 
Punjab 106.78 73.73 26.86 34.88 
Burma 36.15 26.62 33.52 33.65 
Bihar & Orissa 24.20 55.29 4.53 11.20 
Central Provinces 19.00 48.25 26.30 33.18 
Assam 44.26 22.22 20.60 28.00 
All the 9 
Provinces 
62.27 69.24 20.98 39.48 
Source: Indian Statutory Commission, Vol. V, Swati Publications, New Delhi, 1988, p. 833 
 
 
The percentage increase of revenue was much higher in Punjab Madras 
and Bombay than in Bengal and United Provinces. Therefore percentage 
growth of revenue under the Provincial heads during 1912-13 to 1920-21 for 
Bengal was only 22.30 as against 29.06 in Madras, 34.88 in Punjab and 
52.43 per cent in Bombay. (table 21) This inequity was said to have further 
accentuated by the introduction of Meston award, 1921 in which Bengal 
Province was the worst affected. But Bengal, as is evident from table 21, 
started experiencing the financial crisis much before the introduction of the 
Meston settlement while Bengal  registered much lower growth in Provincial 
revenue compared to other Provinces. The reason behind it was difficult to 
seek. In permanently settled Bengal, land revenue already lost its buoyancy 
and  became an inelastic source of revenue. During early part of the 19th 
century rapid industrialisation, particularly export oriented, did take place in  
Bengal. But the ever expanding custom duty falling under the Imperial head 
failed to improve financial health of the Bengal government. On the other 
hand  income tax falling under the divided heads was shared between the 
Provincial and Imperial governments until 1921 i.e. until the implementation 
of Government of India Act 1919. That too did not seem to help Bengal that 
much for, as Thomas (1939) argued, that the income tax structure was yet 
to develop in the early part of the 20th century. Income tax and professional 
or certificate taxes were levied at very low rates during 1861 to 1919. (Das 
Gupta, 1948, p. 287) Therefore, exclusion of customs revenue from the 
Provincial heads coupled with inelastic land revenue and underdeveloped 
income tax collections until the early part of 20th century made the finance 
of Bengal much worse than other Provinces. Meston award (1921), 
however, accentuated the problem further by excluding customs duty and 
income tax both from the Provincial heads of revenue that consequently 
gave rise to the demand for total abolition of this system and the feeling of 
being disfavoured compared to other Provinces.    
 
However, if we follow the evolution of the Imperial-Provincial finance, we 
can hardly overlook the fact that  there was no well thought out plan on 
different systems of Imperial-Provincial finance undertaken from time to 
time. Neither adequate attention was paid to the need of a particular 
Province or Provinces nor the capacity of Provinces to cope with the 
different systems was taken into account. All that mattered was the urgency 
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to meet the immediate need of the time and i.e., the need of the Imperial 
government for further consolidation and expansion of its territory.  
Therefore, different experiments were undertaken from time to time in 
relation  to the Imperial-Provincial finance in an ad hoc manner. All these 
eventually led to varying stage of development among Provinces widening  
regional disparities. Perceiving the problem in this overall perspective, it 
may be noted that not only Bengal but other Provinces too were affected in 
different degrees and eventually carried this legacy of deep-seated inter-
Provincial disparity in resource mobilising potential in to the post-
Independence days.           
 
Bengal Provincial finance under Meston Settlement and compared to 
other Provinces 
 
The passing of the Government of India Act, 1919 marked the end of an era 
and the beginning of a new. The financial system adopted in India in 1919 
was a halfway measure between unitary and federal. It was, however, 
proposed to hand over to the Provinces the entire financial responsibility-
both, of revenue realisation and expenditure. The old system of divided 
head was discarded and the total revenue of India was shared between the 
Central and the Provincial Governments.  Therefore, proceeds from income 
tax, custom duties, salt tax, opium tax, contribution from railways, posts and 
telegraphs were allotted to the Centre while land revenue, liquor tax, excise, 
irrigation receipts, forests, stamps (both general and judicial) and 
registration fees became Provincial sources of revenue.  
 
As a result the Central government was faced with a heavy annual deficit of 
Rs. 18.5 crores. and the Provincial governments gained Rs.18.5 crores. In 
order to meet the deficit of the Centre the Joint Report suggested a system 
of contribution from each Provinces assessed on the basis of their normal 
surplus. This proposal was strongly opposed by several Provinces. In order 
to ease the difficult situation the Financial Relation Committee was 
appointed, with Lord Meston as chairman, to inquire into the whole question 
of the financial relations between the Central government and the 
Provinces. After considering different aspects of the situation the Meston 
committee concluded that the guiding principle in this matter should be the 
capacity to contribute and the Committee recommended a fixed ratio of 
contribution which came into force in 1921-22. Protest from two industrial 
Provinces such as Bombay and Bengal became stronger. They emphasised 
on the fact that being centres of commercial and trade activities their 
indirect contribution in the form of custom, salt and income tax was much 
larger than other Provinces and their finances tended to be already in a 
precarious condition as the ever-expanding revenue sources were kept 
under the Imperial government by the Government of India Act, 1919. 
Therefore, they opposed the programme of any further contribution to the 
Central exchequer and considered the whole arrangement unfair and 
demanded complete revision of the whole settlement. Bengal’s financial 
situation gradually became much worse than other Provinces much before 
the introduction of Meston settlement as we have discussed earlier. 
Consequently,  the case of Bengal had been recommended for special 
consideration to the government of India. As a result, certain remission in 
 63
the contribution of Bengal was agreed upon for a period of three years 
commencing from1922-23. However, in 1926-27 the system of contribution 
was abolished altogether for all Provinces.  
 
Abolition of the system of contribution augmented the resources of the 
agricultural Provinces such as Punjab and Madras but industrial Provinces 
were still left with a comparatively inadequate and non-expanding resource 
base. It was, however, recognised that the allocation of the entire receipts 
of land revenue to the Provinces and the entire receipts from income tax 
and custom duties to the Imperial government had penalised the industrial 
Provinces to the benefit of the agricultural Provinces.(Simon Commission 
Report on India (SCRI) Vol. V, p. 961) In order to eliminate such injustice,  
Joint Select Committee decided to allocate part of the proceeds from 
income tax to the Provinces which was known as Devolution Rule 15 and 
was particularly aimed at benefiting two industrial Provinces. Unfortunately 
Bengal and Bombay were the only two Provinces which have not benefited 
by the Devolution rule 15. Whereas other Provinces for whose benefit the 
rule was not introduced gained by varying amounts of revenue. It is evident 
from the table 22 that the rule had failed to give the industrial provinces 
such as Bombay any share of the income tax for Bombay had received 
nothing since 1922-23 and Bengal since 1921-22. 
 
  
Table: 22 
Amount Realised by the Provinces under Devolution Rule 15 
   
                                                                                              (Rs. in lakhs) 
Province 1921-22 1922-23 1923-24 1924-25 1925-26 1926-27 1927-28 1928-29 
Budget 
Madras 4.08 -- 10.82 
(5.66) 
1.57 4.27 4.64 5.20 6.50 
Bombay 14.72 3.00 -- 
(13.50) 
-- -- -- -- -- 
Bengal 0.95 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
United 
Provinces 
3.20 0.33 -- -- 0.03 -- -- -- 
Punjab 0.30 5.69 4.24 
(0.06) 
1.90 3.82 4.02 3.50 4.00 
Burma 3.85 -- 
(1.11) 
0.38 
(-0.08) 
5.90 8.92 14.32 15.00 14.00 
Bihar & 
Orissa 
0.58 2.87 2.55 2.55 2.41 3.25 3.60 3.50 
Central 
Provinces 
0.90 1.49 
(0.39) 
3.42 2.30 1.36 2.18 1.60 2.00 
Assam 0.02 1.15 4.16 5.54 5.29 4.92 6.00 6.00 
Total 28.60 14.53 
(1.50) 
25.57 
(19.14) 
19.76 26.10 33.33 34.90 36.00 
Source: Simon Commission Report on India (Indian Statutory Commission), Vol. V, Reprinted 
by Swati Publications, New Delhi, 1988, p. 868 
 
 
However, as mentioned earlier, the major contention of the industrial 
Provinces was, ever expanding sources of revenue such as income tax, 
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custom duties fell under the Imperial heads. In contrast the Provinces 
particularly Bengal and Bombay were left with inelastic source of revenue. 
Thus over time almost all Imperial revenues exhibited large potentials of 
expansion and growth over the years. On the contrary revenues under the 
Provincial heads indicated declining tendency over the years. (see 
Appendix table 1  &   table 2 ) In the course of last several decades the 
customs and income tax receipts registered considerable increase but the 
land revenue showed declining tendency.42   
 
Considering Bengal separately, it can be noticed that on the one hand 
Bengal started developing as an industrial Province with two main industries 
namely jute and tea while on the other hand land revenue in Bengal-one of 
the major revenues became inelastic. The two major industries of Bengal, 
jute and tea both were mainly export based and earned considerable 
amount of customs duties and income tax. Neither of these, however, were 
under the purview of Provincial taxation. Excise, another important 
Provincial tax also was not a very elastic source of revenue in Bengal. 
When the income from excise in Madras with a population of 42 millions 
was Rs. 5 crores and in Bombay with population of 19 million is Rs. 4.5 
crores, the revenue from excise in Bengal with population of 47 millions was 
only 2.25 crores. Moreover, there was a political tendency towards 
prohibition of liquor which was likely to result in further reduction in the 
proceeds from excise. (Gupta, 1928, p. 8) Low level of per head land 
revenue and per head excise of Bengal could be evidenced from the table 
23.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table: 23 
Burden of Per-Head Land Revenue & Excise in the Various Provinces in 1928-29  
              Land Revenue 
Per head Per acre 
Excise  
Per head 
Provinces 
Rs.     A.          P. Rs.       A.      P. Rs.      A.        P. 
Bengal 1         3            8 0         11       0 0          7          2 
Bihar & Orissa 0         9            5 0          8         6 0          8          1 
Bombay 1        11           6 2          7         9 1         12         9 
Madras 2         5            0 1         14        9 1          3          3 
                                                          
42 The land revenue which was the most important and major source of revenue started 
showing declining tendency since the later part of 19th century while other taxes such as 
income tax, customs and railways gained importance. In the first period,before the 
imposition of income tax in 1860, land revenue constituted between 61 and 73 per cent of 
the total revenues of India. During the second period, from 1861 to 1919, when income tax 
or professional certificate taxes were levied at lower rates the percentage of land revenue 
to total revenue came down significantly and varied between 40 and 50 per cent. During 
the third period of higher income tax rates and high customs duties from 1916 onwards the 
percentage came down still further and it was about 20 per cent during early part and 
middle of the 20th century. (Das Gupta, B, Provincial Taxation Under Autonomy, Oxford 
University Press, London, 1948, p. 287) 
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United Provinces 2         0            0 1         15        9 0          4          4 
Punjab 2         5            7 3          6         4 0          8          3 
Source: Thomas, P. J, The Growth of Federal Finance in India, Oxford University Press, 
London, 1939, p. 348 
 
Therefore, the growth of revenue in Bengal was confined to stamps duty, 
registration charges and small item like amusement taxes. Thus, the 
allocation of revenue sources in the Government of India Act,1919 was 
particularly quite unfavourable for Bengal. Other Provinces sought to 
enhance their revenue by additional taxation on land but Bengal could not 
do so. So far any attempt to impose cesses on land in Bengal was only 
partially successful. Therefore, while other major Provinces managed to 
increase their revenue after the introduction of Meston Settlement,  in case 
of Bengal there was no such proportionate increase. Among the major 
Provinces, Madras was able to increase its revenue per head from  Rs.1.9  
in 1913-14 to Rs. 4 in 1925-26, Punjab increased it from Rs. 2.4 to Rs. 5.8 
and Bombay from Rs. 4.1 to Rs. 8  during the same period. Contrary to that 
Bengal was able to increase its revenue from Rs. 1.4 in 1913-14 to  Rs. 2.5 
only in 1925-26. (Gupta, 1928, p. 4) The budget speech given by the 
Finance Member of Bengal while introducing the budget for 1927-28 bore 
the testimony to the acute financial crisis faced by Bengal during the period. 
As he said, “Even if the contribution to the Government of India is remitted, 
either temporarily or permanently, we shall have to face a deficit of Rs. 
37,13, 000 in next year budget. In these circumstances we may be able to 
carry on for a year or so, but not unless we can see ultimate relief in the 
near future; and that relief must take the shape of a new Financial 
Settlement which will leave Bengal with an expanding income adequate for 
her needs and proper development.” (quoted in Gupta, 1928, p. 10)    
 
Paradoxical to the continuous deterioration of Bengal’s financial position its 
contribution to the Imperial exchequer had been increasing and was much 
higher than other Provinces. Table 24 below shows that major portion of the 
Imperial revenues was contributed by the two Provinces-Bengal and 
Bombay. Bengal’s share in the Imperial revenue in 1921-22 was Rs. 23.11 
lakhs which was highest among the Provinces except Bombay which 
contributed Rs 24.62 lakhs. In 1928-29 Bengal had the largest share of 
Central revenue which was Rs. 26.77 lakhs followed by Bombay Rs. 24.83 
lakhs. In contrast only Rs. 8.95 lakhs in 1921-22 and only Rs. 10.97 lakhs in 
1928-29 was left as a Provincial share of revenue in Bengal. The 
memorandum submitted by the Bengal government to the Simon 
Commission Report on India (SCRI, Vol. VIII, p. 88)  also mentioned about 
the largest contribution made by Bengal to Central exchequer. Contrary to 
that the Province managed to retain the smallest percentage of its 
resources for meeting its needs (table 25). Furthermore, if the Imperial and 
Provincial taxation are taken together the incidence of taxation per head of 
the population was much higher in Bengal than in any other Province 
except for Bombay (table 26) (SCRI , Vol. VIII, p.90) 
 
 
Table: 24 
Share of Central Revenue and Provincial Revenue in Each Provinces Between 
1921-22 and 1928-29 
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                                                                                                                 (In lakhs  of Rs.) 
           1921-22             1925-26             1928-29 Provinces 
Central Provincial Central Provincial Central Provincial 
Bengal 23.11 8.95 26.24 10.71 26.77 10.97 
Madras 
8.85 15.23 6.64 16.93 7.67 17.58 
Bombay 24.62 13.67 23.88 15.58 24.83 15.22 
Punjab 2.41 8.85 .71 12.66 1.01 18.15 
U.P 3.74 12.42 1.64 12.70 4.22 11.45 
Source: Gupta, J.N, The Case for Financial Justice to Bengal, Calcutta University 
Press, 1931, p. 34 
 
 
Table: 25 
Percentage of Revenues of the Government of India Derived from Different 
Provinces Between 1921-22 and 1925-26 
              Percentages in- Provinces 
1921-22 1925-26 
Bengal  
36.0 45.0 
U.P 
6.0 1.6 
Madras 12.3 9.6 
B. & Orissa 0.7 0.7 
Punjab 4.0 1.5 
Bombay 39.0 40.0 
C.P 1.5 1.0 
Assam 0.5 0.6 
Total 100.00 100.00 
Source: Simon Commission Report On India (Indian Statutory Commission), Vol. 
VIII, p. 88 
 
Table: 26     
Per Head Central and Provincial Taxation and Combined Per Head Taxation    
(1925-26) 
 
Province Provincial 
taxation 
Rs.  A. 
Central Taxation 
Rs.  A. 
Total 
Rs.   A. 
Bengal 
2.5 5.3 7.8 
U.P 2.13 0.9 3.6 
Madras 4.0 1.11 5.11 
Bihar & Orissa 1.11 0.1 1.12 
Punjab 5.8 0.14 5.6 
Bombay 8.0 11.11 19.11 
C.P 4.0 0.7 4.7 
Assam 3.5 0.8 3.13 
Source: Simon Commission Report On India (Indian Statutory Commission), Vol. 
VIII, p. 90 
 
It may be true that not all money raised in Bengal by way of customs duties 
and income tax was  paid by the people of Bengal. But the part paid by  
people from outside was likely to be comparatively small. An analysis of 
income tax assessment was made in 1920 by the Financial Relation 
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Committee which showed that over 90 per cent of income tax collected in 
Calcutta came solely from Bengal. (SCRI, Vol. VIII, p.86) 
 
The memorandum submitted by the government of Bengal to the Indian 
Statutory Commission commented that, “The custom revenue is derived 
from both import and export duties. It is not possible to say what part of the 
imports paying duty at Calcutta goes to areas outside Bengal, but it is 
certain that the larger part is consumed in Bengal.  With regard to exports, 
there is no question. Almost all the jute and much of the rice and tea on 
which export duties have been levied at Calcutta are grown in Bengal”. 
SCRI, Vol. VIII, p.86) Thus almost whole of the export revenue, one of the 
most expanding sources of income, increasing from Rs. 2.92 lakhs in 1919-
20 to Rs. 3.64 lakhs in 1925-26 was derived from Bengal. (table 27) 
 
 
Table: 27 
Customs Duties Derived from Bengal Between 1919-20  and 1925-26 
                                                                                         (In Lakhs of  Rs.) 
Items/Year 1919-20 1925-26 
Jute 2,92 3,64 
Tea 50 43 
Rice 2 7 
 
Source: Simon Commission Report On India (Indian Statutory Commission),  Vol. 
VIII, p.86 
 
Denial of any share in expanding areas of revenues such as income tax and 
custom duties or indeed from any revenue based on the commercial and 
industrial wealth of the Provinces except that from the stamp duty, has been 
felt more acutely because ‘the Province has been burdened with the 
increasing cost of administration which the commercial and industrial 
development made necessary’.(SCRI, Vol. VIII, p.86)  Furthermore, it was 
alleged by the government of Bengal that abolition of Provincial contribution 
was possible because of rapid increase of revenue from custom duties 
since 1921. This enabled the government of India to abolish the Provincial 
contribution. In other words, people of the industrial Provinces namely 
Bengal are now making the contribution for other Provinces. (SCRI, Vol. 
VIII, p.91) 
 
The government of Bengal urged total revision of the Meston Settlement  
before the Reform Commission which was entrusted to review the financial 
condition of both Imperial and Provincial government. Government of 
Bengal claimed that, the existing financial settlement was wrong and treated 
Bengal most unfairly, and owing to that Bengal had been suffering from 
shortage of funds. Thus, the working of the reformed constitution in Bengal 
was so hampered that the ministers in the nation building departments had 
found it extremely difficult to carry on their work. We would like to turn to 
this area later on.  
 
Consequently the demand for sharing the proceeds from jute duty and 
income tax came to the fore. While it was admitted that Permanent 
Settlement inhibited the government of Bengal from realising revenue from 
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further increase in valuation of land43 in general (table 28 & 29) compared to 
other temporarily settled Provinces and particularly from expanding 
commercial crops such as jute. The government of India, however,  
managed to appropriate the benefit from such commercial crops in the form 
of income tax, customs duty and railways receipts. Therefore, “Almost the 
whole of the jute crop grown in Bengal and its development since the days 
of the Permanent Settlement represents a great increase in the agricultural 
wealth of Bengal but because of the Permanent Settlement it has added 
nothing to the land revenue. Its revenue producing values is taken by the 
Government of India in the form of export duty, income tax and railway 
receipts and Bengal gets nothing”.(Memorandum Submitted by the 
Government of Bengal to the Indian Statutory Commission, SCRI, Vol. VIII, 
p. 84).  However, it was said that Bengal shared with Bihar and Orissa the 
unwelcome effects of Permanent Settlement which prevents the expansion 
of land revenue and with Bombay the loss of revenue derived from 
industrial and commercial wealth but Bengal alone suffers from the both of 
these adversities. 
 
Table: 28 
Land Revenue from Different Provinces  Between 1912-13 and 1925-26 
                                                                        (In Thousands of Rs. ) 
               Land Revenue in Provinces 
          1912-13        1925-26 
Difference 
Permanently Settled 
Provinces 
   
Bengal   2,70,42 2,78,77 +8,35 
Bihar and Orissa 1,49,21 1,55,71 +6,50 
Other Provinces    
United Provinces 6,64,13 7,04,99 +19,86 
Madras 6,83,62 7,18,18 +64,56 
Punjab 3,15,79 1,57,58 +1,41,79 
Bombay 3,92,26 5,03,68 +1,11,42 
Central Provinces 1,80,04 2,02,78 +22,74 
Burma 2,86,16 4,08,29 +1,22,13 
Assam 71,50 92,54 +21,94 
Source: Simon Commission Report On India (Indian Statutory Commission), VIII, p. 83 
 
Table: 29 
                                                          
43 It was a matter of great dissatisfaction during that time which was also expressed in the 
report of the Simon Commission Report on India that with the passage of time, there was a 
substantial growth of towns and also trade and industries. Therefore, consequent increase 
in the valuation of permanently settled land had been appropriated by the few. “There is a 
land in the city of Calcutta, the owner of which pays in land revenue a little over a quarter of 
a rupee per acre, although the annual value of the land runs into thousands of rupees. 
Most of the up-country towns in Bengal are built upon permanently settled land, which... 
escapes any increased land revenue and pays only a fraction of rupee per acre.” (SCRI, 
Vol. I, p. 340) Furthermore, there was huge unearned income due to the exclusion of 
certain source of revenue at the time of Permanent Settlement. “The Government had also 
suffered loss of revenue from minerals and from fisheries in certain navigable rivers as 
these natural resources had not been taken into account at the time of Permanent 
Settlement. The annual loss ‘in this generation’ resulting from the Permanent Settlement 
might be estimated at anything between Rs. 2 crores and Rs. 8 crores. (Banerjee, A.C, The 
Agrarian System of Bengal, Vol. 2: 1793-1955, K.P. Bagchi & Company, Calcutta, 1981, 
pp.384) 
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Land Revenue Per head in Different Provinces in 1925-26 
Permanently Settled Provinces Land Revenue Per Head in 1925-26 
Rs.     A.* 
Bengal 0        10 
Bihar and Orissa 
0        7 
Other Provinces  
United Provinces 
1       9 
Madras 1      11 
Punjub 2       8 
Bombay 2       7 
Central Provinces 1       7 
Burma 4      15 
Assam 
1       3 
Source: Simon Commission Report On India (Indian Statutory Commission), Volume VIII, P.84 
*16 Anna=1Rs.  
4 pice = 1 Anna 
 
Some scholars namely Shah (1921), Misra (1942), Thomas (1939), on the 
contrary, perceived this Meston Settlement as a rectification of a long 
standing financial injustice to some Provinces and welcomed it. They were 
of the opinion that Bengal should not ask for favour instead the Province 
should take necessary steps to increase its own revenue. It was often 
pointed out by the ‘government of Bengal that its financial difficulties on 
account of Permanent Settlement are special and hence the Province 
needs favoured treatment’. It was argued that Bengal had already received 
favoured treatment for long by not contributing enough resources in the 
form of land revenue (Misra,1942, pp. 153-154) Before Bengal emerged as 
an industrial Province, its contribution to the Indian finance was waning 
particularly after middle of the 19th century. Since then proceeds from land 
revenue of Bengal started declining compared to other Provinces resulted in 
lower level of contribution of Bengal to Imperial exchequer. The table 30 
brings out the fact that while other Provinces made rapid progress in the 
percentage share of Provincial revenue to total revenue over the period 
from 1871-72 to 1918-19, Bengal’s percentage share to the total revenue 
increased at a lower pace than other major Provinces such as Bombay and 
Madras. While Bengal’s percentage share of  provincial revenue increased 
from 2.8 per cent in 1870-71 to 4.00 per cent in 1918-19 as against 
Bombay’s percentage share increased from 1.8 per cent in 1871-72 to 5.45 
in 1918-19 and Madras from 1.59 in 1871-72 to 4.75 in 1918-19. Owing to 
that, other Provinces had to bear unequal tax burden. Such inequality, as 
said by Thomas (1939) was rectified after the reform which is apparent from 
the table 30.  
 
Table: 30 
Percentage Growth of Provincial Finance Between 1871-72 and 1918-19 
 
Provincial revenues as a percentage of the total revenues of India Provinces 
1871-72 1882-83 1892-93 1904-05 1912-13 1918-19 
C.P .655 1.055 .863 .905 2.52 1.715 
Burma .572 1.66 2.256 3.023 4.73 3.57 
Bengal 2.8 5.9 4.72 4.12 5.56 4.00 
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N.W.P & 
Oudh 
1.99 4.16 3.6 - - - 
Punjab 1.66 1.59 1.888 2.08 3.96 3.11 
Madras 1.596 3.32 3.3 2.88 6.27 4.75 
Bombay 1.8 4.9 4.49 4.05 6.17 5.45 
Assam - .61 .738 .597 1.38 1.00 
U.P - - - 2.99 5.5 4.15 
Bihar 
&Orissa 
- - - - 2.6 1.9 
Total 
Provincial 
11.11 22.8 21.75 20.4 38.6 29.2 
Source:  Ambedkar, B.R, The Evolution of Provincial Finance in British India, A Study in the 
Provincial Decentralisation of Imperial Finance, P.S. King & Son, Ltd., London, 1925,  p. 136 
 
 
 
Table: 31 
Increase of Revenue of Different Provinces Between 1921-22 and 1928-29 
                                                                           (In lakhs of Rs.) 
Provinces Revenue 1921-22 
(deducting 
contributions) 
Revenue  
1928-29 
Percentage 
increase 
Madras 11.46 17.53 53 
Bombay 13.11 15.22 16 
Bengal 8.32 10.99 32 
United Provinces 10.02 11.45 14 
Punjab 7.10 11.16 57 
Burma 9.18 11.12 21 
Bihar & Orissa 4.43 5.87 30 
Central Provinces 4.63 5.36 16 
Assam 1.81 2.74 50 
Total Provincial 
revenues 
70.06 91.44 30 
Source: Thomas, P.J, The Growth of Federal Finance in India, Oxford University Press, 
London, 1939, p. 346 
 
It is also clear from table 31 that the Punjab and Madras enjoyed a much 
larger increase after the Meston settlement of revenue than Bombay, United 
Provinces, Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. But it may not be necessarily 
concluded, as Thomas (1939) argued, that the Meston Settlement was 
unfair to Bengal along with other Permanently Settled Provinces. This 
result, in his opinion, was partly due to the rectification of the longstanding 
injustice suffered by certain Provinces before the Government of India Act, 
1919. However, Madras and United Provinces contributed before Meston 
Settlement much larger proportion of their total revenue to the Central 
exchequer than Bengal and Bombay. As land revenue was under divided 
heads and the incidence of which was much higher in these two Provinces 
than in Bengal and Bombay. But this inequality was hidden by the system of 
‘divided heads’ and was largely rectified in the Act of 1919. (Thomas, 1939, 
p. 346 ) 
 
In British India land was subject to two taxes: local rates (cesses) and land 
revenue. Since over time Permanent Settlement prevented the land 
revenue from being an expansive source of revenue. It was also suggested 
that  necessary revision of land revenue settlement (Permanent Settlement) 
 71
should be done by the Bengal government instead of asking for special 
concessions. Because with the inception of Government of India Act, 1919 
land revenue came under the purview of Provincial government which 
would eventually help Bengal, as suggested by some scholars, to overcome 
the severe financial crisis.44 In line with this argument it was also suggested 
that Bengal should take necessary steps to augment its revenue not only 
through alteration of the arrangement of Permanent Settlement but also 
through imposition of  further local cess on land instead of asking for favour. 
But increasing Bengal’s revenue through the existing cesses was difficult 
not only due to stiff opposition from Zemindars  but also actualising more 
revenue from cesses on land revenue was limited by the fact that the 
valuation of land had not been revised for a long time and the rate of cess 
on land was based on outdated valuation. Valuation was made at very long 
intervals sometimes of 30 or 40 years or more after the first imposition of 
the road cess (1871) and public works cess (1877). So income from them 
made only a meagre amount. In order to increase Provincial revenue some 
rectification was urgently necessary. (Das Gupta, 1948, p. 343).  
 
However, the question of abolition of Permanent Settlement and imposition 
of cess gave rise to substantial debate among the scholars of Bengal. It 
was argued that possible increase of revenue through abolition of 
Permanent Settlement could not justify the deprivation made to Bengal 
since the Meston settlement.45 Besides, any new local cess on land would 
have meant injustice for present owner of the land while the Permanent 
Settlement,1793 had created large number of intermediaries between the 
original landlords and tenant through sub-infeudation.46The counter 
                                                          
44 “Now that under the Reform Act, Land Revenue has been made an entirely Provincial 
receipt. The Bengal Government may find it less difficult than before to increase their land 
revenue, in case of necessity. Instead of these we find the curious position that on the plea 
that their land recvenue is fixed and therefore small, they should have concessions in the 
matter of provincial contributions, and i fact, they have succeded in getting certain 
concessions. “ (Vakil, C.N, Financial Development in Modern India, Bombay & London, 
1924, p. 352) 
45 The criticisms (a) that Bengal can easily get rid of the Permanent Settlement, and (b) 
that this will bring substantial relief to the Province, are unfounded. In any case a possible 
increase of revenue by the abolition of the Permanent Settlement can not justify the 
deprivation of Bengal of her Provincial Revenue. Dutta Roy B.N (ed.) Sir N.N. Sircar’s 
Speeches and Pamphlets, The Book Company Ltd., Calcutta, 1934, p. 108)  
46 The opposition against local cess on land was evident from Gupta’s comment (1928) “It 
has sometimes been argued that the province enjoying the benefits of the Permanent 
Settlement should impose some form of local taxation on land, but this proposal of 
circumventing the Permanent Settlement has been closely examined and has been 
declared to be undesirable both on administrative and equitable grounds”.(Gupta, J.N, The 
Financial Starvation of Bengal, Calcutta, 1928, p. 7).  
Das Gupta summarised the opposition against local cess on land of Bengal in the following 
manner: “ the opposition takes two distinct lines.. first they oppose the levy itself. An 
unequal levy on land hits the present owners of land doubly; they have to pay the tax; and 
the value of their land is reduced by the capitalised value of the tax.... secondly, the 
landlords object to the manner of collection under which they have to pay to Government 
the entire cess payable by themselves as well as by the ryots in anticipation of collecting 
the ryot’s portion. The ryot’s portion is difficult to collect in time because (a) the ryots in the 
permanently settled areas are accustomed to run up for three years in respect of rents and 
cesses, (b) the primary education cess (imposed in 1938) being new, the ryots make 
difficulties about paying it. Hence the landlords have always to pay in advance of collection. 
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argument was that the only person who suffered due to imposition of cess 
was the owner of the land at the time of levy. Later on the person to whom 
the land was transferred reduced the market price of the land by an amount 
equal to the capitalised value of the revenue or cess. Hence to the 
transferee the land revenue or the cess is no burden even if he is made to 
pay them. Further, it was argued that “the inequality will diminish with the 
passage of time until it entirely disappears in the newly established 
equilibrium”. (Das Gupta, 1948, pp. 346-351)    
 
The Meston Settlement resulted in the shortages of resources and 
mounting deficits in Bengal’s finance leaving a very little sum for 
development purposes. Therefore, continued financial crisis of the Province 
had adverse impact on those departments of administration dealing with the 
moral and material progress of the people namely public health, agriculture, 
irrigation, industries and mass education. Let’s compare the position of 
Bengal with other Provinces. Table 32, 33 & 34 indicate the increase of 
expenditure on nation building services of Bengal during 1920s compared 
to other Provinces. From the table 32 it is evident that during 1922-23 to 
1929-30 the percentage increase of Bengal on nation building services  was 
the lowest, 14 per cent as against 86 per cent in Madras, 82 per cent in 
Punjab  and 25 per cent in Bombay. ( see table 3 in Appendix) 
 
 
Table: 32 
Expenditure on Nation Building Services by Different Provinces  
Between 1922-23 and 1929-30 
                                                                                                    (Rs. in Lakhs) 
Provinces 1922-23 1929-30 Increase Percentage increase 
Madras 411.3 763.8 352.5 86 
Punjab 299.0 542.7 243.7 82 
United Provinces 298.0 388.2 90.2 30 
Bombay 453.5 567.6 114.1 25 
Bengal 353.9 404.0 50.1 14 
Source: Simon Commission Report On India (Indian Statutory Commission), Volume II, p. 234 
 
Table: 33 
Percentage Increase of Expenditure on Education and Medical Relief & Public Health of Different 
Provinces Between 1922-23 and 1929-30 
 
Provinces Education Medical Relief & Public 
Health 
Madras 82 115 
Punjab 78 94 
United Provinces 47 67 
Bombay 23 43 
Bengal 21 24 
Source: Simon Commission Report On India (Indian Statutory Commission), Volume II, p. 234 
 
Table: 34 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
This cause hardship to them.” (Das Gupta, B, Provincial Taxation Under Autonomy, Oxford 
University Press, London, 1948, p.351)     
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Expenditure Per Head of Population of Different Provinces in 1929-30 
                   Expenditure per head on 
Education Medical & 
Public Health
Total 
Expenditure 
Provinces 
Rs.    A.        P. Rs.    A.     P. Rs.     A.     P. 
Madras 0.      9           9 0       5        5 4        2        11 
Bombay 1       1           0 0       7        6 8       4         8 
Bengal 0       4          6 0       3        4 2       8        10 
United Province 0       6          9 0       2        3 2      11        8 
Punjab 0      13         0 0       6        3 5       8         8 
Burma 0      15         4 0       7      10 8       9         11 
Bihar & Orissa 0       4          2 0       2        5 1      13        0 
Central Provinces 0       6          6 0      2         7 3      12         8  
Assam 0       6          9 0       4        8 3      14         9 
Source: Thomas, P.J, The Growth of Federal Finance in India, Oxford University Press, 
London, 1939, p. 347 
 
 
Among other major areas agriculture, one of the major industries of Bengal 
did not get due fund for its development. The report of the Industries 
Committee revealed that while Madras was able to increase its expenditure 
on agriculture from  Rs.13 lakhs in 1919-20 to Rs.17 lakh in 1926-27. 
Bombay from Rs.13.5 lakhs to Rs.16.5 lakhs, United Province from Rs.10 
lakhs to Rs.23 lakhs, Punjab from Rs. 11 lakhs to Rs.22 lakhs during the 
same period. On the contrary Bengal was able to increase its expenditure 
on this vital sphere of national welfare from Rs. 8.5 lakhs to Rs. 10 lakhs 
only during the same period.  (Gupta, 1931, p. 64)  
 
In their note of dissent given before the Land Revenue Commission of 
Bengal, 1940 Sir Bijay Chand Mahatab, (Raja of Bardwaman) and Mr 
Brajendra Kishore, (Member of Land Revenue Commission) also 
commented that “far from financing scheme for improving the agriculture the 
Bengal government. could not spend sufficient money even for running their 
agricultural department efficiently. Whereas all other major Provinces, 
where there is no Permanent Settlement has been spending on an average 
25 lakhs or so on agricultural department Bengal could not provide more 
than 12 or 13 lakhs. Moreover, Bengal has not got any agricultural college 
yet. Agriculture which is the main industry of Bengal has been starved and 
this was due to paucity of funds on account of inelasticity of land revenue. 
In spite of cultivator paying their due share of rent at a rate not less than 
that of Punjab and Madras.” (Note of Dissent by Sir Bijay Chand Mahatab, 
Raja of Bardwaman and Mr Brajendra Kishore, Member of Land Revenue 
Commission of Bengal, 1940, Vol. I, p. 303) (See table 5 in Appendix) 
Likewise, percentage expenditure on science and scientific departments of 
Bengal had also been suffering from paucity of funds and consequently 
expenditure on this department was much lower than other Provinces which 
had a retarding effect on the overall industrial development of Bengal. (See 
table 4 in Appendix) In this connection it would be worthwhile to note that 
permanent department of industries was established in Bengal  in 1920 with 
an Advisory Board of Industries to advice the Director on important aspects 
of industrial development. Industrial Department from the very outset 
suffered from financial crisis and had to cut its projects down during the 
later part of 1920s. Five gazetted officers out of ten in the Industrial 
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Department had to be retrenched faced with such acute financial 
stringency. (Awwal, 1982, pp. 17-37) 
  
 Bengal Provincial finance in the depression of 1930s 
 
The financial position of Bengal further deteriorated during the economic  
depression of early 1930s. Most of its revenues, particularly the liquor 
excise, stamps and registration fees were affected by the slump. Bombay 
and United Province withstood the depression relatively better than the 
other Provinces owing to rapid expansion of sugar industry in United 
Provinces and cotton industry in Bombay since 1930. In contrast,  Bengal, 
Assam, Bihar and Orissa were the worst hit by the depression. The effect of 
the general economic depression were most severe in Bengal mainly 
because of the tremendous slump in the price of jute and rice, two principal 
crops of the Province. On the other hand it seems that other Provinces 
namely Bombay and United Provinces withstood the depression on account 
of comparatively lower decline of value of the agricultural production 
coupled with rapid expansion in  two industries,  cotton and sugar, under 
the protective tariff environment.  However, percentage decrease of value of 
crops in Bengal was highest during the period of depression 61.1 per cent 
as against 45 per cent in Madras, 30.4 per cent in Bombay and 35.2 per 
cent in United Province. (table 35)  
 
 
Table: 35 
Value of Agricultural Produce of Different Provinces During the Depression 
Between 1928-29 and 1932-33   
(about ten main crops)                                                                                (Rs. in lakhs) 
Provinces Value of crops 
in 1928-29 
Value of crops in 
1932-33 
Change in value  Percentage decrease 
from 1928-29 
Madras 1,80,78 99,33 -81,45 -45.0 
Bombay 1,20,52 83,86 -36,66 -30.4 
Bengal 2,32,59 90.54 -1,42,05 -61.1 
United Provinces 1,40,52 91.01 -49,51 -35.2 
Punjab 76,78 48,53 -28,25 -36.8 
Burma 63,38 29,45 -33,93 -53.5 
Bihar & Orissa 1,35,17 56,55 -78,62 -58.2 
Central Provinces 68,77 35,40 -33,37 -48.5 
Total 10,18,51 5,34,67 -4,83,84 -47.5 
Source: Thomas, P.J, The Growth of Federal Finance in India, Oxford University Press, London, 1939, p. 371 
 
 
Table: 36 
Provincial  Surplus (Deficit)  Between 1921-22 and 1936-37 
(Rs. in lakhs) 
Year Bengal 
 
Madras Bombay 
 
Punjab United 
Province 
Bihar & 
Orissa 
1921-22 -110.4 303 -43 - 115 - 
1922-23 -26.1 342 148 - 177 - 
1923-24 35.2 374 84 - 224 - 
1924-25 -143.8 317 62 - 197 7 
1925-26 33.9 320 -42 247 209 4 
1926-27 -43.5 267 -121 260 188 -49 
1927-28 0.3 207 -20 35 262 -29 
1928.29 8.1 139 -21 -4 -83 -17 
1929-30 2.4 124 11 105 64 -22 
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1930-31 -174.6 -106 -182 39 -91 -71 
1931-32 -199.4 6 -47 62 -62 -35 
1932-33 -129.8 77 22 79 15 2 
1933-34 -175.9 0 15 66 -3 -10 
1934-35 -5.3 5 -20 66 -13 6 
1935-36 -3.7 -32 -22 9 17 -7 
1936-37 -41.4 0 n.a. 2 -64 -12 
Source: Ahmad, Z.A, Public Revenue and Expenditure in India, Congress  
Political and Economic Studies-No. 8, Political and Economic Information  
Department of All India Congress Committee, 1938  
 
 
Of all the Provinces Bengal was hit the hardest by the depression which 
was also evidenced from huge successive budget deficits of Bengal during 
the period of depression compared to other Provinces. (table 36) In the 
expenditure side, due to the rise of extremist movement,  expenditure on 
law and order and police occupied major portion in the budget allocation. 
Therefore, Bengal had to incur large amount of unproductive expenditure on 
police and jail & convictions compared to other Provinces in order to combat 
terrorist movement by sacrificing the expenditure on productive areas. (See 
table 6 & 7 in Appendix) Eventually, some measures of exercising 
economies47were taken but the mounting expenditure on police and jails 
owing to rapid deterioration of law and order situation of Bengal neutralised 
any attempt of exercising economy. On the revenue side, the collection of 
Provincial revenue started falling rapidly after 1931-32 to a level even lower 
than the level of 1921-22 (table 37).  
 
Table: 37 
Bengal Finance Between 1921-22 and 1936-37 
                                          (In Lakhs of Rs.) 
Year Total Revenue Total Expenditure 
1921-22 987.8 1098.2 
1922-23 985.4 1011.5 
1923-24 1013.3 978.1 
1924-25 1032.3 1176.1 
1925-26 1070.6 1036.7 
1926-27 1050.4 1093.9 
1927-28 1081.3 1081.0 
1928-29 1098.7 1090.6 
1929-30 1135.9 1133.5 
1930-31 966.3 1140.9 
1931-32 901.1 1100.5 
1932-33 938.0 1067.8 
1933-34 905.8 1081.7 
1934-35 1102.7 1108.0 
1935-36 1147.5 1151.2 
1936-37 1149.4 1190.8 
                                                          
47 Retrenchment committees (1922-23) were appointed in several Provinces. The Bengal 
Committee recommended a saving of Rs. 190 lakhs. Similarly the amount for Punjab 
committee was  Rs. 37.25 lakhs and Bombay Committee Rs. 88 lakhs.  (Banerjea, P, A 
Study of Indian Economics, Macmillan and co. Ltd. London, 1927, p.274) Different 
measures were taken in an object to reduce expenditure such as salary cut of the 
government employees. In some Provinces, emergency taxation was levied but such 
taxation was unpopular owing to the prevailing slump.(Thomas, P.J, The Growth of Federal 
Finance in India, Oxford University Press, London,1939, p. 370) 
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Source: Ahmad, Z.A, Public Revenue and Expenditure in India, Congress  
Political and Economic Studies-No. 8, Political and Economic Information  
Department of All India Congress Committee, 1938  
 
Faced with such acute financial crisis public opinion for sharing the 
proceeds from jute export duty and income tax with Bengal gained 
considerable support.  Urgency of sharing of proceeds from jute duty with 
Bengal was perceived from three dimensions. Firstly, it was demanded that 
proceeds from jute duty could be utilised for bridging the widening 
budgetary gaps of Bengal. Secondly, government of Bengal and 
intellectuals also raised the question of the legitimacy of treating jute export 
duty as Imperial revenue. It was argued that jute duty should be treated as 
Provincial tax instead of federal48.Some scholars went on to say that, in its 
incidence and character, the jute export duty has no resemblance to import 
duty. It is, in fact, revenue from land. Therefore, jute duty was a special 
class of revenue of Bengal imposed on land and should be treated as land 
revenue which was under the system federation classed as Provincial 
source of revenue. (Dutta Roy, 1934, pp. 107-108) That apart, others also 
emphasised on the fact that the jute “export duty had turned in substance 
into an excise duty to which the provincial government was entitled.”49 
Finally, it was felt by the people of Bengal and the government that severe  
financial injustice was being done to Bengal by taxing its staple products for 
the benefit of the rest of India.50 It may be mentioned here that jute duty 
was imposed in 1916 as an emergency measure under the exceptional 
circumstance of the war. Later on it was extended for longer periods. And 
jute from which the government of India earned considerable export duty, 
was one of the few commodities on which export duty was imposed leaving 
other products namely wheat, salt, cotton-goods, sugar and so forth entirely 
for the benefit of the producing Provinces (Awwal,1982, p. 38) Hence it was 
demanded that the whole proceed from the export duty on jute ought to be 
surrendered to Bengal while entire amount of the proceeds from the jute 
export duty along with income tax raised from jute manufacture and jute 
business located in Bengal was taken away by the government of India. Sir 
Anderson, the Governor of Bengal, felt that the Centre did not have any 
moral claim to appropriate any part of the proceeds of jute tax except so far 
as there might be disposable surplus after the legitimate requirements of 
the Provinces had been met.  (Telegram from Government of Bengal dated 
                                                          
48 The then Finance Minister of Bengal commented “we see no reason, therefore, why the 
proceeds of such an export duty should not be treated differently from an import duty...we 
have protested against the retention of any part of the export duty on jute as a federal 
source of revenue on the ground that it involves differential taxation of the inhabitants of 
Bengal and the other two jute-producing Provinces in favour of the rest of India.” (Quoted in 
Mitter, S.C, A Recovery Plan for Bengal, the Book Company Ltd, Calcutta, 1934, p. 675) 
49 Suggested by S.N Roy, member of Councillor of Bengal Legislative Assembly, on 4th 
March, 1921, mentioned in  Roy, J. K & Sato, H, Centre-State Financial Relations in India- 
A focus on West Bengal, Institute of Developing EconomicsTokyo,1987, p. 30 
 
50 “In the first place Bengal can never rest content under a fiscal system which aims at 
protecting largely at her expense as a consumer, the products of other provinces while 
taxing her distinctive staple product for the benefit of the Centre, in other words for the 
benefit of those provinces.” (Telegram from Government of Bengal dated 6th May 1936; in 
Indian Financial Enquiry Report by Sir Otto Niemeyer, Government of India, 1936, p. 6) 
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6th May 1936; in Indian Financial Enquiry Report by Sir Otto Niemeyer, 
Government of India, 1936) 
 
At last in the budget (1934-35) the Government of India according to the 
suggestion of Indian Constitutional Reform (1933) took the decision that at 
least 50 percent of the net revenue from the jute export duty be assigned to 
Bengal. As government of Bengal was not completely happy with this 
arrangement and expected that gradually the percentage of the proceeds of 
the duty to be assigned to the jute producing Provinces would go up to 
favour the jute producing Provinces so as to give the Provinces the whole 
amount of net proceeds except what is retained by the Centre for research. 
 
Bengal Provincial finance from Government of India Act, 1935 till 
Independence  
 
Mounting deficit of the Provincial finances since the outset of depression 
and the resulting uncertainties on the recovery from the depression 
necessitated thorough enquiry into the financial position of  both the 
Provinces and the Centre. Sir Otto Niemyer was appointed in January 1936 
to make recommendations after reviewing the budgetary positions of the 
government of India and those of Provinces. The distribution of the 
proceeds from taxes on income, the assignment of net proceeds of jute 
export duties and grants in aid to the Provinces were mainly dealt with.  
 
Sir Otto Niemeyer recommended the percentage of export duty on jute 
should be increased from 50 per cent  to 62 ½ in favour of the jute growing 
Provinces on the estimated gross yield of the duty in 1936-37. He 
recommended that 62 ½ per cent of the net proceeds from export duty on 
jute should be allocated among Assam, Bengal, Orissa, and Bihar in 
proportion to the percentage of jute production in each Province to the total 
jute production of these four Provinces. Sir Otto Niemeyer did not admit that 
the jute producing Provinces had any special claim to the proceeds of this 
duty. He justified his recommendation not by any such inherent right of 
those Provinces but only on the ground that they stood in need of financial 
assistance. However, Bengal was not completely satisfied with the 
arrangement for they demanded the whole portion of the proceeds from jute 
duty.  
 
Similarly, Niemeyer recommended that 50 per cent of the net proceeds of 
the income tax should be assigned to the Provinces. This became the basis 
of vertical transfer under income-tax to the Provinces even after 
Independence and it remained at this level till it was raised to 55 per cent by 
the First Finance Commission, 1952. After taking into account various 
dimensions of the problem, Niemeyer concluded that “substantial justice 
would be done by fixing the scheme of redistribution partly on residence 
and partly on population”. 
 
It is, however, worth mentioning that some scholars of Bengal demanded 
that share of income tax should not be based on population but on 
contribution each Province makes. They argued that about 36.2 percent of 
the total income tax raised in India came from Bengal (table 38). So Bengal 
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would be able to receive its legitimate share if the distribution of proceeds 
from income tax should bear close relation to the actual amount received 
from each Province.(Mitter,1934, p. 676)  Interestingly enough, the idea was 
later picked up by the West Bengal Government after Independence.51 
Memorandum submitted before the Finance Commissions by the Congress 
Governments of West Bengal (until the Sixth Finance Commission, 1973) 
bear the testimony to this conviction. However, First Finance Commission, 
1952 strongly opposed this idea. It seems that until early 1970s when 
Bengal managed to retain its position as an advanced industrial State and 
was in a position to contribute more in the form of income tax, the demand 
for distribution of proceeds from income on the basis on contribution gained 
support. This area will be discussed in detail in chapter 2 of this study.      
 
Table: 38 
Income Tax Collected From Different  Provinces in 1929-30 
Provinces Income tax 
collected (In 
Crores of Rs.) 
Percentage share  
of income tax 
Madras 1.41 8.26 
Bombay 3.69 21.62 
United Provinces 0.90 5.27 
Punjab 0.64 3.75 
Bengal 6.18 36.22 
Total 17.06 100.00 
Source: Mitter, S.C, A Recovery Plan for Bengal, The Book Company Ltd. Calcutta, 
(year not mentioned), p. 676  
 
 
However, despite being able to share the proceeds from income tax and 
jute export duty Bengal’s comparative financial position did not improve until 
Independence. This is evident from table 39. Average per capita revenue of 
Bengal during the period of 1937-38 to 1946-47 was as low as Rs. 3.9 as 
against Rs. 10.7 in Bombay, Rs.5.7 in Madras and  Rs. 6.9 in Punjab.  It 
appears that Bengal did not manage to catch up with the other Provinces 
despite being able to share the proceeds from income tax and jute export 
duty following the recommendations of Otto Niemeyer since 1937 and was 
yet to be recovered from the deep-seated budgetary crisis inflicted during 
the years of depression in the 1930s.  
 
With the new constitution introduced in 1937, budgetary deficits of Bengal 
were avoided for three years. But immediately thereafter World War II broke 
out and Bengal again began to face with large deficits. The threat of  
bombing by the Japanese caused a large exodus from Calcutta—main 
centre of trade and business activities of the Province. In addition, the 
                                                          
51 At the time of the First Commission, the government of West Bengal took an extreme 
position when it claimed that ‘each state should get back out of the net proceeds 
attributable to it the percentage share assigned to the States as a whole’. It contended that 
the money raised in one state could not be made available to another state. In its view the 
duty of the Finance Commission was merely to determine the central share in this tax and 
‘place the balance in the hands of the government in whose respective territories the tax 
had been levied or to whom they were attributable. (Vithal, B.P.R & Sastry, M.L, Fiscal 
Federalism in India, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2001, p. 93)  
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famine of 1943 and great Calcutta killing of 1946 also constituted great 
drain on the finances of the Province. Thus the result of all these had 
adverse impact on the economy of the Province. An estimation shows that 
business in the Province and hence income tax collection from the Province 
went down drastically because of the aforementioned occurrences. 
(Memorandum on Allocation of Income-tax and Grant-in-aid in Lieu of Jute 
export duty, Prepared for Sir. C.D Desmukh, GOWB, 1950, p. 64) 
Moreover, with the outbreak of World War II, share of income tax of the 
Provinces was reduced in order to cope with the increased expenditure of 
the Central government on account of the War52 and the original Provincial 
share of income tax as recommended by Niemeyer was restored again in 
1950-51. Such reduction of income tax share of the Provinces might have 
had some adverse effect on other industrial Provinces including Bengal.  
 
After Independence West Bengal appeared to have improved its position 
compared both in comparison to other states and previous years. Between 
1950-51 and 1951-52 per capita revenue of West Bengal was the highest of 
all States except Bombay. (table 39) However, West Bengal could not 
manage to retain its supremacy for more than two decades after 
Independence and started declining in terms of all most all economic 
indicators thereafter. Inherent structural constraints and weakness of its 
economic base coupled with Central policies pursued after Independence 
seem to be the main reasons for such deterioration. These eventually have 
given rise to the feeling of being disfavoured or discriminated against. (the 
term ‘discrimination’ started being widely used after Left Front Government 
came to power in 1977) Consequently it was alleged that during tthe pre-
Independence days Bengal was for other Provinces and for the Imperial 
government and such tradition continued even afterwards when West 
Bengal’s wealth and comparative advantage continued to be taken away 
and was utilised for the benefit of other Provinces, particularly, Bombay 
later on Maharastra and the Centre. Therefore, West Bengal has been 
experiencing continued wealth drain which is the main reasons for its 
economic deterioration. (Roy, R, The Agony of West Bengal A Study in 
Union-State Relations, New Age Publishers Private Limited, Calcutta, 1971) 
We will like to turn on to this area in the chapter 2 of this study. 
  
 
 
Table : 39 
 
Per Capita Revenues of Part A and Part B States Between 1937-38 and 1951-52                                                       
(Rs.) 
                                                          
52 The outbreak of World War II necessitated huge expenditure particularly on defence  
and underlined the need to strengthen Central finances. “Accordingly it was decided that 
for the duration of the war the centre should be allowed to retain a fixed sum of Rs. 4.5 
crore out of the Provincial share of income tax. The Order-in-Council was amended for this 
purpose and the modified provision regulated the distribution of the income tax from 1940-
41 to 1945.-46. In each of the following four years the sum retained by the centre from the 
provincial share was reduced by Rs. 75 lakh a year over the previous year and the full 
Provincial share was restored to the provinces in 1950-51.” (Gurumurthi, S, Fiscal 
Federalism in India Some Issues, Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, pp. 18-19) 
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States/Provinces Average 1937-
38 to 1946-47 
1950-51 1951-52 
Provisional 
figures 
Assam 4.3 11.0 12.5 
Bihar 2.5 7.2 7.0 
Bombay 10.7 16.8 16.8 
Madhya Pradesh 4.3 9.1 10.8 
Madras 5.7 10.2 10.5 
Orissa 3.0 7.1 7.9 
Punjab 6.9* 13.4 14.1 
Uttar Pradesh 3.7 8.2 8.6 
West Bengal 3.9* 13.8 15.6 
Source: Report of the Finance Commission,  Government of India, 1952, pp. 58-59 
*Figures relate to the undivided Provinces 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Complaint of discrimination against erstwhile Bengal and now West Bengal 
has the early root and can be traced as far back as to the pre-
Independence period when Bengal was said to be mother of all Provinces 
and also helped to consolidate the British Indian empire in the early days of 
colonial period. However, in order to extract maximum revenue from land 
with certainty and regularity while incurring the lowest cost of collection,  
required for financing ongoing war and for meeting other administrative 
expenditures, Permanent Settlement, 1793 was introduced. This eventually 
caused enormous inelasticity of Bengal’s principal source of revenue i.e., 
land revenue. Evidently, such inelasticity of land revenue became a major 
handicap for local infrastructural improvement. Not only that the land 
revenue per head in Bengal was almost the lowest since the later part of 
19th century, proceeds from local cess for local purposes which was 
imposed on land as a part of decentralisation pursued by Lord Mayo in 
1871, was also quite low in Bengal. Consequently enhancement of 
agricultural productivity through expansion of irrigation and other rural 
developmental schemes were stalled in Bengal.  
 
Resource crisis of Bengal Province was accentuated further with the 
introduction of Government of India Act 1919 under which proceeds from 
income tax, ever expanding source of revenue of industrially advanced 
Bengal and customs duty, another important source of Bengal’s revenue 
(due to its monopoly in jute products, bulk of which got exported) were kept 
under the Imperial head leaving Provinces only with the inelastic land 
revenue and minor other sources of revenue which were less buoyant in 
nature. Owing to the inadequacy of funds nation building services, 
infrastructural development of Bengal got affected severely leading to 
further resource crisis of Bengal. Such historical factors laid the foundation 
of economic distress of Bengal which had considerable impact on the 
economy of Bengal even in the post-Independence period.  
 
The period under study may be divided mainly into two periods i.e., the pre-
Government of India Act, 1919 and the post. During the Pre-Government of 
India Act period, from time to time Bengal intelligentsia launched the 
complaint that the Province was discriminated against as far as public 
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investment in irrigation was concerned. A meagre allocation of irrigation 
investment to Bengal had considerable impact on the agricultural wealth 
and hence land revenue which was the major source of revenue until early 
part of the 20th century. On the other hand the counter argument was that 
the allocation of higher level of public investment to a particular Province 
should be contingent on the contribution it makes. And so far land revenue 
and local taxes per head remained much lower in Bengal compared to other 
Provinces particularly since the later part of the 19th century. Consequently, 
the major burden of taxation had to be borne by other Provinces 
Furthermore, increment of income consequent upon irrigation investment 
could not be appropriated by the state while the land revenue was made 
fixed in perpetuity under the Permanent Settlement. In response to that 
argument Bengal intelligentsia and also the Bengal government 
emphasised on the fact that  contribution of a particular Province should be 
judged in terms of totality of its past contribution rather than what is being 
contributed in present days. It was Bengal who financed for the expansion 
of British territory and consolidated their rule in India and fed other 
Provinces. Therefore, the allocation of public investment particularly in 
irrigation should be based on the total contribution made by the Province.    
 
However, during the post-Government of India Act period the discrimination 
against Bengal became much more apparent than before. Bengal being the 
highest contributor in the Central exchequer in the form of customs duty and 
income tax was denied any share of it. Instead Bengal had to rest content 
with land revenue which was a quite inelastic form of revenue. 
Consequently Bengal demanded adequate compensation and privilege and 
finally complete abolition of the Government of India Act, 1919. However, 
during the post- Government of India Act 1919 period some scholars 
argued that Bengal should stop demanding further privilege and 
compensation for Bengal had so far been the most privileged Province by 
way of not contributing due share of revenue to the Central exchequer. 
These scholars perceived the Government of India Act, 1919 as a remedial 
measure of the long standing injustice made to other agricultural Provinces 
while these Provinces, as argued by them, contributed more than their due 
share so far.  
 
The financial health of Bengal started deteriorating with the beginning of 
economic depression of 1930s. Which gave rise to the feeling of being 
discriminated more intensely than ever before. It was complained that 
Imperial government as well as other Provinces were being benefited at the 
expense of Bengal. There was a continuous drain of wealth from the 
Province since the early part of the colonial days without giving it anything 
in return.  
 
It was, however, true that Bengal was subject to the highest form of 
exploitation and extraction of wealth and was the worst victim of commercial 
penetration made by British financiers since early days of colonial rule. And 
also the evolution of Imperial-Provincial finance during the entire British 
period revealed that the colonial government was not guided by any 
egalitarian motive. It neither paid adequate attention to the need of the 
different Provinces nor did it take into account the ability of Provinces to 
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cope with the financial reform. Different Imperial-Provincial financial system 
were undertaken from time to time in order to meet the immediate need and 
urgent situations. Therefore, there was no well-thought out Plan. Different 
Imperial-Provincial financial systems were exercised on an ad hoc manner 
without paying much attention to redressing the ever widening regional 
imbalance in British India.  
 
The same is equally true for the distribution of public investment among 
different regions. Distribution of public investment, like different experiments 
as regards Imperial-Provincial finance, were taken up according to the need 
of British capital and expansion of British territory. And such unequal 
distribution of public investment is said to be the major reason for the deep-
seated regional imbalance not only during the pre-Independence period but 
also in the post-Independence period. Therefore, the problem of federal 
finance of Bengal should be perceived both in the perspective of overall 
regional imbalance existing in British India as well as Province (Bengal)-
specific particularities which made the Province concerned suffer more than 
other Provinces.         
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Appendix 
 
 
Table: 1 
Percentage Trend of Different Revenues Between 1858 and 1929 
 
Year Land Revenue Customs Excise Income-Tax 
1858 50.0 7.7 3.0 - 
1880 29.5 3.3 4.1 0.6 
1900 23.2 4.3 5.1 1.7 
1914 26.0 7.7 10.8 2.4 
1929 18.8 31.2 11.2 9.1 
 Source: Thomas, P.J, The Growth of Federal Finance in India,  
Oxford University Press, 1939  p. 4 
 
 
Table: 2 
Trend of Major Revenues Between 1921-22 and 1935-36 
 
Year Customs Taxes on 
Income 
Land 
Revenue 
Excise 
1921-22 18.5 11.9 18.7 9.2 
1922-23 20.9 9.2 17.9 6.8 
1923-24 18.7 8.7 16.4 9.1 
1924-25 20.9 7.4 16.3 8.9 
1925-26 21.6 7.3 16.1 9.0 
1926-27 21.7 7.3 15.9 9.0 
1927-28 21.8 7.0 16.8 8.9 
1928-29 22.3 7.7 15.0 9.0 
1929-30 22.5 7.5 14.2 8.3 
1930-31 22.5 7.8 14.5 8.0 
1931-32 22.6 8.5 16.1 7.2 
1932-33 23.7 8.5 14.7 7.0 
1933-34 23.3 8.4 14.8 7.4 
1934-35 24.1 8.4 14.7 6.8 
1935-36 25.7 8.1 15.3 7.2 
Source: Ahmad, Z.A, Public Revenue and Expenditure in India, Congress  
Political and Economic Studies-No. 8, Political and Economic Information  
Department of All India Congress Committe 
 
Table: 3 
Percentage of Expenditure on Education in Different Provinces  
Between 1921-22 and 1935-36 
 
Year Bombay Bengal Punjab Madras 
1921-22 12.1 9.5 -- 11.2 
1922-23 13.6 12.0 -- 12.2 
1923-24 14.7 12.6 -- 13.0 
1924-25 13.9 10.2 -- 13.1 
1925-26 14.1 12.7 11.4 13.7 
1926-27 14.2 12.4 12.5 14.0 
1927-28 15.3 12.8 12.4 14.8 
1928-29 15.3 12.8 13.07 16.3 
1929-30 15.5 12.6 15.2 15.7 
1930-31 15.7 12.4 16.0 16.8 
1931-32 15.4 12.2 14.8 15.0 
1932-33 14.7 11.8 14.7 15.6 
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1933-34 15.0 11.7 15.2 15.5 
1934-35 14.9 11.5 15.4 15.3 
1935-36 14.6 11.3 15.1 15.4 
1936-37 -- 11.5 13.6 15.3 
 Source: Ahmad, Z.A, Public Revenue and Expenditure in India, Congress  
Political and Economic Studies-No. 8, Political and Economic Information  
Department of All India Congress Committee, 1938  
 
Table: 4 
Percentage Expenditure on Scientific Departments in Different Provinces 
Between  1921-22 and 1936-37 
 
Year Bombay Bengal Punjab Madras 
1921-22 .07 .01 -- .1 
1922-23 .05 .02 -- .1 
1923-24 .05 .03 -- .1 
1924-25 .05 .02 -- .1 
1925-26 .05 .03 .02 .2 
1926-27 .04 .1 .05 .2 
1927-28 .04 .02 .02 .2 
1928-29 .03 .02 .02 .2 
1929-30 .04 .02 .02 .2 
1930-31 .04 .03 .02 .2 
1931-32 .04 .03 .02 .1 
1932-33 .05 .03 .02 .1 
1933-34 .05 .03 .02 .1 
1934-35 .05 .03 .02 .05 
1935-36 .04 .03 .03 .03 
1936-37 -- .02 .02 .05 
Source: Ahmad, Z.A, Public Revenue and Expenditure in India, Congress  
Political and Economic Studies-No. 8, Political and Economic Information  
Department of All India Congress Committee, 1938  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table: 5 
Percentage Expenditure on Agriculture in Different Provinces  
Between 1921-22 and 1936-37 
 
Year Bengal Bombay Punjab Madras 
1921-22 1.6 2.04 -- 2.0 
1922-23 2.1 1.8 -- 2.1 
1923-24 1.9 1.8 -- 2.1 
1924-25 1.5 1.9 -- 2.1 
1925-26 1.9 1.9 3.3 2.2 
1926-27 2.0 1.9 3.9 2.3 
1927-28 2.0 2.05 4.3 2.3 
1928-29 2.3 2.1 4.5 2.4 
1929-30 2.2 2.1 5.3 2.5 
1930-31 2.3 2.2 5.3 2.5 
1931-32 2.2 2.2 4.5 2.5 
1932-33 2.2 1.9 4.6 2.3 
1933-34 2.1 2.8 4.3 2.3 
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1934-35 2.1 2.09 4.5 2.4 
1935-36 2.1 2.1 4.7 2.4 
1936-37 2.1 - 4.6 2.4 
 
Source: Ahmad, Z.A, Public Revenue and Expenditure in India, Congress  
Political and Economic Studies-No. 8, Political and Economic Information  
Department of All India Congress Committee, 1938  
 
Table: 6 
Percentage of Expenditure on Police in Different Provinces  
Between 1921-22 and 1936-37 
 
Year Bombay Bengal Punjab Madras 
1921-22 13.2 15.2 -- 15.7 
1922-23 13.4 18.3 -- 16.2 
1923-24 12.8 18.1 -- 15.9 
1924-25 12.8 15.3 -- 15.0 
1925-26 12.2 17.3 10.2 13.7 
1926-27 11.9 17.1 9.4 13.2 
1927-28 12.5 17.1 8.6 12.8 
1928-29 12.9 18.0 9.2 12.1 
1929-30 13.08 18.5 10.5 12.0 
1930-31 14.4 19.3 10.8 10.2 
1931-32 14.09 20.1 10.5 10.6 
1932-33 14.8 20.5 11.5 10.5 
1933-34 14.4 20.5 11.8 10.0 
1934-35 14.3 20.2 11.9 10.0 
1935-36 14.08 19.9 11.5 10.0 
1936-37  19.7 10.6 9.7 
Source: Ahmad, Z.A, Public Revenue and Expenditure in India, Congress  
Political and Economic Studies-No. 8, Political and Economic Information  
Department of All India Congress Committee, 1938  
 
 
 
Table: 7 
Percentage Expenditure on Jails and Convict Settlements  
Between 1921-22 and 1936-37 
Year Bombay Bengal Punjab Madras 
1921-22 2.1 3.0 -- 2.3 
1922-23 2.1 3.5 -- 3.1 
1923-24 1.9 3.3 -- 2.5 
1924-25 1.9 2.7 -- 2.2 
1925-26 1.8 3.0 1.9 2.2 
1926-27 1.7 2.9 2.7 2.0 
1927-28 1.8 3.1 3.0 2.1 
1928-29 1.8 3.0 3.07 1.9 
1929-30 1.8 3.0 4.5 1.9 
1930-31 2.1 3.9 3.7 1.7 
1931-32 1.7 3.4 3.2 1.5 
1932-33 2.1 3.8 3.2 1.4 
1933-34 1.9 4.0 3.1 1.3 
1934-35 1.8 3.9 2.9 1.3 
1935-36 1.7 3.8 2.8 1.3 
1936-37 - 3.7 2.5 1.3 
Source: Ahmad, Z.A, Public Revenue and Expenditure in India, Congress  
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Political and Economic Studies-No. 8, Political and Economic Information  
Department of All India Congress Committee, 1938  
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Chapter: 2 
 
Political Economy of the Federalising Process in West 
Bengal and the Feeling of Discrimination During the Pre 
and Post-Left Front Era 
 
 
Centre-State relation has undergone a qualitative change in West Bengal 
since Independence. From the very onset, it was never free from conflict 
and most of the time fraught with tensions. First three decades after 
Independence was the period of consensus and non-antagonism owing to 
the existence of one Party system53 ‘in which power was shared between 
the Centre and States under the control of the ruling Congress Party’. 
Though some underlying conflicts were there, they were sought to be 
resolved outside the Constitution without allowing such contentious issues 
come to the surface.54 Against the backdrop of such absolute, 
unchallenged centripetal bias of the Centre-State framework, relation 
between the Centre and West Bengal in particular, until the mid 1960s, 
was relatively more conflict-prone than any other State in India. West 
Bengal often managed to retain an independent position by pursuing it’s 
decisions regarding some issues without giving in to the pressure of the 
Centre.55 Thus, it was of great difficulty for  the Centre to impose its will on 
                                                          
53 As Sathyamurthy (1989) observed, this was the period of “linguistic/cultural 
differentiation within a framework of unchallenged unity and integrity of the Indian state 
(1947-67)....By and large however, federal India during the period 1947-67, was 
characterised by political homogeneity. The power of the state, as indeed power in the 
states was wielded by the same political force represented by the Congress. No great 
conflict had yet surfaced....” (Sathyamurthy, T.V, ‘Impact of Centre-State Relations on 
Indian Politics An Interpretative Reckoning 1947-87’, EPW, September 23, 1989,  pp. 
2133- 2135) 
 
 
54 It was mentioned in the report of the Administrative Reform Commission that owing to 
the existence of one Party system there was a strong tendency to avoid conflicts 
regarding Centre-State relation and there was hardly any provision to resolve this 
problem systematically at the constitutional plane. Frequent recourse to unconstitutional 
means to solve the problem, however, undermined the aspiration of true federalism in 
India. (Ghosh, M,(ed.), “Kendra Rajya Samparka” (Centre-state relations), A. Mukerjee & 
Company Private Limited, Calcutta, 1978, pp. 2-3)  
 
55 The Study undertaken by Franda (1968) observed that as regards several issues such 
as dispute arising from reorganisation of the boundary of two States, Bihar and West 
Bengal through setting up of State Reorganisation Commission, 1953  and conflict of 
interests between these two States consequent upon establishment of Damodar Valley 
Corporation,1948,  it was the West Bengal State Congress leaders who had the ultimate 
say on this matter. Similarly any attempt of imposing Centre’s decision regarding 
establishment of standardised land reform policy regulation during 1950s faced stiff 
resistance from the State Congress leaders and eventually their wish established. He 
concluded, “....perhaps the most remarkable facet of centre-state relations in West 
Bengal is the fact that the bargaining process which takes place is not typically 
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West Bengal without having faced tough resistance. According to Franda’s 
(1968) observation such relative independence of West Bengal compared 
to other States emanates from it’s unique social, political and economic 
history. (Franda,1968, pp. 201-224) 
 
Nevertheless, West Bengal’s leadership didn’t rebel against the Centre 
fundamentally during the first three decades after Independence. They 
were critical but co-operative. From time to time they made bargains about 
operational aspects of the existing federal provisions whenever felt 
necessary but didn’t oppose the existing relations per se by going against 
the Constitutional framework. Therefore, it was neither total absence of 
differences nor it raised fundamental question against the federal system 
itself56.  
 
However, the style of bargaining underwent a sea change soon after the 
United Front government57 took charge in 1967 ushering in two 
fundamental changes.  For the first time, pre-existing tensions in the area 
of Centre-State relations became an issue of political mobilisation which 
was a clear shift from the earlier period. And secondly, instead of 
remaining confined to the operational aspects of federal fiscal relations it 
started questioning the structural mould of the Indian federation.(Ray, 
1973, p. 180) These two radical changes could be understood against the 
backdrop of a considerable change of power balance in the national polity 
during that period. The period, beginning from the late 1960s, marked the 
emergence of regional parties in the national polity which reached it’s 
culmination in 1977 when for the first time a non-Congress (I) coalition 
government was formed at the Centre along with formation of 
governments in different States of India led by some regional parties 
around the same period. This breakdown of one party domination in Indian 
politics created a conducive environment for the questions against 
structural aspects of Centre-State relations and the consequent demand 
for change of power balance in favour of the States.  
 
Memorandum on Centre-State Financial Relations, December 1, 1977 was 
probably the first articulated attempt by the Communist Party of India 
(Marxist) CPI(M) to consolidate the demand for radical restructuring of the 
existing Centre-State relations through amendment to the Constitution. In 
the national context a similar attempt was first made by Rajamannar 
Report (1968) commissioned by Tamil Nadu government. Subsequently, 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
characterised by “submission”, or by authority relationships...”, (Franda, M.F, West 
Bengal and the Federalising Process in India, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New 
Jersey, 1968, p. 199)  
56 Ray (1973)  observes that at that time, during B.C. Roy’s (the then Chief Minister of 
West Bengal) regime the demands of the State were mainly confined to the traditional 
areas of Centre-State financial relations and didn’t go against the constitutional verdicts. 
At times certain intensity was generated but it was not allowed to transpire into agitational 
politics. (Ray, A, “Political Dynamics of India’s Federalism: West Bengal’s Experience” in 
Maheshwari, B.L (ed.) Centre-State Relations in the Seventies, Minerva Associates, 
Calcutta, 1973, pp. 177-193) 
 
 
57United Front government was basically a short-lived (1967-69) anti Congress coalition 
government led by the Communist Party of India Marxist (CPI M).  
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Administrative Reform Commission, Report on the Study Team on Centre-
State Relationship, 1968 also came up. The next considerable step in this 
line was taken by the government of India. However, growing importance 
of non-Congress (I) political parties at the State levels as well as at the 
Centre and the consequent conflict building on the Centre-State relations 
necessitated substantive review of the Indian federal structure. Sarkaria 
Commission, 1984 was set up by the government of India in an attempt to 
review the existing Centre-States relations thoroughly. Ray & Kincaid 
(1988) viewed these initiatives as the outcome of a second generation 
strain on the Indian federal system. They went on to say that, “...this strain 
originates from a redefinition of the demand on the structural change of the 
India’s federation rather than reinforcing constitutional restraints on 
national government”.58 
 
However, in West Bengal the United Front government laid down the 
foundation of the demand for constitutional change in the federal structure 
of India during the short duration of their rule. Subsequently, they took this 
demand to the street for political mobilisation which was further crystallised 
during the Left Front regime since 1977. In course of time, another 
dimension of the problem opened up during the Left Front regime in West 
Bengal which could be termed as a new form of regionalism59 embodied in 
                                                          
58 The first generation of Indian federation lasted till 1966. During the first generation a 
major part of the ‘State demands was directed towards reinforcing constitutional restraints 
on the national government’. And it was only confined to the functional aspect of 
federalism. For example, many States voiced their concern about the growing importance 
of Planning Commission a non-constitutional body over the Finance Commission which is 
a constitutional body. However, during the second generation which commenced from the 
late 1960s, many State governments and political parties (see also Maheswari B.L, ‘ 
Centre-State Relations Issue Awareness and Party Positions’, EPW, June 12, 1971) 
emphasised on bringing about structural changes in Indian federalism. Therefore, since 
the late 1960’s the State governments, especially those controlled by non-Congress(I) 
political parties had formulated their demands for changes in the Constitution that would 
secure more power and autonomy to the States. (Ray, A & Kincaid, J, ‘ Politics, Economic 
Development and Second Generation Strain in India’s Federal System’, Publius, Journal 
of Federalism, Vol. 18, No. 2, 1988, p. 152)   
 
 
59Ray (1973) observed that in Bengal, since the pre-Independence days radicalism and 
regionalism was mixed up in a vigorous manner. The partition of Bengal and consequent 
adversities faced by West Bengal strengthened the feeling of regionalism. And people of 
West Bengal resented the Centre’s neglect to the problems of the State. Interestingly 
enough any conventional regional party like DMK in Tamil Nadu was unlikely to have any 
appeal to the people of West Bengal who are said to be highly politicised and 
modernised. Therefore, Communist Party of India (Marxist)  suited best in West Bengal 
which seemed have combined regionalism with radicalism. (Ray, A, ‘Political Dynamics of 
India’s Federalism : West Bengal’s Experience’, in Maheshwari, B.L, (ed.) Centre-State 
Relations in the Seventies, Minerva Associates, Calcutta, 1973, pp. 177-178)The 
observation made by a political activist also reinforces this point. He felt that the demand 
for more power to the State and fight against the Centre “often borders on the nationalist 
propaganda that Bengal and the Bengalis are deprived of their due share, and co-
operation is sought even from the Congress (I ) MPs and MLAs from West Bengal to fight 
against the Centre for Bengal's interest”. (Vinod Mishra Selected Works, A CPIM(L) 
Publication, New Delhi, 1999, p. 320) (The Article  was written on January 1988),   
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the phrase ‘discrimination against West Bengal’. West Bengal has been 
singled out from the rest of the Indian federation by the government and it 
was alleged that the State has been subject to discrimination for 
Communist rule so far as Centre-State relations is concerned.60 Thus, the 
issue of imbalance of power in the Indian federal structure has become a 
part of the political weaponry and consequently all the maladies and 
lacunas in the Centre-State relations and consequent impact on the State 
have been identified with the term ‘discrimination’ against West Bengal.  
 
The complaint of discrimination against the erstwhile Bengal and now 
West Bengal has its early root. It can be traced as far back as to the pre-
Independence period when Bengal was eventually made to suffer for the 
sake of British expansion and for the benefit of other Provinces. In order to 
extract maximum revenue from land with certainty and regularity while 
incurring lowest cost of collection, Permanent Settlement, 1793 was 
introduced which eventually caused enormous inelasticity to Bengal’s 
principal source of revenue. This inelasticity of land revenue became a 
major handicap for local infrastructural improvement and enhancement of 
agricultural productivity through expansion of irrigation. Resource crisis of 
Bengal Province accentuated further with the introduction of the 
Government of India Act 1919 in which proceeds from income tax an ever 
expanding source of revenue of industrially advanced Bengal and customs 
duty, another important source of Bengal’s revenue due to it’s monopoly in 
jute products, bulk of which got exported, were kept under the Federal 
head leaving Bengal only with inelastic land revenue. Owing to the 
inadequacy of funds nation building services and infrastructural 
development of Bengal got severely affected which led to further resource 
crisis of Bengal. Such historical factors laid the foundation of economic 
distress of Bengal which had considerable impact on the economy of 
Bengal in the post-Independence period.  
 
From time to time the Bengal intelligentsia protested against such a 
discriminatory situation and demanded necessary amendment. British 
India’ fiscal history could be divided mainly into two periods i.e.,  pre-
Government of India Act, 1919 and post. During the Pre-Government of 
India Act period Bengal started complaining that the Province was 
discriminated against as far as public investment in irrigation is concerned 
which had considerable impact on the buoyancy of land revenue and was 
the major source of revenue until the early 20th century. Those who 
opposed to this argued that since per head land revenue and local taxes 
was much lower in Bengal compared to the other Provinces the major 
burden of taxation was actually borne by other Provinces. That apart, 
Bengal should stop complaining about lower investment in irrigation 
because rate of return on irrigation investment and per capita local 
taxation was much lower in Bengal from which irrigation schemes were 
                                                          
60 Political Organisational Report of the CPIM stated “CC (Central Committee) explains 
the background of discrimination against WB (West Bengal) by the Centre because of the 
existence of the LF (Left Front) government and the earlier policies which militated 
against the industrial development in the State such as the freight equalisation and the 
partisan use of licensing policy.” (Political and Organisational Report of the 15th Congress 
of the Communist Party of India (Marxist); quoted in Liberation, Central Organ of CPI 
(ML), June 1996, p. 21)   
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supposed to be financed. In addition increment of income consequent 
upon irrigation would not be accrued to the state while land revenue being 
fixed in perpetuity on account of Permanent Settlement. Bengal’s 
intelligentsia argued that Bengal’s contribution should be judged in terms 
of past contribution rather than it’s present. It was Bengal who financed the 
expansion of British territory and consolidated their rule in India and also 
fed other Provinces. During the post-Government of India Act period the 
discrimination against Bengal became much more intense than even 
before. Bengal being the highest contributor in the Central exchequer in 
the form of customs duty and income tax was denied of any share of it. 
Instead Bengal had to rest content with land revenue which was quite an 
inelastic form of revenue.  
 
Interestingly, the feeling of being disfavoured was continued during the 
post-Independence period. Bengal suffered considerably in the past due to 
wrong principles adopted during the pre-Independence period and West 
Bengal had to suffer after the Independence period on account of  
misconceived notion of regional equality which tends to equalise rest of 
the Indian States at the expense of West Bengal. There seems to be 
continued drain of wealth or transference of income from the erstwhile 
Bengal and later West Bengal to other States as well as to the Central 
exchequer. The result is the peculiar paradox that wealth generated in 
West Bengal benefits other States while creating additional problems and 
liabilities for the government of West Bengal. (Memorandum Submitted to 
Third Finance Commission, GOWB, 1961 p. 25)    
 
In pursuance of the study of politics of discrimination against West Bengal 
until the pre-Left Front period61, three aspects need to be considered. 
Firstly, basic structural lacuna of West Bengal’s economy which has its 
early root in the pre-Independence period which had left deep-seated 
remnants in its economy and consequently had limited its own resource 
mobilising power even after the post-Independence period. We have 
touched this area precisely at the earlier part of this study. Secondly, 
successive Central policies taken shortly after Independence which, as 
alleged by the different governments of West Bengal, (Congress, United 
Front and later on Left Front) had accentuated the economic constraints of 
the State further. Finally, during the following three decades after 
Independence, Congress government of West Bengal had raised the 
questions of faulty application of constitutional provisions concerned with 
resource transfers from the Centre to the Sates. Which was said to have 
further affected West Bengal’s resource base considerably. Thus the 
present study would only remain confined to the incorrect application of 
constitutional provisions for devolution of resources from the Centre to the 
States and States per-se. Subsequent part of our study would deal with 
the last two aspects mentioned above.         
 
Politics of discrimination during the pre-Left Front era 
                                                          
61 It should be noted that after the breakdown of the United Front government, West 
Bengal was ruled by the Congress Party again during 1970-77 until Left Front came to 
power.  
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Conflict between the Centre and West Bengal government during the pre-
Left Front era could be classified into two main categories, one related to 
the series of discriminatory62 Central policies. Another one was related to 
basic problem regarding fiscal federal relations in India and the role of two 
resource transferring agencies- the Finance Commission and the Planning 
Commission. The weightages chosen by these two institutions for 
devolving funds among the States were targets of the sharpest criticism. It 
was, argued that not only particular weightages chosen for devolving funds 
were incorrect but also the very practice of attaching weightages while 
devolving funds from the Centre among the States per se is 
unconstitutional. It was also felt that such incorrect application of 
weightages in the devolution of funds circumscribed  resource mobilisation 
potential of the State further and was the root cause of economic 
deterioration of the State.  
 
Discriminatory Central policies after Independence 
 
Soon after Independence the Provincial shares of jute export duty and 
income tax set by Niemeyer Award in 1937, were altered. With the Partition 
of India in August 1947 the following States namely Punjab, Bengal and 
Assam were divided. This necessitated certain adjustments in the scheme 
of redistribution of income tax and jute export duty among the Provinces. 
While the basic scheme of Sir Otto Niemeyer with regard to income tax was 
retained, the shares of the divided Provinces of Bengal and Punjab were 
reduced in proportion to the population reduced in these two States owing 
to Partition. Many States including West Bengal were not satisfied with such 
arrangements for the allocation of income tax by the government of India 
immediately after the Partition and protested against this decision. It was 
decided that the matter should be referred to an important authority for 
reconsideration. Towards the end of 1949, C.D. Desmukh, a senior civil 
servant was appointed by the government of India to enquire into this 
matter. Table 1 (see Appendix) indicates the percentage distribution among 
the States of their share of income tax before the Partition, under the 
arrangement made by the government of India immediately after the 
Partition and under the award given by Desmukh. However, the Desmukh 
award which came into existence in 1950-51 remained in force until the 
recommendation of the First Finance Commission, 1952.  
 
Admittedly, West Bengal suffered a lot due to the reduction of its share of 
income tax (from 20 percent to 12 per cent) which was one of most 
expanding and buoyant sources of revenue in the State. It was argued that 
other States and the Centre were benefited at the cost of West Bengal 
because Bombay’s share was pushed up from 20 per cent to 21 per cent  
and the share of Madras was also went up from 15 per cent to 18 per cent 
in the same period. Therefore, “The money saved at the cost of West 
                                                          
62 The term ‘discrimination’ was also used during this time without having too much 
fixation of this expression. Instead it was perceived as a situation where West Bengal was 
victimised for not giving adequate consideration while pursuing these Central policies. As 
a matter of fact these policies were said to have adverse effect on the eastern region as a 
whole including West Bengal.  
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Bengal enabled almost all other States to get more. The Partition of Bengal 
was, in respect of the jute duty and income tax, turned into a windfall for 
other States and the Centre.” (Roy, 1971, pp. 33-34) However, on the basis 
of population as well as collection, Bengal’s share of income tax should 
have been much more than that of Bombay as Bengal’s population was 
three times higher than Bombay. Banerjea too mentioned that as a result of 
Partition West Bengal’s contribution to the income tax fell by only 1/80th. 
Therefore, West Bengal’s share should have been cut by no more than a 
quarter per cent. However, the actual reduction was 40 per cent.  (Roy, 
1971, pp. 33-34) 
  
After the partition roughly 70 percent of the jute growing area of undivided 
India went to Pakistan. The government of India therefore reconsidered the 
distribution of the proceeds from the jute export duty among the Provinces 
on the basis of the quantity of the jute grown in these Provinces. 
Consequently, after Independence the Provincial share of jute export duty 
was reduced from 62 ½ to 20 per cent which affected West Bengal 
substantially owing to the fact that erstwhile Bengal or later West Bengal 
was the largest recipient of the proceeds from jute export duty. Afterwards 
although additional ad-hoc grants of Rs. 40 lakhs in 1947-48 and of Rs. 50 
lakh each in 1948-49 and 1949-50 were made to West Bengal in 
consideration of the difficulties caused to it by the Partition, the decision of 
reduction of the Provincial share of jute export duty gave rise to severe 
dissatisfaction within West Bengal government. (Indian Finances,  
Monograph No. 123, Arthya Vanijya Gabeshna Mandir, Calcutta,  year is 
not mentioned, p. 11) 
 
Moreover, the Centre urged West Bengal to divert paddy land to jute 
cultivation, in order to make good the shortage in the supply of raw jute as a 
result of loss of the jute growing eastern zone of undivided Bengal to 
Pakistan.63 Thus the switch over from Aus paddy to jute after the Partition 
was said to be the root cause of the problem of food deficit in the State 
which in turn led to the rise in the prices of food grains in the State. During 
the Second Plan period (1956-61) production of food grains increased by 5 
per cent in West Bengal as against the average all India increase of 15.6 
per cent. (Memorandum Submitted to Third Finance Commission, GOWB, 
1961, p. 25) On account of chronic food shortage, the administrative cost of 
the State incurred on rationing, cordoning etc. went up leaving little fund for 
other nation building services. Food deficit necessitated import of food 
grains from other States. But notwithstanding the recommendations of the 
Agricultural Price Commission other agriculturally prosperous States have 
been resisting all through all attempts at lowering the prices of wheat or 
cotton. (Memorandum Submitted to Sixth Finance Commission, GOWB, 
1973, p. 20)  
                                                          
63 After the Partition ‘grow more jute programme’ was initiated by the government of India 
in an attempt to resolve the immediate crisis faced by the jute industry. The problem was 
aggravated by two set of policies. One was the imposition of an export duty by Pakistan 
government on her exports of raw jute to India and another one was that the rise in the 
value of the Pakistan rupee in terms of Indian currency due to devaluation of Indian 
currency. (Singh, V.B, Economic History of India: 1857-1956, Allied Publishers Private 
Limited, New Delhi, 1965, p. 275)  
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Despite the high density of population and fullest utilisation of the available 
land resources, production of jute in West Bengal had to be increased and 
the acreage under jute cultivation rose from 2.66 lakh acres in 1947-48 to 
about 11.44 lakh acres in 1961-62. (Memorandum Submitted to Fifth 
Finance Commission, GOWB,1969, p. 7). One estimation regarding State-
wise utilisation of available lands shows that  percentage of net area sown 
to total geographical area of the State was as high as 59.1 per cent in 1956-
57 which was the highest among the other States except Uttar Pradesh 
(60.1 per cent). (Memorandum Submitted to Third Finance Commission,  
GOWB,1961, p. 63)  
 
Distress of West Bengal was further accentuated due to the following 
adversities: the grant in lieu of jute export duty was stopped after some 
period64 and much to the detriment to the jute industry, the price of jute 
even after the formation of the Jute Corporation of India barely covered the 
cultivation cost. Devaluation of rupee in 1966 could have brought some 
relief to the jute industry in the State, but rise in export duty on jute further 
lowered the profit that could have been earned from raw jute. 
(Memorandum Submitted to Sixth Finance Commission, GOWB, 1973, p. 
20)  
 
The government of West Bengal alleged that jute and tea earned 
substantial amount of foreign exchange but the State had no control over 
the foreign exchange it earned. The benefit from the export from jute, jute 
products and tea the two foreign exchange earners of the country goes to 
the country. On the other the government of West Bengal had to face the 
difficulties of diversion of land for growing these commercial crops at the 
expense of production of food grains and bear the responsibility of providing 
basic infrastructuctural facilities to these industries. (Memorandum 
Submitted to Fifth Finance Commission, GOWB,1969, p. 7) 
 
Freight equalisation policy 
 
West Bengal was, however, one of worst victims of certain policies pursued 
by the government of India after Independence such as the freight 
equalisation policy and refugee rehabilitation policy. As Minister of 
Commerce & Industry and Iron & Steel, T.T Krishnamachari took the 
decision in 1956 to equalise the prices of iron and steel and coal all over the 
country and thus neutralised the locational advantage of West Bengal and 
other eastern States. Moreover, freight rate on cotton and oil seeds were 
not equalised which caused considerable harm to the industries of West 
Bengal related to these products. The detail of which will be discussed in 
                                                          
64According to Desmukh award the jute growing States were no longer entitled to a 
specified share of the net proceeds of the export duty on jute or jute products. Under the 
Article 273 of the Constitution the jute duty was assigned wholly to the Centre, the States 
of West Bengal, Assam, Bihar and Orissa were  to receive grants-in-aid so long as the jute 
export was levied or for a period of 10 years whichever was earlier. (Indian Finances,  
Monograph No. 123, Arthya Vanijya Gabeshana Mandir, Calcutta,  year is not mentioned, 
p. 13) 
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the subsequent part of this study. In 1956 T.T Krishnamachari equalised the 
cement prices also. Afterwards the cement industry became more profitable 
in the southern part of India on account  the equalisation of freight rates of 
coal and steel along with cement. On the contrary West Bengal had to pay 
very high transport charges mainly because of increased freight rate while 
the State earlier used to get cement from Bihar and the transport charges 
were not very high.(Dutta, 1985, pp. 133-134) This selective freight 
equalisation policy coupled with other policies pursued by the government 
of India made the industrial prospects of West Bengal rather bleak. 
 
Refugee rehabilitation policy 
 
Following the Partition after Independence West Bengal being the largest 
recipient of the refugees in eastern region was severely affected in many 
respects (see table 2 Appendix). Such influx of refugees has been still 
continuing but now it is called infiltration. However, over 73 per cent of the 
refugees came to West Bengal and the concentration of refugees was so 
high in West Bengal that they accounted for nearly one-tenth of the 
population (Das, 2000, p. 15). In contrast, in the case of Punjab, a north-
western State of India, the stream of migration on both sides not only 
gradually slowed down and almost ceased within a year or so but also in 
Punjab out-migration was greater than in-migration and making the problem 
somewhat easier for the authorities to deal. (Das, 2000, p. 16). 
 
Several studies (Chakrabarti, 1999; Bose, 2000) observed that the Bengali 
refugees suffered greater discrimination compared to the West Indian 
refugees. The Central government declared that the policy towards the 
migrants in West Bengal was to provide relief through temporary 
accommodation in relief camps and not economic rehabilitation. It was 
expected that those who had left East Pakistan for fear of their lives, would 
return to their homes as soon as peace was restored. Thus there was no 
well thought out plan for rehabilitation for the refugees of West Bengal. 
(Sen, 2000, p. 57) In contrast the government of India accepted the policy 
of exchange of populations and property and the problem of rehabilitation 
was solved  much efficiently and quickly in case of West Pakistan refugees.  
 
The Central government policies for the two regions were not only different, 
but opposite. Nehru wanted to stop the influx of refugees by the pact of 
1950 (Nehru-Liaquat pact, 1950). Inevitable outcome of the Pact was that it 
effectively stopped the outflow of the Muslims from West Bengal and 
facilitated the process of the return of the Muslim migrants from East 
Pakistan to their homes. While Muslim evacuees came back, there was 
hardly any out-migration of Hindus from West Bengal. (Chakrabarti, 1999, 
p.210). Since there was considerable level of non-cooperation showed to 
these displaced people by the Pakistani government. the Nehru-Liaquat 
Pact remained ineffective for those refugees who wanted to claim properties 
in the East Pakistan. In fact the External Affairs Ministry in November 1968, 
admitted that the Nehru-Liaquat Pact has all along been violated by 
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Pakistan. (Memorandum Submitted to Sixth Finance Commission, GOWB, 
1973, p. 21) 
 
West Bengal government repeatedly raised the point before the successive 
Finance Commissions i.e., from the First to the Sixth about the burden 
placed on the government of sheltering, feeding and rehabilitating the 
refugees from erstwhile East Pakistan. And the Central assistance provided 
in connection with a problem of such magnitude was inadequate. The influx 
of refugees was the direct result of the Partition following Independence and 
the government of India recognised in principle that the cost of rehabilitation 
of these refugees should not be borne by the any single State government 
but should be met by the Central government. However, reality belied such 
conviction. The State had to incur considerable additional expenditure to 
meet the barest of necessities of these people. There was thus a gap 
between the amount of Central assistance provided for refugees and the 
actual expenditure incurred by the State government and the accumulated 
gap up to the early 1970s amounted to about Rs. 33 crore. (Memorandum 
Submitted to Sixth Finance Commission, GOWB, 1973, p. 23) Though the 
expenditure should be borne entirely by the government of India but the 
Centre denied its responsibility in real life.65 
 
The State government also pointed out that on account of sudden increase 
of the density of population in the State, the economic and civic conditions 
of the vast industrial complex of greater Calcutta started deteriorating. 
During the 10 years between 1951 and 1961, the rate of growth of 
population in West Bengal mainly on account of the influx of refugees was 
32.94 per cent and was much higher than the all India average of 21.5 per 
cent. Therefore, except for Assam (34.30 per cent) the rate of growth of 
population in West Bengal was the highest in India. During the census of 
1971 the percentage increase of population, however, registered a slightly 
slower pace i.e., 26.87 per cent. But it was still much higher than the all 
India average of 24.80 per cent. Population density in West Bengal in 1961 
stood at 1,032 persons per square mile as against the all India average of 
384 and was the highest in India except Kerala (1,125 persons per square 
mile) )(see table 3 Appendix) (Memorandum Submitted to Sixth Finance 
Commission, GOWB, 1973, p. 12). Evidently, there was a greater need of 
resources of the State for the development in all fronts of the economy due 
to the sudden increase in the density of population.  
 
                                                          
65 In this respect West Bengal government recently commented that, “Even after 50 
years of independence, there are major unresolved issues connected with 
rehabilitation of displaced persons from erstwhile East Pakistan. Of the total financial 
requirement of about Rs. 1726 crores necessary for comprehensive rehabilitation, not 
even 10 per cent has been obtained from the Centre over the year.” (Basu, J (ed.) 
People’s Power in Practice 20 years of Left Front in West Bengal,  National Book 
Agency, Calcutta, 1997, p. 256)  
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Incorrect application of Constitutional provisions for devolution of 
resources from the Centre to the States 
 
After Independence West Bengal government initiated a debate with the 
First Finance Commission (1952) on the principle of distribution of 
proceeds from income tax. By taking an extreme position in this respect, 
West Bengal government claimed that each State should receive what it 
contributes to the total income tax collection of the country and the State 
demanded that money raised in one State should not be made available to 
the other States. Therefore, according to the State “each state should get 
back out of the net proceeds attributable to it the percentage share 
assigned to the States as a whole.” (Vithal & Sastry, 2001, p. 93) The 
State went on to say that “the duty of the Finance Commission was merely 
to determine the Central shares in this tax and ‘place the balance in the 
hands of the Governments in whose respective territories the tax had been 
levied or to whom they were attributable’.” (ibid. p. 93)  
 
However, the First Finance Commission was of the opinion that the view of 
the West Bengal Government was untenable and stated. “The Constitution 
does not recognise that any state has a right to the income of tax collected 
or even arising in its area. A state acquires a right to definite amount of the 
divisible pool only after the manner of distribution has been prescribed by 
the President. ...in our view there is no question of considering the 
distribution of tax on the basis of returning to a particular State the whole 
or part of the collections in its area or on the basis of the States having a 
notional right to the concurrent levy of income tax.”  (ibid., pp.93-94) 
 
Further, the government of West Bengal claimed that the criterion chosen 
by the Finance Commissions for the distribution of the proceeds from 
income tax and excise duties among the States are not only incorrect and 
injurious to West Bengal’s economy but also attaching weight itself for 
devolving resources is unconstitutional. They had strongly demanded that 
each State should receive in accordance with its contribution and hence 
the criteria chosen for devolution of funds among the States are altogether 
irrelevant. The West Bengal government observed that there are two 
constitutional methods of transferring resources. First, through the sharing 
of taxes and second, through grants. Regarding sharing of taxes the State 
felt that the proceeds of taxes and duties should be distributed on the 
basis of attributability. (Memorandum to the Second Finance Commission, 
GOWB, 1956, p. 27) According to this proposition, a State should receive 
that amount of transfers which could have been levied and collected by 
that State if it had the power to levy those taxes. Such power, however, for 
the convenience of administration and uniformity of treatment was 
assigned to the Centre. Therefore, the distribution to the States of divisible 
Central taxes and duties should be mainly based on the contribution or 
collection of each State and such basis would fully compensate the State 
for foregoing the right to levy the tax. (Memorandum Submitted to Sixth 
Finance Commission, GOWB, 1973, pp. 3-4) 
 
The debate regarding the criterion chosen for devolution of income tax  
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Being one of the advanced industrialised States-West Bengal is said to 
have been affected considerably by the incorrect criterion/weightages 
chosen by the Finance Commissions for devolving the proceeds from 
income tax among the States. The First Finance Commission (1952) 
expressed that the major factors, which in its opinion, should enter into an 
appropriate scheme for the distribution of income tax proceeds among the 
States were needs of the States measured by ‘population’ and also 
‘collection’ or ‘contribution’ of each States to the total income tax 
collection. However, successive Finance Commissions from the First to 
the Sixth were twisting around attaching 10 or 20 percent to the 
‘contribution’ principle and the remaining 80 or 90 percent to ‘population’ 
as a measure of needs of the respective State.    
 
The question regarding the origin of income tax and consequently of how 
much weightage should be given to the contribution principle also became 
the centre of debate within the successive Finance Commissions. On one 
occasion the First Finance Commission mentioned that “a substantial part 
of the tax receipts accrues in respect of incomes originating beyond the 
boundaries of the respective states” (Memorandum to the Fourth Finance 
Commission, GOWB, 1965, p. 26) thus attaching major weight to 
contribution principle did not seem to have much ground to the 
Commission. Yet on an other occasion the First Finance Commission 
recognised the relevance of the factor of contribution in the distribution of a 
shared income tax and justified it on grounds that “It is pertinent to bear in 
mind the fact that there is all over the country a core of incomes-
particularly in the range of personal and small business incomes-which 
could be treated as of local origin”. (Memorandum to the Third Finance 
Commission, GOWB, 1961, p. 12) With this frame of hesitant mind the 
First Finance Commission, however, marked the beginning of attaching 20 
per cent weight to the principle of contribution. And the remaining 80 per 
cent was attached to population factor as a measure of needs. This basic 
principle was more or less followed by all the successive Finance 
Commissions. Seemingly, they didn’t want to break the tradition set by the 
First Finance Commission even though some were of the opinion that 
there may be case for greater weightage being given to collection in the 
restricted field of personal income tax.  
 
According to the West Bengal government the contribution principle should 
receive greater weightage in devolving the proceeds from income tax 
since there was no doubt that the major part of the income tax was of the 
local origin. Therefore each State should receive what it contributes to the 
total income tax collection. Particularly after the introduction of Finance Act 
of 1956 which excluded corporation tax paid by companies from the 
divisible pool of income tax, contribution principle became more relevant 
than earlier. Because income tax collected from the companies which 
normally function beyond the territories of a particular State was excluded 
from the divisible pool of income tax and subsequently made the income 
tax completely of local origin. Afterwards, there would be hardly any 
justification, as felt by the State government, whatsoever for not 
distributing the State’s share of the income tax entirely on the basis of the 
 99
collection figures of that State.66At least there is a valid justification of 
attaching contribution and population principle on 50:50 basis. The award 
of Otto Niemeyer (1935) however, based on the principle of giving 50 per 
cent weightage to contribution and 50 percent weightage to population. 
Afterwards Expert Committee on financial provisions of the Constitution 
had recommended that 58 per cent weightage should be given to the 
contribution principle and the weightage to population should be 33 and 9 
per cent should remain for adjustment. (Memorandum Submitted to  Sixth 
Finance Commission, GOWB, 1973, p. 125)  In the changed context 
reversion to that old principle, as felt by the State, would be the only fair 
and equitable basis for distribution of the proceeds of income tax among 
the States.  
 
Table 4 (see Appendix) indicates the State-wise percentage receipts of 
income tax share as against their contribution to total income tax collection 
during the period between 1958-59 and 1969-70. The figures speak for 
themselves. The government of West Bengal complained that industrial 
States like West Bengal, Maharastra suffered as a result of the 
insignificant weightage being attached to the factor of contribution. For 
example, in 1958-59, 1967-68, 1968-69 and 1969-70 percentage of 
receipts to income tax collection of West Bengal were 16.2, 51.3, 48.1 and 
52.0 percent respectively. On the other hand industrially less developed 
States received more than what was collected within their territories. 
Therefore, Assam  received 133.1, 134.7, 112.0 and 173.8 respectively in 
the above mentioned years. And Uttar Pradesh received 216.4, 
200.5,171.7 and 198.3 respectively during the same period (table 4 see 
Appendix). Another estimation shows that while the Central government 
collected Rs.119 crores by way of corporation tax and income tax in 1962-
63 from West Bengal, the State received back only Rs. 11.52 crores as its 
share of income tax (Memorandum to the Fourth Finance Commission, 
GOWB, 1965, p. 27) thereby leaving  meagre sum for infrastructural 
development of the State. Greater weigthage given to collection factors 
                                                          
66 Arguments against the adoption of the contribution principle for purposes of distribution, 
relied upon the fact that the activities of companies normally extend beyond the cities or 
the States where they had their headquarters. But as a result of the amendments made in 
1959 which excluded the tax paid by the companies from the divisible pool of income tax, 
the substance of this logic seemed to have lost its ground what they might have earlier 
had. Furthermore, with the introduction of this Act all the arguments supporting economic 
integration of the country, removal of barriers to trade and commerce and such other 
factors completely lost their ground. What is now left as income tax is of purely local 
origin and forms a part of the local ‘core of income’. (Memorandum to the Third Finance 
Commission, GOWB, 1961, pp. 13-15) 
It should be noted that Third Finance Commission also felt the justification of giving major 
weight to the contribution principle after passing this Finance Act, 1959. The Commission 
said, “ Since the Second Finance Commission made its recommendation taxes of 
incomes paid by the companies have been excluded from the divisible pool. The bulk of 
this tax paid by the companies would have accrued from income tax of all India origin. 
With the exclusion of these elements from the divisible pool a higher percentage than 
before of the total yield of incomes now represents the taxes derived from incomes of 
local origin.” But despite such realisation Third Finance Commission have also attached 
20 per cent to the collection factor.  (Memorandum to the Fourth Finance Commission, 
GOWB, 1965, p. 26)   
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was also justified on the ground that the State with higher concentration of 
urban population and industries needs to bear additional liabilities for 
maintaining basic infrastructural facilities and other civic amenities. 
 
We have mentioned before, according to the First and the Second Finance 
Commission’s view ‘need’, but not contribution, should be the main 
criterion for the distribution of the proceeds from income tax and excise 
duties among the States. This basic principle was accepted by all the 
successive Finance Commissions. The criterion of “need”, as was 
considered by the Finance Commissions, however, could be quantified by 
the respective population of the State as the assumption was that “needs” 
vary directly and proportionately with population.  
 
Government of West Bengal strongly stood against the principle of 
attaching ‘need’ measured by population as an important criterion for 
resource distribution and said it is completely unconstitutional. Because 
need of a particular State is supposed to be taken care of by the Article 
275 of the Constitution. Article of 275 clearly provides that Parliament has 
to determine which States are in need of assistance. Therefore, if 
resources of the States found to be insufficient to meet its requirements, it 
is for the Parliament or the President to assess the needs of the States 
and provide necessary grants-in-aid  to the States under the Article 275.  
On the other hand Article 270 of the Constitution which provides for the 
distribution of the proceeds of the income tax among the States, makes no 
mention of the need factor nor does it imply that income tax should be 
distributed in a manner so as to put all the States in a position of equality. 
This argument is valid only for the purpose of Article 275. Therefore, the 
principle behind Article 275 can not be extended for the purpose of 
depriving one State of what is legitimately its due in order to give aid or 
assistance to another State.67  
 
The State further felt that if at all population factor is to be considered for 
resource devolution then adequate attention should also be paid to the 
density of population along with the total volume of population of the State. 
High density of population in West Bengal became one of the major 
problems during the post-Partition period. And it should not be overlooked 
that the per capita needs of those States with heavy concentration of 
population in vast cities are much greater. The government explained that 
per capita cost of social overheads and services is much higher in 
                                                          
67 It would be worthwhile to note that the Fourth Finance Commission (1965) seemed to 
be of the same opinion. As it said, “In regard to income tax the Constitution does not say 
that it should be distributed on the basis of budgetary needs. In fact, however, great the 
budgetary needs, a State will not get a share, if, for some reason or other the tax is not 
leviable in that State. And even when there is no budgetary need in a particular case, a 
State can not be denied some share in the income tax proceeds if the tax happens to be 
levied within that State. In the case of the Union excises also, the provisions are almost 
similar.....The only Article in the Constitution which refers to the need for financial 
assistance is Article 275. The grants-in-aid under this Article are to made only to ‘such 
States as are in the opinion of Parliament ‘in need of assistance’ ”. (Memorandum 
Submitted to Sixth Finance Commission, GOWB, 1973, p. 4) 
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concentrated centres of population than where the population is evenly 
distributed over a wide area and is pre-dominantly rural in character.  
 
Against this backdrop the feeling of deprivation originates from the fact on 
account of receiving less share of the proceeds from income tax than its 
legitimate due which, as observed by the West Bengal government, was 
nothing but transference of resources from West Bengal to other States for 
their benefit. In it’s view, even though all the States had suffered due to 
incorrect application of the Constitutional provisions of devolving funds, 
West Bengal’s sufferings were more acute than others. The division of 
taxing power provided in the Constitution puts the State in a severe 
hardship. West Bengal was perhaps the only State where the agricultural 
sector was decadent68 and not only failed to mobilise any revenue but also 
imposed liabilities on the Government’s exchequer. With the abolition of 
Zemindari, land revenue was no longer a source of net revenue in West 
Bengal as costs of collection, payment of compensation to ex-
intermediaries and settlement operations left a negative balance of 9.14 
crores in the land revenue receipts over the five years between 1961 and 
1966. (Memorandum to the Third Finance Commission, GOWB, 1961 p. 
10) 
 
Unfortunately,  the Constitution had made the State government 
dependent on revenues from the agriculture sector in the form of land 
revenue, forest receipts, and irrigation rates which though yielded large 
revenues in other States i.e., in Uttar Pradesh but revenue collected from 
land, as mentioned before, was not only insignificant in West Bengal but 
also left a negative balance. (Memorandum to the Third Finance 
Commission, GOWB, 1961 p. 10) In contrast, West Bengal had a large 
prosperous industrial sector and the economic development of West 
Bengal largely have been dependent on this sector. Yet the State had no 
power to tax its industrial income. Thus government of West Bengal had 
power to tax the wealth which it did not posses but had no power to tax 
wealth which it had in plenty. Therefore, industrial development instead of 
being a source of wealth, became rather liability on the State. For the 
State alone had to bear the enormous cost of maintaining the basic 
infrastructure for industrial development and the allied essential social 
service. But economic prosperity of the State by virtue of industrial 
development was taken away by the government of India by means of 
corporation tax and customs duty in which the State has no share and 
income tax and excise duty which was distributed among the so called 
industrially less developed States in the name of the misconceived 
principle of regional equality. Thus other States with a growing agricultural 
sector had the best of both the worlds. On the one hand they had the 
benefit of the income generated from their buoyant agricultural sector of 
                                                          
68An estimation shows that the percentage increase of productivity in food grains over the 
period from 1952-53 to 1964-65 was only 0.90 per cent as against the all India average of 
1.60 per cent.  And percentage increase of productivity in non-food grains and all crops 
taken together were 0.09 per cent and 1.41 per cent as against 1.79 per cent and 1.91 
per cent of all India average during the same period. Moreover only 17.40 per cent of the 
net sown area (62.9) was double cropped in the State due to insignificant irrigation 
facilities in 1966-67. Memorandum Submitted to Fifth Finance commission, GOWB, 1969, 
p. 7) 
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these States and on the other hand they received the income generated in 
the industrial States in the shape of shares of divisible taxes on the basis 
of the principle of per capita equality. 
 
It was argued that if the transfer of Central resources i.e., income tax and 
other Centrally collected but divided taxes is utilised as an instrument to 
pump money out of one or two industrially developed States in pursuance 
of removing the inter-State disparities within a very short time span, then 
other States enjoying the advantage of natural resources and having 
potential for industrial development would not only be left with insufficient 
resources required to provide necessary infra-structural facilities for 
industrial development but also it could widen the gap between it’s 
taxability and wealth. The State alleged before the Second Finance 
Commission that the great disparity between wealth and taxability was the 
biggest tragedy in the State. The State of West Bengal produced great 
wealth and was required to provide services and infrastructure so that 
wealth could be produced adequately.  But unfortunately the State was not 
in a position to  tax the wealth. “As a result West Bengal today enjoys the 
unenviable position of having great concentration of wealth but little power 
by which this wealth can be taxed for the benefit of the poor people living 
in the midst of that wealth. This great disparity between wealth and 
taxability is the biggest tragedy in the State and this is at the root of most 
of the malady from which the body politic of this State suffers. This is the 
problem peculiar to West Bengal and can not be solved without giving the 
State Government a commensurate share in the tax on industrial wealth 
and industrial income.” (Memorandum Submitted to Second Finance 
Commission, GOWB, 1956, pp. 8-9) 
 
Furthermore,  balanced regional development, as argued by the State, can 
not be achieved if the growth of industrial States are stalled. Such practice, 
as the State felt, would also lead to the grave danger of retarding the 
economic growth of India as a whole. Therefore, the task of removing 
regional disparities should be undertaken in a gradual planned process 
and any step towards that direction must be preceded by proper 
identification of the backward areas of different States. Even though West 
Bengal appeared to be one of the most industrially advanced and 
prosperous States, the per capita income of most of the districts of West 
Bengal were miserably low. In fact all the districts of West Bengal except 
three had been declared backward by the Planning Commission. 
(Memorandum Submitted to the Fifth Finance Commission, GOWB, 1969, 
p. 22) 
 
Excise duties consumption weightage 
 
Appropriate selection of the criteria for distributing the proceeds from 
excise duties gave rise to major debates between the West Bengal 
government and the successive Finance Commissions during the 
Congress regime. Regarding the criterion for distribution of the proceeds 
from the excise duties, all Finance Commissions seemed to have reached 
to the consensus that it would be preferable to continue population as the 
sole basis for distribution. And the remaining amount was left for 
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adjustments. However, First Finance Commission suggested that State-
wise consumption of the shared commodities should be suitable basis for 
devolution of the proceeds from excise duties. But in the absence of any 
reliable State-wise consumption data69 the Commission had to use 
population as the basis for distribution.  The main principle set by the First 
Finance Commission was followed by the successive Commissions with 
few adjustments.  
 
The State government, however, was of the opinion that consumption 
would be the only fair and correct principle for devolution. While 
substantial part of excise duties like sales tax are taxes on consumption. 
Moreover excise duties are passed on to the ultimate consumers who bear 
the ultimate burden. Thus, the distribution of proceeds from excise duty 
should be on the basis of origin and contribution and a State should get 
what could be levied if it had power to tax the commodities. 
 
It is rather axiomatic that consumption of excisable commodities is quite 
high in densely populated, industrialised urban areas as in some parts of 
West Bengal. By far the largest amount of Union excise duties are 
collected from items like kerosene, matches, tobacco, tea, sugar, cotton 
fabrics, motor spirit, diesel oil, cement, paper and vegetable products. It 
can not be denied that consumption of such commodities are higher in 
densely populated urban areas. An estimation shows that in 1960 articles 
like kerosene (14.82 per cent) matches (19.88 per cent) tobacco (17.19 
per cent) tea (21.59 per cent) sugar (11.71 per cent), cotton fabrics (8.17 
per cent), motor spirit (8.38 per cent) and paper (30.69 percent) was fairly 
high in West Bengal where there are considerable large area of densely 
populated urban areas. (Memorandum Submitted to Fourth Finance 
Commission, GOWB, 1965, pp. 31-32) Therefore, the government 
observed that the State would be deprived of its due share if consumption 
criterion  for devolving proceeds from excise duties is not attached. 
 
The Third Finance Commission (1961) onwards, besides attaching major 
weightage to population factor, relative financial weakness/backwardness 
of the States (with minor variation from one Finance Commission to 
another) became another main criterion in devolution of the proceeds from 
excise duties. The Third Finance Commission which was instrumental in 
introducing the backwardness factor stated that in the matter of division of 
the States share of Union excise duties an attempt should be made to 
bring all the State’s as far as possible to a comparable level of financial 
balance.  
 
Attaching weightage to the principle like backwardness is not only 
unconstitutional, as the State criticised, but also unwelcome morally. While 
many of the commodities bearing excise duty as mentioned above are of 
                                                          
69 Second Finance Commission, however, accepted the principle of distribution of 
excisable duties on the basis of consumption was  but both First and Second Finance 
Commission drew the attention to the lack of statistics regarding consumption which are 
reliable. Moreover Second Finance Commission didn’t adopt it because they thought that 
the more urbanised would be benefited by the adoption of consumption criteria. However, 
West Bengal government argued that Second Finance Commission seemed to have 
overlooked the liabilities devolving upon the urbanised States. 
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basic necessities of life and consumed largely by the poorest classes. 
Therefore, the proceeds of excise duties are also partly derived from 
consumption of excisable articles by the poor and backward sections of 
the so called advanced States. Factors such as financial weakness or 
relative backwardness of the States, as the State felt, are not relevant to 
the question of where excisable articles are sold or where the excise 
duties accrue. Therefore, to take money from the poorest classes of the 
people of one so called advanced State in order to give it to other States 
on the ground of the latter’s relative financial weakness or relative 
backwardness can not be justified. Likewise, the State argued, the 
provision for grants-in-aid as spelt out in the Constitution should deal with 
the problem of backwardness of a particular State. But shares of excise 
duties should not be utilised for such purposes.70 
 
That apart, the backwardness criterion tended not to take into account the 
real measurement of backwardness of the State like West Bengal as we 
have mentioned earlier. There are backward areas and prosperous areas 
in all States and distribution of the divisible pool of Central excise duties 
assuming an entire State as backward or advanced is wrong in principle. 
Thus, it was argued that if backwardness is to be given priority then intra-
State disparity in West Bengal should be taken into account. Needs of 
West Bengal would be much higher than other States due to her acute 
intra-regional disparity than other States. Of total income generated in the 
State about 58 per cent comes from Calcutta and some adjacent areas. Of 
the total number of persons employed in registered factories of the State in 
1961, 83 per cent were employed in the four districts of Howrah, Hoogly, 
24 Paraganas and Calcutta. Of the total industrial income about 78.7 per 
cent was derived from the region centred around Calcutta and Howrah. 
Therefore, other parts of West Bengal were as backward and 
underdeveloped as any other so called backward area of India. 
(Memorandum Submitted to the Fifth Finance Commission, GOWB, 1969, 
p. 22) 
 
In sum the major contention of the State was that although West Bengal 
was relatively industrially developed than many other States, it is decadent 
in agriculture. Unfortunately, industrial development instead of being a 
source of wealth to the State government has become a liability under the 
present pattern of transferring the federal resources to the States. Under 
this pattern the wealth generated in West Bengal in the form of corporation 
tax, and customs duty are taken away by the Central government and 
income tax and excise duties are being largely transferred to other States 
due to the misconceived principle of per capita equity based on incorrect 
selection of weightages for devolving funds which are clearly 
unconstitutional.  
 
                                                          
70 The same argument was also made by the State while discussing the futility of 
attaching the criteria of ‘need’ for the devolution of the proceeds from income tax. It was 
again argued that the criteria of relative backwardness  for devolving funds from the 
proceeds from excise duties can not be used since such factors are normally dealt with 
by provision of grants-in-aid to States under the Article 275 of the Constitution.  
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Before Independence, Bengal suffered significantly due to the inelasticity 
of land revenue which was under the purview of the Provincial government 
and the Provinces at large denied any share of income tax and customs 
duty which Bengal produced in plenty. Thus, surplus generated in Bengal 
was allegedly being transferred to other States as well as appropriated by 
the Centre. After Independence the same trend seemed to have continued 
whereby West Bengal allegedly received much less share of income tax 
and excise duty due to meagre weightage being attached to contribution 
principle in case of income tax and consumption principle in case of excise 
duty. Which, however, said to have impaired its nation building services 
and hence the overall infrastructural development.  
 
In respect of the per capita share of total Central taxes and statutory 
grants (Articles 273 and 275) the position of West Bengal was third among 
all the States in 1952-53. In 1957-58 too the position of West Bengal in 
this respect  was the same but in 1962-63 it went down to the ninth  place 
and in 1966-67 it further went down to eleventh place. (table 5 see 
Appendix) In per capita devolution of Central resources while every State 
had improved its position during the above mentioned period i.e., during 
the awards of the First to Sixth Finance Commissions,  West Bengal 
suffered a deterioration. Even in terms of population, as the State 
demanded, West Bengal should have got much more than the present 
allocation of the Central tax transfers and grants-in aid. Thus it appears 
that in the eagerness to help the so called less developed States the basic 
needs of West Bengal were overlooked. (Memorandum Submitted to Fifth 
Finance Commission, GOWB, 1969, p. 15) The effect of the inadequate 
devolution of federal funds was reflected in inadequate allocation of 
resources in social services of the State. In 1952-53 West Bengal 
occupied the third position in India in respect of per capita expenditure on 
nation building activities. In 1957-58 it’s position was fourth and in 1962-63 
it’s position slipped down to ninth. In  1963-64, 1964-65, 1966-67 it’s 
position further drastically reduced to eleventh amongst the States in India. 
(table 6 see Appendix) (Memorandum Submitted to Fourth Finance 
Commission, GOWB,1965, pp. 18-19 & Memorandum Submitted to Fifth 
Finance Commission, 1969, p. 16) 
 
In addition to that as complained by the West Bengal government, different 
Central policies pursued after Independence including the Partition 
brought tremendous suffering to West Bengal in many respects at the 
same time became source of profit to the other States. Income tax share 
was increased for other Sates while it decreased for West Bengal soon 
after Independence on account of the Partition. The proceeds form jute 
export duty though remained undiminished in fact the proceeds rose, but 
the government of India reduced the share of West Bengal and 
appropriated the savings. Thus, in the front of income tax, the Partition of 
Bengal became a source of profit to other States and in the case of jute 
export duty and jute goods the Partition became a source of profit to 
government of India. (Memorandum Submitted to Second Finance 
Commission, GOWB, 1956, pp. 8)   
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In this context it needs to be mentioned that West Bengal government 
during the Congress rule emphasised on the fact that Central policies 
pursued so far did not take adequate note of the needs of West Bengal 
and Constitutional verdicts and federal principles were not  followed 
properly by the Centre and the Central institutions in many respects. The 
Constitution clearly spells that ‘need’ as measured by population of the 
State should not be the basis of devolution of resources among the States 
which is taken care of by Article 275 of the Constitution. Yet major 
weightage has been so far attached to the criterion of population which is 
supposedly represented the needs of a particular State in devolution of 
proceeds both from income tax and excise duties. This practice had left 
inadequate resources for West Bengal and consequently became the root 
cause of the major maladies of its economy.  
 
The Constitution, however, clearly demarcates the responsibilities of the 
two levels of the governments i.e., State and the Centre. But, as 
expressed by the State, the Centre lately had made considerable 
encroachment upon the State subjects leading to unnecessary duplication 
and overlapping of functions between the two levels of governments. An 
estimation shows that expenditure by the government of India on subjects 
which were clearly assigned to the States increased during the last years 
by over 85 per cent while the expenditure on those functions which were 
assigned to the Centre increased to only 8 per cent. Therefore, such 
violation of federal principle made the State comment that “the federal 
principle requires that the Central Government and the State Governments 
should each be limited to their own spheres, and, within that sphere, 
should be independent of each other.” (Memorandum Submitted to Third 
Finance Commission, GOWB ,1961, p. 5) In this context the State felt that 
the Finance Commission while assessing the need of the Centre at the 
time of resource devolution between the Centre and the State should take 
into account the trend of constant encroachment by the Centre on the 
State subjects and therefore should not provide the Centre anything more 
than was needed. “In our view one of the major tasks of the Finance 
Commission would be to assess the needs of the Centre according to the 
function it is required to discharge under the Constitution and to allow it to 
retain so much and so much only, of the funds that are actually required 
for the discharge of those specifically Central functions in an efficient 
manner. The surplus should be transferred to the States in the forms of 
share of divisible taxes rather than in the form of discretionary grants.” 
(Memorandum Submitted to Third Finance Commission, GOWB ,1961, p. 
6) 
 
The State also expressed it’s concern over the fact of the Planning 
Commission, a non-Constitutional body getting more powerful than the 
Constitutional body like the Finance Commission which does not go well 
with the  federal aspirations and was bound to give rise to discretionary 
tendency in the Centre-State financial relations. Therefore, the State felt 
that the Finance Commission should act in their own right of exercising 
their Constitutional powers. The views of the Planning Commission are 
entitled to respect but it should be remembered that the Planing 
Commission is entirely an advisory body without any Constitutional power. 
 107
And the Planning Commission should not be encouraged to  take upon 
themselves duties and functions which the Constitution has entrusted to 
the Finance Commission. (Memorandum Submitted to Third Finance 
Commission, GOWB, 1961, p. 53) 
  
Evidently, during the pre-Left Front era though the accusation of being 
deprived as far Centre-State resource devolution was concerned, was 
made by the Congress government, any demand for a radical change in 
the federal system of India through amendment to the Constitution and the 
change in the structure and functions of the Centrally controlled financial 
institutions was not raised. Instead it was repeatedly said that fulfilment of 
the Constitutional provisions would minimise the suffering of West Bengal. 
The Congress government was very much critical about the Central 
policies taken so far, coupled with erroneous application of federal 
principles which went against the interest of the State. But these were not 
perceived as deliberate discrimination made against the particular State. 
Contrary to that during the Left Front era the demand for far reaching 
radical change of the Indian federation came to the fore along with the 
accusation of politically motivated, time specific and State specific 
discrimination against the State by the Centre.  
  
West Bengal and the Centre during the Left Front era 
 
During the last five decades Centre-State financial relations in India has 
undergone substantial change and it appears to indicate more centripetal 
bias than what was envisaged in the Constitution. Having voted to power 
in 1977, Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI (M)---major partner of the 
Left Front government, started addressing the lacunas of the federal 
structure of India and demanded fundamental change in this relation by 
amendment to the Constitution through submitting the Memorandum on 
Centre-State Relations on December 1, 1977. The document is said to 
have derived some inspiration and even ideas from the Rajamannar 
Committee Report. (Thimmaiah,1980, p. 19)  
 
However, such demand of complete restructuring of the Indian federal set 
up was articulated by the CPI (M)-major partner of the United Front (1967-
69) government and later on the Left Front government.71 In 1971 the 
CPI(M) in its election manifesto expressed its view on the Centre-State 
relations in general and vehemently opposed the issue of existing 
framework of the federal structure of India. It was observed by the Party 
that the federal structure of India tended to become more unitary than 
federal. CPI(M)’s election manifesto said “the Congress Government 
denies real autonomy to the States and Union territories. By transferring 
more and more powers to the Centre, the Government is negating the 
                                                          
71 “Until 1977, the impetus for changing the Constitution in the direction of greater 
devolution was confined almost solely to CPI(M),.... from 1977 onwards however, a 
chorus of different political voices rose throughout India which argued for different 
degrees and levels of autonomy for the States”. (Sathyamurthy, T.V,  Southern Chief 
Ministers’ Meeting,  July 10, EPW, 1982, p. 577)   
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autonomy of Constituent units and turning the federal structure of the 
Indian Union into a unitary state.” (Maheshwari, 1971, p. 1192) 
Consequently the Party demanded abolition of the posts of governors, and 
Centre’s right to impose President rule in the State. Concerning other 
areas of Centre-State relations, the Party demanded transfer of most 
subjects provided under the Concurrent list to the States and provision of 
greater financial resources to the Sates. (Maheshwari, 1971, p. 1194)  
  
Over time the sharpness of the demand for complete restructuring of the 
Centre-State relations of India started getting worn down and with mere 
operational aspect coming to the fore. The whole course of the movement 
initiated by the Left Front government against the existing federal structure 
of India can be periodised under three categories. The first period covers 
from 1977 to  approximately late 1980s. During this period the Left Front 
government laid more emphasis on demanding complete restructuring of 
the Centre-State relations through Constitutional amendment. Second 
period commenced from the late 1980s, during this time the government 
started concentrating more on operational aspect of the Centre-State 
financial relations and the demand for structural change of federal fiscal 
relations of India took a backseat. Thus, in a course of time the 
government confined itself to maximisation of the benefit of the State 
subject to the constraint provided by the Constitution i.e., the best use of 
existing provision of federal structure of India. Finally, since the inception 
of the economic liberalisation,1991, de-regulation and de-control of it’s 
central theme, the State decided to exploit the opportunities of the 
abolition of industrial licensing policy and freight equalisation policy i.e., 
the limited autonomy provided to the States as part of the new economic 
policy to industrialise in their respective jurisdictions. However, both of 
these policies said to have adverse impact on the industrialisation of the 
State. The struggle against the Centre and Central policies during this 
period was perceived in terms of taking necessary initiatives to 
industrialise the State.   
 
Autonomy of the States- Two debates Non-Congress Party Vs. CPI (M)   
 
The Memorandum on Centre-State Relations, December 1, 1977 marked 
the beginning of demanding for significant fundamental change in the 
Indian federal structure. The Party also demanded radical redefinition of 
the character of the Indian state. The Memorandum said, the Constitution 
should be amended to include the word ‘Federal’ in the description of the 
Republic of India. Furthermore, the constitutional change should also be 
made to replace the word ‘Union’ by the expressions of ‘Federation’ so as 
to make the system truly federal.72  
                                                          
72In India first non-Congress coalition government headed by Janata Party came to power 
at the Centre in 1977. The then Prime Minister Morarji Desai emphasised that‚ ‘stronger 
States means Stronger Centre‘. But when Chief Minister of West Bengal submitted the 
Memorandum on Centre-State Relations on December 1, 1977, Mr. Morarji Desai turned 
down the demand for more State autonomy raised by the West Bengal government 
branding it an attempt to break up the country. He further said that more State autonomy 
at that juncture might encourage breaking away of certain States from the Indian Union. 
(Thimmaiah, G, ‘The Issue of More State Autonomy’, in Singh, S (ed.) Union-State 
Financial Relations in India, Sterling Publishers Pvt. Ltd. New Delhi, 1980, pp. 18) It is 
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Though the main thrust of the Memorandum was the demand for 
constitutional amendments for providing more autonomy to the States in 
the economic, fiscal and administrative areas it was clearly stressed in the 
Memorandum that the demand for strong States does not have any 
contradiction with the strong Centre. Instead the Party feels that when the 
power balance between the Centre and the States be distributed in such a 
way that “their respective spheres of authority are clearly marked out” that 
would automatically lead to true federation. However, as far as back in 
1972-73, the CIP(M) also stood for strong Centre and equally strong 
autonomous States. It was perceived that  the two being not contradictory 
to each other but complementary. The Centre can be further strengthened 
only by strengthening the States. (Anti-People Policy of the Indira 
Congress, West Bengal State Committee, CPIM, 1983) 
 
In order to attain these two complementary objectives i.e., protecting the 
State’s autonomy and preserving and strengthening the Union authority, 
the Party feels that a strong Centre in a truly federal structure should be 
capable of discharging it’s elementary duty of defending the 
independence, sovereignty and unity of India. While the States should be 
vested with powers in relation to all social and developmental areas. 
(Peoples Democracy, September 30, 1984) However, the States are 
required to act in such a way while exercising their full rights in their own 
spheres that ‘they do not transgress the spheres allotted to the Central 
Government, the latter too, on its part, should not interfere in the sphere of 
the States... “ (A Memorandum on Centre-State Relations, December 1, 
1977) Thus no party would get strengthened at the cost of another.  
 
There have been two pre-existing rationales for maintaining such national 
unity i.e., two versions of the bourgeois approach to Centre-State relations 
as described by the Party.  One group concerns with centralisation at the 
expense of the State autonomy and the other concerns with weakening 
national unity in the name of the State autonomy.  From time to time India 
has been witnessing separatist movements which tend to threaten national 
unity. As the Party feels that Centre-State question is being distorted by 
these elements while one of the major objectives of these movements is to 
attain State autonomy at the cost of weakening national unity. But the 
autonomy of the States by no means, as the party demands, should be 
achieved by disrupting the unity and integrity of the Indian federation. 
Hand in hand with this separatist movements another trend is also present 
in the Indian federation. Thus where secessionist overtones are absent, 
the question of Centre-State relations is exploited by reactionary local 
vested interests that eventually leads to the feelings of regionalism and 
local chauvinism. Quite evidently, as the Party observes, all of these 
trends tend to erode the common feeling of national unity. (Ranadive, B.T,  
The Sarkaria Commission Report: Empty Rhetoric, The Marxist, 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
worthwhile to note that the very same argument was used during the construction of the 
Constitution while incorporating some unitary trends into Indian federation. 
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Theoretical Quarterly of the CPI (M), Vol. 6, January-March, 1988, pp. 34-
35)    Nevertheless, it should be stressed that while the Party is opposed 
to all disruptionist movements as also opposed to the increasing 
centralisation as a weapon to defend national unity against forces of 
disintegration. Thus the CPI (M)’s understanding is totally different from 
the Centre and also from the Sarkaria Commission (1984). Both in the 
name of maintaining national unity justify concentration of legislative, 
administrative and financial power in the hands of the Centre. (Ranadive, 
B.T,  The Sarkaria Commission Report: Empty Rhetoric, The Marxist, 
Theoretical Quarterly of the CPI (M), Vol. 6, January-March, 1988, pp. 36-
37) 
 
Needless to say, strengthening the Centre, as the Party feels, does not 
rule out the demand for restructuring the Constitution for ensuring greater 
autonomy to the States. Because without relevant amendments to the 
Constitution it will never be possible to transfer the necessary power and 
resources to the States. Moreover, the Party observed that non-Congress 
governments and also some Congress governments broadly feel there is 
nothing wrong with the Constitution as it was framed, that what is wrong is 
only in it’s working. Therefore, they hardly demand for radical restructuring 
of the Constitution of India. But the Party is of the opinion that both the 
basic structure of the Constitution and the manner in which the provisions 
of the Constitution was distorted in an attempt to strengthen the Centre 
while undermining the State’s autonomy needs to be addressed. (Peoples 
Democracy, CPI (M) Party organ, March 23, 1969 and also see Peoples 
Democracy, April 23, 1978) 
 
In relation to this, the Party also notices that the difference between the 
other non-Congress parties as well as a particular section of Congress 
party and CPI (M) lies not only in their perception of existing framework 
and functioning of the Constitution and to what extent it needs to be 
amended. But it deals more with the question of basic conflict of the Indian 
polity and class structure which gets manifested in the arena of Centre-
State relations. Thus “it is not just a question of getting a few Constitutional 
amendments......It is a intense battle against the growing authoritarian 
attacks of the ruling party on Indian democracy....Congress leaders like Sri  
Kamaraj even certain non-Congress governments raise the problem as if it 
is a pure and simple constitutional problem which can be amicably settled 
by tinkering with this or that provision of the Constitution. ...The CPI (M) 
has all along held that the question of Centre-State relation is not a 
question of just some provisions in the country’s Constitution but, inherent 
in this problem are the some of the serious contradictions which are 
coming to the surface as class contradictions in the Indian society....” 
(Peoples Democracy, March 23, 1969) Thus the Party argued, the 
question of Centre-State relations is not merely a problem confined to the 
framework of the Indian Constitution rather “it is a problem which reflects 
the struggle of two contending class policies–the policies of big bourgeois-
led state and the policies which the democratic movement stands for.”  
(Peoples Democracy, March 23, 1969)  “The former attempted to develop 
the Indian Union as a highly centralised state through which alone the 
bourgeois can get control of the extensive home market and enter into 
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collaboration with foreign capital. The later relies on real democracy for the 
popular masses, state autonomy being an essential element in real and 
full democracy.“ (Namboodiripad, 1987, p. 46) Therefore “the party’s 
understanding of and proposals related to centre-state relations is a part of 
it’s approach to the whole question of democracy. As opposed to 
bourgeois democracy, the basis on which the Congress rulers framed the 
Constitution, our programme based itself on people’s democracy.” 
(Namboodiripad, 1987, p. 46)  
 
The Party goes on to say that, “Hand in hand with this conflict on the 
question of centralisation and state autonomy between the bourgeoisie 
and proletariat, there is also a conflict between the two sections of the 
bourgeoisie-those ruling the centre and the states respectively. The former 
talks of a “strong centre” which rules out state autonomy, while the latter 
tries to reduce the functions of the centre to the minimum.” 
(Namboodiripad, 1987, p. 46) Moreover, the Party feels that,  other non-
Congress political parties like DMK represents a faction of ruling class as 
the central ruling party and therefore wants a restructuring of Centre-State 
relations within the same socio-class set up. Instead the political party like 
CPI (M) which represents the working class sets the question of the 
Centre-State relations in the framework of a different co-relation of class 
force. (Namboodiripad, 1987, p. 44)  
 
Thus the CPI(M) in one occasion places greater emphasis on fundamental 
restructuring of the Indian federation through basic amendment to the 
Constitution with a view to ensure autonomy of the States while 
strengthening the Centre and upholding the national unity. But in other 
occasion, the Party perceives the whole conflict as regards Centre-State 
relations in the light of basic class conflict of the Indian polity. Therefore, 
as the Party feels, unless such class conflict is addressed or mitigated the 
real autonomy of the States could not be attained. Which, however, marks 
the difference from the other political parties including both Congress and 
non-Congress parties. Because on the one hand the latter want to 
perceive the problem of Centre-State relations in terms of minimising the 
ill-functioning of the Constitution and/or bringing some cosmetic change in 
it but hardly demand any radical restructuring of the Constitution with a 
view to ensure greater autonomy of the States. In both occasions political 
parties other than left democratic parties like CPI (M) want to restructure 
the Centre-State relations within the same socio-economic and class 
structure. That apart, the difference between the CPI (M) and other 
Congress and Non-Congress parties lies also in the fact that either the 
latter legitimise centralisation in the name of upholding national unity or 
tend to weaken nation unity in the name of strengthening the States 
autonomy while the CPI (M) stands for striking the balance between the 
State autonomy and the strong Centre. 
 
Therefore, the crux of the demand formulated by the Party is to attain the 
balance between these two countervailing forces. But one fails to 
understand how such desired balance of ensuring State autonomy and 
strengthening the Centre will come into force. If such balance  is attained 
through radical restructuring of the Constitution then the question is will it 
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be attained on the basis of same socio-economic and class structure or 
total restructuring of the Indian polity and economy. The Party seems to be 
suffering from lack of understanding as regards this question. While in one 
occasion, the Party describes that the desired balance of ensuring State 
autonomy and strengthening the Centre should be set on radical 
restructuring of the existing class relations and in other occasion, the Party 
seems to accept the existing class relations while stressing the need for 
upholding and protecting national unity in order to combat ongoing 
secessionist movements in the Indian territory. Therefore, it appears to us 
that the Party legitimises centralisation for the sake of upholding existing 
frame of national unity which is, quite evidently, based on the same class 
structure.  
 
Therefore, in course of time the difference between what the Party tried to 
maintain from the other political parties in terms of restructuring the Indian 
federation with a view to attain State autonomy by radically changing the 
existing class force as against the view of congress and non-Congress 
political parties which stand for attaining the State autonomy within the 
existing class structure of the Indian federation got increasingly blurred. 
That eventually leads the Party to only get confined to a more 
accommodating position. Thus since the late 1980s the Party mainly 
focused on the more operational area of the Centre-State relations leaving 
aside the demand for radical restructuring of the Indian federal set up. 
However, this trend became more apparent with the inception of economic 
liberalisation, 1991. The focal point of the struggle against the Centre and 
central policies was to exploit limited autonomy provided to the State in the 
sphere of industrialisation. Set aside the demand of radical structuring of 
Centre-State relations on which the Party focused until the early 1980s, 
even the recent threat constituted on the State’s autonomy since economic 
liberalisation did not get adequate attention it deserved . Subsequent part 
of our study will deal with this area.  
 
Furthermore, the difference between the democratic centralisation what 
the Party stands for as against authoritarian centralism which denies 
autonomy to the subordinate governments does not seem to be clearly 
exercised in the State-local government relations in West Bengal. Though 
several studies on Panchayat in West Bengal admit that decentralisation 
of power was successfully exercised but to what extent three different 
forms of decentralisation i.e., political, administrative and financial 
decentralisation took place in West Bengal leaves adequate room for 
controversy. It is disheartening to note that although the Party upholds 
democratic centralisation the study pursued by Bhattacharya (1998) 
observes that in State-local relations the Party hardly wants to lose its grip 
and almost all major decisions are taken by the Party hierarchy. Evidently 
centralising operational mechanism of the CPI (M) for running Panchayat 
is evident.  At each level of the Panchayat the Party forms Panchaytat Sub 
Committee (PSC) which is the Party’s Parichalana (organisational) 
Committee (PC) All elected Party members of Panchayat Samiti and Zila 
Parishad will act under the respective committees. The final decision at 
each level will be taken by the PSC although the elected members can 
make recommendations. Thus the Party sources clearly establishes that 
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that Panchayat are emptied of all real content as the important decision 
are taken at the level of Panchayat Sub Committee (PSC) violating the 
rule of democratic decentralisation principle where people’s participation is 
sought to be ensured. (Bhattacharya, H, Micro Foundations of Bengal 
Communism, Ajanta, Books International, New Delhi, 1998, pp. 108-114). 
Moreover the Party not only is reluctant to provide complete autonomy of 
the local governments but also legitimises such denial through articulating 
it in the following manner. The Party feels, needless to say that there is a 
strong centripetal bias in the Indian federation and such centralisation puts 
constraints on them to empower local governments with a view to make 
them function as self government.73 
 
Demand for limited restructuring of Centre-State relations 
 
As mentioned above the Party holds the view that in its actual working the 
Constitution came to be distorted and even the limited extent of autonomy 
that found a place in the Constitution has been eroded. Although the 
Constitution was meant to be a federal one its unitary features have 
increasingly come to overshadow it’s federal features. Thus the 
Constitution which was adopted after Independence and came into force is 
federal in form but “Unitary” in content which necessitated radical 
restructuring of the Constitution. That as proposed by the Party will be 
described in the subsequent part.   
 
The demand for providing more autonomy to the States includes the 
following aspects. Emergency provision enabling the Centre to interfere in 
the affairs of the States under Article 249  of the Constitution should be 
removed. And residuary powers which are not included either under the 
Centre, State and Concurrent list  be transferred to the States. However, 
Concurrent list is one of the most contentious issues of the Centre-State 
relations. It was demanded by the West Bengal government that 
Concurrent list should be abolished and the items covered by the lists be 
included under the State list.74 But the industrial and power or irrigation 
                                                          
73 In August 1992, the Minister of Panchayats of West Bengal, Dr. Surya Kanto Mishra 
articulated this view in the concluding speech to a Panchayat workshop, Calcutta in the 
following manner, “I want to make it clear that devolution of power can be done to the 
extent that the State Government possesses it. In India there is only one government. 
The rest are local administrative bodies. The State Government does not possess any 
state power, and therefore cant not decentralise state power and is circumscribed in the 
devolution of finances to the lower level.” Quoted in Lieten, G.K, “ For a New Debate on 
West Bengal”, Mainstream, February 12, 1994, pp. 22 and also see Lieten, G.K,  
Development, Devolution and Democracy village discourse in West Bengal, Sage 
Publication, 1996, p.232) 
74 While expressing her view to the Commission on Centre-State Relations, 1984, the 
Government said “To begin with, the Concurrent List should be abolished. Article 254 
implies that the Concurrent list is in effect the second Union list, since in case of a conflict 
between a Central piece of legislation and State law, the Central law will prevail; items 
covered by the Concurrent list are thus subject to the ultimate jurisdiction of the Union 
Government. It is our point of view that this list must be eliminated in entirely and all items 
covered by it be transferred to the State List.“ (Reply to questionnaire, Commission on 
Centre-State Relations, Government of West Bengal, July, 1984, p. 4) 
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schemes which concern more than one State have to be kept in the Union 
list so that there can be a common policy and final decision in regard to 
these multi-State projects that will be taken by the Union government, 
while the execution and implementation should be channelled through the 
State governments. Industrial licensing policy apparently generated a lot of 
debate before its abolition. The State alleged that political influence played 
greater role in distribution of such industrial licences among the States and 
claimed that major modification in the industrial licensing system was 
called for. Besides the lists in the Seventh Schedule should be 
reformulated so that States may be given exclusive power in case of the 
certain categories of industries. 
 
In order to preserve State autonomy it was claimed that the State 
Legislature must be the supreme authority in the State sphere and no 
interference by the Centre in this sphere should be allowed on any ground. 
West Bengal government demanded abolition of Article 200 and 201 of the 
Constitution which empowers the  Governor of the State to reserve Bills 
passed by the Legislative Assembly of the State for President’s assent.  
And bills passed by the State Legislature should not be left in pendency for 
the assent of the Parliament and the Parliament should not pass laws on 
subjects included in  the State list.  
 
On the structure and function of two multiple resource transfer agencies, 
the Finance Commission and the Planning Commission, West Bengal 
government took quite a radical position and not only criticised the 
operational limitation of these two bodies but also demanded thorough 
restructuring of these agencies. However, the Finance Commission is a 
statutory body appointed after every five years under the provision of the 
Article 280 of the Constitution. It’s chief function is to make 
recommendations on the distribution of the net proceeds of sharable taxes 
between the Centre and the States. The State demanded that Article 280 
clause 3, sub-clause (a) which provides “the distribution between the 
Union and the States of the net proceeds of the taxes which are to be or 
may be divided between the Union and the States” should be deleted and 
redrafted in such a way so as to make it clear that the duty of the Finance 
Commission is only to make recommendations to the President on issues 
related  to the allocation among the States of their respective shares of the 
proceeds. (Memorandum on Centre-State Relations, GOWB, December 
1,1977) 
 
The government of West Bengal laid great emphasis on the concept of 
‘totality of resources’. The total resources raised by the Centre, they claim 
should go to the divisible pool instead of the Centre sharing selective taxes 
and duties with the States. It was demanded by the government of West 
Bengal that 75 per cent of such total resources of the Centre should be 
shared with the States following the Finance Commission’s 
recommendations instead of sharing the proceeds from selective taxes 
and duties as spelt in the Constitution. West Bengal government went on 
to say that it should not be the job of the Finance Commission to decide on 
the proportion of revenues to be distributed between the Centre and the 
States. Its task should be only to fix the proportion that each State should 
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get from the 75 per cent of the total financial realisation of the Centre. 
(Memorandum on Centre-State Relations, GOWB, December 1,1977) 
 
In this connection it should be mentioned that even though Tenth Finance 
Commission (1992) recommended that 29 percent of the proceeds from all 
taxes and duties imposed by the Centre should be brought under the 
divisible pool with a view to enabling the States to enjoy the buoyancy of 
Central taxes but the concept of ‘totality of resources’ seemed to 
encompass a much larger domain of Centre’s resources which is to be 
shared with the States. Therefore, the main thrust of the West Bengal 
government during 1980s was to reorder Union-States financial relations 
in such a manner that the devolution of resources from the Centre to the 
States should cover the totality of resources which includes the total 
amount of resources the Centre generates from all conceivable sources of 
revenue including those of capital receipts namely receipts from bonds 
and others revenue sources. The case for including receipts obtained 
through periodic increases in administrative prices in the divisible pool 
derives from the consideration that such increase has been intended 
largely to avoid the Constitutional obligation to share the proceeds of 
excise duties with the States. The inclusion of the capital receipts such as 
those from special bearer bonds in the divisible pool was also legitimised 
on the ground that contributions to these bonds directly affect receipts 
under income tax and hence the sharable portion of the States. Since the 
States were under the purview of the existing recommendation of the 
Finance Commission, entitled to receive  a fixed percentage (which varied 
from one Commission to another) of the proceeds from income tax. 
Therefore it is also legitimate that contribution to the bonds too is included 
in the pool. Similarly, proceeds from various borrowing programmes 
launched by the Centre, proceeds from all schemes for revenue-raising, 
contingent upon major concessions being accorded under the income tax 
and also all probable sources from which the Centre normally raised 
revenue should be shared with the States. (Reply to Questionnaire, 
Commission on Centre-State Financial Relation, GOWB, July 1984, p. 20 
& 28) 
 
Evidently, West Bengal government demanded greater role to be played 
by the Finance Commission. Finance Commissions are not only expected 
to be confined to their narrow legalistic position i.e., they should not only 
concerned with vertical (Centre to the States)  as well as horizontal (States 
per se) distribution of resources. They should also concern “with the 
question whether the existing Constitutional provisions are adequate for 
dealing with the imbalance in the State’s revenue account and whether 
Central laws are ultra vires the Constitution or ethically wrong.” Thus the 
State felt that it is the duty of the Finance Commission to point out the 
inadequacies of the existing order of fiscal federal relations which seriously 
constrains the financial relations between the Centre and the States. 
(Memorandum to the Eighth Finance Commission, GOWB, 1983, p. 2) 
 
Grants-in-aid provided by the Finance Commission seemed to have also 
become major point of contention since such grants, as alleged by the 
State, tend to widen the regional disparity further by discriminating against 
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the low income States. The State demanded complete abolition of the 
usual provision of grants-in-aid by the Finance commission. The grants-in-
aid element should be treated as a residuary support to fill the gap left 
uncovered after the distribution of shares of the Central taxes and duties. 
Moreover, in the State’s view, grants under Article 275 of  the Constitution 
are to be used only for meeting specific resource problems of a significant 
nature faced by the States. The gap between the normal revenue of the 
State and its non-Plan expenditure, including committed liabilities in 
respect of Plan schemes, Central sector schemes, Centrally-sponsored 
schemes etc., should be filled by shares of Central taxes and duties as far 
as possible.75 (Memorandum to the Seventh Finance Commission, 
GOWB, 1978, p. 5) 
 
There is a longstanding debate on whether it is rational to make an 
artificial distinction between Plan and Non-Plan expenditures on the 
ground that Plan transfers are made by Planning Commission and Non-
Plan transfers by the Finance Commission. The obvious result of such a 
division is that the States tend to underestimate the necessity of allocating 
adequate funds for the maintenance of the existing units in an attempt to 
receive more funds from the Planning Commission by creating more and 
more new Plan schemes. This Plan and non-Plan distinction is rather 
arbitrary as observed by the West Bengal government and therefore the 
State strongly recommended that financial transfer of all categories be 
decided upon and reviewed periodically by one and the same body 
preferably set up under the auspices of Inter-State Council in order to 
avoid such complications and wastage of funds. (Reply to Questionnaire, 
Commission on Centre-State Relations, GOWB, 1984, pp. 25-26) 
 
Regarding the structure and function of the Planning Commission the 
State expressed it’s dissatisfaction and demanded that the structure of the 
Planning Commission be changed so that it may perform efficiently in the 
spirit of true federation. The Planning Commission, as the State’s opinion, 
is currently a relatively ineffective institution acting as an appendage of the 
                                                          
75 The government felt that the principle of grants-in aid should be abolished altogether 
once the process of resource-sharing takes into fullest account the different aspects of 
economic and social disparities. Once this is done efficiently there should be no occasion 
for considering separately the issue of  grants for narrowing down the disparities at the 
level of administrative and social services. Under any circumstances  the mechanism of 
grants must not be used to discriminate further in favour of the relatively better-off States, 
as it was done in the past. There may be some provision for offering grants-in-aid to 
cover situations of emergency, but the allocations must be made exclusively by the body 
set up by the Inter-State Council and not at the discretion of the Union Government. 
(Reply to the Questionnaire Commission on Centre-State Financial Relation, Government 
of West Bengal, 1984, p. 27)  It is worthwhile to note in this connection that the view of 
West Bengal in the pre-Left Front era i.e., during the Congress regime on the question of 
grants-in-aid was broadly similar to that of the Left Front government. It was felt that 
grants-in-aid should largely be a residuary form of assistance. The need of the State 
should be met as far as possible by devolution of taxes and the States should not be 
made dependent on grant assistance while tax sharing being statutory right of the State is 
much buoyant a source of revenue than the grants which is fixed and has some 
discretionary elements. (Memorandum Submitted to Third Finance Commission, GOWB, 
1965, p. 41)  
 
   
 117
Centre. It is not a Constitutional body, but was set up by a resolution of the 
Union government, which appoints and dismisses its members. The Union 
government takes decision on crucial economic issues without apparently 
to caring to consult with the Commission and the later does not dare to 
protest. (Views of the Government Of West Bengal on the Sarkaria 
Commission Report on Centre-State Relations, GOWB, p. 8)  
 
With a view of giving appropriate importance to the views of the States in 
the Planning process, West Bengal government demanded radical 
reconstitution of the Planning Commission too. The Planning Commission, 
according to them, should be converted into a secretariat of the Inter-State 
Council which has the potential of representing the aspirations of the 
States much better than existing body called National Development 
Council.76And the selection of the personnel of the Planning Commission 
must be decided upon by the Inter-State Council instead of the Centre 
alone. 
 
In this context it is necessary to mention that the Central government 
resisted the implementation of the constitutional provision enjoining the 
formation of Inter-State council. The Inter-State Council, however, is 
provided for in the Constitution as a forum for the Centre and the States to 
discuss common issues concerning Centre-State relations. Till 1989 the 
Congress government had never bothered to convene the council. It was 
the V.P. Singh government which first constituted the Council. Since then 
the council has been meeting periodically. This in itself is a result of the 
prolonged struggle pursued by the States.    
 
Further, the State felt that due emphasis should be placed on the opinion 
of the State in the Planning Process which has been conspicuously 
absent. The State, however, feels that since economic and social planning 
does not merely depend on the professional advice of experts but is a 
matter of political consideration and decision,  equal weight should also be 
                                                          
76 It is therefore, important that the National Development Council (NDC)  be supplanted 
by a properly constituted Inter-State Council (ISC) in line with Article 263, as amended, 
with due weightage given to representation of the State governments. The National 
Development Council, as is well known, hardly functions. It meets depending on the wish 
of the Prime Minister, its deliberations are monopolised by the Union government and its 
impact on the national Planning process is negligible. Therefore, the Inter-State Council 
should be reactivated. A Constitutional body like ISC is different in many ways from the 
National Development Council. It was also stressed that a meeting of the NDC can be 
called only by the Centre and used to be held quite infrequently and in a manner 
dependent upon the discretion of the Centre. But an ISC meeting can be requisitioned by 
any of the Chief Minister and besides , Chief Ministers have the power of veto on the 
proposals before the ISC. (Reply to Questionnaire, Commission on Centre-State 
Relations, West Bengal Government, 1984, pp. 43-45 & Views of the Government Of 
West Bengal on the Sarkaria Commission Report on Centre-State Relations, GOWB, pp. 
8-9) 
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given to the political consideration and decision taken at the State level. 
The Union Ministers must not be allowed to impose their ideas on the 
Planning Commission. At least the Constitution itself should lay down 
procedural details for the  Planning Commission’s functioning.  Except for 
a number of industries crucial for defence or where massive investments 
are called for which are beyond the ability of the State government, the 
whole responsibility for overall planning and licensing for industries should 
be transferred to the States. (Reply to Questionnaire, Commission on 
Centre-State Relations, GOWB, 1984, pp. 43-45) 
 
The period of emphasis on functional aspect of federal structure of India 
 
The government of West Bengal seems to have started accommodating 
itself with the existing system of the federal fiscal relations from the second 
phase i.e., from the late 1980s. The State remained mainly confined to the 
functional/operational aspect of the Centre-State financial relations without 
stressing on the demand for restructuring the entire framework of the 
federal system of India. However, the State had sought to maximise it’s 
bounty subject to the constraint posed by the Indian federal system. 
Subsequently,  government of West Bengal made some suggestions 
before the Finance Commission i.e.,  Centre regarding different issues 
which were likely to benefit both the Centre and the State.   
 
One of them related to arranging joint effort of resource mobilisation aimed 
at augmentation of resources of both the Centre and the States may be 
taken up for the examination in some detail. At present some taxes are 
levied and collected by the Centre and then shared with the States. 
Instead of this existing system, the State suggested that the taxes be 
levied by the Centre for reasons of uniformity in tax rate etc., but collected 
by the State which will thus augment the resources of both the Centre and 
the States. This is highly possible if this joint effort of resource mobilisation 
is exercised under proper built-in-incentive. For example,  the power of 
levying excise duties is at present retained in the hands of the Centre. But 
if the power of collection, with appropriate Constitutional amendment and 
legal provisioning, is decentralised to the States the proceeds from excise 
duties would be augmented. Since the States already have comparable 
experience, information and administrative machinery for collection of 
sales tax and have often achieved higher rate of collection than the 
corresponding centralised excise duty collection. Moreover, with the built-
in incentive where 50 per cent of additional collection by the concerned 
State over and above the previously fixed target will be given back to the 
State along with its usual share would encourage the State to utilise their 
full potential in collecting resources. As a punitive measure it was also 
suggested that if there is any short fall in collection from the State’s target 
the State must be prepared to allow suitable deduction from its own share 
of excise duty for that corresponding item so the  Centre does not have to 
lose in any case. (Memorandum Submitted to the Tenth Finance 
Commission, GOWB,1992, pp.24-25 ) However, it could be noted that the 
success of decentralisation in resource mobilisation being practised in the 
State since November 1, 1992 in the sphere of State and local government 
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and encouraged West Bengal  government to extend it to the domain of 
the Centre and the State.  
 
In  1981 the Government of India issued bearer bonds which could be 
freely purchased and transferred and their holders were not expected to 
be called upon to explain the source from which they obtained the money 
invested in them. This scheme, however, was aimed at tapping ‘black 
money‘ which was accumulated by evading income tax. The obvious 
outcome of this scheme was that those possessing such money were 
spared the responsibility of paying any income tax on it. Evidently the loss 
on this account was entirely that of the States. While they were denied the 
share of the income tax77 which could have accorded to them if the total 
‘black money’ absorbed in the bonds, had been subjected to tax. It was 
estimated by the government of West Bengal that from the sum of Rs. 1, 
000 crores which the government of India intended to collect through the 
bonds, the share of West Bengal would have been at least Rs. 67 crore 
and the State should have been entitled to receive the amount. 
(Memorandum Submitted to the Eighth Finance Commission, GOWB, 
1983, p. 7) 
 
The State government also made the suggestions before the Tenth 
Finance Commission of unearthing ‘black money‘ through the Centre-State 
co-operative efforts. It was expected that with a built-in-incentive for the 
States in the form of sharing a part of the additional resources thus 
mobilised would benefit both the Centre and the State government. In this 
effort West Bengal government intended to help the Centre with relevant 
information to the extent possible within the limited ambit of the State’s 
power. Thus if the collection of the ‘black money’ of the States exceeds the 
stipulated target particularly through such co-operative effort, a certain 
percentage of the additional collection over and above the usual 
percentage of devolution may be given back to the concerned State. In 
this manner, both the Centre and the State would be benefited. 
(Memorandum Submitted to the Tenth Finance Commission, GOWB, 
1992, p.12 ) Afterwards Voluntary Disclosure of Income Scheme (VDIS) 
was adopted in the 1996-97 Union budget in an attempt  to unearth ‘black 
money’. In line with the previous suggestion the State suggested that there 
should be regular monitoring of a comprehensive information base on the 
basis of the co-operative effort of the Centre and the States with a built-in-
incentive for the states share a part of the additional collection. 
(Memorandum Submitted to Eleventh Finance Commission, GOWB, 1998, 
pp. 4-5) 
 
Accepting the federal structure of India since 1990s  
                                                          
77 Share of income tax proceeds of the States was also affected by the fact, as West 
Bengal Government observed, that the Central Government often made adjustment in the 
income taxation through exemption, concessions etc., without consultation with the States 
who affected the worst. The State demanded in this respect that the Finance Commission 
should recommend specifically that the Central government must consult the States 
before announcing such adjustments, exemptions, and allowances. (Memorandum 
submitted to the different Finance Commissions during the Left Front Government of 
West Bengal) 
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The struggle against Centralisation of the Indian federation experienced 
dramatic turn in the State since the inception of economic liberalisation of 
1990s. With the abolition of freight equalisation policy and industrial 
licensing policy as a part of economic liberalisation, it was felt by the Party 
that the course of struggle pursued since the late 1970s against the Centre 
and regressive nature of the Indian federation must be changed in the 
changed milieu of 1990s. The State should actively pursue industrialisation 
with a view to exploiting the limited autonomy provided to the State in the 
sphere of industrialisation in it’s jurisdiction. Eventually new economic 
policy was designed by the CPI (M)-led Left Front government in 1994 in 
order to accelerate and facilitate the process of industrialisation in the 
State.  
 
The Party feels that West Bengal is not an independent and sovereign 
country and the State has to function within the framework of the 
Constitution of India. Jurisdiction of a State government has been 
categorically defined in the Constitution. The State governments at large 
have no role in formulating economic policy. Because economic power 
such as policies of export-import, foreign investment, monetary policy, 
financial institutions, major resource mobilisation, taxation and duties are 
all concentrated in the hand of the Centre and are also determined by the 
Centre. Thus the States at large are neither able to implement alternative 
industrial policies set by them nor the Central government‘s policy can be 
altered or transcended in a particular State i.e.,  West Bengal alone. 
(Peoples Democracy, November 12, 1995) Furthermore, “within the 
existing capitalist system and parameters set out by the big bourgeois led 
government it is not possible to develop industries autonomously in West 
Bengal with the limited resources of the state government. Nor it is 
possible to change the nature of the capitalist path of development in one 
state alone when all the powers vest with the Centre”.  (Peoples 
Democracy, Jan 8, 1995) 
 
That apart, the Party observes that Congress policies so far was directed 
towards discriminating against eastern zone in general and West Bengal in 
particular. Discriminatory attitude was geared in the areas of providing 
industrial license, allocating financial assistance and credit by the centrally 
controlled financial institutions and commercial banks. These factors 
coupled with implementation of freight equalisation policy (1956) made the 
State into industrially desert. Such pro-longed discrimination must be 
countered. Thus in order to counter the blockade and discrimination made 
by the Centre, it is of urgent necessity to develop industries in the State. 
(Peoples Democracy, January 8, 1995) 
 
Further, with the abolition of freight equalisation policy and industrial 
licensing policy it became meaningless to complain against Centre’s 
discrimination in regards these areas. In the changed milieu the tactics 
should be different. “Unlike in 1985, when the struggle was against the 
discrimination of the centre, with it’s power of licensing and regulation of 
industry against West Bengal today with deregulation and de-licensing it is 
up to the Left Front government to initiate steps to attract capital investment 
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in West Bengal.” (Peoples Democracy, January 8, 1995) Thus the changed 
context of 1990s brought basic question before the States i.e.,  
industrialisation or de-industrialisation. The Party’s understanding was that 
the Left should always stand for industrialisation in order to give relief to the 
people by taking an initiative to industrialise the State while functioning 
within the parameters of the Central Government’s policy. (Peoples 
Democracy February 26, 1995) Moreover, as mentioned above, 
industrialisation of the State was also perceived as a battle against the 
Centre’s discriminatory policies pursued so far in an attempt to de-
industrialise the State.   
 
Initially the focal point of the struggle against the centripetal bias of the 
Indian federation by the Party started with complete restructuring of the 
Indian federal set up by radically amending the Indian Constitution and also 
by altering the pre-existing class relations with a view to ensure greater 
autonomy of the States. By the late 1980s the focal point of the struggle 
shifted more towards addressing mere operational area of the federal fiscal 
relations. With the inception of New Economic Policy, 1991 this trend was 
further strengthened. It was ultimately confined into the rationale that the 
States in general and West Bengal in particular has to operate under this 
very structure of the Indian federation and the States at large are unable to 
pursue alternative course of development in the face of this all India 
liberalisation and privatisation. Therefore, though the Party started it’s 
struggle with radically restructuring the Indian federal system the Party 
ultimately ended up with accepting the structure itself and seeking for the 
opportunities to make best use of the existing structure.  
 
The type of struggle against the Centre pursued by the Party during 1990s 
have two ramifications.  On the one hand such struggle seems to have 
given rise to the feeling of  new form of regionalism because it is meant to 
address the spheres where the State in particular was subject to get 
discriminated against. Thus the struggle against the Centre remain confined 
into taking necessary initiatives to industrialise the State in an attempt to 
make counter attack against the perceived discrimination. On the other 
hand the State does not seem to bother much about broader demand of 
restructuring the Centre-State relations. Set aside the demand for radical 
restructuring of the Indian federation with a view to provide more autonomy 
to the States, even the assault made on the federal structure of India during 
the late 1990s , which considerably eroded States autonomy did not seem 
to get adequate attention it deserved.  
 
During 1990s the budgetary crisis of both the Central and the States got 
intensified. The Central government while making no serious attempt at 
reducing it’s budgetary deficit by exercising fiscal discipline took the easier 
option to linking Central grants, a statutory rights of the States, to revenue 
deficits reduction by the States violating the aspiration of true federation. 
Though Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Bill, 2000 was 
introduced aiming at introducing greater fiscal discipline of the Centre. But it 
seems to have little impact on the Central finance. Because revenue deficit 
as well as fiscal deficit of the Central government continued to rise during 
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the recent years. Revenue deficit of the Centre as per cent of GDP 
increased from 2.5 per cent in 1991-92  to 3.9 per cent in  2002-03 (BE). 
While fiscal deficit as per cent of GDP increased from 4.7 per cent in 1991-
92 to 5.5 per cent in 2002-03. (BE) (Economic Survey,  2002-03) 
 
There has been a common consensus among the scholars of public finance 
that over time Centre-State relations has deteriorated and the fiscal power 
of the States became worsened much more than what was envisaged in the 
Constitution. Despite this pre-existing trend, the decade of 1990s seems to 
have witnessed unprecedented attack on State’s autonomy. The release of 
normal Central Plan assistance was made conditional to fulfilment of certain 
criteria. The Planning Commission, however, made a declaration on July 1,  
1999,  that “Central Plan assistance to States- already agreed to and 
approved- would be released on a monthly basis strictly on the 
recommendations of the State Plan Adviser concerned (in the Planning 
Commission), on the basis of the certain new criteria now laid down”. 
(Ghosh, 1999, p. 113). Evidently, Central Plan assistance to the States 
would be eventually controlled by few chosen bureaucrats of the Centre. 
Because the Ministry of Finance, government of India supposed to release 
Plan funds to the States only on hearing from the concerned State Plan 
Adviser of the Planning Commission which basically consists of Indian 
Administrative Service thus facilitating the process of renewed 
bureaucratisation and discretion to be exercised by the bureaucrats and the 
Centre in the matter of Central Plan transfer. Further, the Commission also 
stressed that the release of the Central Plan assistance could be withheld if 
the concerned State fails to meet certain criteria of fiscal discipline78 laid 
down by the Planning Commission.  
  
That apart, a fund with effect from April 2000 was also proposed to be set 
up by the Planning Commission. The assistance from which was said to be 
linked to specific projects and would be allocated to the States on the basis 
of the certain laid down criteria and performance parameters. With this 
objective in view detailed Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was 
intended to draw up with the State governments. And the release of funds 
would be available to the States subject to the fulfilment of the 
conditionalities under  the MoU. (Ghosh,1999, pp. 114) The Planning 
Commission felt that an arrangement should be made under which the 
Commission can monitor the performance of the States in specific projects 
and encourage greater fiscal discipline of the States in order to derive 
optimum output of various Plan schemes. But whatever may be the 
intention the proposed arrangement would seem to encourage discretionary 
element in the statutory transfers from the Centre to the States.  (Centre-
State Relations, Unsavoury Changes, EPW, June 19, 1999) 
                                                          
78Some of the conditions for withholding the release could be as follows: inadequate 
expenditure in the previous months;  serious financial irregularities and non-achievement of 
outlays under earmarked sectors/schemes; inadequate performance in importance 
sectors/core plan; non-receipt of crucial information like Plan documents, sectoral 
allocations, expenditure statement, etc. and non-implementation of guidelines issued by 
the Planning Commission from time to time.  (Ghosh, A, ‘Financial Designs’, Frontline, July 
16, 1999, p. 114) 
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Terms of reference of the Eleventh Finance Commission, 2000 (EFC) was 
altered shortly before the final submission of the Commission’s report due 
to an additional mandate which was received by the Commission from the 
Central government. Needless to say, such alteration was made without 
prior consultation with either the Finance Ministers of the States and/or with 
the Inter-State Council. The Sarkaria Commission (1984), however, 
suggested that before finalising the terms of reference of the Finance 
Commission the consultation with the States is necessary. Additional 
mandate received from the Centre stressed that the EFC should draw a 
monitorable fiscal reform programme aimed at reduction of revenue deficits 
of the States. With this objective in view, 15 per cent of the total non-Plan 
grants to be devolved by the EFC plus a matching grants from the Centre 
was set aside as an incentive fund. The States facing acute deficits are 
required to draw Medium-Term Fiscal Reform Programmes (MTFRP) 
following the guidelines of the EFC. And the incentive fund was said to be 
distributed among the States at per the assessment of performance of 
MTFRP by the monitoring group. Interestingly enough, the monitoring group 
was supposed to consist of officials from the State governments concerned, 
Ministry of Finance, government of India, Planning Commission and outside 
experts (Economic Survey,  2001-02). Seemingly, the monitoring agency is 
to be set up by the government of India but neither by the Inter-State 
council, nor by the National Development Council, nor any body where both 
the Centre and  the States are represented. That apart, the Constitution of 
the Indian federation provided for automatic and unconditional devolution of 
non-Plan grants made by the Finance Commission under the Article 275. 
Thus the system of linking the payment of non-Plan grants, a statutory 
transfers, to the performance of the States in implementing the mandated 
fiscal reforms seems to be clearly beyond the intent and spirit of the federal 
structure.  
 
In view of the above the West Bengal government drew up Medium-Term 
Fiscal Reform Programme (MTFRP) with the basic objective of reducing 
the revenue deficit as a percentage of revenue receipt by 5 per cent in 
each year from 2000-01 onwards with reference to it’s level for the year 
1999-00. It was expected by the State that implementation of Medium-
Term Fiscal Reform Programme would be a collaborative exercise on the 
part of the Centre and the State. Though the State has achieved 
significant reduction of revenue deficit as a percentage of revenue receipt 
i.e., which has fallen from 91 per cent in 1999-00 to 58.5 per cent in 2002-
03. Nevertheless, as complained by the State, the Central transfers to the 
State due to mainly two reasons have significantly come down over the 
last five years making it difficult for the State to achieve it’s target. First, 
during the first three years the deficit grant as recommended by the EFC 
was available on a sharply declining scale. Secondly, it has become 
increasingly difficult for the State to live up to the EFC’s expectation of 
reducing revenue deficit on account of significant shortfall of resource 
transfers from the Centre to the State which would be discussed in detail 
shortly. In a situation like this the State “suggests that that the single 
monitorable objective (i.e., reduction of revenue deficit as a percentage of 
revenue receipt by 5 per cent every year) in terms of which the 
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performance of a State under the medium–term fiscal reform programme 
is judged needs to be reviewed. For instance, among others, if a State has 
already achieved a reduction in the ratio of revenue deficit to revenue 
receipt by more than 25 per cent before five years, the year to year 
reduction clause may be modified.” (Memorandum to the Twelfth Finance 
Commission, GOWB, July 2003, pp. 14-15) 
 
Medium-Term Fiscal Reforms Programme prepared by a number of States 
aimed at phasing out revenue deficit and reducing fiscal deficit is expected 
to form the basis of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the 
States and the Ministry of Finance, government of India. Thus MTFRP 
pursued by the States was considered as a preliminary exercise of MoU to 
be entered with the deficit-ridden States in order to correct chronic and 
fiscal imbalance of the States finance. How good the intention  may be, the 
manner in which the arrangement of MoU was so far pursued received 
severe criticism. Because the proposed system of MoU lacks 
transparency. People at large have no right to know what State-specific 
conditionalities have been laid down by the Ministry of Finance, 
government of India. (EPW, March 18, 2000. p. 970) The Party aptly 
describes that “these recommendations strike at the very root of our 
federal structure, ushering in an authoritarian centralism in financial 
matters; they violate the spirit of our constitution; in addition they are 
unreasonable, illogical and unfair and discriminatory. “ (Peoples 
Democracy, February, 2001) 
 
Criticising the occasion of Orissa entering MoU arrangement, the Party 
feels that the rapid implementation of MTFRP and arrangement of MoU 
could  hardly solve the fiscal crisis of the State while the fiscal imbalance 
of the State in particular seem to be an outcome of the fiscal 
mismanagement by successive governments of Orissa as well as wrong 
policies of the Central government. (Peoples Democracy,  January 13, 
2002) However, such observation appears to be also true for CPI (M)-led 
Left Front government ruling in West  Bengal. But despite such 
understanding West Bengal agreed on pursuing MTFRP and later on MoU 
arrangement with the Ministry of Finance, government of India in a 
desperate need of receiving funds from the Centre instead of seeking 
alternative arrangements to mitigate it’s acute fiscal imbalance. Till date, 
as reported by the government of India, the MTFRP  has been finalised for 
nine States, namely Nagaland, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Orissa, 
Kerala Arunachal Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Manipur and West Bengal. 
So far MoU have been signed with the government of Orissa, Karnataka 
and Nagaland in consultation with the Ministry of Finance. MoU with 
respect to six other States i.e.,  including West Bengal are being drawn up 
by the respective governments. (Economic Survey, 2001-02) 
 
This is disheartening to note that, the Party has hardly focused on the 
struggle against the recent threat placed on the autonomy of the States. 
Instead, it seems that in an attempt to redress the fiscal imbalance, the 
State has taken easy option. Thus since the late 1980s State’s demand 
has remained not only confined into mere cosmetic change of the Indian 
federation but also witnessed complete passivity as regards recent assault 
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made on State’s autonomy during 1990s. But in a situation like this it 
appears that without addressing the basic centripetal bias of the Indian 
federation, on which the Party aptly focused initially, and recent threat on 
the State autonomy, relentless endeavour on the part of the State to adjust 
itself to the Indian federation would neither bring immediate relief to the 
State nor ensure real State autonomy.  
 
Furthermore, as mentioned above, the State during 1990s also seemed to 
have placed the focal point of the struggle against the Centre on the 
narrow objective of industrialising the State which was perceived as a 
counter-attack against the discriminatory attitude shown so far by the 
Centre towards the State. Broadly speaking further industrialisation of the 
States in general and West Bengal in particular does not automatically 
lead to more resources of the States in the form of income tax, corporation 
tax, excise duties and the State level sales tax  to an equal extent unless 
the federal fiscal relations are restructured radically with a view to 
providing greater financial autonomy to the States.  
 
Before the recommendation of the Tenth Finance Commission (TFC), 
1992 a certain percent of Central taxes such as proceeds from the income 
tax (except corporation tax) and excise duties was shared with the States. 
Alternative scheme of devolution was introduced by the recommendation 
of the Tenth Finance Commission. Accordingly 29 per cent of the 
proceeds from all Central taxes and duties was proposed to be shared 
with the States thus enabling the States to enjoy the aggregate buoyancy 
of all Central taxes instead of sharing few taxes. However, the proposed 
amount of 29 per cent of divisible Central tax has given rise to lots of 
debates. It seems that 29 per cent proceeds from all Central taxes would 
hardly augment the resource position of the States while the States was 
earlier used to receive as much as 29 percent or slightly less than that 
before the recommendation of the Commission.79  
 
The State government also have repeatedly urged the need for an 
increase in divisible portion of Central taxes. With this objective in view the 
State gave a definite guideline before the Twelfth Finance Commission. 
The State noticed that the justification of sharing at least 50 per cent of the 
all Central taxes with the States would be understood if the principle 
mentioned below is followed by the Commission. “The Central taxes 
should be shared with the States in such a way that the Central taxes net 
of transfer to the States and the State taxes including the share of Central 
taxes bear the same proportion to the developmental expenditure of the 
Centre and the States respectively”.(Memorandum to the Twelfth Finance 
Commission, GOWB, July 2003, p. 8) Thus on the basis of the relative 
                                                          
79 The tax devolution to the States as a percentage of the total tax revenue receipts of the 
Centre increases from 15.7 per cent during 1952-57 to 20.3 per cent in 1977-78. The 
percentage jumps to 28.44 per cent in 1979-80 and 28.77 in 1980-81. Such sharp 
increase of the percentage share of the States could be explained  by the sharp hike of 
the divisible pool of union excise duty from 20 per cent to 40 per cent under the 
recommendation of the Seventh Finance Commission. However, the percentage starts 
showing declining tendency after 1980-81 and stabilises around 25 per cent during the 
last part of 1980s. (Gurumurthi, S, ‘Towards an Alternative System of Tax-Sharing in 
India’, EPW, March 20-27, 1993, p. 527)   
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development expenditure of the Centre and the States there is a strong 
principled and logical justification for raising the share of Central taxes to 
at least 50 per cent. In the meeting of the Standing Committee of Inter-
State Council it was also decided that the divisible portion of the Central 
taxes be raised to 33.3 percent to begin with and thereafter to 50 per cent. 
(ibid.,  p. 7)  
 
Of major disadvantages of alternative resource devolution scheme, it is 
expected that the Centre would keep continuing it’s usual practice of rising 
non-sharable revenue by increasing administered prices instead of 
reviewing the excise duties resulting in shortfall in the divisible portion of 
the Central taxes. Moreover, as a part of economic liberalisation, as 
mentioned above, Voluntary Disclosure of Income Scheme (VDIS) was 
introduced in the 1996-97 with a view to unearth ‘black money’ of the 
Indian economy. The State aptly demanded that the States in general 
should be able to share the proceeds from the VDIS as an additionality 
and should not be set off against arrears payable to States. Because as 
proceeds from the VDIS arose out of evasion of tax over a period of time. 
If the taxes had not been evaded the States would have got higher tax 
devolution in the respective years as a matter of rightful claim. Thus, there 
is no reason why the States should lose a substantial part of it’s share 
merely because this has been collected on a later date chosen unilaterally 
by the Centre. (Memorandum to the Eleventh Finance Commission, 
GOWB, December 1998, pp. 4-5) 
 
It was argued that one of the major advantages of the alternative 
devolution schemes is that the States would be able to share the 
buoyancy of all Central taxes. Recent massive decline of tax-GDP ratio of 
the Central government seems to have wiped out the expected benefit of 
the scheme   likely to be enjoyed by the States. During 1990s several tax 
reforms have been introduced in regard both the direct and indirect 
taxation that coupled with the structural shift in the composition of GDP 
more towards the less taxed services sector have affected the growth in 
the Central tax revenue. The tax-GDP ratio of the Centre has suffered 
steady deterioration from 10.1 in 1990-91 to just about 8.1 in 2001-02.  
(RBI Bulletin, May 19, 2003) Likewise, tax buoyancy of the Centre also 
reduced drastically. Between the Eighth and Ninth Plan periods the 
buoyancy of the Central taxes deteriorated from 0.9 to 0.8. Though the 
buoyancy in direct tax collection was maintained at 1.3 between these 
periods. But the buoyancy in indirect taxes declined from 0.7 to 0.6. 
(Economic Survey, 2002-03) Thus it seems that buoyancy in direct tax 
collection has been overshadowed by decline in  the buoyancy of indirect 
tax.   
 
On the direct tax front certain measures were taken aiming to further 
progress towards widening the tax base, rationalisation and simplification 
of tax structure and encouraging voluntary compliance that resulted in 
increased buoyancy in direct tax during 1990s. Thus direct tax revenue of 
the Centre as a proportion of GDP increased from 1.9 per cent  in 1990-91 
to 3.2 per cent in 1997-98 and then slightly declined to 3.0 per cent in 
2001-02. (Economic Survey, 2002-03) Considering separately, among 
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direct taxes, personal income tax as proportion of GDP increased from 1.9 
per cent in 1990-91 to 3.0 per cent in 2001-02. On the other hand 
corporation income tax increased from 0.9 per cent to 1.6 per cent during 
the same period. (Economic Survey, 2002-03)  
 
Even though both direct taxes showed increasing trend, the problem of 
non-compliance as regards corporate income tax is a matter of great 
concern while zero-tax companies have become a growing phenomenon 
in the Indian corporate sector.  Several incentives in corporate taxation 
system in India were introduced from time to time. Eventually “some highly 
profitable large corporates have been able to reduce their tax liability to nil 
or a nominal level consistently over a long period through astute planning 
by utilising of innumerable tax concessions and fiscal incentives80 
available under the corporate tax structure. (Sharma,1997, p.417 ) With a 
view to bring such zero-tax companies into tax net the Central government 
made concerted attempt in the past at least on two occasions i.e., in 1983-
84 and 1987-88. And lastly in 1996-97 an arrangement of Minimum 
Alternative Tax (MAT) was introduced to bring zero tax companies into tax 
net. 
 
Despite such attempts 45 top corporate sectors were recently identified 
who did not pay even the Minimum Alternative Tax. (Godbole, 2002, p. 
4887) In addition, as mentioned above, corporate sectors often manage to 
bring down the effective rate of corporate taxation by taking advantage of 
different fiscal incentives. Recent analysis made by the Task Force 
Reports on Direct Tax and Indirect Tax, 2002 reveals that there has been 
a large divergence between statutory rate and effective rate in the 
corporate tax in India. Thus the effective corporate tax rate of a sample of 
3, 777 companies in 1999-00 was just 21.7 per cent as against the 
statutory rate of 38.5 per cent. Similarly the effective corporate tax rate of 
a sample of 2,585 companies in 200-01 was 21.9 per cent as against the 
statutory rate of 39.5 per cent. (ibid.,)  In view of the above, it seems that 
had these large corporate sectors been brought effectively under the tax 
net, divisible pool of Central tax would have been much higher. Thus 
greater enthusiasm of industrialisation, as argued above, does not 
automatically lead to a greater resources of the States.  
 
In the area of indirect tax the process of rate reduction, rationalisation  and 
simplification was further carried forward as a part of ongoing tax reform 
pursued since1990s that led to reduction in the buoyancy of exercise 
duties. Indirect taxes as a proportion of GDP declined  from 7.9 per cent in 
1990-91 to 5.9 per cent in 1997-98 and further 5 Per cent in 2001-02. 
(Economic Survey, 2002-03). Such reduction in excise duties can be 
explained due mainly to two reasons.  Firstly, the system of Central excise 
was drastically overhauled with the introduction of a single Central Value 
added Tax (CENVAT) of 16 per cent ad valorem on all manufactured 
                                                          
80 It includes investment allowances tax holiday in respect of new industrial undertakings, 
deduction in respect of scientific expenditure, export promotion allowances, depreciation 
allowances etc. (EPW, Feb 22, 1997) 
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goods with a few exceptions. Thus the decline in excise to GDP ratio 
reflects lowering of rates and extension of input credit system under 
MODVAT/CENVAT. Furthermore, CENVAT/MODVAT (i.e., modified Value 
Added Tax) was introduced in order to minimise the cascading effects of 
multi-point excise levies. (Gurumurthi, 1999, p. 2879) But the progressive 
extension of MODVAT to the whole industrial sector led to a drastic 
reduction in the proceeds from excise duty to GDP while some maladies 
regarding the application of MODVAT could not be removed completely. 
(Mohan, 2000, p. 2030) Secondly, the proceeds from excise duties 
decreased due mainly to the fact that during 1990s industrial growth was 
not as high as had been expected from the economic reform pursued 
since 1990s. During1990s both the primary sector (2.8 per cent) and the 
secondary sector (5.7 per cent) grew much at lower pace than that of the 
service sector which grew at 7.8 per cent per year.  But the services 
largely remain untaxed at the Central level. (Rao,2002, p. 3265)  
 
Within the indirect tax the decline in customs was more pronounced. The 
decline in the share of the customs duties is the result of a conscious 
decisions taken as a part of economic liberalisation to make the Indian 
industries competitive and to integrate with the global economy. Thus fall 
in customs can be explained by a steep decline in the peak customs tariff. 
The proceeds from custom duty as proportion of GDP has declined from 
3.6 per cent in 1990-91 to 1.8 per cent in 2001-02. (Economic Survey, 
2002-03)  
 
On the whole indirect tax have always claimed increasingly larger share 
during the past decades. In 1982-83 while total taxes amounted to 17.1 
per cent of GNP. Of which only 3.4 per cent was attributed to direct tax 
and remaining 14. 6 per cent to indirect tax. Such trend continued also 
during 1990s. Collection from direct tax constituted only 36.9 per cent of 
gross tax revenue while indirect tax revenue constituted 62.2 per cent in 
2001-02. Therefore, the enhancement in direct tax to GDP has been 
outweighed by a decline in indirect tax to GDP ratio thus relatively higher 
buoyancy of direct tax has failed to raise the tax-GDP ratio.  (Economic 
Survey, 2002-03)  
 
Evidently, significant  shortfall in the Central tax/GDP ratio has adverse 
effect on divisible portion i.e., transfers from the Centre to the States. 
Considering West Bengal separately, it is noticed that in the year of 2001-
02 West Bengal’s share of Central taxes fell short of the projection of the 
EFC by Rs. 736 crore. In the year 2002-03, West Bengal’s share of 
Central taxes again fell short of the estimate of the EFC by Rs. 1400 crore. 
According to Union budget estimates for the year 2003-04, the State’s 
share of Central taxes will fall further short of the EFC’s estimate by about 
Rs. 2000 crore. (Memorandum to the Twelfth Finance Commission, 
GOWB, July 2003, p. 14)  
 
On account of the above mentioned situation, it seems that increased 
volume of income tax, corporation tax and excise duty due to recent major 
thrust given on rapid industrialisation by the States in general and West 
Bengal in particular would not automatically  ensure increased volume of 
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resources of the States. Likewise, potential rise in sales tax collection due 
to the expected increase in business activities would hardly make any 
impact on the States resource position as long as disharmony in sales tax 
system will be left unattended. Such disharmony leads not only to varying 
point of levy of sales tax (i.e., first point, double point and multi-point sales 
taxation) in the States but also multiple sales tax rates on the same 
commodity across the States due to various objectives resulted in 
complicated sales tax structure. Such multiple sales tax rate made an 
conducive environment of rate wars where the States tend to reduce sales 
tax rates below those of neighbouring States in an effort to divert trade 
from others and this leads to considerable loss of revenue. That apart , 
over time the States in general shifted towards first point of levy due 
mainly to administrative consideration which leads to narrow sales tax 
base. With a narrow base sales tax rates need to be high in order to 
collect intended revenue. With the same objective in view various 
experimentation in the form of surcharges and turnover tax are also 
imposed. Eventually, higher tax rates combined with the problem of 
cascading (i.e., taxation of inputs as well as finished output) leads to 
pressure for tax incentives from business communities, tax avoidance, 
weak enforcement by administrators and thus potential revenue loss from 
sales tax. Another major problem as regards sales tax system is that the 
definition of the powers of excise taxation as well as sales tax refers only 
to ‘goods’ without any mention of service. But in the production system of 
modern economics, service and manufacture are in-separable and the line 
between goods and services is getting increasingly blurred. Such 
complication also provides adequate opportunities for sales tax evasion 
and narrow sales tax base. (NIPFP, 1994) 
 
In addition competitive reduction of sales tax rates in order to attract 
potential investors in their respective jurisdictions has also considerable 
adverse impact on the sales tax  collection i.e., loss of potential revenues 
of the States. Evidently, poor and middle income States like West Bengal 
are net loser of this game without having any commensurate gain. 
Because an analysis reveals that despite such sales tax incentive 
investment tend to flow to those region where infrastructural provision is 
better. (Kurian,  February 12, 2000)  
 
Recently West Bengal government admitted that the policy of giving 
incentive in the form of providing sales tax rebate and deferment with a 
view to attract potential investors in the State  resulted in significant 
shortfall in sales tax collection of more than Rs. 600 crore during the 2002-
03 financial year. Which is being one of main causes of severe financial 
crisis of the State. (Rajya Sarkarer Arthik Sankat: Karan Abong 
Samadhaner Path (Financial Crisis of the State, Causes and Remedial 
Measures) Finance Department, GOWB, 30th January, 2003, p. 5)  
 
That apart, due to the ambiguity of the definition of the sales tax spelled in 
the Constitution the States are not able to levy tax on service sectors. The 
power to levy tax on services is not mentioned either in the State list or in 
the Concurrent List of the VII Schedule to the Constitution. However, by 
virtue of Entry 97 in the Union list which gives power to the Centre for levy 
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and collection of “any tax not mentioned in either of those Lists” the Centre 
started to impose service tax since 1994-95. Initially, tax on three specified 
services namely telephone, general insurance and stock brokerage was 
introduced at the rate of 5 per cent on the value of taxable service. Over 
the years number of services have been brought under the ambit of 
service tax.  Despite such progressive extension of service tax, services 
largely remained outside the tax net. The share of the collection from 
service tax has not been commensurate with it’s increasing share in the 
GDP. Thus while the income from the service sector excluding public 
administration and defence constitutes more than a third of total GDP in 
1998-99, the total indirect tax collected from the service sector by the 
Central and State government together is only one per cent of GDP or 
6.66 per cent of total tax revenue. The formal introduction of service taxes 
since 1994-95  by the Centre has made only a marginal difference to the 
over all revenue productivity. (Rao, 2001, p. 4000) Thus as long as service 
sectors at large will remain outside the domain of the States and Centre’s 
tax net the States will continue to lose potential resources while under the 
present arrangement neither the Centre nor the States are able to exploit 
service sectors to full extent. 
 
In West Bengal during the period from 1995-96 and 2000-01 significant 
improvement was registered in the service sector. Share of trade, hotel 
and restaurant in the NSDP improves by almost 15 per cent while 
improvements of the share of banking and insurance sector is around 57 
per cent. Thus on the whole share total service sectors81 in the NSDP of 
the State increased by 21 per cent during the period from 1995-96 to 
2000-01. In contrast contribution of agriculture and manufacturing (both 
registered and unregistered) in the NSDP has declined by 21 per cent and 
9 per cent respectively during the same period. (Chatterjee & Ghosh, 
2003, pp. 33-34) However, it was decided by the High Powered 
Committee82 that States would be empowered to impose services taxes by 
the mid of 2004. But it is not decided yet which areas of services will be 
brought under the States tax net. That apart, in order to get rid of existing 
disharmony in sales tax system and potential revenue loss, the States and 
the Centre seem to have reached a common consensus of applying VAT 
since the middle of 2004 after procrastinating this issue for long period. 
(Rajya Sarkarer Arthik Sankat: Karan Abong Samadhaner Path (Financial 
Crisis of the State: Causes and Remedial Measures, Finance Department, 
West Bengal Government, 30th January, 2003, p. 16)  
 
Politics of discrimination  
 
Another important dimension of the problem have been in existence in the 
State from the very outset along with the evolution of the demand for 
                                                          
81 Total services includes, trade, hotel and restaurant; banking and insurance; real estate, 
ownership of dwellings & business services and also other services.  
82 The High Powered Committee,  for assessing the financial situation of the States 
constituted by the Government of India at the suggestion of the State governments on 
26th July 2002. The High Powered Committee under the chairmanship of the Union 
Finance Minister mainly consists of Finance Ministers of different States.  
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fundamental and later on operational restructuring of the Centre-State 
relations. That relates to addressing this issue of discrimination at the 
political plane. Soon after the Left Front government was voted to power, 
‘discrimination against West Bengal’ tended to become the focal point of 
the whole movement against the Centre. The State felt that that it has 
been subject to deliberate discrimination due to it’s political opposition. 
However, such allegation of discrimination had also been put forward by 
the CPI (M)-led United Front government during 1967-69.Over time this 
aspect tends to outweigh institutional/structural dimension of the 
movement against the Centre.  
 
The first three decades after Independence, were also fraught with tension 
and conflict between the Centre and the States. West Bengal government 
led by the Congress party relentlessly expressed its dissatisfaction about 
the  decision unilaterally taken by the Centre shortly after Independence 
as regards reduction of the share of jute export duty, reduction of the 
State’s share of the proceeds from income tax, discriminatory refugee 
rehabilitation policy of the Centre and lastly introduction of freight 
equalisation policy. All these policies allegedly went against the interest of 
the State and consequently made it’s economic position weaker than the 
other States. Nevertheless, the then West Bengal government didn’t want 
to perceive these policies as a part of deliberate discrimination made 
against West Bengal in particular. At the institutional plane of the Centre-
State financial relations, the Finance Commissions were accused of 
attaching incorrect weightages for devolution of resources among the 
States without following the Constitutional provision properly. Thus, 
incorrect applications of weightages and consequent adverse impact on 
West Bengal’s resource position was perceived as a limitation of the 
functioning of the Indian federal structure rather than any attempt of 
deliberate discrimination against the State in particular. 
 
In contrast, in the subsequent periods commencing from the United Front 
regime, the allegation of being discriminated against by the Centre and 
Centrally controlled institutions became a predominant feature in West 
Bengal’s discourse as far as the Centre-State relations are concerned. It 
would be worthwhile to mention in this respect that since the mid-960s the 
declining trend of West Bengal’s economy started being apparent which 
was further aggravated by the economic depression of the late 1960s. 
West Bengal was hit the hardest by this depression and the economic 
health of West Bengal deteriorated quite drastically. Economic 
deterioration of West Bengal since the late 1960s seemed to have 
intensified the feeling of being discriminated against and subsequently the 
Centre was made responsible for the present plight of the State.  
 
The memorandum submitted by the West Bengal government to the Fifth 
Finance Commission (1969) prepared by the CPI (M)-led United Front 
Government bears testimony to this accusation more clearly than any 
previous official document. Studies undertaken by Roy (1971) and Ghosh 
(1971), echoed the feeling of the West Bengal government. It was alleged  
by Roy (1971) that during the colonial period Bengal was made to sacrifice 
more than it’s due share for the benefit of other Provinces and for the 
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expansion of British territory. And there had been continuous wealth drain 
from the erstwhile Bengal now West Bengal to the rest of the British Indian 
territory. Wealth drain from West Bengal for the benefit of other States and 
India seems to have continued during the post-Independence period by 
denying it’s legitimate share resulting in such distressful economic 
situation of West Bengal. Contrary to that, Bengal Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry (BCCI) in their different publications during the late 1960s 
and the early 1970s tried to address this delicate issue from a more 
balanced perspective and wanted to perceive the problem of deterioration 
of West Bengal’s economy from broader structural, historical and 
economic reality of the State rather than being trapped into polemical 
expression of ‘discrimination against West Bengal’ by the Central 
government.  
 
West Bengal’s economy made a slight recovery by the mid-1970s even 
though it started lagging behind in terms of almost all economic indicators 
not only compared to it’s own standard achieved in the past but also 
compared to other industrialised States. It was in this context that the Left 
Front government came to power in West Bengal in 1977. After having 
voted to power, CPI (M)-led government aptly started raising voice against 
the existing imbalance and disorder of Centre-State relations of India and 
stood for the change of the basic structural mould of the Indian federation. 
However, in the subsequent period it became more and more confined to 
mainly addressing the mere operational side of the federal fiscal relations 
thereby turning more and more to functional aspect of the Indian 
federation rather than firmly standing for radical restructuring of the 
existing Centre-State financial relations.  
 
Interestingly, at the political level while addressing the electorate, it was 
repeatedly emphasised by the Party  that West Bengal has been subject to 
politically motivated discrimination. Thus, instead of perceiving such 
adversities faced by the State in the context of historical, economic, 
cultural and existing regressive federal structure of India, the Party started 
projecting that it is basically time specific, deliberate and politically 
motivated discrimination against the State in particular. Consequently 
West Bengal seemed to have been singled out from the rest of the Indian 
States in the process of such projection that it’s comparative economic 
deterioration is mainly the outcome of discriminatory policies pursued by 
the Centre. In an attempt to reinforce the allegation of discrimination 
against the State, the Left Front government tended to put itself in 
constant comparison with other richer States particularly Maharastra, 
Karnataka and Gujrat in respect of some economic parameters namely 
unequal distribution of industrial licenses, comparative low level of credit 
deposit ratio of the State and low level of  Central Plan assistance. 
Therefore, the pre-dominant tone of this allegation was that while other 
richer States have been favoured by the Centre, West Bengal became the 
sole victim of the existing imbalance in the Centre-State financial relations 
because of it’s political opposition to the Centre since 1977. Such constant 
propaganda of being discriminated in a particular jargon became part of 
the political weaponry of the State since 1977. Subsequently the State 
took a lead to mobilise other States against the Centre by forming anti-
 133
Centre conclave83 However, as mentioned above, during 1990s renewed 
activism as regards industrialisation of the State was perceived as a 
struggle against the Centre and Centre’s discriminatory policies. It was 
argued that allegation of discrimination against the State has lost it’s 
ground with the abolition of freight equalisation policy and industrial 
licensing policy. Thus in the changed context the State has to take 
necessary initiative to industrialise the State in order to make a counter 
attack against the prolonged discrimination. 
 
In pursuance of the study of politics of discrimination two broad aspects 
deserve attention i.e., historical condition which constituted constraints on 
development of West Bengal along with eastern region as a whole on the 
one hand and regressive structure of the federal fiscal system of India 
under which distribution of financial powers and different types of resource 
allocations between the States and the Centre is determined on the other. 
Both of these factors eventually determine the position of the State in the 
Indian federation and the benefits which can accrue to the State compared 
to other States.  
 
Thus the State in a Indian federation is subject to manly four types of 
constraints. Firstly, all States being a part of the strong unitary bias of the 
Indian federation facing a particular set of problems irrespective of their 
economic position and regional location. Secondly, the State belonging to 
less developed group has added disadvantage of being discriminated 
against while rich income States are favoured. Thirdly, being a State 
belong to disadvantaged region i.e., eastern region, has other typical 
handicaps  due to both historical development and the post-Independence 
development of this region. And finally there are some State-specific 
constraints which are also partly the legacy of the pre-Independence 
                                                          
83One of the distinctive features of the Indian politics in the 1980s was the anti-Centre 
agitation on account of formation of non-Congress governments in different regions and 
consequently anti-Centre politics has been strengthened. Jyoti Basu, former Chief 
Minster of West Bengal started a new type of politics which was known as conclave 
politics. Basu took the lead to gather all anti-Congress governments existing in different 
States to get organised under the same platform. After the conclave stage was ended 
Basu started a new chapter of anti-Centre politics in which attempts were made to unify 
the non-Congress governments and to influence the public opinion for building up an 
alternative government at the Centre. The main demand, however, was that the 
component regions must be given greater powers. (Dasgupta, S, West Bengal’s Jyoti 
Basu A political Profile, Gian Publishing House, New Delhi, 1992, pp.79-81)     
As Vinod Mishra (1988) former General Secretary of CPIM (L) also observes that “...the 
Party concentrated on the demand for more money and power from the Centre and for 
restructuring centre-state relations. For the last ten years this has been the central slogan 
of the Party, the core strategy for working out a united front of all state governments 
irrespective of their political colour. The justification given has been that the Centre 
discriminates particularly against West Bengal and that, with more money and power the 
state government can indeed do much more for the people.” (Vinod Mishra Selected 
Works, (The Article  was written on January 1988), A CPIM(L) Publication, New Delhi, 
1999, p. 320)   
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period and partly the outcome of the post-Independence development. 
Therefore, in pursuance of the study of politics of discrimination, an 
integrated approach needs to be pursued and the need of examining such 
problem into particular context instead of perceiving those separately.  
 
Conclusion 
 
If one follows the discourse of politics of discrimination since 
Independence one can see that there has been a qualitative change in the 
conceptualisation of the term ‘discrimination’ over the period. People of 
West Bengal and hence the government are said to be highly politicised 
and modernised and hardly became subordinate to the Centre not even 
during the period i.e. first three decades after Independence, when Indian 
federalism was characterised by unchallenged unity and consensus. Even 
during that time West Bengal government led by the Congress party is 
said to have retained it’s independent position and the relation between 
the Centre and West Bengal was more conflict prone than other States in 
the Indian Union. Nevertheless, Congress government in West Bengal 
during the pre-Left Front era did not want to rebel against the structure of 
the Indian federation nor did they demand any far reaching structural 
change of the federal system of India through amendment to the 
Constitution. All they said was that if the Constitutional provisions of 
Central resource transfers to the States were followed properly i.e., if the 
criteria for devolving funds were chosen and  applied as per with the 
Constitutional mandate, sufferings of West Bengal would have minimised.  
 
The Congress government argued that the industrialised State like West 
Bengal according to the Constitutional provision are entitled to tax 
agricultural sector which was decadent in nature in the State while leaving 
the taxes like income tax, customs duty which are contingent upon 
industrial development and hence beyond it’s purview. This led to 
widening the gap between wealth and taxability of the State. Evidently, the 
return from industrial sector in the form of income tax, customs duty and 
foreign exchange are appropriated either by the Centre or by other States 
following the principle of resource allocation recommended by the 
Centrally controlled resource transfer agencies. Principle of horizontal 
resource allocations, as felt by the Congress government of the State, are 
basically guided by the misconceived principle of redressing regional 
inequality by siphoning off money from the so called industrial State like 
West Bengal for the benefit of the so called less developed States. 
Therefore, there had been a clear transference of wealth from West 
Bengal either to the Centre or to other States by depriving the State 
significantly. Consequently, Congress government of the State during the 
pre-Left Front era made repeated plea before the Centrally controlled 
resource transfers agencies namely the Finance Commission to follow 
Constitutional provisions properly that would, in their opinion, secure the 
interest of the State.  
 
However, such style of bargaining underwent a sea change soon after the 
United Front (1967-69) came to power. During their short tenure they laid 
the foundation of  asking for radical change of the federal structure of India 
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which was further consolidated by the Left Front government since 1977. 
Overtime there has been a considerable shift from the earlier radical 
position of the State to more a accommodating position. Having started 
with raising voice against basic structural lacuna of the Centre-State 
relations and asking for far reaching radical or structural change of the 
Indian federation through Constitutional amendment and changing the 
existing class relations, the State slowly shifted its centre of gravity more 
towards the operational aspects of federal fiscal relations since the mid 
1980s. Thus started accommodating itself with the existing federal system 
of India and mainly voiced against the functional aspects of the federal 
fiscal relation leaving aside the demand for basic structural change of the 
Indian federation.  
 
During 1990s such shift experienced further qualitative and dramatic turn. 
Leaving aside the demand for basic structural change of the Indian 
federation, even recent threat placed on the State’s autonomy during post-
liberalisation era did not receive much opposition from the Party as it 
deserved. More disheartening feature is, on the one and the Party-led 
West Bengal government, took the easier option of following the Centre’s 
mandated fiscal reform-linked Central assistance programme aim at 
redressing fiscal disorder of the State instead of seeking for alternative 
programme. And on the other hand though the Party’s position started with 
restructuring the Indian federation through constitutional amendment and 
on the basis of completely different class relations, it ultimately ended up 
with accepting the very structure during 1990s in an attempt to make the 
best use of the existing limited autonomy provided to the States in the area 
of industrialisation during the post-liberalisation period. Needless to say, 
more resources due to industrialisation does not necessarily ensure more 
resources to the States in general unless federal fiscal relations are 
restructured with a view to providing more fiscal autonomy to the States.  
 
Although there seems to be a dramatic shift, a close examination of the 
CPI (M)’s stand throughout this time period under study, shows that it had 
been flawed from the very beginning. Party’s aspiration of radical 
restructuring of the Indian federation lack understanding as regards the 
nature and character of restructuring of the Indian federation from the very 
outset. Such lack of clarity seems to have eventually led the State to adopt 
accommodating position. On the one hand the Party feels that striking the 
balance between the strong Centre and the States are the crux of the 
demand pursued by the Party. However, the strength of the Centre, as 
described by the Party, neither legitimises centralisation in the name of 
upholding integrity and sovereignty of India nor the Party stands for the 
attempt of weakening the Centre in the name of the demand for so called 
State autonomy raised by some secessionist forces or some regional 
parties which have some strong tone of local chauvinism.  As against 
these two trends the Party upholds national unity and integrity of the Indian 
union while strengthening the Centre and also stands for complete State 
autonomy. Hand in hand with these two conflicts, there are also two 
different types of trends as regards the perception of  Centre-State 
relations. The Congress and non-Congress parties i.e., those parties other 
than Left parties like CPI (M) try to perceive this issue within the same 
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class structure and seek to bring only cosmetic change of the Indian 
Constitution aiming at ensuring State autonomy. In contrast CPI (M) 
stands for State autonomy which is based on completely different class 
relations by radically amending the Constitution of India.  
 
Therefore, the crux of the demand formulated by the Party is to attain the 
balance between these two countervailing forces. But one fails to 
understand how such desired balance of ensuring State autonomy and 
strengthening the Centre will come into force. If such balance  is attained 
through radical restructuring of the Constitution then the question is will it 
be attained on the basis of same socio-economic and class structure or 
total restructuring of the Indian polity and economy. The Party seems to be 
suffering from lack of understanding as regards this question. While in one 
occasion, the Party describes that the desired balance of ensuring State 
autonomy and strengthening the Centre should be set on radical 
restructuring of the existing class relations and on the other hand the Party 
seems to accept the existing class relations while stressing the need for 
upholding and protecting national unity in order to combat ongoing 
secessionist movements in Indian territory. Therefore, it appears to us that 
the Party legitimises authoritarian centralisation for the sake of upholding 
existing frame of national unity which is, quite evidently, based on the 
same class structure. Close examination of the State-local relation tend to 
strengthen our apprehension. An analysis reveals that authoritarian 
centralism has been practised as against democratic centralism upholding 
Party hierarchy in this area. 
 
Another dimension of the struggle against the Centre led by the Party also 
needs to be addressed. At the political plane, while addressing the 
electorate the Left Front government brought the populist stance of being 
discriminated against by the Centre and held the Centre responsible for it’s 
present deterioration. Consequently the demand for radical restructuring of 
Indian federation which was aptly addressed by the Left Front during the 
late 1970s and the early 1980s started being overshadowed by this slogan. 
Therefore, the whole movement against the Centre since the mid 1980s in 
West Bengal was based on the basis of such an emotive slogan of being 
discriminated against by the Centre in relation to distribution of industrial 
licence, institutional finance and allocation of Plan outlay compared to other 
States namely high income States. Eventually, it started to single out itself 
not only from the rest of the Indian States but also from the historical, 
cultural and economic reality of the State while expressing that the State 
has been subject to discrimination. Thus, instead of perceiving these issues 
in respect to these realities the State started emphasising that it is basically 
politically motivated, time specific and deliberate discrimination against the 
State in particular due to it’s political opposition. Seemingly politics of 
discrimination which has become main weapon of the struggle against the 
Centre  particularly during the whole 80s and early 90s lacks integrated 
approach of perceiving the problem from the broader perspective. Such lack 
of perspective seem to have less and less impact on the common people of 
the State consequently has given rise to diminishing return from blaming the 
Centre.    
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Appendix 
Table: 1 
Percentage Distribution of Share of Income Tax of Different States/Provinces 
 
Provinces/ States Pre-Partition 
Share 
Share Under 
Government of 
India allocation 
after Independence
Share under 
Desmukh Award 
Madras 15 18 17.5 
Bombay 20 21 21.0 @ 
West Bengal 20 @ 12 13.5 
Uttar Pradesh 15 19 18.0 
Punjab 8 @ 5 5.5 
Bihar 10 13 12.5 
Madhya Pradesh 5 6 6.0 
Assam 2 @ 3 3.0 
Orissa 
2 3 3.0 
Source: Gurumurthi, S, Fiscal Federalism in India Some Issues,  
Vikas Publishing House Pvt. Ltd.  New Delhi, 1995, p. 23 
@ relates to the undivided provinces 
 
Table: 2   
Percentage Distribution of Refugees in Different Eastern  States 
              (Till November, 1971) 
States No. Of Refugees Percentage of the total  
West Bengal 7.5 million 76 % 
Tripura 1.4 million 15 % 
Meghalaya 0.7 million 6 % 
Assam 0.3 million 3 % 
Total 9.9 million 100 % 
Source:  Bandyopadhyay, S, ‘ Millions Seeking Refuge The Refugee Question in West Bengal: 
1971 in Bose, P.K (ed.) Refugees in West Bengal Institutional Process and Contested 
Identities, Calcutta Research Group, Calcutta, 2000, p. 35 
 
Table: 3 
Population Density of Different States and Percentage of Land Utilisation  
Between 1951 and 1961 
 
States Percentage of 
population 
increase (1951-
61) 
Population density 
per square mile 
On the basis of 
1961 census 
Percentage of net 
area sown to total 
geographical area of 
the States  
(1956-57) 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
Andhra Pradesh 15.63 339 41.4 
Assam 34.30 252 9.4 
Bihar 19.78 691 44.6 
Bombay -- -- 55.0 
Gujrat 26.80 286 -- 
Jammu Kashmir 9.73 NA 3.0 
Kerala 24.55 1,125 47.1 
Madhya Pradesh 24.25 189 35.0 
Madras 11.73 671 44.9 
Maharastra 23.44 332 -- 
Mysore 21.36 318 52.5 
Orissa 19.94 292 36.0 
Punjab 25.80 431 60.1 
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Rajasthan 26.14 152 36.3 
Uttar Pradesh 16.67 650 57.6 
West Bengal 32.94 1,031 59.1 
All India 21.49 384 -- 
Source: For column 2 & 3 Memorandum Submitted to Third Finance Commission, 
Government of West Bengal, 1961, p. 61; For Column 4 see ibid., p. 63 
 
 
Table: 4 
Percentage of Income Tax Receipts to Collections of Respective States  
Between 1958-59 and 1969-70 
 
States 1958-59 1967-68 1968-69 1969-70 
   (1)    (2)      (3)     (4)     (5) 
Andhra Pradesh 132.3 128.2 125.3 147.5 
Assam 133.1 134.7 112.0 173.8 
Bihar 182.8 301.0 205.1 273.7 
Bombay 19.4 -- -- -- 
Gujrat -- 40.0 37.5 41.5 
Haryana -- 153.8 133.1 181.3 
Jammu & Kashmir 373.9 156.1 110.1 156.5 
Kerala 88.5 101.9 87.3 114.2 
Madhya Pradesh 187.8 169.1 152.4 140.0 
Maharastra -- 30.1 26.7 25.5 
Madras 49.6 -- -- -- 
Mysore 86.9 106.1 77.7 95.8 
Orissa 393.1 307.2 279.0 346.2 
Punjab 103.9 53.0 52.5 57.7 
Rajasthan 192.5 201.4 180.7 187.2 
Tamil Nadu -- 66.7 54.7 62.5 
Uttar Pradesh 216.4 200.5 171.7 198.3 
West Bengal 16.2 51.3 48.1 52.0 
Source: Column 2 see Memorandum Submitted to the Third Finance Commission, GOWB, 
1961, p. 55; For Column 3 and 4 see Memorandum Submitted to Sixth Finance Commission, 
GOWB,1973, p. 57  
 
 
Table: 5 
Per Capita Share of Central Taxes and Statutory Grants (Article 273 & 275)  
Between 1952-53 and 1966-67 
(In Rs.) 
States 1952-53 1957-58 1962-63 1966-67 
Andhra Pradesh -- -- -- 10.6 
Assam 4.8 10.8 13.0 19.9 
Bihar 2.3 4.3 4.8 6.5 
Bombay 2.6 4.3 7.5 * -- 
Gujrat -- -- -- 8.7 
Jammu & 
Kashmir 
-- -- -- 32.8 
Kerala -- -- -- 18.6 
Madhya Pradesh 1.7 4.9 6.2 7.6 
Madras 4.1 3.3 6.8 ** 9.9 
Maharastra -- -- -- 9.8 
Mysore 2.0 6.5 7.7 15.0 
Orissa 2.7 5.6 13.9 22.6 
Punjab 2.5 4.9 6.0 7.1*** 
Rajasthan 1.7 5.0 7.7 9.9 
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Uttar Pradesh 2.0 3.1 4.1 7.8 
West Bengal 4.0 6.1 5.8 8.4 
Source: Memorandum Submitted to Fifth Finance Commission, Government of West Bengal, 
1969,  p. 13 
• Including Gujrat 
** Including Andhra Pradesh 
*** Including Haryana 
 
 
 
Table: 6 
Per capita Expenditure on National Building Heads of Different States  
Between 1952-53 and 1968-69   (Rs.) 
States Actuals 
1952-53 
Actuals 
1957-58 
Actuals 
1962-63 
Actuals 
1966-67 
Revised 
1967-68 
Budget 
1968-69 
Andhra Pradesh -- 9.9 18.7 25.9 27.6 27.5 
Assam 7.8 17.2 25.6 39.2 37.9 38.4 
Bihar 3.8 8.4 10.7 15.7 15.6 15.8 
Gujrat 17.6 29.5 33.5 36.1 
Maharastra 
6.5* 10.5* 
16.7 29.9 32.5 33.6 
Kerala 6.0 14.0 27.6 35.0 41.5 45.7 
Madhya Pradesh 3.4 9.2 16.1 20.8 24.7 28.4 
Madras 12.7 11.2 24.0 31.4 35.2 37.4 
Mysore 4.5 18.2 25.7 28.4 33.1 36.8 
Orissa 4.2 8.1 22.3 27.4 32.5 34.0 
Punjab 3.9 12.0 21.8 28.0 @ 33.2@ 40.6 
Rajasthan 4.2 8.9 15.7 26.2 33.7 33.5 
Uttar Pradesh 3.8 7.8 14.5 16.4 18.5 19.9 
West Bengal 6.6 12.5 16.8 25.2 28.5 30.0 
Source: Memorandum Submitted to Fifth Finance Commission, Government of West Bengal, 
1969,  p. 16 
*Gujrat & Maharastra Combined 
@ Including Haryana 
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Chapter: 3 
 
History of Economic and Industrial Development of West 
Bengal Including Eastern Region 
 
In pursuance of the integrated approach of addressing the question of 
politics of discrimination, four different dimensions faced by a particular 
State in the Indian federation needs to be examined as was described in the 
chapter 2 of this study. This chapter intends to deal with the problem of 
some State (West Bengal)-specific adverse factors operating on the State’s 
economy from the past namely permanent settled land revenue policies, 
export orientation of West Bengal’s economy and lack of regionally 
committed enterprises. That apart, West Bengal belonging to eastern region 
had also faced some unique and region-specific constraints. Consequently 
this also constituted adverse impact on its economy and made the State 
lagging behind other advanced States in the Indian federation.   
 
Why is eastern region as a whole lagging behind? 
 
Broadly speaking, Bihar, Assam, Orissa and West Bengal comprises the 
eastern region of India excluding all others small Union territories grouped 
as special category States. There is a feeling that eastern region as a whole 
has been suffering from low productivity, low resource mobilisation and 
consequently low level of economic and business activities. By the same 
token low financial assistance by both Centrally controlled financial 
institutions and commercial banks resulting in further low level of public and 
private investment.  
 
The question immediately arises that why was this region discriminated 
against or why other regions were favoured than the eastern region. And 
why eastern region though abundant with natural resources and in 
possession of other comparative advantages has been lagging behind 
others? The answer seems to lie in the historical development of different 
regions from the pre-Independence period. The study undertaken by 
Bharadwaj (1982) reveals that “The eastern region, the first to come under 
complete domination of the British was the base from which the further 
territorial expansion took place.....However the imperial policy differed 
considerably from region to region, in terms of the type of land settlement 
and the extent of commercial penetration into the agrarian economy. This, 
coupled with the differential policy towards public investment (in irrigation 
and railways) had a very diverse impact on the different regions. These 
differences were important in shaping the future pattern and rate of 
industrialisation during the inter-war and post-Independence years and the 
rise of the capitalist and financier classes in the regions. Even after 
Independence, ...this legacy has continued to play an important role.” 
(Bharadwaj,1982, pp. 605-606)  
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The pattern of industrialisation in the eastern region was marked by export 
oriented and European dominated industrialisation. That was quite different 
from that in other regions namely the western region where domestic 
industries mainly served domestic market and were established by regional 
capitalists. The type of industrialisation in different regions, as we have said 
earlier, was the outcome of several factors, one of which being the type of 
land settlement introduced in different regions during the pre-Independence 
period. Broadly speaking Permanent Settlement in land introduced in 
eastern region in 1793, on the one hand prevented the land from being 
more productive while adequate public irrigational work was not undertaken 
on account of land revenue being fixed in perpetuity. On the other hand 
Zemindars  did not take much interest in the improvement of land through 
the privately-owned minor irrigation works while the Zemindars himself was 
in the process of sub-infeudation. Consequently his primary interest was in 
unproductive consumption of surplus generated in land rather than 
productive cultivation. This resulted in low potential for mobilisation of 
capital for industrialisation by the regional capitalists. On the contrary, 
productive investment on land through extensive public irrigation work was 
more attractive in Punjab, Madras, Bombay than in the Permanently Settled 
areas i.e. in Bengal, Bihar, Orissa and United Provinces and hence created 
more conducive environment for reinvestment of the surplus generated in 
land in industrial development by the local capitalists.  
 
Furthermore, the process of de-industrialisation and slow decline of the 
household industries and crafts took place in the eastern region with the 
advent of British. Prior to colonial expansion eastern region made 
considerable progress in these sectors. But in course of time, European 
capital and commerce started dominating the region which was more 
interested in mobilising local funds for export-oriented commercial activities 
while leaving little funds for the expansion of indigenous industries. This led 
to further decline of local industries and decreasing demand for the 
indigenous products in the domestic markets. Because on the one hand the 
market was flooded by imported goods from Britain and on the other hand 
prosperity of the people and hence purchasing power was on the decline in 
the eastern region. On the contrary in the hinterland of Bombay, local 
merchants and financiers were in better control of commerce. For there was 
a significant survival of handicrafts and small scale industries in this region 
and the demand for indigenous products was not curbed by colonial 
penetration as it was the case in eastern region. Subsequently the western 
region comprising Bombay, Gujarat produced a prominent regional 
industrial class which laid the foundation for future industrialisation of this 
region in the post-Independence period. (ibid., p. 607) By contrast eastern 
region was marked by lack of emergence of the class of local capitalists and 
hence lack of expansion and development of local industries. In course of 
time the region developed as an enclave type export-oriented industrial 
region dominated by Europeans which however, necessitated huge public 
investment in the railways in this region since the later part of the 19th 
century (Thavaraj, 1955). Therefore, though the region did not attract 
sufficient public investment in irrigation, later on it had its good share of 
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public investment in railways required for export-oriented industries located 
in the region.84  
 
After Independence as a part of Centralised Planning model emphasis was 
placed on setting up heavy capital based basic industries. Eastern region 
attracted the major share of public investment during this time due to its 
comparative advantage and natural resources base. Yet the large public 
sector investment, these regions have not become diversified industrial 
economies.85 However, the expectation of the planner was that “large scale 
industries specially basic and heavy industries frequently serve as a 
spearhead of intensive and broad based development”. (quoted in Alagh, 
Subrahmanian & Kashyap, 1971, p. 801) Over time this expectation of the 
Planner did not come true. Experience shows that “public sector investment 
has led to an enclave-type of development in the less developed regions 
and ‘spread effect’ within the respective regions has been low.” (Alagh, 
Subrahmanian & Kashyap, 1971, p. 801) 
 
Major decision of the expansion of capacity in the basic and heavy industrial 
sector in the eastern region, however, remained elusive on account of cut-
back in the Central government’s expenditure in the face of acute industrial 
recession since the mid-1960s. Public investment on key areas of 
infrastructure declined. Therefore, the programmes for expansion of 
capacity for power generation, investment on additional capacity for steel 
and increasing the capacity of transport were stalled due to acute crunch of 
fund. Consequently, expansion of heavy capital based and engineering 
                                                          
84Regional distribution of public irrigation was conspicuously uneven as observed by the 
study undertaken by Thavraj (1955) and  there was almost no development in irrigation in 
eastern region. But eastern region had its fair share in the public investment in railway 
expansion since the later part of the 19th century. Since the priority was placed on “as much 
due to military strategic considerations as due to their being the means to provide feeder 
transport network for exports as well as for the European-capital dominated exports 
oriented enterprises in the port enclaves.” (Bharadwaj, K, ‘Regional Differentiation in India’, 
EPW, April, 1982, p.607) 
 
 
85Comparative examination of industrial base in different regions and the degree of their 
diversification reveals that the states, Assam, Orissa and Bihar in the eastern region were 
less industrially diversified than other regions of India during the period between 1956 
and 1965. However, West Bengal though belonging to the eastern region started its 
journey with diversified industrial base. But over time the level of diversification of West 
Bengal remained rather constant and subsequently it started lagging behind other Indian 
States, These States, however, managed to attain more diversification in their industrial 
base between 1956 and 1965. It is noticed that middle level and less diversified regions in 
general specialised in resource based industries and capital goods industries while the 
more diversified regions have in their base in those industries producing capital goods 
and demand oriented consumer goods. Over time eastern region as a whole failed to 
diversify its industrial base from heavy capital based to demand oriented consumer goods 
industries which possess high elasticity.  (Alagh, Y.K, Subrahmanian, K.K & Kashyap, 
S.P, ‘Regional Industrial Diversification in India’, EPW, April 10, 1971) However, the 
structural pattern in the industrial sector has close association with the pattern of income 
distribution. Since the mid-1960 industrial production was more directed towards the 
satisfaction of relatively high-income groups of people resulting in a decline in the growth 
of capital and basic industries. (Banerjee, D, ‘Industrial Stagnation in Eastern India A 
Statistical Investigation’, EPW, February 20, 1982, p. 297) 
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industries which formed the core of the industrial structure in the eastern 
region, suffered severely. (Sau, 1990, p.1020) 
  
Due to lack of adequate funds heavy capital based industries in the eastern 
region started suffering from lack of modernisation, obsolescence of 
machinery, low level of dispersal of the industries and lack of  diversification 
of the product mix. Freight equalisation policy introduced in 1956 is said to 
have further robbed away the advantage enjoyed by the eastern region. 
During the period 1970-85 income from manufacturing sector of the eastern 
region increased by 51.9 per as against 87.8 per cent of all India average 
and the share of the eastern region in the total income from manufacturing 
sector in India declined from 18.6 per cent in 1970-71 to 15.1 per cent in 
1984.85. (Sau, 1990, p.1020) 
  
Economic deterioration of the eastern region as a whole during the last few 
decades compared to other regions in India in terms of some economic 
parameters i.e., growth of industrial development, banking finance, decline 
in number of industrial licences, installed capacity of power and own 
resource mobilisation capacity are being evident from tables from 1 to 7 
(see Appendix).  It is also worthwhile to note that agricutural production in 
the eastern region as a whole was also quite low during the first four 
decades after Independence which had, however, negative feed back on 
the expansion of industries in this region (see table 8 in Appendix). These 
figures are self-explanatory and do not need further elaboration.  
 
However, low level of economic activities and resource generation and 
hence low level of investment in eastern region leads to vicious circle which 
makes it difficult for the region as a whole to cut the knot and to take off in 
the path of massive development. It would be worthwhile to mention here a 
comment made by Ashok  Mitra (1979) the then Finance Minister of West 
Bengal. He said: “An arrangement was thus set which was self-aggravating; 
the eastern region was denied any sizeable public sector outlay under the 
Plan and at the same time, funds from banks and financial institutions also 
made scarce, so that little possibility existed of any significant headway 
being made by any of these states in the industrial, commercial and 
agricultural sectors. And once their rate of growth was slowed down in this 
manner, this poor rate of growth could be and in fact was, made the alibi for 
further lowering the share of Plan funds and institutional resources for the 
eastern states....“(Quoted in EPW; March 24-31, 1979, p. 615) 
 
There is a feeling that erstwhile Bengal was subjected to the highest form of 
colonial penetration and exploitation and had suffered most from control of 
European trade and capital as was discussed in the preceding part of this 
study. After Independence there has been an allegation against the Centre 
to discriminate against West Bengal. However, it is noticed that West 
Bengal as a part of the eastern region has been the victim of historical and 
economic reality of the region. The legacy of different land settlements and 
public investment policies consequent upon different types of 
industrialisation in different regions coupled with diverse policies pursued by 
the Centre in the post-Independence period affected the region as a whole 
including the State in more ways than one and hence laid the foundation for 
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its future course of economic development in the subsequent decades. 
Therefore, necessary attention should now be paid to the historical, social 
and economic development of the State in particular in order to grasp the 
problematic of discrimination against the State.   
 
Structural and historical constraints placed on West Bengal’s 
economy   
 
Bengal started its journey as a Province of India with a highly vulnerable, 
narrow based, colonial-style-industrial structure with over-concentrated 
industrial expansion within limited areas of the State leaving most parts of it 
industrially underdeveloped. The Minister of Planning Mr. D. P. Dhar told 
Lok Sabha on 25th August 1972 that West Bengal’s industry had a colonial 
base, a colonial orientation and promised that government of India would 
take an attempt to diversify the State’s industrial structure. (Bhaumik,1987 
p.23) However, West Bengal or erstwhile Bengal was one of the most 
industrialised Provinces of India and it managed to retain its supremacy 
until the mid-1960s. Nevertheless, inherent structural weakness of the 
industrial base of West Bengal made it more vulnerable to economic 
fluctuations which was revealed with the outbreak of the First World War 
and the economic depression of 1930s. Again in the post-Independence 
period when industrial recession after the mid-1960s struck its economy. 
West Bengal appeared to be hit the hardest by these two recessions 
compared to the other States or erstwhile Provinces of India.  
 
Various constraints had been in operation on West Bengal’s economy since 
the pre-Independence period and could be categorised into two broad areas 
viz. the demand side and the supply side constraints. Supply side 
constraints are broadly divided into structural constraints and policy 
variables. The structural constraints consist of infrastructural bottleneck, 
lopsided industrialisation, agricultural bottleneck and the problem of 
entrepreneurship in the State. Policy variables which had retarding effects 
on West Bengal’s economy consist of freight equalisation policy (1956), 
industrial licensing policy (1951), import substitution policy.  
 
However, three types of institutional factors were on operation in the 
demand side constraints. One is the industrial recession after the mid-
1960s that resulted in massive cut back in the Central government’s 
demand for basic industrial inputs for the engineering industries located in 
West Bengal and consequent deterioration of industrial activities and hence 
of the overall economy of the State. Another one was related to the 
disbursement of low level of institutional (Centrally controlled financial 
institutions and commercial banks) and non-institutional (budgetary 
transfers) finance to West Bengal since the late-1960s and particularly 
since the early 1970s. Therefore, the State was further affected by the 
allocation of significantly low level of Plan outlays particularly since Fourth 
Five Year Plan and low level of financial assistance by the Centrally 
controlled financial institutions which did not seem to help it from recovering 
the State’s industrial stagnation. (See Chart 2) 
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Limited and lop-sided industrialisation in Bengal  
 
(i) Colonial-style industrialisation  
 
During the pre-Independence period industrial structure of Bengal consisted 
mainly of export-oriented industries namely jute, plantation (tea) and 
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extractive mining (coal) which became more recession-prone during the 
economic depression of 1930s than other industries located in different 
other Indian Provinces. Jute manufacture, one of the important industries of 
Bengal, was mainly in the nature of capital or intermediate goods and was 
geared for export market whereas cotton manufacture-one of the major 
industries in the western part of India was primarily of intermediate (cotton 
yarn) or consumption nature (cotton cloth) and mainly served the home 
market. During the period of economic depression of 1930s when most of 
the industries in Bengal went through recession due to lack of demand from 
foreign market and net investment by the firms controlling them had slowed 
down or vanished altogether, the cotton textiles industries in the western 
part of India not only withstood the effect of the recession quite well but also 
the total consumption of cotton piece goods in India continued to expand 
though not continuously after the First World War. (Bagchi,1972, p. 6) The 
other major industries of Bengal such as coal86 and tea were also like jute, 
extremely dependent on export market and hence the economic crisis of the 
1920s and the depression of the 1930s also hit these industries badly. 
 
Introduction of tariff protection87 for the cotton, sugar, steel and paper 
industries did help industrial growth in Bengal. But jute, one of the major 
industries in Bengal not only did not enjoy any protection but also export 
duties on jute which was imposed on 1916 as an emergency measure 
during the First World War, was further extended in the subsequent years 
much to the detriment of this industry. “Hence the relative decline in the 
industrial importance in Bengal compared to western India comprising 
Maharastra and Gujarat caused by the decline of the jute and other export 
based industries was not fully checked by the growth of other industries (on 
account of the tariff protection) in eastern India”. (Bagchi,1972, p. 85) 
However, during the Second World War the export industries in Bengal 
mainly jute recovered to some extent from its slackening period of 
depression and managed to secure profit but “wartime shortages of 
supplies of machinery, restrictions on capital issues and foreign control did 
not permit a renovation of their badly eroded capital stock.” (Bagchi, 1998, 
p. 2975) 
 
                                                          
86 The coal industry witnessed a remarkable expansion during the First World War and 
the early post-War periods. Since early 1920s with the onset of trade depression the 
industry experienced a set back. However, till early 1920s coal served mainly domestic 
market. Later on upon the recommendation of Indian Coal Committee (1925) Indian coal 
started penetrating foreign markets and made considerable progress. But again the 
depression of 1930s threw this industry out of gear. (Prasad, B,M, Second World War and 
Indian Industry 1939-45,  A Case Study of the Coal Industry in Bengal and Bihar, 
Anamika Prakashan, New Delhi, 1992, pp. 8-9)    
87 Until the First World War British India followed the free trade doctrine. During this War 
lack of self-sufficiency of Indian industries and absolute dependence on import was more 
acutely felt. However, the War disrupted the supply from other countries. This, along with 
other factors operating from different directions led the government of India to review the 
policy of Laissez Faire. Consequently Industrial Commission (1916-18) and Fiscal 
Commission (1921) were set up to examine the matter of providing protection to Indian 
industries. Upon the recommendation of Fiscal Commission, Tariff Board was set up to 
inquire into this matter in detail and it granted protection to iron and steel industry in 1924. 
Afterwards other industries such as sugar, coal, cotton textiles, match too were granted 
protection.   
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(ii) Low level of productivity  
 
Bengal was one of the leading industrialised Provinces and remained so 
until the late 1960s. Nevertheless the Province was suffering from low level 
of productivity compared to other Provinces particularly Bombay. In 1921 
and in 1939 Bengal accounted for 35.1%  and 28.7 per cent of the total 
number of the industrial workers in British India respectively as against 25.3 
per cent and 23.0 per cent in Bombay during the same period. In 1946 
according to the first census of manufacturing industries in India West 
Bengal (33.62 per cent) continued to lead other States particularly Bombay 
(33.03 per cent) in terms of its share of total number of industrial workers. 
However, in 1946 while Bombay was lagging behind Bengal in terms of 
number of industrial workers it was much ahead of Bengal in terms of value 
added. Thus total value added in the manufacturing sectors of West Bengal 
in 1946 was Rs. 57.32 crore as against Rs. 87.66 crore for Bombay. This 
indicates that industries situated in Bombay were more efficient, more 
productive and more diversified than in Bengal. The same feature that as 
noted in the first census of manufacturing industry in India in 1946 
continued till 1965 i.e.,  when West Bengal topped in terms of employment 
but was lagging behind Mahartstra in terms of value added. (Dasgupta, 
1998, pp. 3049-3050) 
 
An interesting feature was noticed in West Bengal as far as productivity of 
labour of both engineering and non-engineering industries was concerned 
in 1965. Although the value added per employee in 1965 of all industries 
taken together in West Bengal was much lower than the all India average 
and also developed States like Tamil Nadu and Maharastra. The value 
added per employee in engineering industries in West Bengal was much 
higher than not only two industrially developed States (Tamil Nadu and 
Maharastra) but also higher than the all India average during 1965. (BBCI, 
1971, p. 94) (see table 9 in Appendix).Therefore, as noticed by BBCI, “The 
relative superiority of the engineering industry in West Bengal is in striking 
contrast to the inefficiencies of the State’s non-engineering sector...” (BBCI, 
1971, p. 95) But in spite of the formers contribution, value added per 
employee in all types of industries in West Bengal increased at a lower rate 
than the country’s average during the period  between 1959 and 1965 
which were 148.6 per cent for West Bengal as against 150.0 per cent for 
the all India average. (see table 10 in Appendix) 
 
The relatively higher productivity in the engineering sector of West Bengal, 
as pointed out by the Survey Committee on the Engineering Industry 
appointed by the government of West Bengal, seemed to be at the cost of 
capital productivity. As table 11 (see Appendix) indicates that in 1965 both 
the capital-output and capital-labour ratios were higher in engineering 
industries of West Bengal compared to those in Maharastra and Tamil Nadu 
indicating higher level of capital intensity in the engineering industries of 
West Bengal. (BBCI, 1971, p. 95). Vaid (1972) also came to the similar 
conclusion that despite higher capital investment in the State in engineering 
industries, the industries in general of West Bengal were characterised by 
lower value added per employee compared to Maharastra. Moreover, the 
engineering industry of West Bengal seemed to be also suffering from 
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under-utilisation and inefficient use of capital combined with expanding and 
surplus labour supply while allegedly only about 35 per cent of the 
employment potential of the engineering industry being utilised.  (Vaid, 
1972, pp. 149-183) 
 
The study undertaken by Mathur (1987) also revealed that the overall 
growth rate of productivity and output of the secondary sector of West 
Bengal during the period of 1951-81 were only 0.80 per cent and 3.18 per 
cent respectively.  As against the all India figures of 1.92 per cent and 4.58 
per cent respectively during the same period. (see table 12(a) in Appendix) 
Mathur (1987) also attempted to measure the contributions of different 
factors such as labour, technology, structural shift and interaction factors to 
the growth rate of overall economy in different States of India during the 
period of 1951-81. In the secondary sector labour contributed 58.2 per cent 
in West Bengal while structural change, technology and interaction factor 
contributed only 3.6 per cent, 17.4 per cent and 20.9 per cent respectively 
during the period of 1951-81. Respective figures for Maharastra were as 
follows: contribution of labour 25.6 per cent, structural change 8.6 per cent, 
technological change 23.5 per cent and interaction factor 42.2 per cent. 
Even though comparative contribution of labour was higher in West Bengal 
but it must be perceived in the context of the contribution of other factors to 
the growth of the secondary sector namely structural shift, technology and 
interaction factors. Clearly, all of them are quite low in West Bengal 
compared to Maharastra indicating over all stagnancy, inefficiency and lack 
of dynamism in West Bengal’s economy compared to Maharastra. 
However, as interaction effect is positively related with growth of 
productivity, structural shift and technology of an economy, it is expected to 
be quite low in West Bengal compared to the other States on account of 
negligible contribution of structural shift, technology and productivity88to the 
secondary sector of the State. (see table 12 (b) in Appendix) (Mathur, 1987, 
p. 178) 
 
The travail continues more or less. A recent study (Ray, 1996) undertaken 
in this area also reveals similar picture. States’ share in India’s total 
industrial output is normally measured in terms of value of output (VO) as 
well as net value added (NVA). Both of them have consistently been 
declining over the period from 1976 and 1991 in West Bengal. More 
importantly, prolonged negative profitability in industries of West Bengal 
during the period from 1979-80 to 1990-91 is also a reflection of inefficiency 
and lack of dynamism in the entire industrial sector of West Bengal which is, 
however, clearly unsustainable.   
                                                          
88 It is worthwhile to note in this connection that in West Bengal during the period of 1951-
81 over all growth rate of output  was 2.53 per cent and growth rate of productivity was only 
0.36 per cent. The respective figures for Maharastra were 4.30 per cent and 2.10 per cent. 
However, the growth rate of productivity of the secondary sector (industrial sector) in West 
Bengal was only 0.80 per cent and growth rate of output of the secondary sector was 3.18 
per cent as against 2.02 per cent and 5.14 per cent for Maharastra and 1.92 per cent and 
4.58 per cent for all India average during the same period. Therefore, the growth rate of 
productivity and output in overall sectors as well as the secondary sector was quite low in 
West Bengal compared to the all India average including Maharastra. (Mathur, A, “‘Why 
Growth rates Differ’ Within India: An Alternative Approach” The Journal of Development 
Studies, Vol. 23, No. 2, January 1987, p. 169) 
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During the period under study i.e.,1976-91, it was observed that West 
Bengal remained less capital intensive compared to India and the gap has 
widened remarkably during 1980s. Productivity of capital was much higher 
in West Bengal at the beginning of the period but it declined steadily and 
drastically during the entire period and has fallen below that of India during 
the late 1980s. On the other hand labour productivity in West Bengal 
remained at par with that of India till the early 1980s but has been lagging 
behind since then. Finally the study concluded that main problem of 
industrial production in West Bengal is that it is not only characterised by 
lower capital intensity but also by lower quality of capital manifested in 
backward technologies. This led to declining productivity of capital and 
prevented her from catching up with the national average. (Ray, 1996, pp. 
248-264) 
 
(iii) Lack of diversification of industries and slow rate of change in industrial 
structure in West Bengal 
 
Apart from the traditional old export-oriented industries such as jute, tea, 
coal the advancement in industrial growth in West Bengal was achieved 
mostly through engineering industries, including basic metal industries. One 
of the distinctive features of the eastern region as a whole is the 
predominance of basic metals & alloy industries and lack of growth in 
chemical based industries. Basic metal industries accounted for about 16 to 
22 per cent of the total value of industrial output in West Bengal and Bihar 
in 1978-79 and during 1983-84 more than 52 per cent of the total value of 
output in basic metal industries was produced in Bihar and West Bengal. 
During the same period (1983-84) more than 41 per cent of value of output 
produced in chemicals and the chemical industry in Maharastra and 
Gujarat. (Sau, 1990, p. 1020) 
 
Significant changes in the industrial structure of India took place between 
1946 and 1978 which is evident from table 13 (see Appendix). The 
weightage of agro-based industries declined from 66.5 per cent in 1946 to 
44 per cent by 1960 and further 28.4 per cent by 1978. The weightage of 
metal based industries registered a growth from 9.30 per cent to 24.71 per 
cent between 1946 and 1965. But thereafter it declined to 22.79 per cent by 
1978. In contrast, the chemical based industry slowly strengthened its 
position in the industrial product market between 1946 and 1978 and the 
weightage increased from 4.92 per cent in 1956 to 15.50 per cent  in 1978 
i.e., 215 per cent increase as against 145 per cent increase in metal based 
industries. Besides, the chemical based industries were only marginally 
affected during the general depression period of 1966-68. (Banerjee,1982, 
pp. 297-298). Therefore, it was the chemical and chemical product industry 
which achieved a higher growth rate since the late 1960s. An estimation 
also indicates that during 1960-84, the chemicals and chemical products 
industry had achieved more than 500 per cent growth while the growth rate 
for basic metal industry was only 316 per cent. (Sau, 1992, p. 1023)  
 
As regards the degree of change in the production structure, West Bengal 
lagged far behind Maharastra which was one of the instrumental factors of 
 150
profitability for various types of industries located in different regions. The 
study undertaken by Satia & Cowlagi (1993) indicates that industries overall 
vary considerably in generating surpluses to service capital. While rubber, 
food products, non-electrical, electrical machinery and chemicals are 
capable of generating high surplus, on contrary, electricity and basic metals 
normally generate the lowest surplus. West Bengal, as mentioned before, is 
marked by the dominance of basic metal industries while Maharastra made 
rapid progress in chemical based industries since 1960s.89 Maharastra’s 
competitive strength originated from the persistent dominance of chemical 
and chemical products in its industrial profile. In 1982-83 more than 27.3 
per cent of its industrial production of Maharastra was accounted for by 
industries in the star category which were capable of generating more profit 
than others. Of them chemical and chemical products accounted for 18.3 
per cent and electrical machinery including electronics accounted for 5.1 
per cent.  (Satia & Cowlagi, 1993, p. 175) 
 
Unlike eastern region, western and southern regions as a whole made 
significant progress in chemical based industries. One obvious outcome of 
the insignificant growth of chemical industries in the eastern region in 
general and West Bengal in particular was under-utilisation of the capacity 
and sluggish growth of traffic in the Calcutta-Haldia port since the early 
1970s. Because the pattern of growth of sea-borne trade of India during 
1960-80 changed in favour of petroleum oil lubricants, iron ore and fertiliser 
but against coal on which Calcutta-Haldia port was dependent on. 
Therefore, absence of any phetrochemical complex in the eastern region 
including West Bengal accelerated the deterioration in the traffic growth 
through Calcutta-Haldia port. (see table 14 in Appendix)  (Sau, 1990, pp. 
1020) 
                                                          
89 The share of value added by metal based industries to the total value added in West 
Bengal was 27.8 per cent in 1960 and increased to 30.4 percent in 1970. For Maharastra 
the respective figures were 19.7 per cent and 30.0 per cent during the same period. In 
contrast the share of value added by the chemical based industry to the total value added 
by Maharastra increased from 16.8 per cent in 1960 to 20.6 per cent in 1965 and further 
to 27.8 per cent in 1970. On the other hand the share of value added by the chemical 
based industry to the total value added by West Bengal increased only from 7.5 per cent 
in 1960 to 11.5 per cent in 1970. (Banerjee, D, ‘ Industrial Stagnation in Eastern India A 
Statistical Investigation’, EPW, February 20,  1982, p. 298) 
 
In West Bengal basic metal constituted a very significant part which is also evidenced from 
the fact that in 1965 the largest share of engineering employment was claimed by the basic 
metal industries (29 per cent), followed by transport equipment (24 per cent), metal 
products (20 per cent), and non-electrical machinery (18 per cent). In all other States the 
basic metal industry claimed only 16 per cent of engineering employment and transport 
equipment occupied the top position by providing 35 per cent of employment. (Vaid, K.N, 
Gheraos and Labour Unrest in West Bengal, Shri Ram Centre for Industrial Relations and 
Human Resources, New Delhi,1972, p. 152) 
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(iv) Lack of diversification of engineering industry and dependence of its 
existence on government policy made it more recession prone 
 
Lack of diversification in the overall industrial structure and greater 
dependence on the Central government’s policies for the existence of 
engineering industries of West Bengal made its economy relatively more 
recession prone than those of the other regions. The expansion, growth and 
profitability of the engineering industries (with major share of the basic 
metal industries) dependent largely on the Central government’s demand 
for engineering products and also on different policies pursued by the 
Centre. One estimation shows that only 16 per cent of the output of 
engineering industry of this State went for household consumption and 10 
per cent consumed directly by the Central government and another 45 per 
cent  directly contributed to gross capital formation. Such capital formation 
constituted raw materials for other industries either as raw material input or 
as machinery and was also regulated by the Central government through 
quotas, allocations, and pricing system. Therefore, apart from being a direct 
consumer and regulator of import (since 27 percent output of the 
engineering industries is dependent on imports) government of India also 
controlled the consumption of the engineering outputs as demanded by 
other industries. Evidently, any reduction in the Central government’s order 
or change in its allocation policy could directly affect the profitability of 
engineering industries and it did have serious impact on the engineering 
industries of the State. Hence making these industries more susceptible to 
changes in the tempo of economic activities than the consumption oriented 
industries. (Vaid, 1972) Over time unlike in other States the engineering 
sector in West Bengal failed to capture the consumer goods industries on a 
large scale (Raycahudhuri & Chatterjee, 1998, p. 3063).  Therefore, such 
dependence on government’s policy coupled with lack of expansion of the 
consumer based industries made the State’s industrial structure more 
recession-prone than that of the other States.  
 
(Iv) Lack of dispersal of industries and consequent intra-State disparities in 
West Bengal 
 
Industrial concentration in the Calcutta Metropolitan District (CMD) is 
amongst the heaviest in the world leaving all other districts of West Bengal 
industrially underdeveloped and has resulted in severe intra-State inequity. 
Engineering industries began to grow around Calcutta during the Second 
World War. By 1965 almost entire manufacturing industry of West Bengal 
was concentrated in the CMD area. (four districts of West Bengal namely 
Howrah, Hoogly, 24-Paraganas and Calcutta forms the CMD area) Almost 
the entire jute, cotton textile, chemicals, rubber, food processing and 
miscellaneous light industries are concentrated in the CMD area. Such 
heavy concentration of industries coupled with vast economically 
underdeveloped area of the State caused continuous large scale migration 
to the CMD90 area and consequently made the situation unbearable.  
                                                          
90 However, according to an estimation the CMD area comprised only 1.3 per cent of the 
total area of West Bengal but held 19 per cent of the State’s population, 50 per cent of its 
total industrial work force and 84 per cent of her total registered factory work force. The 
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Indeed, this high degree of intra-State regional imbalance is unprecedented 
and does not exist in any other State of the Indian union. Wide inter-district 
disparity in the location of large scale industries is also mention worthy. Out 
of the 5,658 registered factories in West Bengal in 1967, 4866 factories or 
86  per cent of total were located in the five districts of the State such as 
Calcutta, 24 Paraganas, Howrah, Hoogly and Bardwaman. By contrast 11 
least developed districts out of total sixteen districts of the State accounted 
for only 792 factories i.e., only 14 per cent of the total. Among them 
Calcutta and 24 Paragana alone accounted for 58.31 per cent of the total 
registered factories in 1967. (see table 15 in Appendix).  (BBCI, 1971, p. 47) 
 
Table 16 (see Appendix) indicates inter-district disparities in the distribution 
of employment in the registered factories in West Bengal between 1951 and 
1966. It will be seen from table 16 that the share of the 11 backward 
districts in the State’s registered factory employment was only 7.4 per cent 
in 1951 as against 57.2 percent of only two districts i.e.,  Calcutta and 24 
Paraganas. In 1961 also the share of the 11 backward districts in the 
State’s registered factory employment continued to be as low as 9.0 per 
cent as against 52.9 per cent for the two above mentioned most industrially 
developed districts.91 (BBCI, 1971, p.47) Recent study undertaken by 
Bhattacharya (1998) has also observed that degree of intra-regional 
inequality in West Bengal during the last two decades has been 
continuously much higher than the all India level of regional disparity. 
 
Infrastructural bottleneck 
 
The major institutional problem faced by West Bengal’s industries appears 
to be technological backwardness and lack of initiative to modernise 
machinery. Later studies (Indian Chamber of Commerce (ICC), 1983; Ray, 
1996) also pointed out such technological deficiencies faced by the 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
concentration of industrial employment in the CMD area was remarkably problematic. 
There were 740 industrial workers per square kilometre in the CMD. And per capita income 
generated in the CMD area was Rs. 811 against the national average of Rs. 334 in 1965. 
(Vaid ,K.N Gheraos and labour Unrest in West Bengal, Shri Ram Centre for Industrial 
Relations and Human Resources, New Delhi, 1972, pp. 148-149) 
 
91 In terms of inter-district inequity in the distribution of factory employment it is also 
observed by Vaid (1972) that the five North Bengal districts including the tea plantation 
districts of Darjeeling and Jalpaiguri with 16 per cent of the population of the State had only 
3.42 per cent share of the total employment in the registered factories of the State. 
Therefore, apart from the few most industrially  developed districts of the State the 
remaining backward districts i.e., Murshidabad, Nadia, Birbhum, Purulia, Bankura and 
Midnapur were industrially backward with insufficient and poor infrastructure facilities. In 
1965, these districts together accounted for only 3.96 per cent of the total registered factory 
employment of the State. The obvious outcome of this phenomenon was acute 
unemployment in most parts of the State and an administratively unmanageable situation 
in the CMD area. (Vaid ,K.N, Gheraos and labour Unrest in West Bengal, Shri Ram Centre 
for Industrial Relations and Human Resources, New Delhi, 1972, pp. 148-149) 
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industries of West Bengal and will be discussed later on. The condition of 
the plant and machinery in many lines of the engineering products, cotton 
textiles and some other industries, as BBCI (1975) observed, in West 
Bengal were antiquated compared to the modernised and up-to-date 
industrial complexes in other parts of India particularly in the western 
region. Quite evidently the cost of production in certain industries in West 
Bengal was much higher and some of West Bengal’s engineering products 
had been priced out due to higher production cost despite enjoying the 
benefit of low labour costs. (BBCI, 1975, p. 25) 
 
Power occupies the key position in the infrastructural sector. Since the later 
part of the Third Plan (1961-66) Indian economy, as we have discussed 
earlier, entered a phase of economic crisis. Consequently major areas of 
infrastructural development in the eastern region were stalled due to 
inadequate resources from the Centre. It was observed by the West Bengal 
government “since the Third Plan period due importance was not given to 
the need for installation of new power stations to cope with the growing 
demand in the Eastern Region including West Bengal”.(Economic Review 
(1973-74), Government of West Bengal, Quoted in BBCI, 1975, p. 36) 
 
Power shortages was considered to be one of the major handicaps faced by 
West Bengal’s industries during the first three decades after Independence. 
The chronic and intractable power crisis in West Bengal arose from the 
extremely inadequate development of the generating capacity in the State. 
In the subsequent decades the State did not seem to overcome this 
problem of low capacity of generation of power. We will take up this issue in 
a later part of the study along with other major infrastructural problem faced 
by the State. According to data submitted by the Burman Commission  (set 
up by the State government to investigate  the causes of power shortage of 
the State covering the period between 1951 and 1971) the power 
generation capacity in West Bengal increased only 122 percent as against 
1172 per cent in Tamil Nadu, 1075 per cent in Punjab, 525 per cent in 
Maharastra and 539 per cent in Gujarat between 1951 and 1971. (BBCI, 
1975, p. 36) It would be worthwhile to note that for the eastern region as a 
whole the growth rate of the installed capacity during 1951 to 1980 was only 
724 per cent as against 1407 per cent for the whole of all India. (see table 7 
in Appendix)   
 
However, although West Bengal occupied the third position in terms of per-
capita power consumption among the Indian States but electrification in the 
villages of West Bengal was much lower than other States. The resultant 
shortage of power supply in the villages had been a major hurdle in the path 
of agricultural improvement through irrigation and the development of agro-
based industries. (BBCI, 1971, p.41) West Bengal government while 
submitting the memorandum before the Fifth Finance Commission also 
mentioned the problem of  low generation capacity of power of West Bengal 
and of lower number of villages in the States being electrified compared to 
other States. The rate of growth of the installed capacity of the power 
generation of the State was only 121.1 per cent as against 458.4 per cent of 
all India average during 1951 to 1966-67. Furthermore,  until March 1967, 
1,355 villages of the State were electrified compared to 5,970 villages in 
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Maharastra, 4,472 villages in Andhra Pradesh. (see table 17 in Appendix) 
Another estimation shows that  as on 31st March 1974, there were only 
7,500 electrified villages in West Bengal as against 28,390 in Uttar Pradesh, 
16,000 in Maharastra, 14,124 in Tamil Nadu 10,750 in Andhra Pradesh and 
9,600 in Bihar. (BBCI, 1975, p. 41) 
 
Another major infrastructural lag in this State was the relative deficiency of 
roadways. However, huge emphasis on transport and communication was 
placed during the First Plan outlay in West Bengal. But since the Second 
Plan and more conspicuously since the Third Plan the percentage of Plan 
expenditure on transport and communication in the State started declining 
drastically. Total kilometre of road ways in West Bengal was only 11,168 as 
against 35,233 in Madhya Pradesh, 29,791 in Karnataka, 24,061 in Uttar 
Pradesh, 22,02 in Andhra Pradesh, 21,943 in Rajastrajhan, 20,068 in 
Tamilnadu, 14, 282 in Maharastra and 12,623 in Kerala. In terms of railway 
route West Bengal also lagged behind other States i.e., the total railway 
kilometerage in West Bengal as on 31st March 1972 was 3,696 as against 
8,632 in Uttar Pradesh and over a 5,000 each in Bihar Gujarat, Madhya 
Pradesh, Maharastra and Rajasthan. (BBCI, 1975, p. 41) 
 
Agricultural bottleneck 
 
Of all structural constraints operating on West Bengal’s economy 
agricultural bottleneck was one of the most important one. It seems that the 
legacy of Permanent Settlement was quite strong in its retarding impact on 
agricultural growth in West Bengal in the first four decades after 
Independence. The State Planning Board commented that “one of the 
important reasons for the crisis in industry in West Bengal lies in the 
backwardness of our agriculture. Contrariwise, backwardness of our 
agriculture is due to the nature of industrial complex we have inherited and 
the particular type of socio-economic institutional set up associated with it.“ 
(West Bengal’s Approach to the Fifth Five Year Plan (1974-79), 1972 pp.9; 
quoted in Munsi, 1975, p.44) 
 
West Bengal along with the eastern region as a whole was left far behind 
the other States as far agricultural growth was concerned as we have seen 
in the preceding part of our study. During 1952 to 1979 annual exponential 
growth rate of agricultural production was only 1.85 per cent as against 2.35 
per cent for all India during the same period. (Sau, 1990, p. 1023) (see 
Table 14 in Appendix) Reason for this poor performance of West Bengal’s 
agriculture may be traced in infrastructural and institutional deficiencies. Of 
them lack of facilities for irrigation and low availability of agricultural credit 
were most important. At the end of the Fourth Five year Plan (1969-74) 
West Bengal stood close to the bottom among the major States of India in 
developing major and medium irrigation schemes. (BBCI, 1975, p.18)  
Measured against minor irrigation schemes, West Bengal’s position was 
also quite low compared to the other States. (BBCI, 1975, pp. 18-19) 
However, major thrust was given on restructuring the agrarian policy and 
institutional change in rural economy in the State soon after the Left Front 
government came to power in 1977. Consequently, West Bengal registered 
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higher agricultural growth and started catching up with the rest of India 
during the last two decades.  
 
Institutional factors 
 
(i) Economic crisis in mid-1960s 
 
Many of the disadvantages which were already dampening the growth of 
industries in West Bengal including the eastern region were accentuated by 
two major incidents during the mid-1960s. One was the Indo-Pak war of 
1965 and the other was harvest failure in the country in two consecutive 
years 1965 and 1966 leading to acute industrial recession. Public sector 
investment by the Centre declined significantly and investment on 
expansion of capacity in the basic and the heavy industrial sector was 
almost stopped in the eastern region due to scarcity of resources. During 
1966 and 1967 country’s industrial production declined rapidly and the 
recession in industry assumed national character. But its impact on the 
industries of West Bengal was much worse than in many other States. The 
index of industrial production came down from 106.6 in 1964 to 94.2 in 1970 
as against the all India figures of 108.6 in 1964 to 139.3. (Bose, 1975, p. 
165) (see table 18 in Appendix). However, the industrial recession of the 
mid-1960s did not affect all the industries uniformly. The major industries 
affected were food processing, textiles and engineering goods. Therefore,  
the impact of this recession on West Bengal industries was not only most 
severe but also long standing on account of the lack of diversification in the 
industrial structure of State with predominance of engineering industries run 
by the public sector enterprises which were also heavily dependent on  
Central government’s orders. As we have earlier mentioned that unlike 
consumer goods industries, one of the important features of the heavy 
capital based basic engineering industries along with other major industries 
of the State most of which get exported, is their absolute dependence on 
government’s demand and policies.92 
 
Significant decline in railway orders by the Central government since the 
mid-1960s resulted in recession in the railway equipment industry hence in 
the wagon building firms in West Bengal. Drastic fall in wagon production in 
the State nearly wiped out a number of major industrial units in the State. 
Some important  engineering industries in the State which flourished before 
the onset of the recession could not cope with the crisis and turned sick. 
Consequently they had to be taken over by the government. The sickness 
of these big firms also badly affected the ancillary units located in Howrah 
on account of lack of orders from them who used to supply inputs to these 
giant industries. Actually within a few years whole structure of the 
                                                          
92 In this connection we can quote the West Bengal government. “The growth of large 
scale industry in the State is dependent to a large extent on factors which are beyond the 
control of the State Government. Industries like tea and jute, the two most important 
industries in the State are influenced by the export market. The other major industries in 
the State, like engineering, cotton textile and coal are either dependent on the demand 
generated by the Central Government agencies, as in the case of wagons or are 
influenced by Central Government’s industrial policy, as is the case for cotton textile 
industry. And finally industries like coal are under the direct control of the Central 
Government. “ (Economic Review, Government of West Bengal, 1986-87, p. 28) 
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engineering industry in the State was nearly destroyed. (Dasgupta, 1998, p. 
3050) 
 
(ii) Plan outlay and low level of Central allocation 
 
Low level of Plan outlay and hence Plan expenditure accentuated the 
industrial recession in West Bengal during the late 1960s and the early 
1970s. The size of the Fourth Plan (1969-74)  amounted only to Rs. 323 
crores and barely exceeded that of the Third Five Year Plan (1961-66) 
which accounted for Rs. 305 crores. Expenditures during the Fourth Plan 
compared to the Third Plan under the following heads namely industry & 
mining, transport & communication declined by Rs. 21 crores. This 
especially harmed the structural groups of the industry in West Bengal.  
Although the expenditures in the Fourth Plan for the State under irrigation 
and power registered an increase of Rs. 18 crores over the Third Plan at 
1970s prices. However, in real terms the increase was far less. No other 
State in India experienced such cut back in the Plan expenditure during the 
Fourth Plan. Evidently, such meagre allocations in the Fourth Five Year 
Plan made it more difficult to maintain the level of production in the 
engineering industry of the State. (Bose, 1975, pp. 166-167) (see table 19 
in Appendix). 
 
(iii) Lack of financial assistance given by the Centrally controlled financial 
institutions.  
 
Inadequate financial assistance particularly since the mid-1960s compared 
to other States in the forms of loans, underwriting, guarantees, etc. by the 
government sponsored financial institutions also had greater retarding effect 
on West Bengal’s industrial base compared to other States. We would like 
to turn on to this area in the subsequent part of this study. It would be 
worthwhile to note in this connection that several studies (Gulati & George, 
1985; Shulka & Roy Chowdhury, 1992; Mathur, 1994) observed that of all 
resource transfers from the Centre to the States, financial assistance 
disbursed by the Centrally controlled financial institutions and scheduled 
commercial banks has been showing most regressive trend. That apart,  
there is a strong positive association between level of development of a 
State and financial assistance disbursed. Because financial institutions by 
and large are guided by optimal return on their resources and they are not 
expected to adopt the egalitarian norms which Finance Commission and 
Planning Commission did in an attempt to redress regional imbalance. 
(Mathur, 1994, p. 226)     
 
 (4) Problem of entrepreneurship 
 
Absence of regionally committed class in West Bengal 
 
Absence of regional investors with close ties with the State government is 
one of the most important handicaps of the West Bengal’s economy. The 
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reason might be traced as far back as the pre-Independence period. 
However, Permanent Settlement in Bengal encouraged investment in land 
rather than in commerce and industry. For several reasons the return from 
land was much higher and was considered safer field than any risky venture 
such as industry and commerce. Therefore, Zemindars became more 
inclined towards investment in land and finding employment in the civil 
services. (Vaid, 1972, p. 179) Thus, “this was a middle class connected, not 
with industry or even with large-scale trade and commerce but with the 
liberal professions and landholding”.(Sarkar, 1987, p. 7) However, It was 
often alleged that Bengalis had real apathy for setting up business and the 
Bengali people lacked enterprising quality which was the main reason for 
their misery and poverty. But such allegation was opposed by some 
scholars (Awwal, 1982; Srkar, 1987) and also seems to be inadequate in  
explaining the lack of business motive of the Bengalis. Other structural 
factors prevailing from the past days also need to be considered.  
 
Lack of technical knowledge and lack of sufficient demand for industrial 
products were some of the determining factors which caused low level of 
participation of Bengal’s people in industry, trade and commerce. Natives in 
general lacked technical knowledge in the British India. In Bengal the 
opportunities for industrial and technical education was very limited. At the 
advanced level as late as in 1939, there existed only two engineering 
colleges in Bengal. (Awwal, 1982, p. 136) However, limited market for 
industrial products due to low level of purchasing power of the vast rural 
people on account of the Permanent Settlement in land in Bengal was also 
one of the main important inhibiting factors responsible for low level of 
initiative in setting up small industries by the Bengal entrepreneurs. In 
addition to this the policy of free trade pursued by the government of India 
till 1923 made it difficult for native entrepreneurs in general to penetrate and 
capture market. (Awwal, 1982, p. 139) 
 
Almost all major industries situated in Bengal i.e., jute, tea plantation and 
partly coal were export based and mainly dominated by the Europeans. The 
reasons for this is not difficult to seek. Europeans naturally had better 
understanding about the fluctuations of world market and the pulse of world 
economy. It was difficult to penetrate into this area for Indian in general and 
Bengalis in particular for they had neither technical knowledge nor better 
familiarity with world market. Similar trend was visible in the engineering 
industries of Bengal. Till the beginning of the World War I, the flow of 
entrepreneurs into this industry was extremely limited. By 1937 most of the 
engineering firms operating in Bengal belonged to British owners. The 
reason behind this is obvious. The Europeans naturally possessed the 
required technical knowledge, and the advantage of securing better 
marketing facilities (due to British domination in large purchasing bodies like 
railways). In addition to that, in a colonial set up, they enjoyed patronisation 
by the British government and the British owned financial institutions. 
(Bagchi, 1972; Awwal, 1982)  Therefore, “Its (Bengali entrepreneur’s) failure 
to develop into a bourgeoisie proper was caused not so much by faulty 
values or unsound business instincts, as by the early and massive hold 
established on the higher reaches of modern commerce and industry by 
European firms backed by a foreign government” (Sarkar, 1987, p. 7) 
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Furthermore, there was no department of industry till 1920 under the 
government of Bengal. The Bengal government established its permanent 
department for industries in 1920 along with an Advisory Board of Industries 
to advice the Director on important aspects of industrial development. 
Industrial department from the very onset had suffered from financial crisis 
and had to cut short its projects. This crisis was further intensified when the 
adverse effect of Meston Award (1921) on Bengal’s finance became 
apparent since the mid-1920s.  Acute financial stringency restricted Bengal 
government‘s spending on the nation-building activities of which industrial 
development was one. Five gazetted officers out of ten in the Industrial 
Department had to be retrenched in the face of such acute financial  crisis. 
(Awwal, 1982, pp. 17-37) 
  
Dominance of  Marwari Enterprises 
 
Bengali entrepreneurship emerged during the Swadeshi period soaked in 
patriotic zeal and played an important role between 1833 and 1905  but 
started gradually deteriorating by the 1920s. The void started being filled by 
the Marwaris who replaced Bengali entrepreneurs and started establishing 
themselves in Bengal by the end of 19th century. Marwaris had natural 
inclination for trade and the tradition of whom was more receptive to trade 
and commerce and whose wealth in fact depended on new business 
ventures (Franda,1971, p.23). Furthermore, by the 1920s Bengal and 
particularly Calcutta had become the centre of political agitation, and the 
British commercial ruling classes began replacing their Bengali employees 
by Rajasthanis/Marwaris as far as they could. (Ghosh, 1971, p. 24) The 
Rajasthanis who started their activities mainly in jute industry as traders 
gradually extended their activities to the whole economy of Bengal.93 
Consequently in Bengal “The second rung in the business hierarchy came 
to be occupied in the twentieth century by Marwari and other non-Bengali 
businessmen, drawing upon established, all India connections.” Contrary to 
that “the decade (1920s) also saw the decline of Bengali entrepreneurship 
in the coal industry in the face of European and Marwari competition and 
the discriminatory treatment by British controlled railways and banks.”   
(Sarkar, 1987, pp. 7-8) 
 
Overtime, Marwaris have been almost in exclusive control of the private-
sector industries in the State. From then on, Bengal’s merchant class was 
constituted by non-Bengali migrants, mostly Marwaris. (Chatterji,1985, p.4) 
                                                          
93Vaid (1972) observed that Marwaris came to Bengal during the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century and were engaged mainly as traders, commission agents, and 
contractors to the British trading houses. They, however, lacked the technical knowledge of 
modern business organisation and did not have any intention to compete with their British 
principals. Owing to that they did not launch any company till the beginning of the 20th 
century except for one cotton textile mill. Apart from having shares in jute mills, they mainly 
confined their business activities to trading and doing contract jobs for the British firms. 
After Independence they systematically purchased many British companies and the foreign 
monopoly in jute, tea, coal, shipping exports etc. which was passed onto the Marwari 
hands. (Vaid, K.N, Gheraos and Labour Unrest in West Bengal, Shri Ram Centre for 
Industrial Relations and Human Resources, New Delhi, 1972, p. 170) 
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It has been estimated by the Government of West Bengal in 1969 that out 
of the total approved investment of Rs. 290 crore in West Bengal between 
1959 and 1966 only 4.83 per cent came from Bengali entrepreneurs. On the 
other hand, the share of Marwari entrepreneurs accounted for 45.52 per 
cent. Other Indians and domiciled foreigners accounted for 18.96 per cent 
and 2.76 per cent respectively.(Memorandum to the Fifth Finance 
Commission, West Bengal Government, 1969, p.23 ) 
 
Bengal Chamber of Commerce and Industry (1975) also felt that lack of 
local entrepreneurship was one of the most important reasons for industrial 
backwardness of West Bengal. (BBCI, 1975, p.15) However, one could 
hardly fail to notice the fact that while there has been a distinct trend of 
emergence of the regional capitalists in western India, it was absent in 
eastern India. “Since the inception of modern factory based industry in the 
mid-nineteenth century a regional clustering of industries had occurred. The 
ownership of manufacturing industries in different regions also conformed to 
a pattern. In fact at the time of Independence a regional capitalist class had 
developed to an extent in western India only.”  (Banerjee,1995, p.3) The 
Report of the Industrial Planning and Licensing Policy (Planning 
Commission, 1967) observed that there was strong regional bias in the 
investment pattern of the big business houses in the 1960s except in 
plantation and extractive industries. Therefore, as Banerjee (1998) 
observed while there was a clear trend of regional concentration of 
investments by the respective regional capitalists, in West Bengal, by 
contrast, Marwari business houses tend to reinvest their capital 
accumulated from the State elsewhere in India. (Banerjee, 1998, p. 3074)  
 
Pre-dominance of foreign capital, public sector & Marwari entrepreneurship 
in West Bengal 
 
Foreign companies, Marwari enterprise, and the public sectors, together 
owned most of the industries in West Bengal. Coal mining, jute 
manufacturing and tea plantations that were built up by the British remained 
in their exclusive preserve until Independence and began to pass onto 
Indian hands only after Independence. Nevertheless until late 1960s, Britain 
still provided over 65 per cent of the total foreign private investment in India, 
nearly half of it in traditional industries of West Bengal.  Out of 85 jute mills 
in Calcutta 37 mills functioned with British collaboration till late 1960s. Coal 
mining and tea  plantations  though mostly passed onto Indian hands but 
some control was still enjoyed by British entrepreneurs till late 1960s. (Vaid, 
1972, p. 159) As a consequence even in the 1970s the Bengal Chamber of 
Commerce was almost completely staffed by Scotsmen in the higher ranks 
of its administration. (Rothermund, 2004, forthcoming) A country wise break 
up of the foreign collaboration in India for the year 1963-64 indicated that 
United kingdom alone owned 165 firms in India out of the total 369. Most of 
the British investments and subsidies went finally to eastern India, 
particularly West Bengal. Number of foreign collaborations as by the late 
1960s in West Bengal was 369 which was  next to only Maharsatra (756) as 
against total of 1,710. (Vaid, 1972, pp. 168-169) 
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Apart from dominance of foreign owned firms West Bengal is also marked 
by the dominance of public sector. On the whole public sector and 
government run undertakings together constitute a significant portion of the 
total capital invested and employment in industry of West Bengal resulting 
in over laboraisation and negative profitability for considerably longer 
period. However, public sector undertakings generally operate under the 
social motive of employment generation and both by virtue of nature of 
industrial structure and its acknowledged weak management practices they 
have to bear high overhead emoluments for each employee and as a result 
fail to generate profit. (Gangopadhyay, 1996, p. 269) 
 
An estimation indicates that emoluments per employee in public sector in 
1986-87 was about 40 per cent higher than that in private sectors. 
Furthermore, public sector is marked by higher level of productive capital 
per employee than the private sectors i.e.,  the productive capital per 
employee was nearly three and half times higher than that of private 
sectors. High capital intensity in public sectors, however, does not 
necessarily lead to higher profitability. Public sectors generated only Rs. 
0.07 to serve a rupee of productive capital as against Rs. 0.27 in private 
sectors during the same period. (Satia & Cowlagi, 1993, p. 170) 
 
In nutshell it can be concluded that Marwari enterprises, public sectors and 
foreign companies, together owned most of the industries in West Bengal. 
All three groups are mainly outsiders and they do not seem to take any 
interest in social, political and general development of the States beyond 
their business interests. Furthermore, dominance of Marwari enterprises is 
said to have some direct negative impact on the State’s well being. While in 
the federal structure of India, regional capitalists play greater role in 
attracting share of public investments by influencing government policies. 
Marwaris located in West Bengal neither can be the true representative of 
the State nor they have any organic attachment to the State.94  
 
Dominance of foreign companies or big business houses on the other hand 
posed problems in obtaining industrial licenses for substantial expansion of 
existing units or setting up new units for big business houses particularly 
during the era of inward looking strategy followed in India until the inception 
of New Economic Policy,1991. As a part of inward looking strategy growth 
of foreign investment, expansion of large business houses were restricted 
under the Monopoly Restrictions Trade and Practices Act (MRTP), 1970 
and Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA) (Year). In addition to that 
                                                          
94 In this context we may aptly recall one comment made by Banerjee (1995) could be 
relevant. “The Marwari capitalists who replaced the British had neither the legitimacy nor 
the hegemonic position to be the representative of the region. They could neither identify 
with nor project the aspirations of the region before the central government.....In contrast, 
the emergence of an integrated and indigenous capitalist class in western India has 
provided a boost to the development process of the region. Their hegemonic presence has 
enabled the region to articulate its aspirations before the Union Government. As a result, 
within the federal structure it has attracted more public resources for its development.“ 
(Banerjee, D, industrialisation Programme in West Bengal: Policy and the Problems-Some 
Lessons from Newly Industrialising Countries in Asia, Occasional Paper 149, Centre for 
Studies in Social Sciences, Calcutta, June, 1995 p.3 ) 
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export based industries mostly situated in West Bengal suffered from lack of 
incentives and the absence of any definite export promotion policy during 
the pre-reform period. This area will be dealt with in detail in the later part of 
this study. Lastly, dominance of public enterprises in West Bengal on the 
whole resulted in an enclave type industrial development and not only failed 
to have any spread effect but also by generating least surpluses had further 
negative impact on the industrial scenario of the State. 
 
Policy variables 
 
Freight Equalisation Policy  
 
Freight equalisation policy was introduced in 1956. The Centre equalised 
the railway freights of iron, steel and coal all over the country. This said to 
have robbed away the comparative regional advantage of the mineral-rich 
eastern region. But the freight equalisation policy was not introduced for raw 
materials like cotton and oilseed. West Bengal had a sizeable cotton textile 
industry and host of industries based on oilseeds. Most of these raw 
materials had to be imported from other regions. The cotton mill owners of 
the State raised their voice against this Policy and complained that  cotton 
mills in this State turned sick as heavy freight has to be paid for raw 
material to be bought from Gujarat and Maharastra.95 (Nag,1988, p. 52) 
Therefore, the net result of this selective introduction of freight equalisation 
was that the principal advantages of the eastern region have been taken 
away including West Bengal’s without giving anything in return. Ray and 
Sato (1987) are of the opinion that due to this selective freight equalisation 
policy West Bengal’s industries were compelled to sacrifice their interest for 
ensuring the prosperity of industries in the western region, notably 
Maharastra. Later on the Central government appointed two committees, 
the Marathe Committee and Pande Committee to examine this matter. 
These Committees recommended  phase out of the policy of selective 
freight equalisation and telescopic rate. In practice the recommendation has 
not been carried out. (Ray & Sato, 1987, p. 132) However freight 
equalisation policy was abolished in January 1992 as a part of the New 
Economic Policy.  
 
Import substitution policy 
 
Another feature which affected the export-oriented industries in West 
Bengal was the doctrine of import substitution policy followed by India as 
part of the self-sufficient, heavy industry based, inward looking model 
pursued after Independence. No major incentive was offered to the export 
based industries until much later. In fact there were times when jute industry 
had to pay an export tax. In contrast domestic industries catering to the 
                                                          
95 However, Mr. S.N. Hada, President of the Bengal Mill Owners Association said ” 
...whereas the mills in Ahmedabad and Bombay were given freight concession on 
movement of raw cotton, the mills in the eastern region were not. Whatever concessions 
were enjoyed by the mills in West Bengal, Assam and Orissa till 1971 were withdrawn that 
year and railway freight charges went up by 50 per cent. As a result about 18 mills in West 
Bengal became sick and had to be taken over by the Government.” (Quoted in West 
Bengal The Travail Continues, The Bengal Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Calcutta, 
1975, p. 26) 
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internal market were patronised and were protected by different tariffs and 
quantitative restrictions. Surplus capital generated in mainly the export-
oriented industries was thus siphoned off for the benefit of domestic 
industries during the pre-economic reform in India following the doctrine of 
import substitution policy as against export promotion. (Bagchi, 1998, 
p.2976) It was observed by Banerjee (1998) that import substitution policy 
was not complete substantially before the beginning of 1960s. Therefore, 
until the early 1960s export sector of West Bengal managed to expand. 
(Banerjee, 1998, p.3068) But afterwards West Bengal’s export oriented 
industries became a victim of import substitution policy while not export 
promotion. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In sum it can be said that deep-seated structural constraints tended to 
render the industries situated in the State more recession prone, less 
dynamic having low potential for further expansion. Intra-State imbalance 
and over-concentration of industries in small areas of the State while 
leaving vast areas virtually under-exploited and under-utilised led to severe 
infrastructural problem from which the State is yet to recover. Among other 
important infrastructural bottlenecks low growth rate of agriculture until the 
early 1980s in the State posed considerable problem for industrial 
expansion too. Narrow based industrial structure of the State with lack of 
diversification of industrial products are either made the industries of the 
State dependent on export market (Jute and tea) or on the Central 
government’s orders and policies (engineering industries and coal). That 
however, made these industries severely recession prone. Such lack of 
adaptability and rigidity in the industrial structure of West Bengal prevented 
the State from making change in the production pattern and  the State  was 
left far behind by other industrially developed States who managed to 
change their production structure in favour of consumer based industries 
over the past decades.  
 
Therefore, prolonged industrial stagnation, lack of dynamism and negative 
profitability made increasing number of industries sick in the State which 
made it difficult to attract adequate fresh investment in this region. Thus low 
economic potential, low economic activities resulted in low demand for bank 
credit and hence low disbursement along with low level financial assistance 
by the Centrally controlled financial institutions, all had dampening effect on 
the industrial scenario of the State. Moreover, in a federal structure like 
India regional capitalists have always played an important role in attracting 
major share of private as well as of public investment by influencing the 
Central government’s policies. West Bengal compared to other States 
lacked such a regionally committed industrial class. And neither the State 
had any considerable influence on the Centre for attracting public 
investment nor the capacity of diverting private capital through the industrial 
licensing system.  
 
Having analysed the problem of the State belonging to eastern region and 
State specific structural problem which inhibited West Bengal from being 
favoured in the existing federal structure, we will like to turn on to the area 
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of the problem generally the State faced on account of belonging to the 
Indian federation and also to the middle and poor income category. Now it 
remains to be seen how far such complaint against two multiple resource 
transfer institutions namely the Finance Commission and the Planning 
Commission  and Centrally controlled financial institutions are valid in terms 
of State specific discrimination particularly directed against West Bengal. 
And how far such discrimination is a part of the regressive structure of the 
federal fiscal relations in India which has so far failed to minimise regional 
imbalance. As a matter of fact such resource transfer favoured the richer 
States more than the poorer States. It remains to be seen whether being a 
middle income State, West Bengal has been part of this regional 
discrimination or it has been subject to State-specific politically motivated 
discrimination on account of the political and ideological differences of the 
ruling party of the State in the post Left Front era from the ruling parties in 
the Centre. That will be discussed in the chapter 4 of this study.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 
 
 
 
Table: 1 
Public Finance of Different Regions in India Between 1980-81 and 1990-91 
 
Surplus and deficit 
as percentage of 
aggregate receipts of 
respective year  
Region Percentage share 
of  
total own tax 
revenue in 1989-
90 
Expenditure on 
revenue 
account * 
Expenditure on 
capital 
account** 
1980-81 1990-91 
Percentage 
share of 
total debt in 
1989-90*** 
Eastern 15.2 
 
18.1 7.4 -4.8 -1.4 24.4 
Western & 
Central 
31.9 16.8 10.4 -3.3 -0.2 23.6 
Northern 22.1 19.2 11.7  2.7 -0.3 32.0 
Southern 30.8 16.5 8.9 -2.1 -0.3 20.0 
All India  100 17.6 9.7 -1.8 -0.5 100.0 
Source: Eastern India the Complete Data Base, Bengal Chamber of Commerce & 
Industry, 1993 
* Percentage annual growth over 1980-81 to 1990-91 
** percentage annul growth over 1980-81 to 1990-91 
*** Total debt of the States consists of Central loan, market loans & bonds, advances from 
RBI, loans from banks & institutions, loans from Provident Fund, loans from Reserve Fund 
deposit   
 
 
 
Table: 2 
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Percentage share of expenditure on 
research and  development by the 
State governments  
Regions Percentage share of 
total investment in 
State public sector 
undertaking in 1990 
Percentage 
share of total 
investment in 
co-operative 
institutions in 
1989-90 
1980-81 1990-91 
Eastern 20.82 21.63 16.1 10.53 
Western and 
Central 
15.77 27.29 31.8 39.55 
Northern 34.57 23.13 24.9 27.27 
Southern 28.84 27.95 27.2 22.65 
All India 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: Eastern India the Complete Data Base, Bengal Chamber of Commerce & Industry, 
1993 
 
 
 
 
Table: 3 
Bank Facilities in  Different Regions in India  
Regions Total number of  
bank offices 
Bank offices 
per lakh of 
population 
Percentage  of 
advances to total 
deposits by scheduled 
commercial banks 
Percentage all India  
share of 
disbursements of 
loans by term lending 
institutions* 
 1969 1992 1992 1969 1992 1980-81 1990-91 
Eastern 970 13,070 5.9 86.8 49,9 13.2 8.4 
Western & 
Central 
2,314 13,655 7.3 81.5 60.2 36.8 45.0 
Northern 2,021 17,750 7.2 53.9 54.6 21.2 20.2 
Southern 3,016 16,205 8.1 99.8 80.2 28.8 26.4 
All India 8,321 60,680 7.0 77,9 61.0 100.00 100.00 
Source: Eastern India the Complete Data Base, Bengal Chamber of Commerce & Industry, 
1993 
*Industrial Development Bank of India (IDBI) Industrial  IFCI, ICCI 
 
  
Table: 4 
Labour & Productivity of Different Regions in India 
 
Value added per person 
employed in the  
manufacturing sector (Rs.) 
Value of output per person  
employed in the 
 Manufacturing sector (Rs.) 
Fixed capital per person 
employed in the  
manufacturing sector (Rs.)  
Region 
1948-49 1968-69 1987-88 1948-49 1968-69 1987-88 1948-49 1968-69 1987-88 
Eastern 1499 5854 37920 5,799 26,130 169, 749 1,319 23,038 110,771 
Western 
& Central 
2,365 8,468 47,056 5,819 37,174 253,016 981 21,435 118,182 
Northern 1,795 6,863 31,885 5,942 31,858 193,545 1,163 27,905 108,324 
Southern 1,514 6,704 28,066 5,717 28,070 161,576 1,060 22,059 71,127 
All India 1,859 7,027 36,320 5,808 31,032 197,376 1,146 23,034 100,894 
Source: Eastern India the Complete Data Base, Bengal Chamber of Commerce & Industry, 
1993  
 
 
Table: 5 
Percentage of Total  Licenses Issued in Different Regions Between 1965 and1990 
Region 1965* 1973** 1987 1990 
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Eastern  25.4 9.8 10.38 9.04 
Western & 
Central  
35.9 44.3 38.66 37.21 
Northern  16.8 21.1 22.46 25.33 
Southern  21.9 24.8 28.50 28.42 
All India 100.00 100,00 100.00 100.00 
Source: Eastern India the Complete Data Base, Bengal Chamber of Commerce & 
Industry, 1993  
*, **For 1965 & 1973 see: West Bengal- The Travail Continues, The Bengal Chamber of Commerce 
& Industry, 1975, pp.  81 
 
Table: 6 
Relative Economic Growth Propensity and  Income of the Eastern Region From the 
Manufacturing Sector Between 1968-69 and 1978-79 
 
Year Relative 
Economic 
Growth 
Propensity of the 
Eastern Region 
(Per cent)  
Income of the 
Eastern Region 
From the 
Manufacturing 
Sector (Index) 
1968-69 28.9 100 
1969-70 18.4 -- 
1970-71 18.0 86 
1971-72 18.1 86 
1972-73 18.3 89 
1973-74 17.7 91 
1974-75 17.9 91 
1975-76 17.5 92 
1976-77 17.4 105 
1977-78 17.4 108 
1978-79 16.5 110 
1979-80 16.4 109 
1980-81 17.3 115 
1981-82 16.6 123 
1982-83 15.9 127 
1983-84 14.6 132 
1984-85 14.2 131 
Source: Sau, S.N, ‚ Economics of Calcutta-Haldia Port  
Complex‘, EPW, May 5-12, 1990, p. 1021 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table: 7 
Installed Capacity of Power of Eastern Region Vis-a-Vis Other Regions of India Between 1951  
and 1980 
(per cent) 
                             Capacity Installed (MW) Region 
1951 1961 1973 1980 
Increase from 1951 to 
1980 
(Per cent) 
Eastern  Region 34.5 26.8 22.4 16.3 724 
Southern Region 20.4 19.6 25.0 29.9 2234 
Northern Region 24.3 29.4 24.9 27.7 1734 
Western Region 20.8 24.2 27.7 26.1 1900 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 1407 
Source: Sau, S.N, ‚ Economics of Calcutta-Haldia Port Complex‘, EPW, May 5-12, 1990, p. 
1023 
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Table: 8 
Annual Exponential Growth Rates of Agricultural Production and Yield Per Hectare in Indian 
States 1952-79 
 
        Annual Exponential Growth Rate                     State and Region 
Production Yield Per Hectare 
Eastern Region Bihar 1.67 1.13 
 Orissa 1.40 0.14 
 West Bengal 1.85 0.89 
Western Region Maharastra 1.83 1.53 
 Gujarat 2.83 2.73 
 Madhya Pradesh 1.09 0.36 
 Rajasthan 2.24 1.27 
 Punjab 4.28 3.10 
 Uttar Pradesh 1.96 1.55 
Southern Region Tamil Nadu 2.13 1.89 
 Karnataka 2.38 2.32 
 Kerala 2.36 1.54 
 Andhra Pradesh 1.84 1.71 
All India  2.35 1.72 
Source: Sau, S.N, ‚ Economics of Calcutta-Haldia Port Complex‘, EPW, May 5-12, 1990, p. 
1023 
 
Table: 9 
Value Added Per Employee in Manufacturing Sector (Census Sector) in 1965 
(In Rs.) 
 
States Engineering Non-
Engineering 
All Industries 
West Bengal 5,213 3,558 4,211 
Maharastra 5,003 5,543 5,379 
Tamil Nadu 4,938 4,100 4,342 
India 5,015 3,946 4,266 
Source: West Bengal AnAnalytical Study, The Bengal Chamber of Commerce  
& Industry, Oxford & IBH Publishing Co. New Delhi, 1971, p. 94 
 
Table: 10 
Value Added Per Employee West Bengal and India Between 1959 and 1965 
(In Rs.) 
                     West Bengal                        India  
1959 1965 Percentage 
Increase 
1959 1965 Percentage 
Increase 
Engineering 
Industry 
3,322 5,213 156,9 3,442 5,015 145.7 
All Industries 2,833 4,211 148,6 2,824 4,266 150.0 
Source: West Bengal An Analytical Study, The Bengal Chamber of Commerce  
& Industry, Oxford & IBH Publishing Co. New Delhi, 1971, p. 95 
 
 
 
 
Table: 11 
Capital-Output and Capital-Labour Ratio  (Census Sector) in 1965  
 
 Engineering Non-Engineering All industries 
Productive capital per Rs.    
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1,000 of value added 
West Bengal 3,430 3,252 3,340 
Maharastra 2,357 2,574 2,512 
Tamil Nadu 2,509 3,859 3,415 
India 3,651 3,782 3,736 
Productive capital per 
employee 
   
West Bengal 17,884 11,573 14,060 
Maharastra 11,790 14,266 13,513 
Tamil Nadu 12,390 15,822 14,830 
India 18,312 14,921 15,938 
Source:  West Bengal An Analytical Study, The Bengal Chamber of Commerce & Industry,  
1971, p. 95 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table: 12 (a) 
State-wise Growth Rates of Output, Employment and Productivity (1951-81)  
 
                        Overall                Secondary Sector States 
Output Employment Productivity Output Employment Productivity
Andhra 
Pradesh 
2.98 2.33 0.63 4.65 2.04 2.56 
Assam-
Meghalaya 
3.29 2.41 0.86 4.07 2.95 1.09 
Bihar 3.14 2.12 1.00 4.74 4.00 0.71 
Gujarat 3.46 2.47 0.96 4.77 3.04 1.68 
Kerala 3.01 2.00 0.99 3.83 2.57 1.23 
Madhya 
pradesh 
2.91 2.04 0.85 4.35 2.46 1.85 
Maharastra 4.30 2.16 2.10 5.14 3.06 2.02 
Karnataka 3.63 2.51 1.09 4.82 2.70 2.07 
Orissa 2.93 2.02 0.89 3.89 2.30 1.57 
Punjab-
Haryana 
4.49 2.08 2.36 6.05 3.63 2.34 
Rajasthan 3.07 2.02 1.03 3.05 2.10 0.93 
Tamil Nadu 3.67 2.44 1.21 5.19 3.03 2.10 
Uttar 
Pradesh 
2.42 1.52 0.89 4.07 1.54 2.50 
West 
Bengal 
2.53 2.17 0.36 3.18 2.36 0.80 
Average 3.31 2.08 1.20 4.58 2.61 1.92 
Source: Mathur, A, ‘Why Growth Rates Differ’ Within India: An Alternative Approach, The 
Journal of Development Studies, Vo.23,  No. 2, January 1987, p. 169 
 
 
Table: 12 (b) 
Sector-wise Decomposition of Growth (1951-81)-A Regional Analysis 
 
                Overall Economy                 Secondary Sector  
L S T I L(1)  S(1) T(1) I (1) 
Andhra 
Pradesh 
70.5 1.0 13.6 14.9 34.1 -2.8 39.0 29.7 
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Assam-
Meghalaya 
63.3 1.2 13.0 21.8 44.9 7.5 16.6 31.0 
Bihar 57.3 7.2 12.9 22.7 29.2 24.2 7.8 38.8 
Gujarat 61.0 0.3 17.7 21.1 35.4 6.0 21.2 37.4 
Kerala 56.8 -1.2 22.4 22.1 38.9 8.7 21.2 31.2 
Madhya 
pradesh 
60.9 4.3 14.3 20.5 32.1 5.1 28.2 34.5 
Maharastra 35.4 2.2 29.3 33.2 25.6 8.6 23.5 42.2 
Karnataka 57.6 0.7 17.9 23.8 35.5 1.8 27.3 35.4 
Orissa 59.7 -0.4 23.6 17.1 38.2 4.0 27.6 30.2 
Punjab-
Haryana 
31.3 0.4 36.4 31.9 17.8 11.8 20.9 49.7 
Rajasthan 55.7 0.6 23.1 20.7 56.1 1.8 21.8 20.4 
Tamil Nadu 54.0 0.6 20.0 25.3 29.5 5.4 24.3 40.8 
Uttar 
Pradesh 
54.6 -1.5 32.7 14.3 24.7 0.2 47.4 27.6 
West Bengal 80.8 -2.3 15.2 6.3 58.2 3.6 17.4 20.9 
Source: Mathur, A, ‘Why Growth Rates Differ’ Within India: An Alternative Approach, The 
Journal of Development Studies, Vo.23,  No. 2, January 1987, p. 178 
 
L-Percentage contribution of Labour to growth in over all economy 
L(1)- Percentage contribution of Labour to growth in secondary sector 
S- Percentage contribution of Structural Change to growth in over all economy 
S(1)- Percentage contribution of Structural Change to growth in Secondary Sector 
T- Percentage contribution of Technology to growth in over all economy 
T(1)- Percentage contribution of Technology to growth in secondary sector 
I-Percentage contribution of Interaction Effect to growth in over all economy 
I(1)- Percentage contribution of Interaction Effect to growth in secondary sector 
 
 
 
 
Table: 13 
All India Changes in the Weights of Major Industrial Groups Between 1946 and 1978 
Input based 
Classification 
1946=100 1960=100 1965=100 1970=100 1978=100 
Agro-based  66.55 44.08 34.74 33.68 28.4 
Metal-based 9.30 18.55 24.71 21.93 22.7 
Chemical based 4.92 8.94 8.91 12.86 15. 5 
Source: Banerjee, D, Indian Industrial Growth and Corporate Sector Behaviour in West 
Bengal 1947-97, EPW, November 21, 1998, p. 3068 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table: 14 
Relative Growth Propensity of Traffic of Calcutta-Haldia Port Between  
1968-69 and 1984-85 
 
           Total Traffic ( in Million Tones) Year 
Calcutta-Haldia 
Port 
All Major Ports 
Relative Growth 
Propensity of 
Traffic of 
Calcutta-Haldia 
port  (per cent) 
1968-69 7.96 55.09 14.4 
1969-70 6.90 54.51 12.7 
1970-71 6.01 55.58 10.8 
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1971-72 7.30 59.01 12.4 
1972-73 6.68 58.26 11.5 
1973-74 6.32 63.66 09.9 
1974-75 7.50 65.74 11.4 
1975-76 7.70 66.20 11.6 
1976-77 8.00 68.20 11.7 
1977-78 7.81 66.77 11.7 
1978-79 7.98 71.04 11.2 
1979-80 8.80 79.90 11.0 
1980-81 9.51 81.32 11.7 
1981-82 9.92 87.98 11.3 
1982-83 10.69 93.70 11.4 
1983-84 10.47 100.60 10.4 
1984-85 10.52 107.80 9.8 
Source: Sau, S.N, Economics of Clacutta-Haldia Port Complex,  
EPW, May 5-12, 1990, p. 1021 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Table: 15 
Registered Working Factories in West Bengal by Districts Between 1957 and 1967 
Districts                   1957                  1967 
 Number  Percentage Number Percentage 
Calcutta & 24-
Paraganas 
1802 52.84 3299 58.31 
Howrah & Hoogly 791 23.20 1359 24.01 
Burdwaman 125 3.67 208 3.68 
11 Other Districts 692 20.29 792 14.00 
Total 3410 100.00 5,658 100.00 
Source:  West Bengal An Analytical Study, The Bengal Chamber of Commerce & Industry,  
1971, p. 181 
 
 
Table: 16 
Registered Factory Employment in West Bengal Between 1951 & 1966  
                                                           (No. In Lakhs) 
Districts                           1951                           1966 
   Number Percentage Number Percentage 
Calcutta & 24-
Paraganas 
3.75 57.2 4.45 52.9 
Howrah & Hoogly 1.92 29.3 2.53 28.9 
Burdwaan 0.40 6.1 0.77 9.2 
11 Other Districts 0.48 7.4 0.65 9.0 
Total 6.55 100.00 8.40 100.00 
Source:  West Bengal An Analytical Study, The Bengal Chamber of Commerce & Industry,  
1971, p.47 
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Table: 17 
Rate of Growth of Power of the Installed Capacity Between 1951 and 1966-67  and  
Number of Villages Electrified in West Bengal 
 
States 1951 
(‘000KW) 
1966-67 
(‘000KW) 
Percentage 
Increase 
Number of 
Villages 
Electrified as 
on 31.3.67 
Andhra Pradesh 59 427 623.7 4,472 
Assam 3 161 5,266.7 105 
Bihar 47 147 212.8 4,523 
Gujarat 142 676 376.0 2,246 
Jammu & Kashmir 6 36 500.0 641 
Kerala 33 365 1,006.1 1,805 
Madhya Pradesh 39 377 866.7 1,292 
Madras 155 1,381 791.0 7,406 
Maharastra 339 1,455 329.2 5,970 
Mysore 115 461 300.9 4,836 
Orissa 5 318 6,260.0 631 
Punjab & Haryana 71 919 1,194.4 4,924 
Rajasthan 31 307 890.3 1,687 
Uttar Pradesh 200 925 362.5 9,887 
West Bengal 546 1,207 121.1 1,355 
Total 1,835 10,246 458,4 54,082 
Source: Memorandum Submitted to Fifth Finance Commission, Government of West Bengal, 
1969, p. 17 
 
 
Table: 18 
Index of Industrial Production for West Bengal and India Between  
1964 and 1970 (Base: 1963 = 100) 
 
 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 
West 
Bengal 
106.6 112.8 104.8 103.1 104.3 99.3 94.2 
India 108.6 118.6 117.7 116.7 124.2 133.0 139.3 
Source: Bose, D.K, “The Engineering Industry in West Bengal” in Sen, A; Banerjee N & 
Bannerjee, N (ed.) Problem of the Economy & Planning in West Bengal, Proceedings of a 
Symposium held on 24th to 27th February 1974, Centre for Social Studies in Social Science, 
Calcutta, 1975,  p. 165 
 
Table: 19 
State Plan Expenditures by Major Heads of Development During 
Third (1961-66) and Fourth Five Year Plan (1969-74) 
(Rs. in Crores) 
Head of Development Third Five Year Plan 
1961-66 
Fourth Five Year Plan 
(Provision) 1969-74 
Agriculture and allied 
programme 
37.54 59.04 
Co-operative and community 
development 
16.56 9.67 
Irrigation and power 92.52 110.28 
Industry and mining 25.12 14.98 
Transport and communication 26.20 15.67 
Social services 100.50 69.08 
Miscellaneous 6.51 44.36 
Total 304.75 323.08 
 171
Source: Bose, D.K, “The Engineering Industry in West Bengal” in Sen, A; Banerjee N & 
Bannerjee, N (ed.) Problem of the Economy & Planning in West Bengal, Proceedings of a 
Symposium held on 24th to 27th February 1974, Centre for Social Studies in Social Science, 
Calcutta, 1975,  p. 167 
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Chapter: 4 
 
Distributive Injustice to West Bengal by the Centre or Just 
a Case of Regional Imbalance? 
 
The problem faced by a particular State being a part of the Indian 
federation which has centripetal bias and being a State belonging to the 
middle income State would be discussed in this chapter. Indian federation 
from the very outset suffered from over-centralisation of fiscal power 
leaving the States with insufficient economic resources while entrusting 
upon huge expenditure mainly related to social and welfare services. One 
estimate shows that while the Centre managed to retain almost two third of 
the total revenue raised in the country leaving only one third to the States. 
In contrast, distribution of expenditure is almost equally divided between 
the Centre and the States. (Ray, 1992, p. 148). Contrary to the usual belief 
that more the economy becomes free from the government’s control the 
more decentralisation trend would be apparent in the federal structure, 
New Economic Policy (NEP) pursued since 1991 with the main thrust on 
de-regularisation and de-control of the economy, seems to have increased 
such centralising tendency of the Indian federal structure further. 
 
Needless to say all States, irrespective of their economic status, belonging 
to the Indian federation have been facing the above mentioned negative 
impact of  imbalance of fiscal power between the Centre and the States. 
But the States belonging to middle income and low income groups have 
added disadvantages. They seem to have further affected by the 
retrogressive trend of the inter-se resource allocation among the States. 
Thus there has been a distinct trend of unequal allocation of Central 
resources among the States  and which is often tilted heavily towards the 
richer ones.  
 
Regional imbalance of India can be traced as far back as to the pre-
Independence period. Different land revenue systems and public 
expenditure policies of British India, as we have earlier mentioned, shaped 
the journey towards future development for different regions in India. And 
such developments taking place at unequal pace resulted in regional 
disparities. After Independence one of the main objectives of the Finance 
Commission and the Planning Commission  was to eradicate this inter-State 
imbalance. Regional disparities not only remained pre-dominant feature in 
the Indian federation but also has been increasing over time despite such 
avowed objectives.  
 
Pioneering studies undertaken by Rao (1981), covering the period 1956-65 
and Geroge & Gulati (February 16, 1985) covering the period 1951-80 
concluded that the federal transfers as a whole did not have a mitigating 
influence on the regional inequalities in India. And neither the statutory 
transfer nor the non-statutory transfers, when taken separately, were aimed 
at reducing socio-economic backwardness of the States. Consequently the 
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transfer of resources from the Centre to the States failed to live up to the 
objective of reducing regional inequalities. Different micro studies (Grewal, 
1974, Ansari, 1983; Prasad, 1988; Ramalingom & Kurup, 1991; Shukla & 
Roy Chowdhry,1992; Dandekar, 1993; Sarker, 1994; Murty, 1994; 
Chakraborty, 1998; Chakraborty, 1999; Kurian, 2000) undertaken from time 
to time came to the similar conclusion. 
 
George & Gulati (February 16, 1985) observed that Centre-State flows was 
not equitable and this unfortunately was truer the greater was the discretion 
enjoyed by the Centre. Resource transfers made by the Finance 
Commission i.e., the statutory transfers accounted for only 2/5th of the 
aggregate budgetary transfers. Remaining 3/5th of the Central transfers to 
the States was made by the Planning Commission and the Union Ministers 
and these transfers have a high discretionary component. (George & Gulati, 
February 16, 1985, p. 290) Recent studies pursued by Rao & Sen (1996), 
Prakash (1994) have made similar observation that increasing proliferation 
of non-statutory transfers and consequent decline of statutory transfers 
have resulted in further regional imbalance.96  
 
Centralisation of resources in the hands of the Centre was legitimised on 
the plea that it would eventually ensure equity in the inter-State distribution 
of resources. The relative shares of the three channels of Central transfers 
namely statutory transfers through the Finance Commission, Plan transfers 
through the Planning Commission and discretionary transfers through 
Centrally sponsored schemes by Central Ministers over the period 1956-81 
is presented in the table 1 (see Appendix). As it is evident, the low income 
States as a group have always received relatively lower than average per 
capita transfers of all three types than the middle and rich income category 
States. (George & Gulati, February 16,  1985, p. 294) 
 
The States from 1960-61 to 1986-87 were ranked according to the 
combined score and presented in table 2 (see Appendix) which shows that 
over time the relative positions of some States have been continuously 
declining while other States made rapid progress eventually widening the 
regional disparity. Roughly speaking, West Bengal was classified under the 
high income States until the early 1970s when it ranked among the first five 
most developed States. And thereafter in accordance with its deteriorated 
                                                          
96 The share of transfers recommended by the Finance Commission i.e.,  statutory 
transfers in the total current transfers declined from about 65 per cent during the Fourth 
Five Year Plan (1969-74) to just little over 60 per cent in the Seventh Five Year Plan (1985-
90) and in 1992-93 58.9  per cent. Furthermore, the formula based transfers given by the 
Finance Commission and the Planning Commission declined drastically from 85 per cent in 
the Fifth Plan to 78 per cent during the Seventh Plan and  slightly increased to 79.8 in 
1992-93.  The most striking feature is the proliferation of non-formula based transfers. The 
non-formula based transfers particularly for Central sector and Centrally sponsored 
schemes have shown a substantial increase from 11.6 per cent during the Fourth Plan to 
18.0 percent during Seventh Plan and slightly declined to 17.4 per cent in 1992-93. This 
indicates an increasing degree of discretion exercised by the Central government. As we 
have noted earlier, the more the importance of discretionary transfer the grater would be 
inequitable transfers from the Centre to the States. (Rao, M.G & Sen, T.K, Fiscal 
Federalism in India Theory and Practice, 1996, Macmillan India Ltd. New Delhi,  p. 136)  
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position, it started being categorised under the middle income States 
though it varied from one study to another. The ranking of the State 
registered gradual and drastic downslide over the period from 1960-61 to 
1986-87. The State’s ranking went on steadily sliding down from the third 
position in 1960-61 to the fifth position in 1970-71 to the sixth position in 
1980-81 to the seventh position in 1984-85 and the ninth position by 1986-
87. Contrary to that Punjab, Gujarat, Maharastra and also four Southern 
States (Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, Tamil Nadu) were able to 
improve their position over the period.97  
 
West Bengal belonging to the rich income category until the early 1970s 
managed to enjoy the benefit of all types of the federal fiscal transfers of 
India which had a distinctive trend of discriminating against the backward 
States. The study undertaken by George & Gulati (February 16, 1985) 
covering the period 1956-81 revealed that West Bengal managed to receive 
higher per capita transfers of two types i.e., statutory transfers (Rs. 524) 
and discretionary transfers (Rs. 486) than average per capita statutory 
transfers (Rs. 471) and discretionary transfers (Rs. 449) of all high income 
States taken together. The study indicates that the State also managed to 
receive higher per capita statutory transfers (Rs. 516) and per capita 
discretionary transfers (Rs. 380) than the average of all States taken 
together including low and middle income States. The State was only 
lagging behind in terms of per capita Plan transfers. Per capita average 
Plan transfers for other high income States (Rs. 338),  the middle income 
States (Rs. 436) and the low income States (Rs. 398) was higher than West 
Bengal (Rs. 314) during the above mentioned period (table 1 see 
Appendix). The reasons behind such low Plan transfers is not difficult to 
seek. Plan transfers to the State and hence total Plan outlay depends on 
the capability of the own resource mobilisation of the State. We will dealt 
with this area in detail in later part of this study  to show that the resource 
mobilisation potential of West Bengal was always quite low compared to the 
other high income States.      
 
Transfers made by the Finance Commissions 
 
The transfers made by the Finance Commission i.e., statutory transfers 
could be considered. In pursuance of the study of politics of discrimination 
we can divide the period into two phases; one until the late 1970s the period 
                                                          
97There is a drastic change of position in the ranking hierarchy for some States. Punjab 
continued to occupy the first position in the development list and Bihar occupied the last 
position for all the years. Gujarat which was at the 7th position in 1960-61 continued to 
improve its position and came to the 3rd position by 1984-85.  Maharastra was at the 5th 
position in 1960-61and came to the 2nd  position in 1970-71 and in remained at 4th position 
between 1984-85 and 1986-87. In contrast the decline of Assam, and West Bengal is 
noteworthy. Assam, which occupied the 4th position in 1960-61 came down to the 11th 
position by 1970-71 and to the 14th position just above Bihar between 1980-81 and 1984-
85. Thus, “the top positions in the development hierarchy were occupied by Punjab and 
Haryana where agriculture and small industry dominated and they were followed by two 
urban industry based States, Gujarat and Maharastra.... The next four positions were 
occupied by four southern States-Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Kerala, and Andhra Pradesh in 
that order. The remaining seven position were occupied by the less developed States 
starting with West Bengal ending with Bihar”. (Sarker, P.C,  Regional Imbalances in Indian 
Economy Over Plan Periods, EPW, March 12, 1994, p. 629) 
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under the Congress rule except for two years (1967-69). Other is from the 
late 1970s, during the period of the Left Front government. Thus, the award 
made under the First Finance Commission (1952) to the Sixth Finance 
Commission (1973) covers the pre-Left Front era while from the Seventh 
Finance Commission (1978) to the Eleventh Finance Commission (1998) 
covers the post-Left Front era. 
 
The study undertaken by Rao (1981) while examining the awards given by 
the Second Finance Commission (1957) to Fifth Finance Commission 
(1969) separately, concluded that the total federal transfers made under the 
Finance Commission were not directed towards enhancing the resources of 
the backward States so that they are enabled to keep pace with the 
developed States. On the contrary, the Commissions tended to transfer 
more resources to the developed States namely West Bengal, Maharastra, 
Gujarat and Madras. (Rao, 1981, p. 146).  The study revealed that West 
Bengal, Madras, Gujarat and Maharastra, these four developed States 
occupied the first four ranks in terms of State-wise composite index of 
development during the period between 1956-65.It is, however, noteworthy 
that West Bengal occupied the first rank in terms of the composite 
development index throughout the  benchmark period. (ibid., p. 90) We 
have already noticed from table 1 (see Appendix) that aggregate transfers 
made by the Finance Commissions i.e., statutory transfers over the period 
from 1956-81 clearly went against poor income States. West Bengal which 
belonged to the high income States managed to receive considerably 
higher amount of per capita statutory transfers compared to other States 
during the above mentioned period. (George & Gulati, February 16,  1985) 
 
Contrary to the above observations, the accusation of discrimination against 
West Bengal as far as distribution of statutory transfers was concerned 
came to the fore during the short period of the United Front government 
(1967-69) as well as during the Congress regime as we have mentioned 
before. It was complained that West Bengal was being miserably left with 
insufficient Central resource devolution recommended by the successive 
Finance Commissions. The, per capita Central resource devolution to West 
Bengal was not only lower than other States but it had also been 
decreasing over time. Table 5 of Chapter 2 (see Appendix) indicates that 
West Bengal occupied  3rd place in India in respect of per capita share of 
Central taxes and statutory grants (Article 273 and 275) in 1952-53. In 
1957-58 West Bengal’s position was 3rd but in 1962-63 it went down to the 
9th place and in 1966-67, it went further down to 11th place. (Memorandum 
Submitted to Fifth Finance Commission, GOWB, 1969, p. 13) 
 
So far in all studies on regional disparities in the Indian federation, West 
Bengal was either categorised as high income State or later on as middle 
income State. Such aggregate studies of regional imbalance consequent on 
regressive federal fiscal transfers often failed to take into account the 
distinct position of a particular State both compared to other States and 
compared to its position attained before i.e., they lacked in both cross 
section as well as time series analysis. Considering the position of West 
Bengal separately, it would be evident that even though during the first 
three decades after Independence West Bengal was far ahead of other 
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States98 and was categorised as high income State, its position in terms of 
per capita statutory transfers started declining over time both compared to 
the other high income States and compared to its previous rank.  
 
It was in this context the then Chief Minister, Mr. A. Mukerjee of the United 
Front government  complained that West Bengal was discriminated against 
while other better off States managed to have considerable surplus in their 
budget after the devolution of Central taxes and grants recommended by 
the Fifth Finance Commission (1969). Such allegation made by the West 
Bengal government was questioned by some scholars and academics 
concerned with this area99. It was argued that “the formula for distribution of 
the divisible pool of taxes among the States is based on multiple factors like 
population, respective contribution by the States, an integrated index of 
backwardness, etc. While it is possible to have reservations about some 
particular component of the formula and to seek its modifications, it is hardly 
justifiable to demand that certain State’s be deprived of their due share 
under general formula simply because they have been able to secure 
surpluses by better management of their finances. Moreover, of the seven 
surplus States (Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, Maharastra, 
Punjab, Uttar Pradesh) as referred to by Mr. Mukerjee, four States were 
awarded a smaller percentage of the divisible income tax pool and three 
States of the excise duties pool than West Bengal. The real source of 
surplus for most of the seven fortunate States lay in the relatively higher 
growth of income from their own revenue. It will be seen from the table 3 
that except Bihar the linear growth of revenue from State sources was 
higher than West Bengal in the case of all other surplus States including the 
combined position of Punjab and Haryana”. (BCCI, 1971, p. 147) (see table 
3 in Appendix) 
 
Similar trend followed during the successive Finance Commissions awards 
since the late 1970s. Therefore, West Bengal’s per capita share of 
resources disbursed through the Seventh Finance Commission (1978) was 
in the 9th position among the Indian States and which went down to the 10th 
under the Eighth Finance Commission (1984) award. Murty, 1994, pp. 44-
48) Evidently, West Bengal, being one of the middle income States, since 
the late 1970s managed to receive favourable statutory transfers compared 
to the less developed States but was not able to attain its pre-1965 position. 
In sum, Murty (1994) while examining the awards given by Second Finance 
Commission (1957) to Eighth Finance Commission (1984) concluded that 
“relatively developed and middle level States such as Maharastra, West 
Bengal and Uttar Pradesh have received higher absolute amount as well as 
percentage share compared to other States. In per capita terms also 
                                                          
98 As West Bengal in terms of per capita income of states in India ranked first between 
1950-51 and 1960-61, its position deteriorated drastically to the tenth position in 1970-71. 
Therefore, it is quite evident that economic decline of the State started pretty much earlier 
which reached its culmination during the economic recession of the late 1960s.  
 
99 For details see The Bengal Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 1971, pp. 141-145; 
Banerjee, N, “Financial Resources For West Bengal’s Development” in Bhattacharyya, D 
(ed.) Focus on West Bengal Problems and Prospects , 1972, pp. 141-157 
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relatively developed and middle level States like Punjab, Assam, Karnataka 
and West Bengal have received higher amounts. Of all the developed 
States, Maharastra has always retained comparatively higher position when 
compared to other developed States..... Less developed States like Bihar, 
Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Orissa have received smaller amount both 
in absolute as well as per capita terms. The relative position of the different 
States in the total assistance has not changed much. In conclusion, it can 
be said that the Finance Commission’s transfer have not been in favour of 
more needy and less developed States nor have they been uniformly 
distributed.” (Murty, 1994, p. 40) Shukla & Roy Chowdhry (1992) covering 
the same period also felt that even though different Finance Commissions 
were constantly in search for best criteria which was expected to benefit 
less developed States, but in practice “even the best criterion evolved by 
them had only scratched the surface of the problem of ever-widening 
regional disparities”. (Shukla & Roy Chowdhry, 1992, p. 90)  Regressive 
tendency of fiscal transfers made under the Finance Commissions said to 
have continued and aggravated since 1990s i.e., during the post- 
liberalisation period. Chakraborty (1999) reveals that all types of federal 
fiscal transfers including that of the Finance Commission during the decade 
of 1990s clearly went against the low income States and favoured high and 
the middle income States (in which West Bengal belongs to) which will be 
discussed subsequently. 
 
Of all transfers, that made by the Finance Commission is said to have less 
regressive tendency than other transfers such as Plan transfers, 
discretionary transfers and financial assistance given by the Centrally 
controlled financial institutions (including scheduled commercial banks).100 
Despite that by and large, Finance Commission’s transfer, as it was 
observed by different studies undertaken from time to time, had always 
discriminated against less developed States while favouring the forward 
States. West Bengal started its journey as a high income State and 
consequently favoured by the awards of the Finance Commissions  
compared to the other middle and low income States particularly until the 
late 1960s which is evident from the studies undertaken by Rao (1981) and 
George & Gulati (February 16, 1985). Subsequently its relative position 
deteriorated and over time the State started lagging behind in terms of not 
only Finance Commission’s transfers but also other transfers as well and 
will be evident in the subsequent part of the Study. Thus the observation is 
reinforcing the fact that over time West Bengal has fallen victim to the 
regressive trend in the existing federal fiscal transfers and was no longer 
favoured as other highly developed States. This is more true in the case of 
Plan transfer and discretionary transfers and also the financial transfers 
made by all India financial Institutions. But being a middle income State, 
West Bengal always managed to remain far ahead of other backward 
Sates.  Because there has been a clear correspondence between the level 
                                                          
100Mathur (1994) having considered several studies undertaken so far covering last few 
decades, came to the conclusion that of all transfers statutory transfers made by the 
Finance Commission has been reflecting relatively progressive nature on account of the 
fact that the Finance Commission have increasingly incorporated indicators of 
backwardness in their awards.  (Mathur, A, Regional Economic Change and Development 
Policy in India’ in Puttaswamaiah, K (Ed.) Economic Policy and Tax Reform in India, Indus 
Publishing Company, New Delhi, 1994, pp. 220-221) 
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of development and magnitude of fiscal transfers. On the contrary, there 
has been hardly any evidence of State specific, time specific and deliberate 
discrimination against the State in particular. 
 
Transfers made by the Planning Commissions 
 
Total Plan outlay of the States consists of their own resources and Central 
Plan assistance both of which depend almost exclusively on the capacity of 
additional resources mobilised by the States. In absolute terms the 
advanced States managed to raise more resources and have been able to 
finance the bulk of the Plan requirements as compared to the other poor 
and the middle income States. Thus higher amount of own resource 
mobilisation of the richer States enabled them to receive greater Central 
Plan assistance which in turn magnify their total Plan outlay compared to 
other States. Backward States, on the other hand, failed to receive 
adequate share of Central Plan assistance hence greater Plan outlays on 
account of their low  resource mobilisation. Evidently, the major factors that 
may have accentuated regional disparities are relative financial capacity 
and relative revenue base of the States which are related to the stage of 
development. (Ansari,1983, p. 2081) 
 
However, prior to the Fourth Five Year Plan (1969-74) Central assistance 
for State Plan were largely distributed on a schematic basis. Both the 
quantum of transfers and its loan grant component were discretionary. 
There was no objective criterion for inter-State allocation of Central 
assistance and it was mostly influenced by political considerations. This 
system was bound to be regressive and discriminatory while favouring the 
richer States than the poor ones. Gadgil formula was introduced in 1969 in 
order to incorporate some progressivity in the Central Plan transfers. But as 
time went on it was felt that the formula could not completely eradicate 
regressive tendency of the Central Plan transfers and hence was unable to 
ensure equity in Plan transfers. (Ramalingom & Kurup, 1991, p. 506; 
Kawadia & Kapade, 1994, p. 55) Furthermore, proliferation of the Centrally 
sponsored schemes tend to neutralise any attempt of introduction of 
progressive formula as regards Central Plan transfers. Thus, “the 
importance of the Gadgil formula itself has been progressively whittled 
down and now almost 50 per cent of the Central Plan assistance to the 
States is given outside the formula”. (George & Gulati, February 16, 1985, 
p. 290) Therefore, “the objective of equity would have been better served, 
had the quantum of Central Plan assistance increased at a higher rate. 
Instead what has been happening is that the Centre has been transferring 
an increasingly higher proportion of funds to the State in the form of 
Centrally Sponsored Schemes which today amount to as large as 80 per 
cent of the Plan assistance.” (Ramalingon & Kurup, 1991, p. 503) 
 
In an attempt to ensure more equity in Plan transfers the modified Gadgil 
formula101 was introduced from the Sixth Plan (1980-85)  which, however, 
                                                          
101 During the Fourth Plan period distribution of Central Plan assistance based on a clearly 
defined formula was adopted for the first time which was thought to achieve a fair amount 
of equity and objectivity in the matter of Plan transfers to the States. However, overall 
performance of the formula during the Fourth Plan (1969-74) and Fifth Plan (1974-79) was 
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improved the position of the poorer States in terms of per capita Central 
Plan assistance but it did not have any significant impact on per capita Plan 
outlay. Thus, in spite of a definite shift in favour of the poor States in regard 
to Central Plan transfers, the disparity between the per capita Plan outlays 
of the low income Sates and those of the high income States only 
increased. (Ramalingom & Kurup, 1991, p. 506; Kawadia & Kapade, 1994, 
pp. 55-60) 
 
One of the main reasons for the increasing disparity is that the share of 
Central assistance in the total Plan outlay has been declined continuously 
from 61.8 per cent in the First Plan to 53.0 per cent in Fourth Plan 
(Rao,1981, p.148) and to just 23.02 per cent in the Seventh Plan (Kawadia 
& Kapade 1994, p.60) In the post-liberalisation period Central assistance for 
State Plan decreased further from 12.85 per cent in 1992-93 to 11.1 per 
cent in 1997-98. (Sa´ez, 1999, p. 329) As a result low income States which 
rely relatively more on Central assistance for State Plan expenditure were 
affected severely and have had to be content with slow growth in their per 
capita Plan outlays. (Grewal, 1974, p. 80; Ansari, 1983, p. 2079;  
Ramalingom & Kurup,1991, p.506; Kawadia, & Kapade, 1994, p.60) Thus 
“during the first eighteen years of Planning the poorer States suffered in the 
absence of an objective formula to determine the Central transfer for Plan 
purposes. During the next twelve years these States continued to suffer in 
spite of the implementation of an objective formula which was not 
sufficiently progressive in itself. In any case the degree of progressivity was 
not enough to bring about progressivity in State’s Plan outlays.  In fact what 
is desired is not merely progressivity in Plan transfers but progressivity in 
Plan outlays.” (Shukla & Roy Chowdhury, 1992, p.161) 
  
Rao (1981) examining the period from Second Plan to Fourth Plan 
observed that developed States comprising Maharastra, West Bengal and 
Madras were given liberal Central assistance for Plan while backward 
States in general were denied much needed resources. (Rao, 1981, 
pp.154-155). Another macro study undertaken by George & Gulati 
(February 16, 1985) arrived at the same conclusion as we have already 
noticed. (table 1 see Appendix). Studies undertaken by Ansari (1983) 
Ramalingon & Kurup (1991) Sarker (1994) and Kawadia & Kapade (1994) 
covering last two decades were also of the same opinion that there is a 
clear correspondence between the level of development and Plan Outlay. It 
is, however, interesting to find that, as Ansari observed, the States which 
have had higher per capita Plan expenditure are also those which have a 
relatively high per capita income. (Ansari, 1983, p. 2081). It is also noticed 
that the States which received higher per capita cumulative Plan outlays 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
not satisfactory. A modified formula was introduced on the eve of the Sixth Plan (1980-85) 
responding to the collective demands from the State governments. The weightage given to 
backwardness (per capita income) was doubled and the share assigned to continuing 
irrigation and power projects was dropped. Thus, it was observed that “with the 
modification of this formula a perceptible shift in favour of the poorer States was achieved 
in regard to Central Plan transfers during the Sixth and Seventh Plan periods”. 
(Ramalingom, R & Kurup, K.N, ‘Plan Transfers to States Revised Gadgil Formula: An 
Analysis’,  EPW, March 2-9, 1991, p. 506) 
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were mainly of developed States. (Sarker,1994, p. 629)  Therefore, there is 
a strong positive association between Per Capita Plan Outlay (PCPO) and 
Per Capita Net State Domestic Product. (PCNSDP). Despite the fact that 
one of the professed goals of India’s Five Year Plans has been achieving 
balanced regional development. (Ghosh & De, 1998, p. 3045)  
 
It is worth noting in this connection that though West Bengal was grouped 
as high income State during the first three decades after Independence but 
considering its position separately,  it was found that Plan outlay allocated 
to West Bengal during the first five Plan periods i.e., from First (1951-56) to 
Fifth Plan (1974-79) i.e., during pre-Left Front era, was quite low compared 
to the other high income States (tables 4 & 5, see Appendix). For example, 
in 1960-61, during the hey day of West Bengal, the per capita Plan outlay of 
West Bengal was Rs. 102 which was quite high compared to the poor 
income States namely Bihar (Rs. 65) Rajasthan (Rs. 92) and Assam (Rs. 
86) and also the all India average (Rs. 101). But the amount was quite low 
compared to the high income States such as Gujarat (Rs. 134), Haryana 
(Rs. 168) and Punjab (Rs. 168). (table 5 see Appendix) Such declining 
trend of per capita Plan outlay of West Bengal was evident during the 
subsequent Plan periods. However, the reason behind this is not difficult to 
seek.  After comparing the tables 6 & 7 (see Appendix) we can get the clue. 
Per capita own resource mobilisation of West Bengal from the First Plan to 
Fifth Plan period was considerably lower than the high income States which 
is, as we have discussed before, the main determinant in receiving higher 
Plan outlay. However, it is worthwhile to note that per capita  Central 
assistance for Plans of the West Bengal during the First Plan (1951-56) to 
Fifth Plan (1974-79) was more or less in accordance with other high income 
States except Punjab.  
 
It is in this context, i.e.,  against the backdrop of such regional disparity of 
the Indian federation the complaint of discrimination against West Bengal in 
particular, in the allocation of lower Plan outlay compared to the high 
income States should be examined. Which was raised by the United Front 
government (1967-69) and later on by the Left Front government. (See 
Different Economic Review since 1977, GOWB). Subsequent part of the 
study will deal with this area in further detail.  
 
Such discussion, however, requires in depth analysis of different aspects 
of West Bengal’s economy. Size of Plan outlay of a particular State 
depends on the trend of quality of expenditure  (i.e., share of Plan & non-
Plan and revenue & capital expenditure) of the State, tax effort of the State 
and quality of infrastructural condition and so on. That in turn determines 
the Balance of Current Revenue (BCR) of the State.  Again BCR in turn is 
the main determinant of size of Plan outlay of a particular State. During 
1990s the State was considered as most indebted State with the highest 
level of revenue and fiscal deficit in its budget. Consequently quality of 
expenditure declined sharply  i.e., proliferation of unproductive revenue 
expenditure over capital led to low level of capital formation which further 
resulted in overall poor infrastructural development and hence low 
resource mobilisation potential. Such decline started not only during 1990s 
but also during the last two decades. The fiscal health of the State seem to 
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have further deteriorated due to persistent low level of tax effort102 and 
negligible contribution of non-tax revenue collection compared to most 
major States in India during the last two decades (for detail see chapter 6).   
 
Several studies (BCCI, 1975, Indian Chamber of Commerce, 1983; Mallick, 
1993, Centre for Monitoring of Indian Economy, March 1997: Ghosh & De, 
1998) undertaken from time to time have indicated that the relative 
infrastructural index of West Bengal has deteriorated drastically both 
compared to the other States as well as compared to its own standard 
achieved in the past. Ghosh & De (1998)  constructed a composite index of 
regional infrastructural development which is called Physical Infrastructure 
Development Index (PIDI) on the basis of varying weights to six commonly 
used representative indicators of physical infrastructure such as transport 
network (railway + road), irrigation facility, power and telephone density etc. 
It was observed that the positive association between Per Capita Net State 
Domestic Product (PCNSDP) and PIDI has been strengthened over time. 
Union government’s disbursement of funds through Five Year Plans has 
also practical relationship with PCNSDP and level of  PIDI achieved by a 
particular State.  (Ghosh & De, 1998) 
 
Thus all these factors mentioned above are inter-related and prevented 
West Bengal from any enhancement of own resource mobilisation potential 
of the State which would in turn seem to have put the State in a 
unfavourable position of receiving higher Plan outlay. As we know from 
earlier discussions that during the Pre-Left Front era in terms of almost all 
economic indicators West Bengal was on the decline which had only 
accentuated further during the post-Left Front era.  
 
Therefore, allocation of Plan outlay for different Plan periods during the 
post-Left Front era seems to have been in accordance with its resource 
raising capacity for financing Plan expenditure. During the Sixth Plan (1980-
85) West Bengal’s per capita Plan outlay was Rs. 790 as against the high 
income States namely Gujarat (Rs.1,378), Haryana (Rs.1,793), Maharastra 
(Rs.1,225) and Punjab (Rs.1,444). Although per capita Sixth Plan outlay of 
West Bengal was lower than high income States but which was 
                                                          
102 Different studies undertaken in this area indicate that West Bengal is the State with 
lowest tax effort compared to other States particularly the high and middle income States.  
Chakroborty (1998) measured the own tax effort of different States between 1980-81 and 
1992-92 when own tax-SDP ratio of West Bengal varied from 5.78 to 8.14. The variation 
of tax-SDP ratio (which is one of the most common indicators of tax effort of the State) in 
other high income States namely Maharastra,( 7.48 to 10.97) Gujarat (7.72 to 12.49) 
Karnataka (8.09 to 13.91) Tamil Nadu (8.85 to 14.41), Haryana (7.71 to 10.76) even 
Madhya Pradesh (6.30 to 8.54) and Rajasthan (5.58 to 8.85) during the same period  
seems to be much higher than West Bengal. (Chakraborty, P, ‘Growing Imbalances in 
Federal Fiscal Relationship’, EPW, February 14, 1998, p. 351) 
Coondo (2001) covering the period from 1986-87 to 1996-97 arrived at the conclusion that 
on the whole Assam, Bihar, Orissa, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal are the low own tax-
SDP ratio States. The States of south and west viz.; Karnataka, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Goa, 
Gujarat, and Maharastra constitute the group of high tax-SDP ratio States and the 
remaining States belong to medium tax-SDP ratio category. (Coondo, D & Others, 
“Relative Tax Performances Analysis for Selected States in India”, EPW, October 6, 2001) 
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considerably higher than the poor income States namely Bihar (Rs. 572),  
Orissa (Rs. 684), Uttar Pradesh (Rs. 662) and Rajasthan (Rs. 765). Even 
the per capita Plan outlay for West Bengal during Sixth Plan was much 
higher than the middle income States such as Kerala (Rs. 726), Andhra 
Pradesh (Rs. 713) and Karnataka (Rs. 773). (table 8 see Appendix)  
 
However, over time in respect of high income States the Central assistance 
as proportion of the total Plan outlay decreased from 33.08 per cent in the 
Fourth Plan to 15.17 per cent in the Sixth Plan and then slightly increased 
to 18.21 per cent during the Seventh Plan as we have mentioned earlier. 
This shows that the high income States were able to finance significantly 
higher proportion of their Plan outlay from their own sources compared to 
the low income States and hence are less dependent on the Centre. 
(Ramalingom & Kurup, 1991, p. 503) Contrary to this observation, after 
comparing the column of 1 and 3 of table 8 (see Appendix) we would notice 
an interesting phenomenon. West Bengal, (even though is grouped under 
high income States, and tend to compare itself with high income States 
while alleging of discriminatory attitude of the Centre) seem to be much 
more dependent on the Central assistance for financing Plans not only 
during the Sixth and Seventh Five Year Plan but also during the two earlier 
Plans as we have also observed from the study undertaken by Ansari 
(1981).103 It is, however, evident from the column 1 of table 8 that Central 
assistance as proportion of total Plan outlay during the Sixth Plan was 
19.11 per cent for West Bengal which was the highest except Karnataka ( 
21.22) among the high income group States which indicates greater 
reliance on the Central assistance of financing for the State’s Plan and 
lower resource mobilisation capacity of the State. 
                                                          
103 During the fourth five year Plan the proportion of such dependence of West Bengal was 
58.54 percent which was not only higher than all high income States’ average (33.08)  but 
also higher than many low income States. During the Fifth Plan its dependence on Central 
assistance as indicated by the proportion of Central assistance in its total Plan outlay was 
24.56 per cent as against the high income States’ average , 18.80.   
  
Central assistance as 
proportion of total Plan outlay 
States 
IV Plan V Plan 
Average for Low 
Income States 
54.78 33.97 
Andhra Pradesh 54.08 28.66 
Bihar 68.23 36.52 
Madhya Pardesh 53.51 24.17 
Kerala 51.28 42.32 
Orissa 62.28 40.07 
Rajasthan 69.17 41.09 
Tamil Nadu 35.82 26.47 
Uttar Pradesh 43.94 32.49 
Average for High 
Income States 
33.08 18.80 
Gujrat 28.43 18.01 
Haryana 21.23 16.86 
Karnataka 44.53 25.81 
Maharastra 23.62 14.37 
Punjab 22.18 13.24 
West Bengal 58.54 24.56 
Source: Ibid.,  
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Per capita outlay during the Seventh Plan (1985-90) for West Bengal was 
as low as Rs. 931, much lower than not only all the high income States 
average but also lower than the all low income States except Bihar (Rs. 
905). (See table 8 in Appendix) Dismal performance of the State in 
achieving Sixth Plan targets and huge shortfall in projected own resource 
mobilisation (81.4 per cent, which was the highest of all States) seem to 
have played a big role in lowering Plan outlay of the Seventh Plan. (Bagchi 
& Sen, 1992, pp. 57-58) However, during the Sixth Plan shortfall in reaching 
the Plan targets for West Bengal was nearly 50 percent which was the 
highest of all States’ average (26 per cent). Consequently, total Plan outlay 
of the Seventh Plan (Approved) of West Bengal was only 18 per cent higher 
than the Sixth Plan (Approved). Even so the State could not achieve the 
Plan target and registered a shortfall of 14 per cent as against all India 
average of 11.3 per cent (table 9 see Appendix) Contrary to that Central 
assistance as proportion of total Plan outlay of the State during the Seventh 
Plan was as high as 29.43 per cent which was the highest among the all 
high income States’ average (18.21). ( see Column 2 of table 8). 
 
During the Eighth Plan (1992-97) and Ninth Plan (1997-02) periods 
apparently the same trend continued. In the absence of per capita Plan 
outlay data we can consider total Plan outlay of the States. Given that West 
Bengal one of the most populous States, the total Plan outlay of West 
Bengal during the Eighth Plan (Rs. 9,760) seems to be quite low compared 
to both the high and the middle income States. But despite having 
considerably low Plan outlay West Bengal failed to attain its Plan target 
being the shortfall in this account 33.20 per cent. Only two States had 
higher shortfall in realising Plan outlay than West Bengal viz. Bihar (63.75) 
and Orissa (49.24). West Bengal, however, was the only State except 
Punjab whose own resource mobilisation for the financing of the Eighth 
Plan has shown significance dependence on borrowing. As far as projected 
share of own funds for Eighth Plan is concerned, the percentage share of 
own funds of the State was (--) 68.2 plus usual borrowing of the State (72.1 
per cent).  Evidently, own funds (--68.2) of the State was also made up of 
borrowing. However, in realised Plan outlay the magnitude of borrowing 
further increased to 110.8 per cent. Contrary to that Central Plan assistance 
(projected) for the Eighth Plan for West Bengal was as high as 96.1 per 
cent which was the highest among all States except Punjab (139.4 per 
cent). However, realised Central Plan assistance for West Bengal was 
reduced to 54.5 percent. Nevertheless which was greater than all the high 
income and the middle income States except Punjab (62.6 per cent). Only 
two States from the poor income group i.e., Bihar (97.2 per cent)  and Uttar 
Pradesh (58.3 per cent) managed to receive higher realised Central Plan 
assistance than West Bengal due to their significant shortfall in realised own 
resource mobilisation. (table 10 see Appendix). Thus against the backdrop 
of persistent higher share of the Central Plan assistance, performance of 
the State in own resource mobilising for financing Plans i.e., from the Sixth 
Plan (1980-85) to Ninth Plan (1997-02) needs to be examined in detail in 
the subsequent part of this study.  
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In sum it can be said that West Bengal though could not receive higher 
Plan outlay during the successive Plan periods i.e., not only during the 
pre-Left Front era but also during the post-Left Front era. But its 
performance has been very much in line with its own resource mobilisation 
effort and the overall performance on different development indicators. 
Therefore, taking into considerations all the aspects of Plan transfers 
against the backdrop of regional disparity of the Indian federation and 
problem of receiving higher Plan outlay for less developed States (whose 
own resource mobilisation was lower than others) complaint of State 
specific and  time specific discrimination against a particular State for 
allocation of low Plan outlay seems to have no ground.      
 
Instead, two types of arguments seem to come to the fore, one related to 
egalitarian principles and another, related to market. Following egalitarian 
principle we can question against the regressive structure of the federal 
fiscal relations in India which accentuates regional disparity instead of 
lowering it and can raise the question whether the approach of the Finance 
Commission and the Planning Commission should be changed radically as 
to put more emphasis on enhancing the revenue base of the less 
developed States instead of relying on the so called progressive resource 
devolution criteria. Ansari (1983) argued that it seems necessary to help 
the poorer States in order to break the vicious circle in which there are 
trapped and help them enhancing their own resource mobilisation capacity 
by accelerating their pace of development so that they can catch up with 
the developed States. This would eventually enable them to receive more 
Plan assistance from the Centre and hence greater Plan outlay. That 
would, however, further enable them to increase their own resource 
mobilisation potential. (Ansari, 1983, p. 2081) On the other hand some 
may argue that the federal fiscal transfers of India should be guided by the 
principle of market. Therefore, the States which fail to mobilise adequate 
resources should be left with low Plan outlay while better off States should 
be awarded for their high resource mobilisation effort instead of penalising 
them for their better performance. The advocates of egalitarian principle 
would, however,  question,  whether a poor State can at all mobilise more 
resource unless it is provided adequate Plan outlay and hence higher level 
of Plan expenditure. For low resource mobilisation of the poor States 
belonging to poor regions largely depends on the pre-existing  regional 
imbalance since the pre-Independence days. It is not only the outcome of 
inefficiency in fiscal management and  practising  fiscal imprudency by 
these States.  
 
But such egalitarian principle (accepting only the structural limitations of 
the less developed States) seems to allow the less developed States to 
wash their hands off their own responsibility of enhancing their own 
resource mobilisation capacity and limited though not insignificant potential 
of the individual State’s in augmenting their own resource base. Thus, 
what immediately arises in our mind is whether the low revenue potential, 
proliferation of revenue expenditure and low capital formation of the State 
is only the outcome of structural lacuna of the State which belongs to the 
regressive set up of the Indian federation or it is also partly the outcome of 
lack of exploitation of own resource potential combined with fiscal 
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imprudence and fiscal in-discipline of the States. Later part of the study will 
try to seek answer to this question.  
 
Transfer of resources through Centrally controlled financial 
institutions and commercial scheduled banks. 
 
Of all types of resource transfer from the Centre to the States, the transfer 
of resources through the financial and semi-financial institutions seem to 
play a big role in aggravating regional disparities which is, however, often 
overlooked in the discussion on Centre-State financial relations.104 After 
Independence Indian Constitution placed banking and insurance under the 
Central list. Afterwards practically the whole unorganised banking and 
insurance and deployment of all financial savings canalised through 
organised banking and insurance came under the direct control of the 
Centre with the nationalisation of these institutions. (George & Gulati, 
February 16, 1985, p. 292) Furthermore, commercial banks which also 
accounted for significant portion of the flow of institutional funds came under 
direct Central governmental control with the nationalisation of the scheduled 
commercial banks in 1969. (George & Gulati,1978, p. 1391)  
 
George & Gulati (1978), George & Gulati (February 16, 1985), Shukla & 
Roy Chowdhury (1992) and recently Kurian (2000) observed that equity 
consideration has not been given adequate importance in the inter-State 
distribution of investment funds by the Centrally controlled financial 
institutions and commercial banks. Therefore, inter-State flow of institutional 
finance has been showing highly regressive tendency over the period. 
Discrimination against the less developed States in the matter of distribution 
of institutional finance is evident clearly from table 11 (see Appendix). 
During the period of 1969-76 average per capita commercial banks credit 
and investment was Rs. 270 for the high income States as against Rs. 160 
for the middle income States and Rs. 70 for the low income States. 
Therefore, per capita bank finance of the less developed States was almost 
one fourth of that of the high income States. As regards per capita total 
institutional finance during 1969-76 (i.e. financial transfers made by the 
Centrally controlled financial institutions plus transfers from commercial 
banks) high income States managed to receive as high as Rs. 366 as 
against Rs. 222 for the middle income States and Rs. 109 for the low 
income States. Same trend seems to have followed in the subsequent 
decades. Therefore, both the studies undertaken by George & Gulati, 
                                                          
104 “The disbursal of funds by these institutions has not been studied extensively from the 
Centre-State financial relations angle, though the importance of institutional financial 
flows in accentuating regional disparities was felt even earlier. Firstly, most of these 
institutions have been established by, or transferred to the public sector under the Central 
Government for the explicit purpose of implementing national objectives. Secondly, these 
institutions draw basically from the same pool of the community’s resources as budgetary 
finance. Thirdly, most of these institutions rely heavily on the Union budget and the 
Reserve Bank of India for their funds. Fourthly, the volume of their disbursements in 
different States is quite high in comparison with Union Government’s disbursal of 
budgetary funds to State governments.... Fifthly, the volume of finance from these 
institutions going to States is very high in comparison with the State's own disbursement 
from their capital budgets....”  (Shukla, P.R & Roy Chowdhry, S. K, Centre-State Finances 
in Indian Economy, Akashdeep Publishing House, New Delhi,1992, p. 254) 
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(1985) and (Kurian, 2000) covering the period 1973-80 and the post-
liberalisation period reconfirmed the above mentioned observation 
evidenced in table 11.  
 
Considering the position of West Bengal separately, it would be evident 
that during both 1969-76 and 1973-80 time periods i.e., broadly speaking 
during the pre-Left Front era, commercial bank’s credit allocation as well 
as transfers from all India financial institutions were quite low compared to 
not only high income States to which West Bengal belonged but also 
compared to the some middle income States. This observation was also 
supported by different studies undertaken from time to time by Bengal 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (BCCI)(1971), National Council of 
Applied Economic Research (NCAER) (1962), Report of the Taxation 
Enquiry Committee, Government of Kerala, (1969). Recently the studies 
undertaken by Choudhury (1975), Das & Maiti (1998), Kurian (2000) 
indicate that West Bengal’s share of total institutional finance as well as 
credit deposit ratio during the post-Left Front era have been much lower 
than the other States.  
 
However, Shukla & Roy Chowdhury (1992) and recently Kurian (2000)  
observed that in the regressive set up of the Indian federation the lower 
the per capita income ranking of a State, the lesser is the share of 
institutional finance. They further mentioned  that the States which can 
spend little budgetary funds for capital investment in industry and 
infrastructure facilities on account of their poor resource base are often left 
with little resource disbursed by the Centrally controlled financial 
institutions which leads to further handicap in infrastructural development 
and low potential of attracting investment in the region. This further 
resulted in low disbursement of bank credit and low level of financial 
assistance to the region. As we have mentioned earlier that the less 
developed States seem to be trapped in a low level of equilibrium trap. 
Therefore, in accordance with the egalitarian  principle, it could be argued 
that the banks should have consciously made efforts through the 
distribution of their investments to ensure that the ratio of credit plus 
investment to bank deposits in the low income States reached at least the 
all States average. (Shukla & Roy Chowdhury, 1992, p. 269) However, 
nationalisation of the banking system (1969) was largely taken up to 
ensure that sectoral as well as regional diversification of credit and 
redeployment of bank finances that would eventually mitigate regional 
imbalance. (Shukla & Roy Chowdhury, 1992, pp. 267-72) In reality, 
however, in total disregard to the objective and commercial banks and the 
Centrally controlled financial institutions so far seem to have followed the 
principle of market.  
 
The deposit mobilisation in a region is largely a function of the State 
income. Even though the better off States are in a position to mobilise 
larger quantum of deposit but there is always excess demand for credit 
over deposit mobilised in these regions. Which is on account of higher 
level of economic activities consequent upon large flow of private capital 
from the backward to the developed regions attracted by greater 
opportunity for profits. Such excess credit is often met by siphoning off 
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deposits mobilised in the less developed region in order to meet the 
demand for excess credit of developed region. Quite naturally, less 
developed regions often show relatively excess deposit mobilisation over 
credit take-off due to low level of economic activities and hence low 
demand for bank credit in this region. Therefore, the question was 
legitimately raised that “as far as bank credit is concerned it can be given 
only in the states and regions where there is a demand for it. How can the 
banks pour in more credit than a region or state, it is argued, can absorb? 
But how will a region or state absorb more credit unless the banks 
themselves take steps to create conditions for that?” (George & Gulati,  
1978, p. 1399)  
 
Thus, set aside the debate regarding whether financial institutions should 
be guided by the objective of redressing regional disparities or it would 
follow the profit motive, it can be concluded from the above observation 
that in the Indian federal set up economic development of a particular 
State determines the volume of not only budgetary finance but also 
institutional finance. The latter has rather a distinctive tendency of 
discriminating the less developed States and seems to overlook equity 
consideration completely. Therefore, viewed against such omnipotent 
regressive tendency of institutional finance, any attempt of singling out a 
particular State for having faced discriminatory attitude from either 
Centrally controlled financial institutions or commercial banks does not 
seem to stand a ground. However, State specific problem of receiving 
institutional finance during the post-Left Front era of West Bengal will be 
dealt with in chapter 5 of the study in detail.      
 
New Economic Policy and subsequent change in fiscal federal relations and 
regional imbalance         
 
Since the inception of New Economic Policy (NEP) Indian economy has 
been undergoing several structural level changes which has considerable 
impact on Central as well as State government’s finance and on the Centre-
State financial relation as a whole. Regional imbalance seems to have 
aggravated further during 1990s as observed by different studies 
(Chakraborty, 1998; Chakraborty, 1999; Kurian, 1999; Ahluwalia, 2000) due 
to both the deterioration of quality of expenditure and the declining trend of 
revenue receipts of the Centre as well as the States.105 Evidently, poor and 
middle income States appear to have been most hard hit by these structural 
changes compared to the better off ones.   
 
During 1990s proceeds from taxes and duties of the Centre has been 
showing a considerable decline on account of the introduction of some 
reforms in the tax structure of India consequent upon NEP.106 The Union 
                                                          
105 The main reasons of declining share of revenue receipts of the States will be discussed in 
the chapter 6 in detail. 
106 Subsequent to the economic reforms in 1991  there has been a consistent increase in 
direct tax from about 2% of GDP in 1980s to about 3% in 1999, but a loss has taken place 
in the proceeds from indirect tax. So due to the overwhelming share of the indirect tax in 
the Indian economy, the recent increase in the revenue from direct tax is unlikely to 
compensate for loss of revenues from indirect tax. The cumulative consequences  of  these 
factors is likely to have an adverse effect on the proceeds from total Central  tax revenue in 
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government’s tax revenue as proportion of GDP has gone down from 10.7% 
in 1980 to 8.5% in 1998-99 while non-tax revenue remained at a constant 
level.(Different issues of Reserve Bank of India (RBI) Bulletin) Declining 
share of the proceeds from tax revenue coupled with stagnant non-tax 
revenue have had an adverse impact on the quality of expenditure of the 
Centre.107 Moreover, continuous increase in revenue expenditure could not 
be matched with the slowing pace of revenue receipts and has resulted in 
increasing budgetary gap of the Centre. Consequently, the gap is being 
bridged by market borrowings. That, however, became more expensive on 
account of the ongoing reform of interest rate policies thereby escalating the 
interest rate liability and hence the revenue expenditure of the Centre 
further.108 
 
State finances too have been undergoing significant deterioration since the 
late 1980s particularly after the inception of New Economic Policy. Until 
1987-88 the States had surpluses in their revenue accounts but since then 
revenue deficit of the States started escalating and the revenue deficit 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
1990s compared to the  pre-reform period. We have already dealt with this area in the 
preceding part (chapter 2) of this study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
107 A constant growth of debt servicing payments have adverse  consequences on their 
expenditure pattern. Non-Plan and non-developmental expenditure has been increasing 
while  crowding out the revenue for capital expenditure thereby reducing the allocation  of 
resources  for  necessary infra-structural development. The composition of total 
expenditure of Central government shows that non-developmental expenditure has been 
increasing dramatically during 1990. On the other hand developmental expenditure is 
showing sharp deceleration. Non-developmental expenditure  has increased substantially 
from about 10% in the early 1980s to about 13% of GDP in 1999. However, in 1980s Plan 
expenditure of the Centre was kept considerably high at about 6.5% to 7% of GDP. 
Correspondingly capital expenditures of Central government were also kept at levels of 6% 
to 7% of GDP. But in contrast to the feature in 1980s, both capital expenditure and Plan 
expenditure have been showing steep decrease to the levels of about 4% of GDP or less in 
1990s. (Rao, M.G, Linking Central Grants to Revenue Deficit Reduction by States’, EPW, 
June 3, 2000, pp.  1884) 
 
108 A noteworthy feature of the domestic borrowing pattern of the Central government in 
1990s is increased reliance on market borrowings with the high level of market related 
interest rates. In the late 1990s some changes in monetary policies was introduced which 
have made the cost of borrowings much higher for the Central government i.e., following 
the measures taken by the Reserve Bank of India in 1997 the Centre was no longer 
entitled to meet its deficit by creating money through ad hoc treasury bill. This measure 
compelled the Central government to  meet its financing requirements from the market 
borrowings. Consequently, interest payment liability of the Centre has increased 
considerably from 2.2% of GDP in the early 1980s to about 4.7% in 1999.(Lahiri, A, Budget 
Deficits and Reforms’, EPW, November 11, 2000, pp. 4050) 
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increased from 2.6 per cent of GDP in 1990-91 to 3.7 per cent of GDP in 
1999-00 (Rao, 2000, p. 1884). Implementation of the recommendation of 
the Fifth Pay Commission, (1997) by which salaries of the State 
government employees were brought at same parity with the Centre 
government’s employees and hence increasing salary bill of the State 
governments, coupled with other exogenous factors consequent upon 
NEP (i.e., tax reforms measure and interest policy reform have already 
been mentioned) have been also responsible for bad fiscal health of the 
States’ budget and deterioration in the quality of expenditure of the States.   
 
The underlying pattern of the State expenditure in recent years is 
characterised by rising commitment on account of unproductive revenue 
expenditure mainly non-developmental and the steady deceleration in 
capital expenditure and hence capital formation. The growth of the 
revenue expenditure has severe consequences for Plan finances and on 
capital expenditure. In line with the Central government a major 
adjustment has been made in capital expenditure by the State 
governments. Capital expenditure of the States has been continuously  
declining from 5% of GDP in the early 1980s to about 3% in 1999. Thus, 
while the ratio of revenue to capital expenditure was about 70:30 in the 
early 1980s in early 2000 it is about 83:17 which reflects a significant 
deterioration in the quality of expenditure. (Mohan,  2000, p. 2035)  
 
As a result of the stagnation in the Central tax revenues and increasing 
commitment for revenue expenditure the Finance Commission mandated 
tax revenue devolution has not increased during the 1990s and the Centre 
has been also unable to maintain growing tempo of the Central assistance 
in the form of loans and grants to the States provided by the Planning 
Commission. As percent of GDP, Central transfers to the States was 
reduced from 4.8 per cent in 1990-91 to 3.6 per cent in 1998-99. (Rao, 
2000, p. 1884) The magnitude of the Central governments assistance to 
Central Plan has also experienced substantial decline. The percentage of 
the Central government’s assistance to State Plans too declined from 12.8 
per cent in 1992-93 to 11.1 per cent in 1997-98. (Saez, L, 1999, p. 329) 
The declining share of Central resources coupled with the stagnant 
tax/GDP ratio of the Sates (Different Issues of RBI Bulletin) and 
decreasing level of own non-tax revenue receipts tend to put the State in 
the situation of vicious circle.109 
                                                          
109 Since the increase in the States’ expenditure was not matched by a corresponding 
increase in the revenue receipts of the States the gross fiscal deficit of the States has 
been rising sharply. The Gross Fiscal Deficit (GFD) is about 3% throughout in the 90s in 
comparison to 1.4% % in the 80s. (Soaring up State Finances, EPW, June 12, 1999, pp. 
1468) The resource gap of the State budget is increasingly financed by the market 
borrowing. The interest rate policy reform and consequent deregulation of interest rate 
has made the market borrowing as well as borrowing from the Centre costly. Since the 
Central government has been resorting to market borrowings at market related high 
interest rate, the interest rate on the loan extended by it to the State governments have 
also been increased. As a result the average interest rate on the Central loans to  the 
States has been rising from 5.50% in 1980-81 to 11.74% in 1996-97. On the other hand 
the interest rate subsidy from the Centre to the States has come down to 0.35% in 1996-
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Furthermore, the ability of the States to finance their Plan expenditure 
have been deteriorating continuously from 50% between the mid-1950s 
and the late 1970s to only 40% or less in the late 1990s significantly 
reducing the ability of  the State governments to invest in both social and 
physical infrastructure. (Mohan, 2000, pp. 2029) Understandably, the 
backward States, with lower capacity to finance their Plan expenditure had 
to rely more on Central assistance seem to be worst sufferers of the 
continuous decline in Central Plan assistance and overall low level of 
Central fiscal transfers. Therefore, reduced size of the Central Plan 
assistance, low level of total Central transfers coupled with declining ability 
to finance the Plan expenditure from their own resources affected the less 
developed States in recent years from many directions than the better of 
States. Low level of Plan and capital expenditure halted the growth of 
capital formation and hence the supply of infra-structural facilities and also 
left little money for social expenditures which resulted in low potential for 
attracting private as well as public investment in this regions.  
 
Horizontal and vertical imbalances during the economic reform period 
 
Ahluwalia (2000) reveals that the degree of the regional inequity was 
accentuated during 1990s compared to the previous decade. Estimated 
growth rates of State Domestic Product (SDP) in the 14 major States in 
the pre-reform period (1980-81 to 1990-91) and in the post-reform period 
(1991-92 to 1997-98) show that during the post-reform period the degree 
of dispersion in growth rates across the States increased very significantly. 
The range of variation in the growth rate of SDP in the 1980s was from a 
low of 3.6 per cent in Kerala to a high of 6.6 per cent in Rajasthan. But in 
the 1990s the variation was much larger, from a low of 2.7 per cent per 
year in Bihar to a high of 9.6 per cent in Gujarat. It is interesting to note 
that while the economy as a whole registered an increase in the growth 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
97 from 1.57% in 1991-92. Consequent upon all these measures the interest payment 
burden of the State governments has shown a steady rise from the average of 11% in the 
second half of 1980s to 17.7% in 1997-98 on account of both the market orientation of the 
State borrowing and reduction in the interest subsidies on Central government loans. 
However, not only the quantum of borrowing is increasing but also the cost of borrowing 
is increasing sharply which contributed to higher revenue expenditure and hence increase 
in revenue deficit. All this in turn compel  the States to resort to market borrowing. State 
finance has been set in the path of vicious circle where more and more borrowed 
resources are being required to finance the revenue deficit which in turn would tend to 
increase the revenue deficit in the next phase.  
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rate of 5.55 percent per annum during the pre-reform period to 6.89 per 
cent during the post-reform period, the growth rate of some low income 
States i.e., Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Orissa actually declined reflecting 
‘increased variation in growth performance across the States’. (Ahluwalia, 
2000, p. 1638) (table 12 see Appendix) 
 
Regional disparity has been increasing while there is a growing tendency 
of coefficient variation of Per Capita Net State Domestic Product 
(PCNSDP) since 1970s. Moreover, during the post-liberalisation period 
such disparity has been rising further. It is seen that the coefficient of 
variation of PCNSDP of different States has been steadily rising from 31.8 
per cent in 1981-82 to 37.88 in 1991-92 and reaching the maximum of 43 
in 1993-94 and then slightly decreased to 41.46 in 1994-95. (Ghosh & De, 
1998, p. 3043) 
 
Has Central transfers to the States accentuated regional imbalance 
further? 
 
The distribution of tax transfers across the major States for the period 
between 1991 and 1999 is shown in table 13 (See Appendix). It is to be 
noted that the share of tax transfers to the high income States (Gujarat, 
Haryana, Maharastra, Punjab, Goa) from the Centre increased i.e., the 
percentage of transfer has increased from 14.2 per cent in 1991-92  to 
14.9 per cent in 1998-99. On the other hand for the middle income States 
(Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal) the 
percentage share of tax transfers decreased from 34.2 per cent in 1991-92 
to 33.6 per cent in 1997-98 and then again slightly increased to 35.5 per 
cent in 1998-99. Contrary to that the poor income States (Bihar, Madhya 
Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh) have experienced a declining 
share of Central transfers that has declined from 51.6 per cent in 1991-92 
to 49.6 per cent in 1998-99. (Chakraborty, 1999, p. 3147) 
 
In the case of grants also the inequality appears to be far more acute than 
that in tax transfers. It can be seen from table 14 (see Appendix) that 
during the above mentioned period the share of grants in the total 
transfers by the Centre to the high income States, except Goa,  increased 
sharply from 14.8 per cent in 1991-92 to 22.5 per cent in 1998-99. For the 
middle income States also the share increased from 30 per cent in 1991-
92  to 34.8 per cent in 1998-99. However the worst affected States were 
the low income category States. The share of grants of them in total 
Central grant transfers, declined from 55.2 per cent in 1991-92 to 42.7 per 
cent 1998-99. (Chakraborty, 1999, p. 3147) 
However the average rate of growth of tax transfers and grants also 
indicates inequitable trend. It is evidenced from table 15 (see Appendix) 
that tax transfers grew at lower pace for the low income category States 
compared to the high income States. For the high income States viz. 
Gujarat and Karnataka the tax transfers grew at the rate of 35.9 and 16.7 
 192
per cent per annum respectively between 1992-93 and 1998-99 as against 
15.7 percent for Bihar and 13.9 per cent for Orissa, both belong to the 
poorest category States. The annual average rate of growth of grants also 
was quite high in the high income States compared to the low income 
States. Two high income States namely Haryana and Gujarat registered 
23.6 and 22.7 per cent growth per annum of grants whereas in the low 
income category States, Orissa and Rajasthan a rate of growth of grants 
was as low as 6.2 percent and 7.8 per cent per annum respectively during 
the same period. (Chakraborrty, 1999, p. 3148) 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In sum it could be inferred that existing institutional mechanism for the 
transfers of resources from the Centre to the States are basically unjust and 
contains centripetal bias. Moreover, such institutional mechanism for the 
transfers of resources from the Centre to the States clearly discriminates 
against the poor and the middle income States in which West Bengal 
belongs to. Therefore, existing federal financial system of India did not 
actually discriminate against West Bengal as such but imposed uniform 
rules. On account of which West Bengal was not negatively discriminated 
against but the existing mechanism also does not permit positive 
discrimination in favour of the disadvantaged States including West Bengal. 
Thus, complaint against two multiple resource transfer institutions namely 
the Finance Commission and the Planning Commission and Centrally 
controlled financial institutions seems to have no validity in terms of State 
specific discrimination particularly directed against West Bengal rather it 
appears that such discrimination is a part of the regressive structure of the 
federal fiscal relations in India which has so far failed to minimise regional 
imbalance in the Indian federation.  
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Appendix 
 
 
 
Table: 1 
Aggregate Per Capita Budgetary Transfers, 1956-81     (Rs.) 
States Statutory  Plan Discretionary Total 
A. High Income  
States 
    
Punjab 405 443 604 1452 
Haryana 389 498 490 1377 
Maharastra 461 291 397 1149 
Gujarat 466 355 398 1219 
West Bengal 524 314 486 1324 
Group A 471 338 449 1258 
B. Middle Income 
States 
    
Tamil Nadu 446 350 274 1070 
Kerala 611 445 335 1391 
Orissa 708 536 476 1720 
Assam 742 675 659 2076 
Karnataka 465 374 384 1223 
Andhra Pradesh 504 427 381 1312 
Group B 542 436 386 1364 
C. Low Income 
States 
    
Uttar Pradesh 446 390 264 1100 
Rajasthan 553 451 734 1738 
Madhya Pradesh 428 434 248 1110 
Bihar 456 363 318 1137 
Group C 459 398 332 1189 
D. Special Category 
States  
    
Group D 1701 1902 1086 4689 
All States 516 440 380 1336 
Source: : George, K.K & Gulati, I.S, Centre-State Resource Transfers, 1951-84: An Appraisal,  
EPW, February 16, 1985, p. 292 
 
 
 
Table: 2 
Ranking of States According to Combined Scores Between 1960-61 and 1986-87 
 
State 1960-61 1970-71 1980-81 1984-85 1986-87 
Andhra Pradesh 11 9 9 8 8 
Assam 4 11 14 14 13 
Bihar 15 15 15 15 15 
Gujarat 7 4 4 3 3 
Haryana 2 3 2 2 2 
Karnataka 6 7 7 6 5 
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Kerala 10 8 8 10 7 
Madhya Pradesh 12 13 11 11 11 
Maharastra 5 2 3 4 4 
Orissa 14 14 13 13 14 
Punjab 1 1 1 1 1 
Rajasthan 9 10 10 9 10 
Tamil Nadu  8 6 5 5 6 
Uttar Pradesh 13 12 12 12 12 
West Bengal 3 5 6 7 9 
Source: Sarker, P.C, ‘Regional Imbalances in Indian Economy Over Plan Periods’,  
EPW, March 12, 1994, p. 623 
 
 
 
 
Table: 3 
Revenue From State Sources Between 1961-62 & 1968-69           
(Rs. Crores) 
 
State 1961-62 1968-69 Percentage increase
Bihar 79.81 166.26 208.35 
Gujarat 62.70 157.81 251.69 
Haryana 24.27 74.56 * 
Madhya Pradesh 78.31 171.80 219.38 
Maharastra 118.75 356.76 300.42 
Punjab 77.96 126.00 ** 
Uttar Pradesh 153.99 363.12 235.80 
West Bengal 101.70 214.29 210.70 
 
Andhra Pradesh 85.77 203.53 237.29 
Assam 40.36 93.20 230.92 
Kerala 52.93 132.02 249.42 
Orissa 46.13 121.03 262.36 
Rajasthan 46.21 129.59 280.43 
Uttar Pradesh 153.99 363.12 235.80 
Tamil Nadu 92.18 277.28 300.80 
Source: Fifth Finance Commission, 1969, pp. 129-134 
*, ** Haryana and Punjab was single State hence not comparable 
 
 
Table: 4 
State-Wise Indices of Per Capita Plan Expenditure From First Plan to Fifth Plan 
 
States I  Plan II Plan III Plan Annual Plans IV Plan V Plan 
Punjab 446 286 236 150 230 206 
Haryana -- -- -- 152 261 190 
Maharastra 118 112 114 138 145 148 
Gujarat 136 147 120 140 149 145 
West 
Bengal 
138 94 89 65 60 79 
Karnataka 87 122 111 117 93 104 
Tamil Nadu 77 112 109 118 98 79 
Kerala 67 116 112 122 115 88 
Rajasthan 103 104 108 93 88 94 
Andhra 
Pradesh 
90 102 101 97 72 95 
Madhya 
Pradesh 
87 94 93 73 83 97 
Uttar 
Pradesh 
67 67 80 88 96 93 
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Orissa 141 106 135 102 83 82 
Bihar 67 78 74 67 62 59 
All States 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Ansari, M.M, ‘ Financing of the State’s Plans A perspective for Regional 
Development, EPW, December 3, 1983, p. 2078 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table: 5 
Per Capita Cumulative Plan Outlays  Between 1960-61 & 1986-87 
 (Rs. ) 
 
States 1960-61 1970-71 1980-81 1984-85 1986-87 
High Income States      
Maharastra 94 341 1147 1955 2313 
Gujarat 134 391 1217 2094 2598 
Haryana 168 390 1352 2277 2809 
Punjab 168 421 1287 2240 2784 
Sub Total      
Middle Income States      
Andhra Pradesh 85 276 762 1231 1458 
Karnataka 108 329 894 1377 1523 
Kerala 80 294 829 1279 1396 
West Bengal 102 244 715 1185 1371 
Tamil Nadu 85 297 752 1303 1662 
Sub Total      
Low Income States      
Bihar 65 200 548 919 942 
Madhya Pradesh 82 243 795 1352 1655 
Orissa 110 329 808 1218 1277 
Uttar Pradesh 57 221 719 1148 1340 
Rajasthan 92 293 812 1259 1457 
Sub Total      
Average 101.07 304.93 895.07 1467.80 1722.40 
Source: Sarker, P.C, ‘Regional Imbalances in Indian Economy Over  
Plan Periods’, EPW, March 12, 1994, p. 622 
 
 
Table: 6 
State-Wise Indices of Per Capita Central Assistance From First Plan to Fifth Plan 
 
States I  Plan II Plan III Plan Annual Plans IV Plan V Plan 
Punjab 633 323 328 115 128 122 
Haryana -- -- -- 114 129 139 
Maharastra 58 77 75 71 81 73 
Gujarat 79 100 86 91 96 82 
West 
Bengal 
167 85 79 79 83 84 
Karnataka 96 115 119 118 97 89 
Tamil Nadu 58 112 100 94 81 96 
Kerala 71 92 128 132 136 115 
Rajasthan 150 119 143 144 140 117 
Andhra 79 108 109 118 91 118 
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Pradesh 
Madhya 
Pradesh 
92 119 119 112 103 93 
Uttar 
Pradesh 
54 65 87 88 105 113 
Orissa 208 154 140 121 121 132 
Bihar 58 73 83 82 98 92 
All States 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Ansari, M.M, ‘ Financing of the State’s Plans A perspective for Regional 
Development, EPW, December 3, 1983, p. 2078 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table: 7 
Indices of Per Capita State’s Own Resources for the Plan From First Plan to Fifth Plan 
 
States I  Plan II Plan III Plan Annual Plans IV Plan V Plan 
Punjab 147 248 103 106 308 254 
Haryana -- -- -- 162 358 219 
Maharastra 213 148 170 227 200 191 
Gujarat 227 196 154 204 185 177 
West Bengal 93 104 103 46 43 77 
Karnataka 73 128 100 115 91 112 
Tamil Nadu 107 112 122 335 110 69 
Kerala 60 140 89 108 99 74 
Rajasthan 27 88 57 27 49 82 
Andhra 
Pradesh 
107 96 89 69 57 88 
Madhya 
Pradesh 
80 68 57 23 68 99 
Uttar Pradesh 87 68 70 88 90 82 
Orissa 33 56 127 77 56 54 
Bihar 80 48 62 46 35 41 
All States 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Ansari, M.M, ‘ Financing of the State’s Plans A perspective for Regional 
Development, EPW, December 3, 1983, p. 2078 
 
 
Table: 8 
Per Capita Central Assistance and Per Capita Plan Outlay during the  
Sixth and Seventh Plan  
 
Central assistance as 
proportion of total Plan outlay 
            (Per cent) 
         Per capita Plan outlay 
                  (Rs.) 
VI Plan VII Plan VI Plan VII Plan 
States 
  
   (1)    (2)   (3)   (4) 
Low Income  
States 
33.05 38.12   
Andhra Pradesh 30.15 34.23 713 1,195 
Bihar 43.88 50.17 572 905 
Madhya Pradesh 26.21 24.15 912 1,681 
Kerala 28.51 51.93 726 984 
Orissa 45.03 40.65 684 1,230 
Rajasthan 32.44 44.07 786 1,164 
Tamil Nadu 22.12 25.86 765 1,396 
Uttar Pradesh 36.10 33.90 662 1,183 
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High Income 
States 
15.17 18.21   
Gujarat 12.19 13.84 1,378 2,247 
Haryana 12.21 12.88 1,793 2,889 
Karnataka 21.22 26.44 773 1,195 
Maharastra 12.41 13.39 1,225 2,083 
Punjab 13.92 13.28 1,444 2,424 
West Bengal 19.11 29.43 790 931 
Source: Ramalingom, R & Kurup, K.N, ‘Plan Transfers to States Revised Gadgil Formula: An 
Analysis’, EPW, March 2-9, 1991, p. 504 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table: 9 
Approved and Actual Plan Expenditure for the Sixth and Seventh Plan 
                                                                                                         (Rs. crore) 
States 6th Plan 
(Approved) 
6th Plan 
 (Total  
Actual) 
Percentage 
shortfall in 
6th Plan 
7th Plan 
(Approved) 
7th Plan  
(Total  
Actual) 
Percentage 
shortfall in 7th 
Plan 
Andhra 
Pradesh 
3100 2331 24.80 5200 4871 6.3 
Bihar 3225 2159 33.1 5100 4981 2.3 
Gujarat 3680 2829 23.2 6000 4292 28.5 
Haryana 1800 1148 36.2 2900 2078 28.3 
Karnataka 2265 1938 14.4 3500 3115 11.0 
Kerala 1550 1209 22.0 2100 1773 15.6 
Madhya 
Pradesh 
3800 2814 25.9 7000 5711 18.4 
Maharastra 6175 4740 23.2 10500 8894 15.3 
Orissa 1500 1140 24.0 2700 2716 -0.6 
Punjab 1957 1384 29.3 3285 2850 13.2 
Rajasthan 2025 1572 22.4 3000 2550 15.0 
Tamil Nadu 3150 2602 17.4 5750 5072 11.8 
Uttar 
Pradesh 
5850 4738 19.0 10447 8982 14.0 
West 
Bengal 
3500 1787 48.9 4125 3547 14.0 
Assam 1115 928 16.7 2100 2101 Nil 
All States 47204 35334 25.1 78097 69259 11.3 
Source: Bagchi, A & Sen, T, ‘ Budgetary Trends and Plan Financing in the States’, in  Bagchi, 
A & Bajaj, J.L, & Byrd, W.A (ed.) State Finances in India, Vikas Publishing House Pvt. Ltd., 
New Delhi, 1992, p.56 
 
 
 
Table: 10 
Financing Pattern of the Eighth Five Year Plan (1992-97) 
 
                   Projected Outlay                      Realised Outlay States 
Total 
outlay 
(Rs. 
Crore at 
1991-92 
prices 
Percentage 
share of 
Central 
assistance 
Percentag
e share of 
own 
funds of 
the  
States 
Percentag
e share of 
borrowing
s of the  
States 
Total 
outlay 
(Rs. Crore 
at 1991-92 
prices 
Percentage 
share  
of Central 
assistance 
Percentag
e share of 
own 
funds of 
the  
States 
Percentage 
share of 
borrowings 
of the  
States 
High Income 
States 
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Goa 761 28.3 24.9 46.9 701 28.5 37.1 34.4 
Gujarat 11500 19.1 41.9 39.1 9319 20.1 23.4 56.5 
Haryana 5700 17.3 37.4 45.3 3802 26.5 6.7 66.8 
Maharastra 18520 16.5 31.4 52.4 22692 21.8 44.4 33.9 
Punjab 6570 139.4 (-) 80.7 41.3 5277 62.6 (-) 36.6 74.0 
Middle 
Income 
States 
        
Andhra 
Pradesh 
10500 45.2 4.4 50.4 10966 50.7 (-) 4.7 54.1 
Karnataka 12300 23.6 44.8 31.6 11604 20.9 34.1 66.8 
Kerala 5460 44.2 (-) 26.6 82.4 6712 31.6 5.4 63.0 
Tamil Nadu 10200 55.5 (-) 5.1 49.6 10655 39.3 5.0 55.7 
West Bengal 9760 96.1 (-) 68.2 72.1 6519 54.5 (-) 65.1 110.8 
Low Income 
States 
        
Bihar 13000 43.4 5.1 51.5 4712 97.2 (-) 74.1 76.9 
Madhya 
Pradesh 
11100 30.8 17.5 51.7 9886 33.3 15.2 63.0 
Orissa 10000 43.2 16.7 40.1 5076 49.1 (-) 17.1 68.1 
Rajasthan 11500 36.4 19.1 44.5 8810 39.2 (-) 15.1 75.9 
Uttar 
Pradesh 
21000 54.2 (-) 22.8 68.5 15778 58.3 (-) 30.7 72.4 
Total 15 
States 
157871 40.6 6.4 53.0 132519 39.4 1.6 59.0 
Source: Kurian, N.J, ‘State Government Finances A Study of Recent Trends’, EPW, May 8, 
1999, p. 1118 
 
 
Table: 11 
Per Capita Centre-State Institutional Financial Flows  During 1973-80 and 1969-76 
       
                                                                                                                             (Rs.)    
         Commercial  Banks 
             (1973-80) 
    Commercial Banks 
          (1969-76) 
States 
A. High Income 
States 
Credit Investment Total 
Total 
institution
al finance 
(1973-80) 
Credit Investment Total 
Total 
institution
al finance 
(1969-76) 
Punjab 734 42 776 941 346 47 393 482 
Haryana 446 74 520 756 186 56 242 387 
Maharastra 610 49 667 848 308 41 349 460 
Gujarat 323 69 392 638 164 51 215 348 
West Bengal 321 49 370 449 146 38 184 234 
Group A 472 54 526 690 227 43 270 366 
B. Middle 
Income States  
        
Tamil Nadu 327 38 365 481 203 46 249 336 
Kerala 316 69 385 466 117 40 157 213 
Orissa 85 35 120 169 24 31 55 99 
Assam 92 40 132 173 40 25 65 106 
Karnataka 315 34 349 506 195 38 233 313 
Andhra 
Pradesh 
213 30 243 347 82 28 110 156 
Group B 244 38 282 382 124 36 160 222 
C. Low Income 
States 
        
Uttar Pradesh 121 28 149 214 62 20 82 118 
Rajasthan 168 51 219 305 56 32 88 146 
Madhya 111 27 138 196 39 18 57 93 
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Pradesh 
Bihar 83 26 109 52 38 18 56 91 
Group C 115 30 145 205 50 20 70 109 
D. Special 
Category 
States 
        
Group D 125 80 205 265 45 38 83 128 
All States 252 40 293 393 121 32 153 215 
Source: For the year 1973-80 see George, K.K & Gulati, I.S, Centre-State Resources Transfers, 
1951-84: An  Appraisal’,  EPW, February 16, 1985, p. 294; For the year 1969-76 see Gulati, I.S & 
George, K.K, “ Inter-State Redistribution through Institutional Finance”, EPW, Special Number 
August, 1978, p. 1395  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
               Table: 12 
               Annual Rates of Growth of Gross State Domestic Product (SDP)  
               From 1980-81 to 1990-91 and From 1991-92 to 1997-98 
 
States 1980-81 
    to 
1990-91 
(per cent per 
annum) 
1991-92 
    to 
 1997-98 
(per cent per 
annum) 
Bihar 4.66 2.69 
Rajasthan 6.60 6.54 
Uttar Pradesh 4.95 3.58 
Orissa 4.29 3.25 
Madhya Pradesh 4.56 6.17 
Andhra Pradesh 5.65 5.03 
Tamil Nadu 5.38 6.22 
Kerala 3.57 5.81 
Karnataka 5.29 5.29 
West Bengal 4.71 6.91 
Gujarat 5.08 9.57 
Haryana 6.43 5.02 
Maharastra 6.02 8.01 
Punjab 5.32 4.71 
Combined SDP of 
14 States 
5.24 5.94 
             Source: Ahluwalia, M, S, Economic Performance of States 
              in Post-Reforms Period EPW, May 6, 2000, p. 1638 
 
 
Table: 13 
Distribution of Tax Transfer Across Non-Special Category States From 1991-92 to 1998-99 
(per cent) 
  
 1991-92 1992- 93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 
Higher 
Income 
States 
        
Goa 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
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Gujarat 2.1 4.5 5.0 4.4 4.4 3.8 4.5 4.4 
Haryana 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.5 
Maharastra 8.2 7.7 7.8 7.8 6.4 7.3 7.1 7.0 
Punjab 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 
Group Total 14.2 15.9 16.5 16.0 14.2 14.5 15.1 14.9 
Middle 
Income 
States 
        
Andhra 
Pradesh 
8.7 8.5 8.5 8.6 9.8 9.4 8.9 8.8 
Karnataka 5.3 5.1 5.1 5.2 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.6 
Kerala 3.9 3.8 3.8 3.8 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.6 
Tamil Nadu 8.0 7.8 7.8 7.9 6.9 7.0 6.9 7.2 
West Bengal 8.3 8.1 8.1 8.2 7.7 7.8 8.0 9.3 
Group Total 34.2 33.2 33.4 33.6 34.1 33.7 33.6 35.5 
Low Income 
States 
        
Bihar 12.9 12.5 12.6 12.7 13.4 13.1 12.9 13.0 
Madhya 
Pradesh 
8.7 8.4 8.5 8.5 8.4 8.5 8.6 9.4 
Orissa 5.6 5.5 5.4 5.4 4.9 5.0 5.1 5.1 
Rajasthan 6.0 5.9 5.8 5.9 5.7 5.7 5.8 6.8 
Uttar 
Pradesh 
18.4 18.6 17.9 18.0 19.3 19.5 18.6 15.4 
Group Total 51.6 50.9 50.2 50.4 51.8 51.8 51.2 49.6 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Chakraborty, P,  Recent Trends in State Government Finances A comment, EPW, 
October 30, 1999, p. 3147 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table: 14 
Distribution of Grants Across Non-Special Category States from 1991-92 to 1998-99 
 (Per Cent) 
 
 1991-92 1992-
93 
199
3-94
1994-
95 
1995-
96 
1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 
High Income 
States 
        
Goa 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.2 
Gujarat 3.0 3.7 4.7 4.3 3.7 5.8 4.7 5.3 
Haryana 1.6 1.6 1.8 1.5 2.3 2.3 2.9 3.4 
Maharastra 7.4 7.1 9.0 7.3 8.9 10.3 9.1 8.9 
Punjab 2.1 2.7 2.2 2.0 2.4 2.5 3.9 4.7 
Group Total 14.8 15.5 18.0 15.6 17.8 21.3 20.8 22.5 
Middle 
Income 
States 
        
Andhra 
Pradesh 
8.7 8.0 9.1 8.3 12.1 11.9 8.4 9.2 
Karnataka 4.3 4.5 5.0 5.0 4.5 5.3 7.6 8.1 
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Kerala 3.4 3.5 3.3 4.6 3.6 3.3 4.4 3.7 
Tamil Nadu 6.7 6.3 6.6 6.3 6.0 6.3 5.5 5.4 
West Bengal 6.9 6.8 7.2 7.2 6.8 7.7 7.5 8.4 
Group Total 30.0  29.1 31.2 31.3 32.9 34.5 33.4 34.8 
Low Income 
States 
        
Bihar 10.0 10.2 9.9 8.6 7.6 4.4 8.2 6.3 
Madhya 
Pradesh 
8.5 8.6 8.6 9.1 8.8 8.8 9.5 9.4 
Orissa 6.3 5.8 5.7 5.9 6.5 6.1 5.8 5.2 
Rajasthan 8.7 8.2 8.6 10.3 8.8 8.9 7.9 7.8 
Uttar 
Pradesh 
21.7 22.6 18.0 19.2 17.6 15.9 14.5 14.0 
Group Total 55.2 55.4 50.8 53.1 49.3 44.1 45.8 42.7 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Chakraborty, P,  Recent Trends in State Government Finances A comment, EPW, 
October 30, 1999, p. 3147 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table : 15 
Annual Average Rate of Growth  Tax Transfer And Grants  
Between  1992-93 and 1998-99  
(Per Cent) 
 
States Tax 
Transfers 
 Grants 
Gujarat 35.9 Punjab 26.6 
Kerala 18.7 Haryana 23.6 
Rajasthan 17.8 Gujarat 22.7 
West Bengal 17.6 Karnataka 22.4 
Madhya Pradesh 16.8 Maharastra 13.8 
Karnataka 16.7 Kerala 13.5 
Haryana 15.9 West Bengal 13.0 
Andhra Pradesh 15.9 Bihar 11.8 
Bihar 15.7 Madhya Pradesh 11.3 
All States 15.6 Andhra Pradesh 11.1 
Orissa 13.9 All States 9.5 
Tamil Nadu 13.8 Rajasthan 7.8 
Punjab 13.2 Tamil Nadu 6.3 
Maharastra 13.2 Orissa 6.2 
Uttar Pradesh 13.0 Uttar Pradesh 3.0 
Goa 11.7 Goa -4.5 
Source: Chakraborty, P, Recent Trends in State Government Finances A comment, EPW, 
October 30, 1999, p.3148 
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Chapter: 5 
 
Parameters of Discrimination as Alleged by the Left Front 
Government 
 
Anti-Centre movement had taken two different forms in West Bengal during 
the post-Left Front era. One is related to the demand for institutional change 
of the existing federal structure of India for providing more power both 
economic and administrative to the States. The other was related to the 
complaint of State specific discrimination. The State, so far has insisted that 
West Bengal has been subject to deliberate discrimination by the Centre 
and the Centrally controlled financial institutions compared to the other 
richer States in terms of some economic indicators due to its political 
opposition. This according to the Left Front government, is the main cause 
for relative economic underdevelopment in West Bengal.110The allegation 
mainly comprises low level of credit deposit ratio, low level of financial 
assistance by the Centrally controlled financial institutions, low level of Plan 
assistance hence low level of Plan outlay, insignificant number of issuing 
industrial licenses compared to the other States and some project specific 
factors regarding which West Bengal was also said to be deliberately 
discriminated.111 However, we have already observed in the preceding part 
                                                          
110 “It is alleged by many that the Central Government is discriminating against West 
Bengal in respect of issuing of industrial licence, sanctioning credit, public investment, 
expansion of development of infra-structural facilities etc. The Communist Party of India 
(Marxist) i.e., CPI (M), especially of West Bengal charged the Union Government for 
colonial treatment towards this State.”  (Basu, K, West Bengal Economy Past Present and 
Future, Firma KLM, Pvt. Ltd., Calcutta, 1989,  p. 9) 
 
“In various review of its own performance, the Left Front government repeatedly 
emphasised that the unfair policies of the central government caused the weak 
performance in industrial production and employment”. (Pedersen, J,D, “India’s Industrial 
Dilemmas in West Bengal”, Asian Survey, Vol. XLI, No.4, July/August, 2001, p. 656) 
“Whenever the industrial stagnation of the state was discussed, the standard explanation 
given by the Left Front government and the CPI(M) became the purported discrimination 
West Bengal suffered from the central authorities in New Delhi.” (ibid., 2001, p. 650) 
 
111The incident of setting up of Haldia Petrochemical complex in the State and the 
reluctance shown by the Centre to approve the project for long time has given rise to major 
dis-satisfaction in West Bengal. Other aspects related to the following areas also created 
much contention. The Centre denied to nationalise sick industries in West Bengal despite 
its plea to the Centre; sick industries in West Bengal were denied adequate support for 
their revival by the Centre; West Bengal failed to receive appropriate financial support for 
modernisation of the old industrial units; and non-co-operation of the Centre while 
establishing new units in West Bengal. Along with these some policies were taken by the 
Centre which lowered the employment opportunities in West Bengal considerably and 
caused severe shortages of essential raw materials required for industrial production in 
West Bengal whose supply is controlled by the Centre. Such project specific factors were 
analysed in detail in the study undertaken by Ray & Sato (1987). Since such project 
specific areas are beyond the purview of this study, it is really difficult to say to what 
proportion it is the reflection of hostilities shown by the Centre,  regarding issues mentioned 
above as alleged in the study and to what proportion it has been the outcome of  several 
constraints pre-existing in West Bengal’s economy and society and to what proportion they 
are part of general Central policies which apply for all the States and not for West Bengal 
exclusively.The change of attitude of the Centre on nationalisation of sick industries, or 
providing resources for modernisation of loss making industrial units may be mentioned. 
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of the study that regressive structure of the Indian federation and hence the 
ever widening regional disparities tend to create such inequality among the 
States in general. Now it remains to be seen whether existing regressive 
federal structure coupled with State (West Bengal)-specific structural 
constraints which was partly the legacy of the pre-Independence as well as 
the post-Independence period play any role in accentuating further the 
problem of low share of industrial licence, low level of financial assistance 
and low level of Plan outlay allocation to the States. 
Industrial licensing policy 
 
The complaint launched by the Left Front government as regards 
distribution of industrial license among the States could be summarised as 
follows: ”application for establishment of industries in West Bengal are 
without reasons delayed by the Central Government. Industrial Licences 
(IL) and Letter of Intents (LOI) are not easily issued to prospective 
entrepreneurs who are willing to set up industrial units in this State .... There 
are cases when the applications for the establishment of an industry in 
West Bengal was rejected, but if the entrepreneur applied afresh for the 
setting up of the same industry in any other State, the application was 
sympathetically considered and licence issued.”  (Basu, K, 1989, pp. 10-11)  
 
However, since the mid-1960s declining number of issuing industrial 
licences to West Bengal seem to have become one of the major 
contentious issues. For some people economic decline of West Bengal 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Until the early 1980s Central government extended active co-operation with IRBI, IRCI,  
IDBI, RBI in reviviving sick industries. But in course of time it was felt that the sick 
industries themselves should take some responsibility instead of the easy recourse to the 
Central or State governments or the Centrally controlled financial institutions as the causes 
of sickness lie more often in the incompetence and inefficiency of industries than other 
factors. However, Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provision) Act (SICA) was introduced 
in 1985 in order to provide a definition sickness for the industries. Therefore revival of 
these industries now be dealt with more effectively than before. Over time it was noticed 
that take over by governments either the States or the Central were increasingly proving 
failure to help these sick industries. More importantly, after such take over,  it was noticed 
instead of improving, over time the situation of these industries got worsened accumulating 
huge amount of cumulative loss. Consequently Board of Industrial and Financial 
Reconstruction (BIFR) was set up which started its work in 1987 in  order to deal with sick 
industries through detailed investigation into the reason of sickness before the industry is 
entitled to receive any financial help. Hence,  the notion of mothering sick industries at the 
cost of government’s finance changed since the late 1980s the process of which started in 
theearly 1980s. Against this backdrop, it is difficult to infer to what extent the discrimination 
by the Central government by dint of not providing adequate help to modernise obsolete 
technologies and taking over sick industries is applicable only to West Bengal. How far 
growing number of sick industries in West Bengal lies in the very structure of the State’s 
industrial situation which has been in existence since the late 1960s and how far it is also 
West Bengal government’s failure to mobilise its own resources efficiently so that proper 
infrastructural facilities be provided and would create the environment for the running of the 
existing industries efficiently and provide conducive situation for attracting new investment 
into this region.      
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went hand in hand with the total number of industrial licence issued to the 
State i.e., while some wanted to see it as a reflection of economic downturn, 
for others it simply was a discriminatory policy pursued by the Centre. 
Another kind of argument was, however, related to overall regional 
inequality. Viewed against this broader perspective, it was argued that West 
Bengal along with other industrially developed States managed to secure 
major portion of the industrial licence while leaving the less developed 
States in India with insignificant share of industrial license.  
 
Bengal National Chamber of Commerce and Industry (BNCCI) (1965) 
expressed their concern over the fact that West Bengal’s economy had 
been showing downturn in terms of different criteria such as number of 
registered factories, number of person employed in registered factories, 
amount of capital invested etc. Evidently, West Bengal started losing its 
pace not only compared to the other States but also compared to its own 
standard achieved in the past (BNCCI, 1965, p. 169) which is evident from 
continuously decreasing number of licences issued to the State since 1960. 
Seemingly, “there has been going on all the time considerable exodus of 
capital from West Bengal”. (BNCCI, 1965, p. 169) Against the backdrop of 
this sharp deterioration of industrial situation and declining share of 
industrial licence, it was also argued, how far such continuous decline of 
industrial licence issued to West Bengal would be interpreted in terms of 
concerted move of discriminating against the State by the Central Licensing 
Authority. It is highly probable that the very large differences between the 
figures of licences issued to firms in Maharastra and in West Bengal is 
largely due to lesser number and lower value of applications submitted by 
firms in this State. (BNCCI, 1965, p. 24). Thus total number of applications 
for industrial licences in case of Maharastra and West Bengal during 1956-
66 was 3645 and 2296 respectively. And total number of licenses issued to 
Maharastra and West Bengal was 2741 and 1649 respectively during the 
same period. (Dasgupta, 1998, p. 3051) Therefore the percentage share of 
number of applications submitted during 1956-66 to West Bengal was 16.30 
as against 25.88 per cent for Maharastra. But percentage share of industrial 
licences issued to West Bengal was 16.46 as against 27.37 per cent for 
Maharastra. Evidently, though the proportion of total licence issued to total 
applications of licences submitted was higher in case of both Maharastra 
and West Bengal but the margin of favour was higher in Maharastra than 
West Bengal (table 1 & 2, see Appendix) 
 
It was in this context that the Bengal Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
(BCCI) (1971) felt that though it is true that the margin of favour was higher 
in case of not only Maharastra (25. 88 to 27.37) but also the other four 
advanced States such as Gujarat (8.66 to 8.89), Mysore (2.98 to 3.26) and 
Tamil Nadu (8.97 to 9.68) compared to West Bengal (16.30 to 16.46). 
Nevertheless, “...viewed in the national context, West Bengal can not really 
complain of unfavourable discrimination against herself in this matter” 
(BCCI, 1971, p. 144) while the proportion of total number of applications to 
total number of licence issued was much lower in case of the other 
industrially less developed States such as Andhra Pradesh (3.56 to 3.31), 
Assam (1.08 to 0.95) Madhya Pradesh (2.85 to 2.47) and so on.  (table 2) 
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In contrast Roy (1971) looked at the question of declining share of industrial 
licences as evidence of discrimination against the State by the Central 
Licensing Authority and vehemently accused the Centre for the present 
economic downturn of West Bengal. (Roy, 1971, pp. 51-56). B. M. Birla, 
owner of one of the leading business houses of India while addressing New 
Delhi Press Club in June, 1970, also said that the government of India was 
mainly responsible for the lack of growth of industries in West Bengal. The 
Central government, he alleged, did not provide license to West Bengal on 
the plea that the State was already industrially developed. But the Centre 
did not apply the same yardstick to Maharastra in the matter of industrial 
licences. ( quoted in Roy, 1971, p. 51)  
 
However, such allegation of discrimination made against West Bengal in the 
pre-Left Front era also came to the fore by the Congress government during 
the early 1970s. Siddhartha Sankar Roy, the then Chief Minister of West 
Bengal made similar allegation against the Centre in the matter of issuing 
license to West Bengal. In a meeting with the Chamber of Commerce in 
Calcutta on June 18, 1974, Mr. Roy alleged that the whole of eastern region 
was neglected and the Centre was discriminating against the region, 
particularly West Bengal. (Basu, 1989, p. 9) 
 
Different studies undertaken during 1960s dealing with the problem of 
unequal distribution of industrial licences among the States, however, 
argued that industrial licensing policy instead of following the path of a 
equal industrial development seems to have widened the disparity among 
the States by favouring the more industrially developed States in issuing 
licences liberally compared to the other States. Even the regulation & 
control over industrial development has not proved to be an efficient 
instrument in lessening regional disparities in development. Consequently, 
concentration of private investment in a few industrial centres of the country 
became a major problem. “According to the report of the Monopolies 
Enquiry Commission (1965) there are altogether 533 factories under the 75 
leading industrial business houses of the country of which 288 or more than 
54 per cent were located in three States i.e., West Bengal (152), 
Maharastra (71) and Tamil Nadu (65). Even in these States there was an 
extreme concentration of units in major cities. Calcutta accounted for 76  
and Bombay-Thana for 49.” (Thavraj, 1978, p. 131) As evident from table 3 
(see Appendix) Maharastra & West Bengal seem to have absorbed nearly 
44 per cent of the total license issued during 1952-1967 i.e., out of total 
licence of 11268 during 1952-67 West Bengal and Maharastra  managed to 
receive 4938 hence 44 per cent. And about 36 percent of the total capital 
investment until the late 1960s. (Report of the Taxation Enquiry Committee, 
Government of Kerala, 1969, p. 26)  
 
However, it is worth noting in this connection that although few pockets of 
industrially developed centres such as West Bengal, Maharastra and Tamil 
Nadu seem to have absorbed the major share of industrial licence, the 
position of West Bengal taken separately clearly shows that the share of 
licence had been on a continuous decline compared to Maharstra not only 
since the early 1960s but also even during 1952-57 when West Bengal 
ranked first almost all economic indicators. Thus the share of industrial 
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licence of West Bengal (379) during 1952-57 was considerably lower than 
Maharastra (504) and remained constantly low throughout the 1960s (table 
3 see Appendix). The reason behind this is not difficult to seek. As we have 
mentioned in the preceding part of the this study that structural constraints 
operating on the economy of West Bengal since the pre-Independence 
period had a retarding effect on West Bengal’s industrial development as a 
whole  from the very outset.  
 
In this connection Bengal Chamber of Commerce and Industry (BCCI) 
(1975) in their later study emphasised on certain structural handicaps of the 
industrial base112 of West Bengal which posed considerable difficulties in 
obtaining industrial licence. As they felt that there is a lack of 
entrepreneurship in West Bengal combined with several institutional and 
structural constraints which led to the overall stagnation in the State’s 
industrial scenario. Therefore, a kind of vicious circle has developed in West 
Bengal wherein stagnation discourages entrepreneurship which further 
accentuates stagnation. That is why special effort is required to be taken for 
breaking up this circle. The Bengal Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
(1975) alleged that generous granting of industrial license to West Bengal 
could have helped to provide incentives for setting up more industries in this 
region. But industrial licensing policy so far did not play this supportive role. 
On the contrary, it was being quite discouraging in granting license to West 
Bengal.113 (BCCI, 1975, p. 49).  
 
As regards the other structural handicaps, dominance of large business 
houses  in West Bengal have also had a retarding effect on the economy of 
                                                          
112 Bengal Chamber of Commerce and Industry (1975) admitted that the State has narrow 
base of enterprise with over concentration of industrial base in the few industries and also 
centred on CMDA area of the State. The three major industries of jute, tea and engineering 
employing about 89 per cent of the industrial labour force. Therefore, the industrial 
structure of the State lacks resilience and adaptability. Moreover, it has been suffering from 
lack of diversification, technological bottlenecks and lack of local investor’s involvement 
which resulted in industrial stagnation and made it more recession prone than other States. 
(West Bengal-Travail Continues, Bengal Chamber Commerce and Industry, 1975, p. 58) 
The government of West Bengal while submitting the memorandum before the Sixth 
Finance Commission also mentioned that the so called traditional industries of West 
Bengal like jute, tea, coal mining and structural engineering with railway ancillaries have a 
low growth potential as compared to modern industries like chemical, electronics and 
petro-chemical industries, etc. In addition to that these industries was faced the problems 
of acute shortage of raw materials many of which was under the control of the Centre and 
also infra-structural materials like iron and steel, cement, wagons, transport, vehicles 
power etc. (Memorandum to the Sixth Finance Commission, GOWB, 1973, p.16)Therefore, 
the complaint of discrimination made by West Bengal regarding allocation of inadequate 
raw materials to the State (See Ray & Sato, 1987, p. 144) was in existence much before 
the Left Front came to power.   
 
 
 
113 “Therefore it is seen that the licensing policy, far from encouraging industry in West 
Bengal, is on the contrary, putting needless difficulties in the way of even well established 
units. This unrealistic policy has inhibited the industrial growth of the State with its 
consequent effect on employment potential.” (BCCI, 1975, p. 51) 
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West Bengal and made it difficult to receive licence.114 For historical 
reasons most of these monopoly houses dominated the scene in West 
Bengal and large scale industrial sectors in West Bengal had always been 
run mainly by a few big business houses and international companies. Later 
on introduction of Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act (MRTP) 
1970 with the objective of putting restrictions on the growth of the such 
large monopoly houses had further inhibiting effects on industries in West 
Bengal.115 Obviously, constraints on their growth and expansion leads to 
constraints on the growth of industry of the State in general116.(BCCI, 1975, 
pp. 51-52) As early as in the late 1960s the former Chief Minister, Ajoy 
Kumar Mukerjee, had made the plea that since at least 13 of 20 the then 
listed monopoly houses were based in Calcutta they should be offered 
some relaxation so far as investment within the State is concerned. But the 
plea was turned down by the government of India.(“Wooing Industrialists”, 
EPW, June 12, 1982)   
 
The Chief Minister of West Bengal during the Left Front rule (Jyoti Basu)   
also made a similar plea and it was complained that the Centre was 
having a discriminatory attitude in this regard. While the Centre tended to 
be more liberal in allowing Monopoly and Restrictive Trade and Practices 
(MRTP) and Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA) companies to set 
up new industries in other States. But when it come to West Bengal the 
Centre seemed to be too strict too follow the rules. (“Wooing Industrialists”, 
EPW, June 12, 1982) 
 
Of all structural constraints in obtaining licences lack of regionally 
committed industrialists of the State seems to play big role in its failure to 
influence government policies on distribution of licenses among the States. 
(BCCI, 1975; Dasgupta, 1998; Pedersen, 2001;) According to the Industries 
(Development and Regulation) Act of 1951, most of the industries were 
                                                          
114 In 1974 C. Subramaniam, the then Minister of Industrial Development had admitted that 
fewer licenses were granted to West Bengal than to Maharastra and Gujarat. He gave 
main reason for such a difference as that West Bengal’s application were received from 
large industrial houses or from foreign companies. Not many applications were received 
from medium or new entrepreneurs and the majority being for traditional industries like jute 
coal, steel or heavy engineering. (BCCI, 1975, p. 51) 
115 Under this Act undertakings possessing assets valued of Rs. 20 crores or above, or 
those which are dominant in the production or distribution of goods or the provision of 
services have to register themselves with the Government. Though the Act does not 
automatically debar further expansion of these companies yet this is to be permitted only if 
it is in the “wider public interest”. How this Act has affected industry in West Bengal is 
understod by the fact, revealed in March 1974 by the Chairman of the MRTP Commission 
that not a single application had been received by the Commission from any monopoly 
house in West Bengal. Rightly or wrongly, industrialists fear rejection of their plans. This is 
an added reason for the lack of new investment in West Bengal in recent years.  (BCCI, 
1975, p. 52) 
 
116The legacy of foreign control on investment in industry, mines and plantations in West 
Bengal did not help the State. As late as in 1966-67, data on companies registered 
elsewhere but working in India showed that West Bengal had 288 such companies, against 
181 in Maharastra, with the other States having only a sprinkling of such companies. 
(Dasgupta,S, “ West Bengal and Industry A Regional Perspective, EPW, Nov. 21,1998, p. 
3056 also see Vaid (1972)  
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given to the States. Since then, however, the list has been drastically 
changed. The original was beyond recognition. As a result 93 per cent of 
the organised industry in the country were out of the reach of the State 
governments for they fell entirely within the jurisdiction of the Centre. 
Therefore, in the changed situation the Sate could only work as a pressure 
group for setting up industries in their region. (BCCI, 1975, pp. 46-47) “This 
meant that being able to influence the government’s policies became an 
important precondition for industrial growth of the States. (Pedersen, 2001, 
p. 649) Lack of regional investors and lack of influence on Central policies 
made it difficult for West Bengal to attract “investible resources to the state 
either through the diversion of private capital through the licensing system 
or by investment in the public sector.”117 (Dasgupta, 1998, p. 3058)   
 
During 1970s though the State managed to recover partly from its industrial 
stagnation of the late 1960s and improve its position as far as industrial 
licence is concerned but the State has never been able to reach its pre-
1965 level. Lack of interest of investment in the State continued since that 
period from which the State is yet to recover. In terms of both value added 
and employment the pre-eminence of West Bengal was lost by the late 
1970s118 which has become evident in its declining share in not only the 
                                                          
117 Former Chief Minister of West Bengal Jyoti Basu had repeatedly been saying that the 
Centre did not only invest any money for new public sector projects in the State but was 
also discouraging the private sector in the matter of setting up new industrial units in West 
Bengal. The lack of Centre’s co-operation, as he said, has been reflected in the fall in direct 
investment by the Central government in West Bengal through i’s undertakings. The share 
of West Bengal in the total Central investment has fallen from 11.7 percent in 1970 to 7.1 
per cent in 1985, whereas the share of Maharastra had increased from 3.1 percent in 1970 
to 16.1 per cent in 1985. (Chaudhuri, K, “Left Front Ten Years in Power”, EPW, July 25, 
1987, p. 1230) However, Central investment in the basic and heavy industrial sectors most 
of which are situated in the eastern region including West Bengal started declining since 
the mid-1960s.  Bannerjee (1986) observes that investment by the Centre in the public 
sector undertakings in West Bengal declined from 19.06 per cent of the total investment in 
1966 to 12.89 per cent in 1975. (Banerjee, D, “Unevenness of Development in a National 
Economy: A Case Study of West Bengal Industries”, Centre for Studies in Social Sciences, 
Occasional Paper No. 86, Calcutta, 1986,pp. 74) Therefore, much before the Left Front 
came to power Centre’s investment started declining in West Bengal including the whole 
eastern region.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
118 Indian Chamber of Commerce  commented that productivity in West Bengal continued 
to be very low. Units under the same management and with similar machines are working 
better in other States as compared to West Bengal. With about 13 per cent of the 
organised sectors labour force the value added by West Bengal is only 11.6 per cent in 
1977-78 as against 13.2 per cent (employment) and 20.9 per cent (share in value added) in 
1965. It is evident from the table below that while other States such as Maharastra, Gujarat 
managed to increase their share of value added over the period from 1965 to 1977-78, 
West Bengal registered a sharp decline. (West Bengal Need for Industrial Reconstruction, 
Indian Chamber of Commerce, Calcutta, 1983, p. 7) 
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total industrial licences issued to the State but also in the declining number 
of industrial licences for new units and substantial expansion. Therefore, the 
industrial licences issued to West Bengal had undergone a qualitative 
deterioration. In 1965 out of the 63 licences issued to West Bengal 47 were 
for new units i.e., for substantial expansion while in 1973 out of the total 41 
licences issued only 3 were for new units and 11 were for substantial 
expansion. The same trend continued until the late 1970s and also in the 
later period.  Out of total licences issued to the State very little were, issued 
for new units and substantial expansion. (Dasgupta, 1998, p. 3051)(see 
table 4, 5, 5(a) and 5 (b) in Appendix) 
 
It was in this context the Left Front government came to power in 1977. 
Complaint of discrimination against the State as regards issuing less 
number of industrial licences to West Bengal has to be examined against 
this backdrop. The pre-existing structural constraints such as narrow base 
of industries and lack of modernisation of the existing units119, pre-
dominance of export based industries owned either by  foreign companies 
or governments combined with continuously deteriorated infrastructural 
situation made the State more investment unfriendly and had accentuated 
the industrial stagnation further in the later period. It is well known that 
infrastructure plays an important role in attracting investment into a 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
 
 
 
Table 
 
Percentage Share of Four States in the All India 
 Employment and Value Added  
 Share in Employment      Share in Value Added State 
1965 1977-78 1965 1977-78 
Maharastra 19.2 17.5 24.9 25.0 
West Bengal 22.1 13.2 20.9 11.6 
Gujrat 8.5 9.0 8.6 10.2 
Tamil Nadu 8.7 9.9 8.8 9.9 
Source: West Bengal Need for Industrial Reconstruction,  
Indian Chamber of Commerce, Calcutta, 1983, p. 7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
119 Modernisation of some old industries is urgently called for but trade unions are averse to 
modernisation and rationalisation. Most of the industries in West Bengal are traditional 
industries. Unless they are modernised they can not compete with their counterparts. For 
example in jute industry there is more than 15 per cent excess labour. It should take not 
more than 50 persons to produce a ton of jute goods, while it takes 80 to 90 persons for the 
same in jute industry of West Bengal. (West Bengal Need for Industrial Reconstruction, 
Indian Chamber of Commerce, Calcutta, 1983, p. 7) It is worth recalling the comment made 
by Bengal Chamber of Commerce in 1975 that there has been no compulsion to diversify 
production or modernise industry. Some of West Bengal’s engineering products have been 
priced out due to higher production cost despite low labour cost. So lack of fund for 
modernisation has been in existence since much earlier. (West Bengal The travail 
Continues, Bengal Chamber of Commerce &  Industry, 1975, p. 15) 
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particular region. Indian Chamber of Commerce (1983) made a thorough 
study on serious infrastructural bottleneck of the State covering the period 
from the mid 1960s to the late 1970s.120 At the same time The Association 
of Indian Engineering Industry (AIEI) observed that the industrial structure 
of West Bengal had remained the same for the last twenty years and 
“...witnessing a complete breakdown of infrastructure which far from 
attracting fresh investment is resulting in a massive flight of capital to other 
States and that too by companies who were firmly entrenched in this State 
for nearly a century.” (The Statesman, January 31, 1982; Quoted in Mallick, 
1993, p. 182)    
 
Recently Ghosh & De (1998) wanted to construct a composite index of 
regional infrastructural development which is so far called Physical 
Infrastructure Development Index (PIDI) giving varying weight to six 
commonly used representative indicators of physical infrastructure such as 
transport network (railway + road), irrigation facility, power and telephone 
density etc. According to PIDI, whereas in 1971-72 West Bengal’s rank was 
8 among all the major States in India, it registered a sharp decline and 
came down to 18 in 1994-95 (table 6 see Appendix) (Ghosh & De, 1998, p. 
3041) implying a persistent deterioration of its infrastructure. Similar attempt 
was also made by Centre for Monitoring of Indian Economy (CMIE). 
Relative infrastructure index of the different States in 1993-94 indicates that 
the better off States in general are in a position to provide much better 
infrastructure than the poorer ones. West Bengal’s infrastructure index was 
as low as 94.2 and was followed by Assam (78.9) Bihar (81.1), Madhya 
Pradesh (75.3) and Rajasthan (83.0) (table 7 see Appendix) (also see 
Kurian, 2000, p. 547) 
 
Poor infra-structure, low profitability of the existing industries in West 
Bengal are the main reasons for industrial stagnation, was also 
                                                          
120 West Bengal’s industrial stagnation was due to the inter-action of several adverse 
factors as observed by Indian Chamber of Commerce (1983). Uncertainty of power supply, 
deteriorating infrastructure facilities, aversion to modernisation and rationalisation of labour 
have all contributed to the present deteriorated industrial scenario of the State. (ibid., p. 18) 
One of the major bottlenecks of infrastructure in the State was acute power shortages. The 
major reason for the power shortage was, however, low capacity utilisation in the existing 
power plants and slow pace of capacity expansion. Expansion of generating capacity in the 
State was very low in the past and has continued during the later period too. The slow 
growth of capacity expansion in West Bengal compared to other States during 1951-81 will 
be evident from  table 8 (a) (Appendix). Compared to many States the Plant Load Factor 
(PLF) in West Bengal continues to be also very low during 1979-80 to 1984-85 (table 8 (b) 
see Appendix)The per capita availability of power is one of the important indicators of 
industrialisation which was quite low in West Bengal compared to other States during 
1979-80. (table 8 (c) see Appendix) (West Bengal Need for Industrial Reconstruction, 
Indian Chamber of Commerce, Calcutta,1983, pp. 3-5) As regards development 
expenditure on capital account which is incurred on capital formation and hence 
infrastructural development, declined from 56 per cent in 1966-67 to 31 per cent in 1981-
82. On the contrary revenue expenditure account increased from 54 per cent in 1966-67 to 
71.4 per cent in 1981-82. (ibid., p. 20) 
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acknowledged by the report titled ‘Industrial Revival of West Bengal’ 
prepared by A.Banerjee & others in 2001. In the infrastructure sector the 
report mentioned three major areas, in urgent need to be developed were 
roads, electricity and communication which however, requires significant 
amount of capital expenditure, hence capital formation.  But Comptroller of 
Auditor General (CAG) has already pointed out that Plan expenditure of the 
State showed a negative growth rate (-) 1.6 per cent from 1994-95 to 1998-
99. The State’s debt liabilities had been also as high as Rs. 11, 030 crores 
in 1998-99 when its total revenue was Rs. 9,387 crores. (Bandyopadhyay, 
2001, p. 4789) This area will be dealt with thoroughly in the chapter 6 of this 
study.  
 
As far as supply of power is concerned power generation not the only 
important factor for industrialisation. More important is proper transmission 
and distribution network that is the determining factor. There was hardly any 
grid network in the whole eastern and north eastern region and therefore 
even if surplus power was generated anywhere in these two regions, it 
could not be easily transmitted to deficit areas. (Hazari, 1983, pp. 12) Such 
lack of transmission facilities and distribution network in West Bengal along 
with the whole eastern region seems to continue till to date.121 Furthermore, 
apart from the CMDA area of the State, the quality of power supply in the 
districts of West Bengal prevents setting up industries in this region. There 
is not only uncertainty of “supply of power but the poor quality (low voltage 
and fluctuating voltage) also has a devastating effect on industrial plant and 
machinery deterring any prospective investors”. (Bandyopadhyay, 2001, p. 
4790) 
 
Cumulative effect of all these factors led to prolonged stagnation in the 
industrial sectors of West Bengal122 which has been evident in growing 
number of sick industries in the State since the early 1980s.123 It seems 
                                                          
121 For the same reason we can see that power became abundant because as is no 
demand of power. There is no demand for power from big industries and the subscriber of 
such units are only 2000. Power supply is there but there is no efficient arrangement for 
transmission. (Anandabazar Patrika, Calcutta based Bengali Daily, 12th October, 1998) 
Inadequate transmission and distribution network and the fact that the expected increase in 
demand for power has failed to materialise have also compounded the problem. Non-
utilisation of the additional power generation capacity is a problem faced by the entire 
region. The lack of demand for power made power abundant but low demand and lack of 
distribution facility hinders power suplly where it is needed.  (Times of India, June 4, 1997) 
122 In 1980-81 West Bengal produced 9.8 per cent of the total industrial output of India. It 
reached at 4.5 per cent in 1995-96. Since then there has been marginal improvement but 
nothing significant. West Bengal’s share in the foreign trade (export and import) was 10 per 
cent of India’s total in 1985-86, which came down to 4 per cent in 1998-99. As for the 
measure of vibrancy of trade in 1999-2000, the value of cheques cleared in Calcutta was 
just 6 per cent of the value in Mumbai, compared to the State’s own shrae of 38 per cent in 
1980-81. Thus from the second largest industrial State in India in the mid-1960s West 
Bengal has slipped down to remain just ahead of Uttar Pradesh. (Bandyopadhyay, D, 
“Recipie for Industrial Revival”, EPW, December 29, 2001, p. 4788) 
 
123 Increasing number of industries turned sick in the State due to the cumulative effect of 
all these adverse factors. Industries had become sick at higher rate in West Bengal than all 
States in India. (Anik, Calcutta based Quarterly Bengali Magazine, December, 1994, p.15) 
The number of closures of industrial units in Calcutta began to accelerate from the 
beginning of the 1980s. In December 1979 the number of sick or closed factories was 
22,366 and it increased to 147,780 at the end of 1986 and further stepped up to 159,928 in 
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clear that labour militancy could no longer provide an easy explanation for 
the lack of industrial investment since strikes have decreased significantly 
while lockouts and closures by industrialists increased sharply since the 
early 1980s. Number of strikes in 1980 was 78 while the number of lockouts 
declared by industrialists was as high as 130 and registered a sharp 
increase to 270 in 2000. In contrast number of strikes came down to 26 only 
in 2000 (table 9 see Appendix) (Economic Review, Statistical Appendix, 
GOWB, p. 115) Such increasing number of sick industries coupled with low 
level of industrial activity led to low level of industrial licenses issued to the 
State during the entire Left Front era. Therefore, the question immediately 
arises in our mind that while it is true that during the post-1977 period West 
Bengal has received lower level of industrial licences compared to the other 
industrially developed States (though the trend started much earlier), it is 
not clear to what extent it is the reflection of deliberate discrimination 
against the State or it is just the reflection of low level of economic activities 
and lack of investors’ interest in the State. Since after the abolition of the 
industrial licensing policy (1991) West Bengal did not manage to get 
sufficient industrial licenses compared to both its past performance as well 
as compared to the other States. (Kurian, 2000; Pedersen, 2001, p. 661) 
Before turning to this area it would be worthwhile to mention the observation 
of Mallick (1993) who also seems to have arrived at a similar conclusion.    
 
Mallick (1993) also argued that it is difficult to prove any politically motivated 
discrimination since there is no evidence of systematic discrimination made 
against West Bengal during the Left Front era compared to the Congress 
regime. Consequently lower number of industrial licenses to the State 
during the Left Front era, as perceived by Mallick (1993), was the result of 
relatively poor infrastructure of the State, prolonged industrial stagnation 
and absence of local entrepreneurs who could have had considerable 
influence on Centre’s policy. Therefore, he felt that, “even the Left Front 
admits that investment in Bengal has been on the downturn since the 
1950’s when Congress was in the power. Bengal in any case has neither 
the electoral numbers to exert political pressure nor the efficient 
infrastructure likely to encourage investment.” He went on to say that “if one 
looks at the issuing of licenses by the Centre during both Congress and 
Communist regimes there does not appear to be any systematic 
discrimination against Bengal because of it’s Communist government. 
Though it does not receive the highest number of licenses, it occupies a 
middle position commensurate with the investment opportunities it can 
provide.” (Mallick,1993, p. 183 )  
 
During the post-liberalisation period industrial licensing policy was 
abolished. And in the changed situation Industrial Entrepreneurs 
Memoranda (IEM) has become the indicator of propensity to invest in a 
particular State and IEM is supposed to be submitted by potential investors 
to the respective State governments. In 1994 West Bengal government 
declared their industrial policy and started wooing industrialists into the 
State along with other State governments by offering various incentives. As 
evident from table 10 (see Appendix) that despite such incentives offered by 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
June 1987. About Rs. 5,738 crore of bank loan are now locked up with them. (Mitra, A, “Is 
Calcutta Still India’s City?”, EPW, May 5-12 1990. p. 1003) 
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the State West Bengal’s percentage share of total investment proposals 
coming through the Industrial Entrepreneur’s Memoranda (IEM) was as low 
as 3.3 per cent during the period between August 1991 and December 
1998 which was not only lower than Andhra Pradesh (8.3 per cent ), Gujarat 
(18.7 per cent), Karnataka (5.6 per cent) and Maharastra (18.0 per cent ) 
but it was also considerably lower than Rajasthan (3.9 per cent), Uttar 
Pradesh (9.4 per cent) and Madhya Pradesh (7.4 per cent). By and large 
the disparities between the forward States and the backward States are 
obvious. The group of the forward States managed to secure about two-
third of the investment proposals while the group of the backward States 
accounted for just about 28 per cent of the total amount. Investment into a 
particular region depends on better infrastructural facilities, conducive 
environment for running industries etc. Middle and poor category States, 
quite evidently, have been lagging behind the forward States in regard to 
the above mentioned facilities and are placed in a disadvantageous position 
they in the race for attracting investment into their region. But not to speak 
of poor income States (Bihar, Orissa, Assam), of the middle income States, 
West Bengal’s position seems to be the worst just above Kerala (1.1 pert 
cent). In fact, as it was concluded by Pedersen (2001), that its “performance 
has been very much in line with its share of past industrial licenses.” 
(Pedersen, 2001, p. 661) Separately, the situation regarding foreign 
investment in West Bengal also conforms with the domestic investment. 
West Bengal’s share of IEM filed was as low as 3.1 per cent between June 
1995 and January 1997. And its share of approved foreign investment has 
been even lower accounting only 2.3 per cent reflecting the reluctance 
shown by foreign as well as domestic investors into this State. (Pedersen, 
2001, p. 662)  
 
Low credit-deposit ratio and low level of financial support by financial 
institutions  
 
West Bengal government esspecially the Left Front Ministers feel that they 
have been discriminated by the Centrally controlled financial institutions and 
commercial banks. Since investment of Centrally controlled financial 
institutions (namely, LIC, IDB, ICICI, IFC, IRBI, SBI, UTI) and credit-deposit 
ratio of scheduled commercial banks in West Bengal have remained 
significantly low compared to the other States during the post-Left Front era. 
Therefore, “it is alleged (by West Bengal government) that commercial 
banks show surprising reluctance to advance credit to units or individuals 
located in the state. To put it concretely the so called credit-deposit ratios 
(i.e., C-D ratios) of branches of commercial banks in West Bengal have 
remained remarkably low levels in comparison with those observed in some 
economically more developed states.“ (Das & Maiti, 1998, p. 3081)  
 
However, it is also alleged that one of the major reasons of slow growth rate 
of development mainly in the industrial front in West Bengal is lack of 
institutional credit. Moreover, growing industrial sickness in the State is 
mainly due to lack of funds for modernisation and expansion of industrial 
units. (Chowdhury, 1975, (First edition)  pp. 66-67) New entrepreneurs and 
the existing industrial units in the State have not been provided credit as 
liberally as have been done in other States by the Centrally controlled 
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financial institutions and scheduled commercial banks. (Basu,1989, p.11; 
Choudhury, 1975, pp. 66-67)  
 
As in the case of issuing industrial licences, another allegation of declining 
share of institutional credit to West Bengal came to the fore since the mid-
1960s. Accordingly the complaint of providing inadequate credit to West 
Bengal during the pre-Left Front era was also perceived from two different 
angles. On the one hand it was perceived from the perspective of regional 
imbalance and on the other hand different business organisations 
concerned with West Bengal considered it from the State’s angle. From the 
former perspective West Bengal was considered as a developed State and 
apparent disparities in banking development in few advanced States 
including West Bengal compared to the less developed States124 was of a 
great concern. Thus the problem of siphoning of the deposits mobilised in 
the poor income States in order to cater to the high income States 
consequent upon proportionately larger demand for bank credit than 
deposits in these advanced States were the major areas of contention. 
Furthermore, it was also alleged that the Centrally controlled financial 
institutions seem to have followed the path of widening regional disparity by 
providing major share of financial assistance to the advanced States 
compared to the backward ones. (Report of the Taxation Enquiry 
Commission, Government of Kerala, 1969, 26-27;  Thavraj, 1978, pp. 131-
132; George & Gulati, 1985; Shukla & Roy Chowdhury; 1992, pp. 253-279)  
 
The Report of Taxation Enquiry Commission, Kerala (1969) revealed State- 
wise distribution of bank deposits and bank credits of the scheduled 
commercial banks for years 1961 & 1966. It is evident from table 11 (See 
Appendix) that there are very wide variations in per capita bank deposit and 
per capita bank credit among the States. Evidently, the richer States had 
greater access to bank credit on account of the relatively high degree of 
industrial and commercial activities. This tendency is reflected by relatively 
excess credit over deposits in the richer States like Maharastra and West 
Bengal compared to the poor category States like Bihar and Orissa. In 1961 
per capita bank credit in West Bengal (Rs. 93.5) was greater than per capita 
bank deposit (Rs. 89.3). In 1966 similar trend continued in West Bengal. 
Per capita bank credit of West Bengal was Rs. 142 which was higher than 
the per capita bank deposit of Rs.128.2. In case of Maharastra in 1961 per 
capita bank credit (Rs. 97.0) was much higher than par capita bank deposit 
(Rs. 20.7) though in 1966 per capital bank deposit (Rs. 203. 9) in 
                                                          
124Disparities in the banking sector development which plays a vital role in economic 
development of a particular region was analysed in Rao’s (1981) study Bank constitutes an 
important institution attracting deposits and lending credit i.e., the growth of banking 
facilities indicates extension of organised credit to the developing sectors of the economy. 
State wise index of Bank development indicated that developed States such as 
Maharastra, West Bengal, Madras, and Gujarat occupied top four positions in the banking 
sector in 1956, while the industrially backward States registered low banking index values 
which established that banking development took place only in the industrialised areas. It 
was revealed that Maharastra occupied first and West Bengal second place in banking 
development index during 1956, 1961 and 1965 followed by Madras and Gujarat which 
respectively occupied third and the fourth Place withs variation from year to year. (Rao,H, 
Centre-State Financial Relations Criteria of Federal Fiscal Transfers and Their Application 
in India, Allied Publishers Private Limited, New Delhi,   1981, pp. 85-86) 
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Maharastra was much higher than the per capita bank credit (Rs. 174.1). By 
and large there is a clear indication of siphoning of the excess deposits 
accumulated in the less developed industrialised States through the 
network of banking institutions in favour of the already developed industrial 
and commercial centres. (Report of the Taxation Enquiry Committee, 1969, 
Government of Kerala, 1969, pp. 26-27) Similar observation was also made 
by Thavraj (1978).  Considering the period of 1970s he concluded that there 
was a wide variation in per capita bank deposit and per capita bank credit 
among the States. Commercial bank credit in the four industrially advanced 
States like Maharastra, West Bengal, Gujarat and Tamil Nadu was about 
57.4 per cent of the total commercial credit in the country while the bank 
deposits accumulated in these States constituted less than 50 per cent of 
the total deposit as on 30th June 1974 reflecting siphoning of the excess 
deposits from developed to backward region. (Thavraj, 1978, pp. 131-132) 
 
This trend also evident from the disbursement of funds made by the all-
India financial institutions. Richer States like Maharastra, West Bengal, 
Gujarat and Tamil Nadu tended to absorb a pre-dominant portion of the 
financial assistance channelled through all India financial institutions. 
Particularly, Maharastra and West Bengal have accounted nearly 40 per 
cent of the financial assistance sanctioned by Industrial Development Bank 
of India (IDBI) between July 1964 & June 1968 and 46 per cent of the credit 
given by Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India (ICICI) up to 
December 31, 1966. In the case of credit channelled through the Industrial 
Finance Corporation of India (IFCI) these States share was about 32 per 
cent up to June 1968. (Report of the Taxation Enquiry Committee, 
Government of Kerala, 1969, pp. 26-27) Thavraj (1978) also observed that 
Maharastra, Gujarat, Tamil Nadu and West Bengal claimed the major share 
of the credit disbursed by these centrally controlled financial institutions i.e., 
these four States claimed nearly 50 per cent of the long term funds 
disbursed by the Industrial Development Bank of India (IDBI) during 1975-
76 and about 62 per cent of the loans sanctioned by the Industrial Credit 
and Investment Corporation of India (ICICI) up to December 31, 1976. In 
case of the credit sanctioned through the Industrial Finance Corporation of 
India (IFCI) the share of the four States has been about 48 per cent up to 
June 30, 1976.   (Thavraj, 1978, pp. 131-132) 
 
However, considering the case of West Bengal separately, it was evident 
that West Bengal’s share of per capita credit as well as financial assistance 
through all India financial institutions since the 1960s was much less than 
those in the other developed States including Maharastra. Although until the 
early 1970s the industrial situation of West Bengal was more or less 
comparable with Maharastra. Afterwards West Bengal registered a drastic 
fall in terms of almost all indicators as we have mentioned earlier. It was in 
this context Bengal National Chamber of Commerce and Industry (BNCCI) 
(1965) complained that though West Bengal comes next to Maharastra in 
the percentages of ex-factory value output and the value added by 
manufactures, the State is not receiving much financial help from the 
different Centrally controlled financial agencies.125 Similar contention was 
                                                          
125 Therefore compared to Maharastra as credit disbursed by IFC as on June 1964, West 
Bengal received 10.1 per cent as against 17.3 per cent in Maharastra. Credit disbursed by 
 216
expressed by Bengal Chamber of Commerce and Industry (BCCI) (1971) 
that as against the share of industrial development West Bengal definitely 
was provided less financial assistance by the all India financial institutions 
than Maharastra. Thus, West Bengal clearly was deprived of its due. West 
Bengal’s share of the total credit disbursed by the all India financial 
institutions at the end of 1966-67 should not have been only 13.1 per cent 
as against 26.5 per cent in Maharastra and 14.7 per cent in Tamil Nadu 
(table 12 see Appendix) (BCCI,1971, pp. 146-147) The same trend 
continued during the early years of 1970s. West Bengal, as alleged by 
BCCI, was not favoured by the Centrally controlled financial institutions 
compared to the other developed States.126 
 
West Bengal was also classified under the rich income States by the 
pioneering studies undertaken by Gulati & George (1978) and George & 
Gulati (1985) covering both the period 1969-76 and 1973-80. West Bengal’s 
share of credit by commercial banks as well as financial assistance by the  
Centrally controlled financial institutions were much lower than in case of 
the other advanced States. Therefore, credit plus investment disbursed by 
commercial banks during the period of 1969-76 was only  Rs. 184 for West 
Bengal as against Rs. 215 for Gujarat, Rs. 349 for Maharastra and Rs. 393 
for Punjab. (see table 11 of chapter 4 in Appendix) On the other hand 
credit-deposit ratio was also lowest in West Bengal which accounted for 50 
as against 62 in Gujarat, 73 in Maharastra, 103 in Haryana and 78 in 
Punjab. Equally credit + investment to deposit ratio was also quite low in 
West Bengal compared to the other developed States during the same 
period. (table 13 see Appendix) 
 
Similar trend continued even after the Left Front government came to 
power. If we consider the investment by major credit institutions during the 
Left Front era, it will be found that West Bengal was at the bottom list of the 
so called developed States as can be shown from table 14 (see Appendix). 
However, one of the major handicaps of receiving adequate credit for West 
Bengal is that the head offices of almost all Centrally controlled financial 
institutions are located either in Bombay or in New Delhi. Furthermore, 
regional offices are not given sufficient power to sanction loan beyond a 
certain small amount.  Therefore, locational advantage of having head 
offices is enjoyed by the adjoining States. Though Calcutta is the biggest 
city in India its demand for having the head offices for financial institutions 
were denied. (Basu, 1989, p. 11) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
ICICI as on 1963 West Bengal received 8.1 per cent as against 33.8 per cent to 
Maharastra. Likewise Credit disbursed by LIC, West Bengal received 28. 1 per cent as 
against 31.0 in Maharastra (Economic Problems of West Bengal Proceeding of the 
Seminar held in March 1965, Bengal National Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 
Calcutta, 1965, p. 173) 
126Taking financial institutions as a whole (IDBI, IFCI, ICICI, IRCI,) Maharastra continued to 
be the most favoured State. In 1970-71, 1971-72 and 1972-73 Maharastra received  Rs. 
52.8 crores , Rs. 48.4 crores and Rs. 64.3 crores respectively as against Rs. 11.3 crores,  
Rs.13.7 crores and Rs. 20.8 crores for West Bengal during the same period. (West Bengal 
The Travail Continues, BCCI, Calcutta, 1975, p. 61)  
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Constant allegation of low credit-deposit ratio of West Bengal compared to 
the other developed States seems to be a major area of tension during the 
Left Front era. In this connection it was argued that high or low credit-
deposit ratio of a State could be an outcome of a combination of different 
complicated factors. Low and high credit-deposit ratio do not always 
necessarily correspond to poverty and abundance of a particular region. It 
may also be noted that credit-deposit ratio as an indicator of investment has 
certain limitations as observed by Kurian (1999). Relatively lower credit-
deposit ratio in States like Goa (24.6) Punjab (38.6) and Kerala (44.3) as on 
March 1998  compared to other developed States may result from partly 
high bank deposit in the States on account of large remittances from 
migrants which is well beyond the investment potential of these States 
(table 15 see Appendix) (Kurian, 1999, p. 1117) Similarly, high credit-
deposit ratio of a particular region, however, does not always reflect  
abundance of credit to the region. The credit-deposit ratio of a State may be 
high for example, if the underdevelopment of the State keeps deposit 
mobilisation at a low level. Therefore, high credit-deposit ratio does not 
always corresponds with higher level of economic activities and larger share 
of credits to the particular region. (Das & Maiti, 1998, p. 3081) 
 
Nevertheless  more often than not low credit-deposit ratio corresponds to 
low level of economic activities, low demand for credit and low credit 
worthiness. The very low credit-deposit ratio of States like Bihar (27.5) and 
Uttar Pradesh (28.6) is a reflection of the fact that these States are unable 
to absorb the even lower level of deposits mobilised there.(table 15) 
(Kurian, 1999, p. 1117) Das & Maiti (1998) opined that one of the 
determining factors of credit-deposit ratio of a State or a region is credit- 
worthiness. A low credit-deposit ratio may result from the unwillingness on 
the part of the banks to advance loans in a State for low credit-worthiness of 
the entrepreneurs of that State. (Das & Maiti, 1998, p. 3081) Therefore, 
according to the law of market credit flow will be into those States or regions 
which are more worthy than others. Low credit-deposit ratio may also reflect 
low demand for bank credit for productive purposes due to low level of 
economic activities. In West Bengal, as argued by higher officials of 
commercial  banks, there is hardly any demand for bank credit due to lack 
of interest of investors to invest in this State. Therefore, the allegation of 
providing low volume of credit against the commercial banks of this State 
does not seem to have any ground for lack of demand for bank credit 
automatically leads to  low level of credit- deposit ratio of the State. 
(Anandabazar Patrika (Calcutta based Bengali Daily), October 22, 1998) 
 
However, it is relevant to note that credit-deposit ratio has been showing a 
declining trend for all States since the last three decades as observed by 
Das & Maiti (1998). The credit-deposit ratios over time across the States 
revealed a number of interesting features. Firstly, over the period from 
1972-73 to 1993-94 credit-deposit ratio indicates a downward trend for 
every State. Therefore, though the credit-deposit ratio of West Bengal has 
remained below the all India average except in the first few years of the 
1970s, West Bengal can not be singled out in this respect because as this 
particular feature is seen in  Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat, and even in Punjab. 
(Das & Maiti,  1998, p. 3088)   
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During the post-liberalisation period due to recessionary conditions overall 
credit-deposit ratio of the commercial banks has been coming down. The 
credit-deposit ratio of the all India level was as high as 61 per cent as on 
last Friday of March 1992. Between 1992 and 1998 the over all credit-
deposit ratio came down by 5.5 percentage point. The decline was much 
steeper in the case of low income States, 12 percentage point in Bihar, 12.3 
in Madhya Pradesh, 27 in Orissa, 7.8 in Rajasthan, 16 in Uttar Pradesh. 
Contrary to that credit-deposit ratio in Maharastra improved from 62.4 per 
cent in 1992 to 72.3 per cent in 1998. (Kurian, 1999, p. 1117) 
 
Secondly, the problem with the credit-deposit ratio analysis and using it as 
an investment indicator is that it often overlooks the intra-State regional 
disparity in providing credit. There is a considerable variation in credit-
deposit ratio not only across the States but also across the different regions 
of a given State as well. In general credit-deposit ratio is highest for the 
urban metropolitan area and lowest for the semi-urban area. (Das & Maiti,  
1998, p. 3088)   
  
However, the problem of low credit provided to West Bengal can be seen 
both from the angle of State-specific constraints and problem of the federal 
fiscal relations of India. Stagnating industrial base, large number of sick 
industries and low level of economic activities of the State could not attract 
higher level of investment and hence higher level of bank credit along with 
other poor regions not only during the post Left Front era but also during the 
pre-Left Front era. On the other hand the problem can be seen in the 
broader context of regional imbalance in the federal structure of India. Of all 
types of transfers, as we have noted earlier, discretionary transfers and 
financial assistance by the Centrally controlled financial institutions have all 
along been showing a most regressive trend since last several decades. 
Contrary to that, Finance Commission’s transfer though constituting only a 
small portion of the total transfers, has been showing less regressive trend 
than these other two types of transfers.   
 
West Bengal over time slipped down from the rank of the high income State 
to a middle income State and lost its pre-eminent position in terms of almost 
all indicators. Belonging to one of these less developed regions, West 
Bengal has become a victim of inequitous distribution of the federal fiscal 
transfers (particularly financial assistance disbursed by financial institutions) 
and failed to receive adequate support to break the vicious circle of low 
level equilibrium. Low level of economic and industrial activities of the State 
led to low level of resource mobilisation, hence low level of Plan 
expenditure resulting in poor infrastructural facilities that in turn make it 
difficult to attract adequate investment and bank credit which further leads 
to low level of economic activities. Thus the reluctance of large scale 
investors to invest in the State is being reflected by the decline in the share 
of West Bengal in the total assistance disbursed by all India financial 
institutions as we have mention earlier. 127 
                                                          
127 While it was in the region of 8 per cent in the 1971-77 period it had declined to 5.6 per 
cent in the period from 1982-83 to 1986-87. The corresponding shares of other States in 
this period were Maharastra 18.6 per cent, Gujarat 12.6 per cent, Tamil Nadu 10.2 per 
 219
  
Therefore, there is a positive association between economic activities, level 
of income and credit flow to a certain region. The debate regarding financial 
assistance through both the Centrally controlled financial institutions and 
commercial banks has given rise to  two different arguments.  One is 
regarding market and another is related to attainment of regional equity. As 
mentioned earlier, regional equality argument emphasised on the point that 
special care should be taken by the Centre in order to bring all regions 
belonging to different development stages because of historical reality at 
the same parity. And disadvantaged regions should be helped to break the 
vicious circle they are entrapped in, so that they can catch up with the 
developed States. On the other hand market argument feels that credit 
worthiness and demand for credit should determine the flow of credit to a 
particular region. Besides, the financial institutions have to be guided by 
considerations of optimal return on their resources. (Mathur, 1994, p. 226) 
 
The rationale of market seems to have continued during the post 
liberalisation period when the disparity between the richer States and the 
poorer States aggravated further. And investment flow and financial 
assistance flow had more or less been directed towards the developed 
regions than the less developed regions which seems to be the pre-
dominant feature till date. In the post liberalisation period market has been 
assigned greater role in investment decisions. The performance of a 
individual State in terms of infrastructural facilities, economic growth and 
higher level of economic activities seem to be major determinants of 
attracting investment into this region.  
 
Share of different States in total bank deposits mobilised and the credit 
disbursed as on March 1998 are given in table 15 (see Appendix). It is 
evident that 54 per cent of the total bank deposits was mobilised in the 
group of  developed States while the group of backward States accounted 
for only about 31 percent. Again the share of total bank credit of the 
developed States accounted for about 65 per cent while the less developed 
States received only about 21 per cent of the bank credits. (Kurian, 2000, p. 
546) Thus the share of bank credit of the developed Sates are much higher 
than the credit given to them that, however, indicates siphoning of the 
resources from the backward to the forward regions to meet their excess 
demand for credit. Similarly, credit deposit ratio was much more favourable 
for the forward States than the backward States as is evidenced from table 
15. Considering the position of West Bengal separately, it is found that 
share of bank credit of the State was only 6.2 per cent as against the 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
cent, Uttar Pradesh 8.6 per cent, Karnataka 7.8 per cent and Andhra Pradesh, 4 per cent. ( 
Dasgupta, EPW, 1998, p. 3053) 
One estimation shows that West Bengal received only 6.4 per cent of the total 
disbursement by the all India financial institutions as credit up to March 1986.  Among the 
major States, Maharastra had the privilege to have 18.3 per cent of the total. Gujarat  
11.8 percent, Karnataka 18.3 per cent, Uttar Pradesh 8.1 per cent and Andhra Pradesh 
7.8 per cent. (Choudhury, B, 1975, p. 66) Similarly, percentage of credit to deposit by the 
Commercial banks until December 1985 was as follows: Haryana 68.3 per cent, 
Maharastra 85.1 percent, Gujarat 54.4 per cent, Andhra Pradesh 77.2 per cent and 
Karnataka, 87.6 per cent. But West Bengal got only 50. 3 per cent, Bihar, 39.8 per cent 
and Assam 52.4 per cent. (Choudhury, B, 1975,  pp. 71-72) 
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State’s deposit mobilisation of 7.5 per cent of the all-India total as on March 
1998. Receiving lower level of credit than deposit mobilised in the particular 
region is the typical feature of the most poor and the middle income States 
in the Indian federation.  Thus in Assam whereas 1.0 per cent of all-India 
total deposit mobilised in the State but only 0.6 per cent credit was 
disbursed. In Bihar 2.1 per cent credit was disbursed as against 4.3 per 
cent deposit was mobilised. In Madhya Pradesh 3.6 per cent credit was 
disbursed as against 3.9 per cent deposit was mobilised and in Uttar 
Pradesh 5.1 per cent credit was disbursed as against 9.9 per cent deposit 
was mobilised during the same period. (table 15) 
 
The great disparity between the developed and the less developed States is 
also evident from the cumulative share of financial assistance disbursed by 
all India financial institutions. State-wise financial disbursement up to the 
end of March,1997 are given in table 16 (see Appendix). It is revealed that 
the share of the developed States (63.4 per cent)  is almost two and half 
times higher than the less developed States, (25.1 per cent) indicating 
clearly where the resources mobilised through the all India financial 
institutions were flowing. Here too West Bengal’s share was as low as 3.9 
per cent which was, however, higher than the poor income States namely 
Bihar (1.4 per cent), Assam (0.5 per cent) but was considerably lower than 
the other middle income States like Uttar Pradesh (7.9 per cent), Madhya 
Pradesh (5.1 per cent), and Rajasthan (4.5 per cent). (Kurian, 2000, p. 545) 
 
Low level of Plan outlay: result of regressive structure of the Indian 
federation  or due to fiscal imprudence practised by the State? 
 
Successive Left Front Ministries have launched the complaint on different 
occasions of being discriminated by the Centre for the low volume of 
Central Plan assistance and hence low level of Plan outlay compared to the 
other high income States. As we have earlier mentioned , wide disparities in 
the allocation of Plan outlay among the States is one of the regressive 
features of the federal fiscal transfers of India. Low resource generation 
capacity of the backward States on account of low potential for economic 
activities and hence relatively narrow revenue base compared to the 
forward States makes it difficult for them to receive higher Plan outlay. It is 
true that the pre-existing structural constraints prevent the low and the 
middle income States in general and West Bengal in particular from 
mobilising higher amount of own resources and hence receiving higher Plan 
outlay. But what remains to be seen is whether fiscal imprudence and in-
discipline combined with the existing structural constraints of the State also 
contributes to the declining trend of own resource mobilisation and hence 
allocation of lower Plan outlay.  
 
The period under study can be divided into two periods, the pre and the 
post-Left Front era. The former ranging roughly from First Plan (1951-56) to 
Fifth Plan (1974-79) and the latter from Sixth Plan (1980-85) to Ninth Plan 
(1997-2002). The complaint of being discriminated during the pre-Left front 
era came to the fore during the short tenure of  the United Front 
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government (1967-69). It was alleged by the United Front government that 
in respect of per capita Plan expenditure West Bengal was in the 12th 
position in the Second Plan, 14th position in the Third Plan and the last but 
one position during two years from 1966 to 1968 among the all Indian 
States. (Memorandum to the  Fifth Finance Commission, West Bengal 
Government, 1969,  p.19) (table 17 see Appendix)  
 
We have already mentioned in the preceding part of this study that while it 
is true that per capita Plan outlay in West Bengal was quite low not only 
during the post-Left Front era but also during pre-Left Front era (though it 
was considerably higher than the low and the middle income States), its 
own resource mobilisation also constituted relatively smaller proportion of 
the total Plan financing throughout the First to Fifth Plan. Though we have 
touched this area earlier, it needs further explanation. A comparison of table 
18 & table 6 of chapter 4 of this study (see Appendix) would reveal that 
West Bengal’s own revenues as proportion of the aggregate Plan 
expenditure during First to Fifth Plan was not only quite low compared to 
the other high income States to which West Bengal belonged but it was also 
quite low compared to the all States’ average except during the Second 
Plan and the Third Plan. Other component of the Plan financing i.e., per 
capita Central assistance to West Bengal in contrast was as high as the 
other high income States during the above mentioned period.  
 
Bengal Camber Commerce and Industry (1971) also questioned  the validity  
of such allegation of being discriminated raised by the United Front 
government as far as allocation of per capita Plan outlay was concerned. It 
is quite evident, as argued by the Bengal Chamber of Commerce, that Plan 
outlay/Plan expenditure to a particular State depends on its own resource 
mobilisation. It will be seen from table 19 (see Appendix) that in terms of the 
total per capita Plan outlay for the whole period of 18 years (1951-69), West 
Bengal really occupied one of the lowest positions among the 16 States. 
Nevertheless, as BCCI questioned, “can it be said that this lagging behind 
on the part of West Bengal was due solely or even mainly to Centre's’ 
discrimination against the State”? (BBCI,1971, p.144) On the contrary it 
would be evident from table 19 that the total per capita Central assistance 
to West Bengal during these 18 years was Rs. 141, which was higher than 
Gujarat’s Rs. 132, Tamil Nadu’s Rs. 131 and Maharastra’s Rs. 102. Even in 
the Fourth Plan in which West Bengal’s per capita Plan outlay (Rs.79) was 
the lowest of all States, but its per capita Central assistance was at Rs. 54. 
This was, however, the same as in Maharastra (Rs. 54) and only a rupee 
less than in Tamil Nadu (Rs. 55) “Therefore, it would appear from the above 
table 19 that West Bengal’s short fall in Plan outlay was not mainly due to 
any adverse discrimination by the Centre. It was mainly due to the State’s 
failure to mobilise better internal resources”. (BCCI, 1971, p. 144, ) 
 
The remedy therefore lies in the greater effort for augmenting State’s 
internal resources which has been deteriorating not only from the mid-
1960s but also even earlier that was evidenced from the studies undertaken 
by National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER)(1962), Fifth 
Finance Commission (1969) and  Banerjee (1972).Table 20 (see Appendix) 
indicates major trends of the different components of the State’s revenues 
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between 1951-52 and 1958-59. Between these two years, total revenue had 
increased by 109 per cent while the different components of revenue 
increased at different rates. Grants from the Union government had 
increased by 259 per cent and shared taxes by 107 per cent. On the other 
hand, State taxes increased by only 82 per cent. The relatively high rates of 
increase registered by the Union grants and shared taxes compared to own 
resources reflects the increasing scale of assistance given by the Central 
institutions to the State. (NCAER,1962, p. 187). Likewise, table 21 (see 
Appendix) reveals that amongst the various types of West Bengal’s total 
resources, the State’s own tax and non-tax receipts declined  from 51.14 
per cent to 48.15 per cent and 23.73 per cent  to 15.63 per cent respectively 
over the period from 1960-61 to 1969-70. On the other hand, Central 
resource transfers to West Bengal by way of grants and shared taxes, 
increased from 6.07 per cent to 16.88 per cent and from 19.04 per cent to 
19.32 per cent respectively over the same period. ( Banerjee, 1972, pp. 
143-144) The report of the Fifth Finance Commission (1969) examined the 
growth rate of own revenue of different States during the period 1961-62 to 
1968-69. Among the all States West Bengal (210 per cent), however, 
registered the lowest growth of revenue from State sources except Bihar 
(208 per cent). (table 3, chapter 4 see Appendix) (Fifth Finance 
Commission, 1969, pp. 129-134) 
 
As far as non-tax revenue is concerned all the States registered poor rate of 
mobilisation. But even among the general record of such poor performance, 
West Bengal’s record was the worst of all as evidenced from table 22 (see 
Appendix)  The rate of dividends earned from the State investments in 
1968-69 was only 0.04 per cent for West Bengal as against the all States 
average of 1.35 per cent. Separately considering different States, it was 
3.37 per cent for Gujarat, 3.08 per cent for Madhya Pradesh, 1.94 per cent 
for Rajasthan, 1.83 per cent for Uttar Pradesh, 1.79 per cent for 
Maharastra, (Fifth Finance Commission, 1969,  p.191) 
 
Part of the reason why receipts of existing taxes were not growing fast was 
the failure of the collection machinery. According to the Fifth Finance 
commission (1969) over a quarter of the annual demand for sales tax in 
West Bengal was left arrears by 1966-67. Percentage of sales tax arrears to 
the total demand in West Bengal was 25.64 in 1966-67.  In contrast, the 
respective figures for Maharastra was 10.75, Gujarat 5.37, Andhra Pradesh 
11.17, Tamil Nadu 14.86 and  the all India figure was 15.73 during the same 
period. (table 23 see Appendix) On the whole all taxes taken together West 
Bengal had highest outstanding arrears of Rs. 28.44 except Uttar Pradesh 
(28.76) in 1966-67. No other State in the Indian Union had such a large 
percentage of arrears in sales tax demand nor such large absolute amounts 
of outstanding tax arrears. (table 24 see Appendix)  
 
Against the backdrop of such prolonged record of lower resource 
mobilisation potential of the State, the complaint of discrimination launched 
by the Left Front government needs to be examined. And it remains to be 
seen whether low realisation of Plan target  on account of meagre resource 
mobilisation of the State has become the determining factor of lower Plan 
outlay for the subsequent Plan or it is just the reflection of a State-specific 
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discrimination against West Bengal. Ray & Sato (1987) seemed to have 
expressed the view of West Bengal government and commented that “It is 
apparent from these figures”, i.e., from per capita Plan outlay of the Sixth 
Plan (1980-85) compared to high income States, that “West Bengal can 
legitimately complain of not only an unjustifiable disparity between Central 
Plan aid to West Bengal and that to other A category States, but also of 
unpredictably wide fluctuations in this aid, which seriously impair the 
capacity of the Government of West Bengal to launch and implement 
development programmes”. (Ray & Sato,1987, p. 124)  
 
However, it was observed by the Planning Commission during the Sixth 
Plan (1980-85) that the wide gap between the promise made by the West 
Bengal government (on resources) each year while finalising the Plan and 
what they actually achieved was growing. This kind of shortfall became the 
regular phenomenon over the years. Consequently it was felt that the West 
Bengal government tended to supply to the Planning Commission over 
estimated figures in order to receive a larger Plan outlay from the Planning 
Commission.128 (Mainstream, March 31, 1984, p. 6) 
 
On the other hand West Bengal government felt that the State had to often 
go through ‘financial squeeze’ which prevented it from achieving Plan 
target. The fault, as complained by the State, lay with the Centre for, 
restriction was imposed on drawing overdrafts by the State governments 
which caused severe strain on the State’s resource base. Besides the 
State’s own dues from the Centre are often delayed. More importantly the 
‘financial squeeze’ according to the State government was also on account 
of the Centre’s refusal to provide Rs. 325 crores recommended by the 
Eighth Finance Commission.  But a State official felt that it would not have 
been possible to fulfil 1984-85 annual Plan target even if the Centre had 
granted the amount recommended by the Eighth Finance Commission.(“A  
Bankrupt State”, India Today, April 15, 1985, p. 54) This regular shortfall in 
achieving Plan target, as observed by a scholar, was mainly due to the 
failure of own resource mobilisation of the State. One example of the 
State’s performance in own resource mobilisation in this respect could be 
given. Out of 21 State undertakings of West Bengal, 19 were running at 
huge losses. (Mainstream, March 31, 1984, pp. 5-6) Consequently, during 
the Sixth Plan, shortfall in reaching Plan targets of West Bengal was nearly 
50 percent which was the highest of all States as against the all States 
average of 26 per cent. Even all the poor income States such as Bihar 
(33.1), Assam (16.7), Orissa (24.0) and the middle income States like 
Kerala (22.0), Tamil Nadu (17.4), Uttar Pradesh (19,0), Rajasthan (22.4) 
had much lower shortfall than West Bengal. (Table 9 of chapter 4 see 
Appendix) (Bagchi & Sen, 1992, pp. 55-57) 
 
While introducing the Budget for 1986-87, Joyti Basu launched the 
complaint against low Plan outlay allocation for West Bengal during the 
                                                          
128 Finance Minister of West Bengal himself admitted that his government could at most 
achieve about 70 per cent of the ambitious Rs. 748 crore annual Plan of 1984-85. A 
number of bureaucrats were of the view that it would be difficult to spend more than 50 
per cent of the 1984-85 Plan allocations under the Sixth Plan. (India Today, April 15, 
1985) 
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Seventh Plan (1985-90). He felt that the proposed outlay of Rs. 4,125 
crores was too small and demanded higher Plan outlay for the State and 
consequently more Central Plan assistance. (Mishra,  1986, p. 33 )  But 
such high Plan outlay was denied by the Planning Commission due to its 
past performance. The Planning Commission commented that such a big 
Seventh Plan could not be provided in view of the fact the State failed to 
spend fully the amount allotted for the Sixth Plan. The actual expenditure in 
the Sixth Plan was not above Rs. 2,500 crores against the sanctioned 
amount of Rs. 3,500 crores. Therefore on the basis of the past Plan 
performance a bigger Seventh Plan could not be sanctioned. (Basu, 1989, 
pp.31-33)  
 
It is evident from table 9 of chapter 4 of the study that in West Bengal the 
targeted Plan outlay of the Seventh Plan (Rs. 4,125) was only 18 per cent 
higher than that of the Sixth Plan (Rs. 3,500). Even so the State managed 
to achieve only 86.0 per cent of the Plan target i.e., registered a shortfall 
about 14 per cent. (Bagchi & Sen, 1992, p. 57) as against the all India 
average of 11.3 per cent. Contrary to that Central assistance as proportion 
of total Plan outlay of the State during the Seventh Plan was as high as 
29.43 per cent which was not only the highest among the all high income 
States and higher than all the high income States average (18.21) but also 
much higher than some of the middle income States namely Madhya 
Pardesh (24.15), Tamil Nadu (25.86) (table 8 of chapter 4 see Appendix) 
 
However, own funds of the States for financing the Plan comprises the  
balance from current revenues (BCR), contribution of public sector 
undertakings, non debt capital receipts, additional resource mobilised 
(ARM) and State’s own borrowing. It would be worthwhile to examine the 
State-wise financing pattern of the different five year Plans. So far as 
financing Sixth Plan is concerned an important feature evidenced from table 
25 (see Appendix) is that all the State’s were suffering from shortfall in 
financing Plan from own sources. Seemingly, large aggregate shortfalls in 
all States seems to reflect overestimation of own resource mobilisation of 
the States at the time of setting the Plan targets before the Planning 
Commission. But of all the States the largest shortfall in aggregate own 
State resources was, however,  found in West Bengal (67 per cent) during 
the Sixth Plan followed by Kerala (51), Bihar (44), Haryana (36), Punjab 
(30), Orissa (28), Uttar Pradesh (28) and Rajasthan (23). The shortfall in 
balance of current revenue (BCR) was the single largest factor responsible 
for the shortfall in aggregate resources in almost all States. In West Bengal 
the shortfall in BCR was as high as  92.8 per cent, the highest among all 
States during the Sixth Plan. Moreover, in West Bengal out of the total 
shortfall of Rs. 2,234 crore about Rs. 1500 crores or 64 per cent was 
attributable to the deficiency in BCR. Another source of financing Plan of 
the States is contribution from public sector enterprises (PSE). Table 25 
indicates that the shortfall in the contributions of the public sector 
enterprises (PSE) was significant in absolute terms in Bihar, Punjab, 
Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal.  On the other 
hand recourse to the States’ provident fund, small savings and  adjustments 
in over drafts  seemed to prove helpful in all States. Evidently, the States 
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instead of exploiting own resource potential were financing an increasing 
portion of their Plans with borrowing leading to a growing burden of debt.  
 
The financing pattern of West Bengal separately indicates that during the 
Sixth Plan, contribution of BCR according to latest estimate was fixed at 
Rs.115.9 crore and contribution from public sector enterprises was (--) 
Rs.360.8 which, however, denoted liability of the State. On the other hand, 
small savings, provident fund and market borrowings, according to the 
latest estimate contributed Rs. 669.5, Rs. 110.0, Rs. 445.2 respectively 
reflecting greater dependence on borrowing than mobilising own resources. 
(Bagchi & Sen, 1992, pp. 68-75) 
 
Same trend was evident during the Seventh Plan (1985-90). For the States 
as a whole shortfalls were caused mainly by deficiencies in both the two 
categories i.e., BCR and the contribution of PSE. With the exception of 
Bihar (6.1) and Madhya Pradesh (8.8) in most cases shortfalls in BCR 
accounted for the largest part of the shortfall in the States’ own aggregate 
resources. West Bengal accounted for 83.5 per cent shortfall in BCR during 
the Seventh Plan. Only four States had larger shortfall in BCR than West 
Bengal namely Kerala (229.5), Punjab (107.6), Rajasthan (100.8) and Uttar 
Pradesh (84.0). For West Bengal during the Seventh Plan, BCR as per 
latest estimate was fixed at Rs. 139.3 crores and public sector enterprise 
was fixed at Rs. (--)113.0 crores (which denotes liability of the State). Loan 
from small savings, provident fund and adjustment in overdrafts accounted 
for Rs. 1640.7, Rs. 289.0, Rs. 328.8 respectively. Therefore, the borrowing 
component of the State’s Plan financing was much higher than resource 
component. West Bengal appears to have made up a large shortfall in BCR 
(and smaller shortfall in other items) with increased overdrafts. (Bagchi & 
Sen, 1992, pp. 75-77) 
 
An important factor affecting the availability of resources for the Plan is the 
loses of PSEs. Poor return from PSEs tend to affect the revenue of the 
States while interest and dividends from PSEs constitute an important 
component of own non-tax revenues of the States. Thus insignificant 
mobilisation of non-tax revenue ultimately is reflected in adverse shortfall in  
the balance of current revenues (BCR). Therefore, it is the BCR which plays  
a decisive role in determining the level of per capita Plan expenditure. While 
BCR by definition is current revenue minus non-plan current expenditure. In 
West Bengal during both the Sixth Plan and Seventh Plan the expenditure 
growth had significantly outpaced the growth  of revenue receipts which put 
severe strain on the State’s resource base and hence prevented the State 
from having a higher Plan expenditure.129 On the other hand losses from 
PSEs led to a drain of the budget in the form of guarantee, equity and loan 
given by the States to these loss making PSEs. The detail of the 
                                                          
129 The gap between revenue and expenditure growth in the Seventh Plan was the 
largest, 5.5  percentage points in Uttar Pradesh followed by Tamil Nadu, West Bengal, 
Punjab and Haryana. (ibid., p. 82) During the Sixth Plan total revenue receipts of West 
Bengal as per cent to SDP was 12.33 and total revenue expenditure as percent of SDP 
was 13.84. Total revenue receipts in the Seventh Plan as per cent of SDP was 14.87 and 
Total revenue expenditure was 15.32. (ibid., pp. 80-81) 
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performance of PSEs of the State would be discussed in chapter 6 of this 
study. Poor performance of PSEs put severe constraints on own resource 
mobilisation of the States directly through affecting BCR and indirectly 
through providing low infrastructural facilities leading to low level of 
economic development. Because it is often found that the States with low 
per capita Plan outlay are the States with poor performance in PSEs.130     
 
Allegation against the States for practising fiscal in-discipline also came to 
the fore during the Eighth Plan (1992-97). Therefore the growing gap 
between the resources promised by the State governments for financing 
their Plans before the Planning Commission and the actual realisation of the 
Plan targets was also evident during the Eighth Plan. (Thimmaiah, 2000, p. 
28)  
 
Evidently, it could be noted in this connection that the performance of 
developed States in the realisation of Plan targets was far better than the 
poor and the middle income States in general which was also evident 
during the Eighth Plan. During the Eighth Plan only three high income 
States, Maharastra, Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu and one middle 
income State, Kerala  realised Plan outlays which exceeded the projections. 
Goa and Karnataka realised more than 90 per cent of the projected Plan 
outlay. And Gujarat, Punjab and Madhya Pradesh  realised more than 80 
per cent of the projected Plan outlays. On the contrary, except Haryana 
(66.70) Plan realisation with reference to projected Plan outlay was as low 
as 67 per cent in case of West Bengal (i.e., shortfall 33.20) which was, 
however, not only the lowest among all the high and the middle income 
States but also much lower than the overall Plan realisation for the 15 major 
States taken together (83 per cent). Among the poor income States Bihar 
(36 per cent) and Orissa (51 per cent) achieved lower Plan realisation than 
the projections compared to West Bengal.  (table 26 see Appendix) 
Likewise, as far as per capita Eighth Plan expenditure (anticipated) for all 
the major States was concerned West Bengal’s performance was almost 
the lowest among all the major States. Almost all States whether belonged 
to the high or the middle income category States i.e., (Gujarat, Haryana, 
Karnataka, Kerala, Maharastra, Punjab and Tamil Nadu) achieved 
expenditure levels higher than the all India average (Rs. 1,965).  Among the 
middle income States, however, Andhra Pradesh (Rs.1858), Madhya 
Pradesh (Rs.1742) and Uttar Pradesh (Rs. 1372)  realised  lower than the 
average Plan expenditure achieved for all States. But the performance of 
West Bengal (Rs. 1144) and Bihar (592) seemed to be the worst of all. The 
bad performance of Bihar and West Bengal ascribed to very poor resource 
                                                          
130 Two States with the lowest per capita Plan outlay i.e., Bihar & West Bengal during the 
Sixth and Seventh Plan also occupied the bottom rankings in the performance of State 
Electricity Boards and State Road Transport undertakings, the two major areas of 
investment in PSEs by the State. According to the Planning Commission’s study in 
physical parameters and compounded grading, West Bengal scored 37 and Bihar 38, 
whereas Maharastra topped with 77 followed by Gujarat (64), Punjab (61) and Madhya 
Pradesh (59). (Bagchi, A & Sen, T, ‘Budgetary Trends and Plan Financing in the States’, 
in Bagchi, A, Bajaj, J.L & Byrd, W.A (ed.) State Finances in India, Vikas Publishing House 
Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi,  1992, pp. 76-77) 
 
 
 227
mobilisation efforts on the one hand and steep increase in the non-Plan 
expenditure on the other. (table 26) (Kurian, 2000, p. 543) 
 
The sources of financing the total Plans consists of own funds of the States, 
borrowing by the States and Central assistance. Among all States West 
Bengal  (- 65.1 per cent) had the highest amount of realised negative own 
funds except Bihar( (-74 per cent) as against 1.6 per cent own funds 
(realised) of 15 major States during the Eighth Plan. Negative own funds of 
West Bengal (-65 per cent), however, indicates that that about 65 per cent 
of the borrowing /Central assistance was diverted by West Bengal for 
meeting current expenditure on non-Plan account.   (table 10 of chapter 4  
see Appendix) (Kurian, 1999, p. 1118) 
 
Another major component of Plan financing was borrowing of the State. The 
projected share of borrowing for the 15 major States was 53 per cent of the 
total while the realised share was higher at 59 percent indicating greater 
dependence on borrowing for financing Eighth Plan for all States. However, 
of all the States West Bengal had the highest share of borrowing, 111 per 
cent and the lowest was for Maharastra just at 34 per cent. Though large 
number of States became dependent on borrowing for financing their Plan 
but West Bengal is the only State where borrowings accounted for more 
than 100 per cent of the Plan finances during the Eighth Plan. (table 35) 
(Kurian, 1999, p. 1118) 
 
According to the Planning Commission’s mid-term appraisal during the 
Eighth Plan, West Bengal was ranked as a ‘below average’ State at par with 
the backward States like Bihar and Orissa. The appraisal report severely 
criticised the State for its poor performance in the economic sector, non-
utilisation of its Plan outlays, lack of resource mobilisation and consequently 
a declining trend of per capita income below the national average. However, 
Finance Minister of West Bengal opposed the appraisal report of the 
Planning Commission and said that the Plan targets of first two years under 
the Eighth Plan i.e., 1992-93 and 1993-94 could not be met mainly due to 
the decline in small savings collections of the State owing to faulty Central 
policies regarding the small savings. (The Statesman, July 30, 1995) 
 
Similar trend of heavy reliance on borrowing for financing Plan rather than 
exploiting own revenue potential continued during the Ninth Plan (1997-02). 
During the Eighth Plan negative own funds and high level of borrowing were 
limited to few States, mostly the low income States. Considering first two 
years of Ninth Plan i.e., 1997-98 and 1998-99, the share of negative 
contribution and borrowing have gone up for almost all States. The 
contribution of the 15 major States’ own funds was (--) 18 per cent in 1997-
98 and (--) 24.9 per cent during 1998-99 as against their contribution 
(realised) 1.6 per cent during the Eighth Plan. On the other hand the 
percentage share of borrowing of the 15 major States was 78.2 in 1997-98 
and 87.6 in 1998-99 as against 59. 0 (realised) during the Eighth Plan. 
(Kurian, 1999, pp. 1118-1119) 
 
However, it was alleged by the Planning Commission that three States 
namely West Bengal, Jharkhand and Himachal Pradesh visibly failed to 
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come out with promised resource mobilisation proposals for Ninth Plan. 
Therefore, West Bengal has been getting dependent on borrowings and an 
increasing proportion of the borrowed funds being utilised in current 
consumption as well as for Plan financing. The State’s own borrowing has 
already topped the category of financing for the Plan. On the other hand 
West Bengal’s own fund (which was however, also made up of borrowing) 
as a percentage of Plan resources has continuously worsened from (--) 
62.3 per cent in 1997-98 (Actual) to (--) 178.4 per cent in 2000-01 (latest 
estimate) indicating progressively greater reliance on borrowing. (Business 
Line, August 14, 2001)     
 
Seemingly, Finance Ministry of India was quite reluctant to accept the 
continued plea of West Bengal for higher allocation of Plan during the 
financial year 2001-02 while it was apprehended that it would further 
aggravate the borrowing habit of the State government. West Bengal had 
already topped the list of heavy borrowings and consequent upon heavy 
borrowing, the interest liability as percentage of revenues receipts of the 
State had escalated from 30.8 per cent in 1997-98 to 45.9 per cent in 2000-
01. Interest payment had more than doubled in 2001-01 as compared to 
1997-98 and had surpassed the State’s own tax revenue during 2000-01 
that might have thrown the State into a severe debt trap. (Business Line, 
August 14, 2001)     
 
Therefore, the complaint launched by West Bengal of being discriminated 
against by the Centre does not seem to have any ground while, several 
studies, as we have observed earlier, revealed that there is a clear 
correspondence between the level of development of the States and the 
Central Plan assistance provided and hence the total allocation of Plan 
outlay. Thus such general structural constraints of resource mobilisation of  
the less developed States in general on the one hand and fiscal imprudence 
and fiscal indiscipline of West Bengal on the other seem to have played a 
greater role in its meagre own resource mobilisation and hence low level of 
allocation of Plan Outlay. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Complaint of discrimination against West Bengal was also taken forward by 
the Congress government during the pre-Left front era. But they did not 
want to perceive it as State-specific deliberate discrimination against the 
State in particular. This is partly due to the fact that the same political party 
(Congress) was ruling both in the State and in the Centre thus ruling out 
any possibility of raising the allegation of politically motivated discrimination 
and partly due to the fact that movement against the Centre did not gain 
much momentum during the pre-Left Front era. However, such style of 
bargaining underwent a sea change soon after the United Front government 
came to Power (1967-69). During their short tenure they laid the foundation 
of asking for radical change of the federal structure of India which was 
further consolidated by the Left Front government soon after it came to 
power in 1977.  
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Along with that at the political plane, while addressing the electorate the Left 
Front government brought the populist stance of being discriminated 
against by the Centre and held the Centre responsible for its present 
deterioration. Consequently the demand for radical restructuring of the 
Indian federation which was taken up by the Left Front during the late 1970s 
and the early 1980s started being overshadowed by this slogan. Therefore, 
the whole movement against the Centre since the mid-1980s in West 
Bengal was based on the basis of such an emotive slogan of being 
discriminated against by the Centre in relation to distribution of industrial 
licence, institutional finance and allocation of Plan outlay compared to the 
other States namely high income States. Eventually, the State started to 
single out itself not only from the rest of the Indian States but also the 
historical, cultural and economic reality of the State while expressing that 
the State has been subject to discrimination. Thus,  instead of perceiving 
these issues in respect to these realities it started emphasising that it is 
basically politically motivated, time specific and deliberate discrimination 
against the State in particular due to its political opposition.  
 
Seemingly, such a position of the State seems to lack the broader 
perspective. Therefore, while pursuing the study on politics of discrimination 
as far West Bengal is concerned we need to see the problem in an overall 
perspective rather than in isolation. Firstly, the problem of the States in 
general belonging to the Indian federal structure which has a strong 
regressive tendency and centripetal bias. Secondly, the particular problem 
of a State belonging to the poor and the middle income group who have the 
further added disadvantage of not only facing the centripetal bias of the 
Indian federal structure but also the regressive structure of the Indian 
federation which clearly tend to discriminate against the less developed 
States and favour the rich income States. And thirdly, anther problem of a 
State belonging to disadvantageous region such as eastern region which 
has some typical characteristics and structural constraints that are both the 
legacy of the pre-Independence days and are the outcome of Central 
policies pursued after Independence. Lastly, State specific historical, social 
and economic development also need to be addressed while such State 
specific factors had shaped the future course of development of the State. 
 
However, West Bengal started its journey as rich income State and was far 
ahead of the other States during the first two and half decades after 
Independence. Thereafter it started declining drastically in terms of almost 
all economic indicators. Therefore, by virtue of belonging to the high income 
group, the State was able to attract higher level of budgetary transfers 
(federal fiscal transfer) as well as institutional transfers (transfer from 
Centrally controlled financial institutions and commercial banks) and 
relatively higher share of industrial licence. But it should be noted that even 
during that time although the State managed to receive a much higher 
share than the less developed States but its position was somewhat lower 
than Maharastra along with the other industrially developed States. 
Particularly in respect of allocation of Plan outlay, institutional transfers and 
share of industrial licences which have strong positive association with the 
level of development. The reason behind that is not difficult to seek. From 
the very onset West Bengal’s economy had been suffering from basic 
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structural weakness such as low potential for growth,  structural rigidity and 
lack of dynamism. Thus the sign of future deterioration of its economy 
became apparent even when the State was grouped under the high income 
States. Eventually since the mid-1960s its economy registered a sharp 
deterioration in terms of almost every economic indicator and consequently 
the State started lagging behind in terms of share of budgetary transfers as 
well as institutional transfers and share of industrial  licences even though 
the State was ruled by the same party both at the Centre and the State. 
Therefore, it seems to us that there is a clear correspondence between 
economic development and federal transfers including other institutional 
transfers. 
 
Afterwards since 1977 i.e., during the post –Left Front era the decline of its 
economy was continuous and drastic. The State was no longer grouped 
under the rich income States and slipped down to the middle income States 
carrying all the characteristics of the less developed States such as low 
revenue mobilisation potential, poor infrastructural development and so on.  
As time went by the State became the victim of regressive nature of the 
Indian federation along with the other poor and the middle income States. 
Therefore, the regressive federal structure of India along with the State’s 
structural constraints existing from the pre-Independence days and lack of 
adequate effort made by the State to manage its economy efficiently (the 
detail of which will be discussed in the chapter 6 of this study) made it 
further difficult to retain its position and enjoy the benefit that the State used 
to receive earlier. It seems to us there is a clear correspondence between 
level of development of the State and the favour a State receives in terms 
higher level of budgetary as well as institutional transfers in the Indian 
federation. Thus rules out the possibility of any State-specific, time specific 
and politically motivated deliberate discrimination as regards above 
mentioned areas.  
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Appendix 
 
 
Table: 1 
State-Wise Distribution of Application and Industrial Licence 1956-1966 
States Total Number of 
Application 
Number of Licence 
Issued 
Andhra Pradesh 487 332 
Maharastra 3645 2741 
Madras 1263 970 
Uttar Pradesh 1087 672 
West Bengal 2296 1649 
Bihar 688 517 
Mysore 420 327 
Source: Dsagupta, S, West Bengal and Industry A Regional Perspective, EPW, November 21, 
1998, p. 3051 
 
 
 
 
Table: 2 
State-Wise Distribution of Industrial Licenses, 1956-66  
(Per cent shares) 
 
States Total applications Issued license 
Andhra Pradesh 3.46 3.31 
Assam 1.08 0.95 
Maharastra 25.88 27.37 
Kerala 3.11 3.61 
Madhya Pradesh 2.85 2.47 
Tamil Nadu 8.97 9.68 
Orissa 1.46 1.18 
Punjab 7.46 6.31 
Rajasthan 1.97 1.76 
Uttar Pradesh 7.72 6.71 
West Bengal 16.30 16.46 
Bihar 4.88 5.16 
Mysore 2.98 3.26 
Delhi 2.33 2.10 
Gujarat 8.66 8.89 
Others 0.95 0.78 
Total 100.00 100.00 
West Bengal An Analytical Study, The Bengal Chamber of Commerce & Industry, 1971, p.145 
 
 
Table: 3 
Industrial Licences Issued to Different States Between 1952 and 1967 
 
States 1952 to 
1957 
1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 
Andhra 
Pradesh 
77 15 31 45 48 46 24 41 22 19 11 
Assam 18 -- 14 25 12 10 8 4 2 2 3 
Bihar 91 16 19 53 40 90 86 40 64 52 20 
Delhi 56 12 44 45 23 12 12 4 4 -- 3 
Goa -- -- -- -- -- -- 4 2 5 2 -- 
Gujarat 173 59 99 129 131 122 82 66 33 33 31 
Hariyana -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 13 9 
Himachal 
Pradesh 
-- -- 2 2 -- 1 1 1 1 -- -- 
 232
Jammu & 
Kashmir 
-- -- -- -- -- 2 2 1 1 -- -- 
Kerala 54 16 24 140 60 35 21 20 7 11 7 
Madhya 
Pradesh 
56 5 12 40 34 42 38 12 17 13 6 
Madras 282 72 142 148 105 74 80 144 55 30 17 
Maharastra 504 224 382 506 424 275 246 183 127 112 101 
Mysore 84 13 34 73 39 36 26 34 20 14 7 
Orissa 41 11 10 16 12 19 11 10 5 6 2 
Punjab 161 37 94 131 82 68 67 43 25 19 4 
Rajasthan 32 7 10 30 29 32 21 8 14 10 10 
Uttar 
Pradesh 
172 42 68 134 104 49 70 40 47 20 13 
West 
Bengal 
379 122 217 309 209 184 169 101 66 50 48 
Total 2182 659 1202 1826 1354 1100 950 761 527 415 292 
Source: Report of the Taxation Enquiry Committee, Government of Kerala, 1969, pp. 46-47 
 
Table: 4 
Industrial license Issued to Different States Between 1970 & 1977 
 
 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
Maharastra 112 162 131 171 265 255 143 150 
West Bengal 46 81 54 41 107 74 56 40 
Gujarat 39 66 57 75 89 97 83 60 
Tamil Nadu 36 51 36 63 99 141 61 32 
Andhra 
Pradesh 
13 37 30 29 61 61 51 27 
Karnataka 17 22 38 46 66 64 43 45 
Uttar Pradesh 26 48 48 60 116 72 55 41 
Bihar 22 24 18 9 24 15 17 16 
Source: Dasgupta, S, ‘West Bengal and Industry A Regional Perspective’, EPW, November 21, 
1998, p. 3055 
 
Table: 5 
 Classification of Industrial Licence Granted to West Bengal Between 1971 and 1977 
 
 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
New Units 5 11 3 26 12 14 9 
Substantial 
Expansion 
16* 25* 11 20 23 7 6 
Source: Dasgupta, S, ‘West Bengal and Industry A Regional Perspective’, EPW, November 21, 
1998, p. 3055 
* includes Carry on Business (COB) 
 
 
Table: 5(a) 
Number of Industrial Licences Granted to Different States (1977-87) 
 
States 1977 1978 197
9 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
West Bengal 40 23 30 23 34 27 71 93 51 21 25 
Maharastra 105 101 111 107 114 95 171 134 134 96 86 
Gujarat 60 46 48 85 79 69 115 82 69 86 49 
Andhra 
Pradesh 
27 17 17 42 39 26 63 45 70 40 38 
Tamil Nadu 32 28 26 37 30 41 76 85 177 61 41 
Karnataka 45 26 24 40 25 34 65 49 69 42 45 
Uttar  
Pradesh 
41 26 33 30 24 22 98 80 79 69 40 
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Bihar 16 12 3 4 10 9 29 26 20 9 9 
Source: Dasgupta, S, ‘West Bengal and Industry A Regional Perspective’, EPW, November 21, 
1998, p. 3056 
 
 
Table: 5(b) 
Classification of Industrial Licence Granted to West Bengal (1977-87)  
 
 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
New Units 9 4 6 5 6 7 7 5 4 2 5 
Substantial 
Expansion 
6 3 4 4 6 4 4 8 5 4 3 
Source: Dasgupta, S, ‘West Bengal and Industry A Regional Perspective’, EPW, November 21, 
1998, p. 3056 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table: 6 
Physical Infrastructure Development Index (PIDI) of Different States  
Between 1971-72 and 1994-95 
 
                        1971-72                          1994-95 States 
PIDI Rank PIDI Rank 
Delhi 25.07 1 25.79 1 
Punjab 23.59 2 24.01 2 
Tamil Nadu 21.59 3 21.28 3 
Kerala 20.88 4 17.70 10 
Haryana 19.99 5 20.71 4 
Maharastra 18.60 6 18.73 7 
Karnataka 18.31 7 17.72 9 
West Bengal 17.66 8 11.06 18 
Gujarat 16.79 9 10.81 6 
Bihar 16.27 10 12.50 15 
Goa 15.66 11 20.20 5 
Andhra Pradesh 14.54 12 18.57 8 
Uttar Pradesh 13.92 13 13.46 12 
Himachal 
Pradesh 
12.94 14 15.22 11 
Jammu & 
Kashmir 
12.79 15 10.71 19 
Orissa 12.02 16 13.31 13 
Madhya Pradesh 10.84 18 11.87 17 
Rajasthan 9.73 19 12.10 16 
Assam 9.05 20 8.82 21 
Source: Ghosh, B & De,  P, ‘ Role of Infrastructure in Regional Development A Study Over the 
Plan Period’, EPW, November 21, 1998, p. 3041 
 
 
 
 
Table: 7 
Level of Infrastructural Development During 1990s 
 
State Consumption of Registered Telecom lines Percentage of Relative 
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power per 
capita (kwh) in 
1996-97 
vehicles per 
1,000 persons 
as on March 
31 1997 
per 100 
persons as on 
March 31, 
1999 
irrigation area 
in gross 
cropped areas 
as at end of 
1994-95 
infrastructure 
development 
index @ for 
the year 1993-
94 
 
Andhra 
Pradesh 
332 42.1 2.36 39.6 96.1 
Gujarat 686 91.5 3.75 28.9 122.4 
Haryana 508 64.6 3.18 77.2 141.3 
Karnataka 338 56.5 3.25 23.9 96.9 
Kerala 236 46.5 4.66 13.6 157.1 
Maharastra 557 57.2 4.93 15.3 107.0 
Punjab 790 103.2 5.34 94.8 191.4 
Tamil Nadu 469 56.9 3.84 49.5 144.0 
Assam 108 19.9 0.95 15.0 78.9 
Bihar 145 16.4 0.58 43.2 81.1 
Madhya 
Pardesh 
368 38.8 1.38 22.3 75.3 
Orissa 447 22.9 1.05 25.8 97.0 
Rajasthan 295 45.1 2.11 29.1 83.0 
Uttar  
Pradesh 
194 22.7 1.21 62.6 103.3 
West Bengal  197 19.8 1.86 28.7 94.2 
All-India 338 44.0 2.55 36.5 100.00 
Source: Kurian, N.J, ‘Widening Regional Disparities in India Some Indicators’, EPW, February 
12, 2000, p. 547 
@ “The composite index of infrastructure development constructed by CMIE includes the 
following items with their respective weights in brackets. Transport facilities (26 per cent), 
energy consumption (24 per cent), irrigation facilities (20 per cent), banking facilities (12 per 
cent), communication infrastructure (6 per cent), educational institutions (6 per cent) and 
health facilities (6 per cent). the value of index is normalised at 100 for all-India.” (Ibid., pp. 
547)   
 
 
 
 
Table: 8 (a) 
Growth of Installed Capacity of Power From 1951 to 1981  
 
States 31.12. 1951 
(MW) 
31.3. 1971 
(MW) 
31.12.1981 
(MW) 
Percentage 
increase between 
1951 to 1981 
West Bengal 546 1212 1675 207 
Gujarat 142 907 2251 1485 
Maharastra 339 2119 4075 1102 
Uttar Pradesh 200 1351 3733 1766 
Tamil Nadu 155 1966 2929 1790 
Source: “West Bengal Need for Industrial Reconstruction”, Indian Chamber of Commerce, 
Calcutta, 1983, p. 4 
 
Table: 8 (b) 
 West Bengal State Electricity Board’s Annual Plant Load Factor (percentage)  
 And All India (from 1979-80 to 1984-85) 
 
 1979-80 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 1983-84 1984-85* 
West 
Bengal 
43.5 42.1 37.6 38.5 35.9 36.5 
All India 44.3 44.2 46.4 49.4 47.9 50.1 
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Source: Mallick, R, Development Policy of a Communist Government:  West Bengal Since 
1977, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993, p. 181 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table: 8 © 
Per Capita Availability of Power in 1979-80 (Utilities Only)  
 
States Per Capita Availability (KWH) 
Punjab 405.32 
Haryana 281.14 
Gujarat 279.11 
Maharastra 265.77 
Tamil Nadu 222.81 
Karnataka 187.17 
West Bengal 123.04 
Uttar Pradesh 93.61 
Bihar 77.34 
Source: : “West Bengal Need for Industrial Reconstruction”, Indian Chamber of Commerce, 
Calcutta, 1983, p. 4 
 
 
Table: 9 
Industrial Disputes in West Bengal Between 1980 and 2000 
                    Number of Cases Year 
Strikes Lock-outs Total 
1980 78 130 208 
1985 39 165 204 
1990 16 179 195 
1995 33 136 169 
1996 17 144 161 
1997 29 161 190 
1998 ® 25 213 238 
1999® 34 264 298 
2000 (p)  
upto November 
26 270 296 
Source: Economic Review (Statistical Appendix),  
Government of West Bengal 2000-01, p. 115 
R= Revised 
P= Provisional 
 
 
Table: 10 
Investment Proposals  Obtained by the Major States of India From 1991 to 1998  
(per cent) 
 
States Percentage  share of Investment 
proposals from August 1991-
December 1998 
Andhra Pradesh 8.3 
Gujarat 18.7 
Haryana 3.6 
Karnataka 5.6 
Kerala 1.1 
Maharastra 18.0 
Punjab 3.4 
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Tamil Nadu 7.2 
Sub-Total 
(Forward States) 
65.9 
Assam 0.7 
Bihar 1.2 
Madhya Pradesh 7.4 
Orissa 2.2 
Rajasthan 3.9 
Uttar Pradesh 9.4 
West Bengal 3.3 
Sub Total 
(Backward States) 
28.1 
All India 100 
Source:  Kurian. N.J, Widening Regional Disparities in India Some Indicators,  
EPW, February 12, 2000, p. 545 
 
Table: 11 
Inter State Distribution of Deposits and Bank Credit of Scheduled Commercial Banks 
Between 1961 and 1966 
 
No. Of 
offices 
Deposits  
(Rs. crores) 
Bank Credit 
(Rs. crores) 
Per capita bank 
deposit (Rs.) 
Per capita bank 
credit (Rs.)  
States 
1961 1966 1961 1966 1961 1966 1961 1966 1961 1966 
Andhra 
Pradesh 
332 461 58.9 132.9 48.1 81.1 16.4 33.3 13.4 20.3 
Assam 45 65 17.7 36.3 5.0 9.8 14.9 26.2 4.2 7.1 
Bihar 178 226 56.3 111.7 24.2 40.9 12.1 21.3 5.2 7.8 
Gujarat 334 544 136.0 295.8 79.0 145.7 66.0 124.1 38.4 61.1 
Jammu & 
Kashmir 
14 15 11.0 19.6 1.2 1.4 30.5 51.1 3.4 3.7 
Kerala 241 400 51.7 111.5 30.8 66.3 30.6 57.8 18.2 34.3 
Madhya 
Pradesh 
185 265 53.8 87.9 26.3 58.8 16.6 23.8 8.1 15.9 
Madras 608 923 126.5 241.3 119.8 244.2 37.5 65.5 35.5 66.3 
Maharastra 584 865 477.9 923.8 384.0 759.0 20.7 203.9 97.0 174.1 
Mysore 426 611 77.6 182.2 52.9 116.6 32.9 68.3 22.4 43.7 
Orissa 53 81 7.8 19.7 5.4 8.9 4.5 10.0 3.1 4.5 
Punjab & 
Haryana 
322 389 101.3 206.9 34.6 69.9 49.9 109.8 17.0 37.1 
Rajasthan 179 259 33.8 61.7 15.7 28.8 16.7 26.3 7.8 12.2 
Uttar 
Pradesh 
460 575 132.7 268.0 76.0 133.1 18.0 32.3 10.3 13.6 
West Bengal 257 382 311.8 516.7 326.3 575.5 89.3 128.2 93.5 142.0 
Total States 
(Including 
others) 
4414 6383 960.7 3594.1 1286.1 2443.0 44.6 72.1 29.3 50.0 
Source: Report of the Taxation Enquiry Committee, Government of Kerala, 1969, pp. 42 
 
 
 
Table: 12 
State-wise Distribution of Assistance by Financial Institutions 
as at the end of 1966-67           (Rs. Lakhs) 
States Amount Percentage Share 
Andhra Pradesh 61,15 5.7 
Assam 22,78 2.1 
Bihar 57,80 5.4 
Gujarat 94,14 8.8 
Haryana 22,99 2.2 
Kerala 25,17 2.4 
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Madhya Pradesh 26,61 2.5 
Tamil Nadu 156,21 14.7 
Maharastra 282,23 26.5 
Mysore 43,64 4.1 
Orissa 19,62 1.8 
Punjab 12,56 1.2 
Rajasthan 32,91 3.1 
Uttar Pradesh 54,82 5.2 
West Bengal 139,73 13.1 
Jammu & Kashmir 1,20 0.1 
Union Territories 12,17 1.1 
Total 1065,73 100.00 
West Bengal An Analytical Study, The Bengal Chamber of Commerce & Industry,  
1971, p.146 
 
 
 
 
Table: 13 
Credit-Deposit and Investment Deposit Ratios of Commercial Banks During 1969-76 
 
States Credit-Deposit 
Ratio 
Investment-
Deposit 
Ratio 
Credit + 
Investment Deposit 
Ratio 
A. High Income  
States 
   
Punjab 78 11 89 
Haryana 103 31 134 
Maharastra 73 10 83 
Gujarat 62 19 81 
West Bengal 50 13 63 
Group A 67 13 80 
B. Middle 
Income States 
   
Tamil Nadu 114 26 140 
Kerala 75 25 100 
Orissa 51 65 116 
Assam 58 36 94 
Karnataka 114 22 136 
Andhra Pradesh 65 23 88 
Group B 92 26 118 
C. Low Income 
States 
   
Uttar Pradesh 52 16 68 
Rajasthan 66 38 104 
Madhya Pradesh 48 22 70 
Bihar 41 19 60 
Group C 50 20 70 
D. Special 
Category States  
   
Group D 29 25 54 
All States 68 18 86 
Source: Gulati, I.S & George, K.K, ‘ Inter-State Redistribution Through Institutional Finance’, 
EPW, Special Number, August 1978, p. 1399 
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Table: 14 
Transfers of Institutional Finance to West Bengal up to December 1985 and March 1986 
Distribution of Deposits & Advances of Scheduled 
Commercial Banks upto December 1985 
States All India Financial 
Institutions upto 
March 1986  
(Per cent) 
Deposits 
(Rs. in Lakhs) 
Advances 
(Rs. in lakhs) 
Percentage of 
advances to 
deposits 
West Bengal 6.4 88,66,49 44,63,76 50.3 
Maharastra 18.3 1,63,59,76 1,39,15,16 85.1 
Gujarat 11.8 53,25,62 28,98,08 54.4 
Karnataka 8.1 42,45,47 36,76,84 87.6 
Uttar Pradesh 8.1 85,44,50 39,70,43 46.5 
Andhra Pradesh 7.8 48,67,99 37,58,80 77.2 
Source: Choudhry, B, Portrait of West Bengal, Print-O-Craft, Calcutta, 1975 (First Edition)  pp. 
67-73 
 
 
 
 
Table: 15 
Bank Deposits  and Bank Credit  & Credit Deposit Ratio as on March, 1998 
                        
States Share of 
Bank 
Deposits 
Share of 
Bank 
credit 
Credit 
Deposit 
ratio 
Andhra Pradesh 5.3 6.9 72.1 
Goa -- -- 48.2 
Gujarat 5.9 5.1 48.2 
Haryana 2.1 1.6 42.9 
Karnataka 5.4 6.6 68.2 
Kerala 4.6 3.7 44.3 
Maharastra 19.9 25.9 72.3 
Punjab 4.6 3.2 38.6 
Tamil Nadu 6.6 11.5 96.1 
Sub Total 
(Forward states) 
54.4 64.5  
Assam 1.0 0.6 32.8 
Bihar 4.3 2.1 27.5 
Madhya Pradesh 3.9 3.6 51.4 
Orissa 1.5 1.2 45.2 
Rajasthan 2.8 2.4 47.4 
Uttar Pradesh 9.9 5.1 47.4 
West Bengal 7.5 6.2 46.1 
Sub Total 
(Backward 
states) 
30.9 21.2  
All India 100 100 55.5 
Source: Kurian, N.J, State Government Finances A survey of Recent Trends, EPW, May 8, 
1999, pp. 1116, and also see Kurian, N.J, Widening Regional Disparities in India Some 
Indicators, EPW,  February 12, 2000, p. 546 
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Table: 16 
Disbursal of Financial Assistance by Centrally Controlled Financial Institutions for  
Major States of India Until March 1997  
 
State Cumulative Share of 
Financial Assistance 
Disbursed by all 
India Financial 
Institutions 
Cumulative 
Financial assistance 
Disbursed by State-
Financial 
Corporation  
Andhra Pradesh 7.2 7.8 
Gujarat 13.5 9.3 
Haryana 2.5 4.8 
Karnataka 6.1 15.5 
Kerala 1.7 4.4 
Maharastra 21.0 11.5 
Punjab 2.4 3.6 
Tamil Nadu 9.0 10.6 
Sub-Total (Forward 
States) 
63.4 67.5 
Assam 0.5 0.5 
Bihar 1.4 2.0 
Madhya Pradesh 5.1 3.2 
Orissa 1.8 3.7 
Rajasthan 4.5 6.1 
Uttar Pradesh 7.9 11.1 
West Bengal 3.9 2.5 
Sub Total 
(Backward States) 
25.1 29.1 
All India 100.0 100.0 
Source: Kurian, N.J, Widening Regional Disparities in India Some Indicators, EPW, February, 
12, 2000, p. 545 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 240
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
              
 
 
 
Table: 17 
Per Capita Plan Expenditure in West Bengal 1956- 68     (Rs. ) 
 
States Second Plan 
(1956-61) 
Third Plan 
(1961-66) 
Annual Plan 
(1966-68) 
Andhra Pradesh 50.2 85.6 40.2 
Assam 53.0 97.4 43.4 
Bihar 38.0 60.5 27.8 
Bombay 59.9 - - 
Gujarat - 100.5 52.8 
Jammu & Kashmir 74.4 170.0 103.5 
Kerala 46.7 93.6 43.5 
Madhya Pradesh 44.9 77.8 33.5 
Madras 55.5 92.1 42.2 
Maharastra - 92.2 54.7 
Mysore 58.8 95.6 42.8 
Nagaland .. 270.0 285.0 
Orissa 51.1 104.7 49.5 
Punjab 74.6 104.1 54.3 
Rajasthan 49.7 88.0 38.8 
Uttar Pradesh 31.0 65.8 37.0 
West Bengal  44.6 75.6 30.6 
Total States 48.3 83.7 41.2 
Source: Memorandum to Fifth Finance Commission, West Bengal Government, 1969, p. 19 
 
 
 
 
Table: 18 
State’s Own Revenues as Proportion of the Aggregate Plan Expenditure From the First Plan 
to Fifth Plan 
(Percentage) 
 
States I  Plan II Plan III Plan Annual Plans IV Plan V Plan 
Punjab 12.4 41.7 47.2 57.0 77.1 73.2 
Haryana -- -- -- 45.9 78.8 73.7 
Maharastra 68.6 65.4 61.6 71.5 76.2 82.4 
Gujarat 64.8 66.0 52.9 63.0 71.7 78.0 
West Bengal 26.1 53.2 48.3 30.4 41.5 62.2 
Karnataka 31.9 51.1 37.5 43.5 55.3 69.1 
Tamil Nadu 54.3 48.9 45.3 54.7 64.3 56.0 
Kerala 35.1 51.9 33.0 38.6 48.9 53.2 
Rajasthan 9.1 41.0 23.3 12.4 31.1 55.4 
Andhra 
Pradesh 
45.0 47.0 36.2 31.8 45.4 59.1 
Madhya 
Pradesh 
35.8 33.8 24.0 14.4 46.6 65.5 
Uttar Pradesh 47.9 46.9 36.4 42.9 56.1 56.3 
Orissa 20.2 25.8 38.8 33.6 37.8 42.0 
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Bihar 46.6 52.5 34.9 29.0 31.2 43.9 
All States 39.1 49.4 40.8 43.6 57.4 64.1 
Source: Ansari, M.M, ‘ Financing of the State’s Plans A perspective for Regional 
Development, EPW, December 3, 1983, p. 2077 
 
 
 
Table: 19 
Per Capita Plan Out lay and Central Assistance for State Plans From  
First Plan to Fourth Plan 
                                                                           (Rs. ) 
            Total for 18 years 
                (1951-69) 
       Fourth Plan (1969-74) States 
Plan Outlay Central 
Assistance 
Plan Outlay  Central 
Assistance 
Andhra Pradesh 243 149 90 66 
Assam 269 201 161 157 
Bihar 181 109 82 63 
Gujrat 346 132 188 66 
Haryana 81 52 212 87 
Jammu & 
Kashmir 
453 416 382 382 
Kerala 264 161 133 90 
Madhya Pradesh 223 164 96 71 
Maharastra 300 102 178 54 
Mysore 292 162 122 65 
Ngaland 715 715 875 875 
Orissa 309 214 81 71 
Punjab 395 242 206 77 
Rajasthan 260 202 101 93 
Tamil Nadu 254 131 136 55 
Uttar Pradesh 190 111 114 63 
West Bengal 243 141 79 54 
All States 253 147 123 71 
West Bengal An Analytical Study, The Bengal Chamber of Commerce & Industry, 1971, p.143 
 
 
Table: 20 
Relative Increase in the Major Components of Revenue of West Bengal Between 1951-52 and 
1958-59 
 
Name of 
Source 
1951-52 1958-59 Percentage 
increase 
between 1951-
52 & 1958-59 
 Rs. Crores Percent of 
 total 
Rs Crores Percent of total  
Shared taxes 7.06 18.4 14.58 18.2 106.5 
State taxes 23.80 60.8 42.50 53.0 82.4 
Revenue from 
commercial 
undertakings 
and forests 
0.42 1.1 1.64 2.0 290.5 
Other non-tax 
revenue 
3.70 9.7 7.76 9.7 109.7 
Grants from 
Union 
Government 
3.83 10.0 13.73 17.1 258.5 
Total 38.31 100.00 80.21 100.00 109.4 
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Source: Techno Economic Survey of West Bengal, National Council of Applied Economics 
Research (NCAER), 1962, p. 254 
 
Table: 21 
 Percentage Sources of West Bengal’s Receipts Between 1960-61 and 1969-70  
Revenue Receipts 1960-61 1969-70 
State’s own tax receipts  51.14 48.15 
Share in Central taxes 19.04 19.32 
State’s own non-tax receipts 
excluding grants 
23.73 15.53 
Grants from Centre 6.07 16.88 
Total revenue receipts 
      
100.00 100.00 
Source: Banerjee, N, “Financial Resources for West Bengal’s Development”, 
 in Bhattacharya, D (ed.) Focus on West Bengal Problems and prospects, 1972, p. 143  
 
 
 
 
 
Table: 22 
Rate of Dividends on State Investment in 1968-69                 (Rs. in Lakhs) 
States Total investments at the 
end of 1967-68 
Dividends in 1968-69 Rate of dividends col. 
3 as percentage of col. 
4 
Andhra Pradesh 4188 29 0.69 
Assam 1349 1 0.07 
Bihar N.A 3 NA 
Gujarat 2911 98 3.37 
Haryana NA 2 NA 
Jammu & Kashmir 896 1 0.11 
Kerala 3027 28 0.92 
Madhya Pradesh 2890 89 3.08 
Maharastra 5023 90 1.79 
Mysore 3414 41 1.20 
Ngaland NA NA NA 
Orissa 3071 10 0.33 
Punjab 1557 16 1.03 
Rajasthan 824 16 1.94 
Tamil Nadu 2525 19 0.75 
Uttar Pradesh 2684 49 1.83 
West Bengal 2241 1 0.04 
Total 36600 493 1.35 
Source: Fifth Finance Commission, 1969, pp. 191 
 
Table: 23 
Percentage of Sales Tax Arrears to the Total Demand From 1964-65 to 1966-67   
(Percentage) 
States 1964-65 1965-66 1966-67 
Andhra Pradesh 13.82 13.49 11.17 
Assam 9.35 10.15 13.15 
Bihar 23.22 22.98 24.00 
Gujarat 6.09 6.23 5.37 
Haryana - - 5.39 
Jammu & Kashmir 2.33 10.59 9.17 
Kerala 18.01 18.92 16.76 
Madhya Pradesh 10.54 9.60 8.89 
Maharastra 12.86 12.27 10.75 
Mysore 12.13 12.05 12.44 
Orissa 22.73 22.04 23.53 
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Punjab 3.09 3.70 3.76 
Rajasthan 7.58 8.76 11.62 
Tamil Nadu 13.63 15.57 14.86 
Urttar Pardesh 35.96 32.84 29.96 
West Bengal 28.40 25.64 25.64 
Total States 17.14 16.56 15.73 
Source: Fifth Finance Commission, Government of India, 1969, p. 148  
 
 
Table: 24 
Arrears in Total Tax Revenue of the States in 1968-69     
 (Rs. Crores) 
States As on Total 
Andhra Pradesh 31.3.1968 20.92 
Assam 31.3.1968 8.82 
Bihar 31.3.1969 18.81 
Gujrat 31.3.1968 5.49 
Haryana 31.3.1968 0.43 
Jammu & Kashmir 31.3.1969 0.53 
Kerala 31.3.1969 9.23 
Madhya Pradesh 31.3.1968 8.10 
Maharastra 31.3.1968 17.85 
Mysore 31.3.1968 12.88 
Orissa 31.3.1968 4.66 
Punjab 31.3.1969 1.45 
Rajasthan 31.3.1968 9.12 
Tamil Nadu 31.3.1969 10.29 
Uttar Pradesh 31.3.1969 28.76 
West Bengal 31.3.1969 28.44 
Total - 185.78 
Source: Fifth Finance Commission, 1969, p. 146 
 
 
 
Table: 25 
Shortfall in Resources for the States During the Sixth Plan (1980-85) 
 
States BC
R 
CPSE SS PF MCR AOD MB & 
NL 
Total 
State 
Resource
s 
Central 
Assistanc
e 
Total 
Resource
s@ 
Andhra 
Pradesh 
37.9 1111.8 (-)8.7 6.3 26.6 (-)280.3 42.5 37.4 13.2 30.3 
Bihar 40.9 719.1 3.0 32.6 46.7 27.4 23.1 62.6 15.4 44.1 
Gujarat NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Haryana 48.0 472.9 7.5 17.1 (-)173.0 (-)580.7 24.3 41.9 (-)1.2 36.3 
Karnataka 23.9 (-)9.3 (-)0.3 18.1 20.1 (-)42.2 35.1 24.1 22.8 23.8 
Kerala 46.1 (-)59.2 (-)1.3 (-)4.7 38.6 21.5 42.3 30.3 24.0 51.1 
Madhya 
Pradesh 
14.1 747.2 24.8 60.1 (-)257.8 (-)388.8 34.4 36.9 22.4 33.0 
Maharastra NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Orissa 24.9 (-)108.3 36.4 3.6 32.4 60.2 48.5 44.8 20.4 27.6 
Punjab 50.2 1124.9 24.3 23.4 309.3 (-)82.7 12.8 32.1 16.7 29.8 
Rajasthan 51.0 49.7 (-
)26.2 
10.0 (-)61.8 (-)160.2 13.6 37.2 (-)9.9 22.7 
Tamil Nadu NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Uttar 
Pradesh 
28.5 (-)1359.4 8.7 31.8 117.8 18.8 37.4 33.8 15.9 27.9 
West Bengal 92.8 72.6 20.5 (-)9.3 (-)203.8 2473.7 30.6 81.4 7.5 67.0 
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Source: Bagchi, A & Sen, T, ‘ Budgetary Trends and Plan Financing in the States’, in  Bagchi, 
A & Bajaj, J.L, & Byrd, W.A (ed.) State Finances in India, Vikas Publishing House Pvt. Ltd., 
New Delhi, 1992, pp. 69-74 
 
BCR= Balance of Current Revenue; CPSE= Contribution of Public Sector Enterprises; SS= 
Small Savings; PF= Provident Funds; MCR= Misc. Capital Receipts; AOD= Adjustment of 
Overdrafts etc.; MB & NL= Market Borrowing and Negotiated Loans 
 
@ Total resources for State’s Plan expenditure consists of Balance from 
 Current Revenue, Contribution of Public Enterprises Small Savings, Provident  
Funds, Misc. Capital Receipts, Adjustment of Over Drafts etc., Market Borrowing  
and Negotiated Loans.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table: 26 
Allocation of Eighth Plan Outlay and  Percentage Shortfall and Per Capita Anticipated 
Expenditure of Eighth Plan  
 
Projected 
outlay 
(Rs. Crore at 
1991-92 
Prices) 
Realised 
outlay 
(Rs. Crore at 
1991-92 
Prices) 
Percentage 
of shortfall in 
projected 
outlay 
Per Capita 
anticipated 
expenditure  
of 8th Plan 
(Rs.) 
States 
      (1)      (2)    (3)   (4) 
High Income States     
Goa 761 701 7.88  -- 
Gujarat 11,500 9,319 18.96 2700 
Haryana 5,700 3,802 33.29 2838 
Maharastra 18,520 22,692 (-) 22.52 3101 
Punjab 6,570 5,277 19.68 2951 
Middle Income States     
Andhra Pradesh 10,500 10,966 (-) 4.43 1858 
Karnataka 12,300 11,604 5.65 3138 
Kerala 5,460 6,712 (-) 22.9 2370 
Tamil Nadu 10,200 10,655 (-) 4.55 2427 
West Bengal 9,760 6,519 33.20 1144 
Low Income States     
Bihar 13,000 4,712 63.20 592 
Madhya Pradesh 11,100 9,886 10.93 1742 
Orissa 10,000 5,076 49.24 2123 
Rajasthan 11,500 8,810 23.39 2548 
Uttar Pradesh 21,000 15,778 24.74 1372 
All India 1,57,871 1,32,519 16.05 1965 
Source: Column 1 and 2 see Kurian, N.J, ‘ State Government Finances’, EPW, May 8, 1999, pp. 
1119 & column 4  see Kurian, N.J, ‘Widening Regional Disparities in India Some Indicators’, 
EPW, February 12, 2000, p. 543  
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Chapter: 6 
 
Economic Policy Reform and Budgetary Performance of 
West Bengal During the 1990s Compared to Other States 
and the Previous Decade 
 
Since the mid-1980’s almost all Indian States have been facing 
considerable revenue deficit. The crisis has further accentuated after the 
inception of New Economic Policy (NEP), 1991. The reason behind such 
phenomenon lies in the structural constraints of Indian economy as well as 
some policy measures taken as part of NEP. In this context this chapter 
attempts to analyse the fiscal position of West Bengal during 1990s 
compared to other States and to the previous decade (1980s).  Of all the 
major category States, in recent times West Bengal’s budgetary crisis has 
been most acute one. According to the latest budgetary position, the State 
was declared one of the most indebted States in India and the rate of 
growth in public debt during 1990-99 was 19 per cent, the highest for any 
State with the exception of Himachal Pradesh (19.9 per cent) (Shankar, 
2000, p. 4607). An estimation shows that during the 2001-02 fiscal year 
West Bengal government has spent 10 percent more than of its revenue 
receipts in current expenditure. Therefore, it has not only spent the whole 
amount of its revenue receipts collected during the respective year but it 
has also to borrow some additional amount in order to maintain its regular 
expenditure. Moreover, West Bengal government is one of the major States 
of India to have been taken considerable number of Overdrafts from the 
Reserve Bank of India for meeting its expenditure. During the financial year 
of 2000-01, the government took Overdraft 134 times which was 
considerably higher than most other Indian States. Only five States took 
more Overdrafts than West Bengal during the same financial year, namely 
Orissa (194), Bihar, Kerala (204) Manipur (263) and Uttar Pardesh (209). 
(Anandabazar Patrika, Bengali Daily, Calcutta, July 9, 2002) These pictures 
alone could indicate the severity of the budgetary crisis faced by West 
Bengal in recent years . 
 
It is often argued that the main problem of West Bengal compared to other 
States is its low level of revenue mobilisation capacity compared to the 
other States on the one hand and continuously growing revenue 
expenditure in its budget on the other. Thus its revenue expenditure has 
been growing at quicker pace than its revenue receipts resulting in huge 
fiscal as well as revenue deficit. It remains to be seen how far such acute 
crisis is the outcome of the failure of  internal resource mobilisation of West 
Bengal in  particular and all States in general. And how far such acute fiscal 
crisis is the outcome of New Economic Policy pursued in 1991 which had 
allegedly worsened the position of the State governments in general further 
and eroded their fiscal base compared to previous decades.  
 
After having been voted to power in 1977, the Left Front government ruling 
in West Bengal started complaining about being discriminated against by 
the Centre which eventually became the focal point of their movement 
against the existing bias of the federal fiscal relations in India. Consequently 
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the State constantly blamed the Central government for its present plight. 
This chapter attempts to examine to what extent West Bengal has been 
subject to discrimination as far as devolution of resources from the Centre 
to the States is concerned during 1990s. And to what extent the present 
severe financial crisis is its own making by not attaching adequate 
importance to fiscal prudence, fiscal discipline and better management of its 
revenue raising potential  and own resource mobilisation.   
 
Trends in State governments finances over the two  decades (1980-81 
to 1999-00)                           
 
State finances in general have been undergoing significant deterioration 
since the late 1980s particularly after the New Economic Policy in 1991 
came into effect. Until the early 1980s, the State governments in general 
enjoyed a revenue surplus. Deficits on the revenue account was a rather 
unusual phenomenon. The situation changed rapidly from the mid-1980s. 
And by the 1990s almost all States were reduced to deficit category States. 
(Nair,1998, pp. 41-42) Thus adequate attention should be paid to the State 
government’s budgetary situation during the decade of 1980s. Later on we 
will  turn to the decade of 1990s.     
 
Table: 1  
Comparative Study  of Expenditure on Wages and Salaries and Revenue Receipts 
Among the States 
 
States Growth rates  
of salary and  
wages per  
cent per annum 
1980-88 
Average annual per  
capita own-tax revenue 
during  
the Sixth Plan (1980-85) 
(Rs.) 
Average annual per  
capita own-tax revenue 
during  
the Seventh Plan (1985-90)
(Rs.) 
         (1)            ( 2)                ( 3)           ( 4) 
High Income States    
Gujarat 17.8 213.87 390.04 
Haryana 17.3 241.33 448.11 
Maharastra 16.5 243.31 454.20 
Punjab 13.4 273.08 469.72 
Aggregate 16.25 242.89 440.51 
Middle Income States    
Andhra Pradesh 14.8 151.93 300.44 
Karnataka 13.6 176.49 335.23 
Kerala 16.9 171.64 330.32 
Tamil Nadu 21.7 197.79 352.08 
West Bengal 15.9 122.47 240.17 
Aggregate 16.58 164.06 311.64 
Low Income States    
Bihar 15.9 52.32 92.66 
Madhya Pradesh 19.1 102.05 192.09 
Orissa 16.5 65.58 132.15 
Rajasthan 16.7 102.86 188.83 
Uttar Pradesh 16.8 78.41 141.64 
Aggregate 17.0 80.24 149.47 
All Major States 17.1 138.42 257.45 
Sources: For column 1  see  Bagchi, A, Bajaj. J.L & Byrd, W.A (ed.) State Finances in India, 
NIPFP, Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, 1992, p. 97. For column 2, ibid., p. 89, for column 
3, ibid., p. 90 
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High growth of wages and salaries and subsidies is said to be one of the 
main reasons for the growing level of revenue deficit of the States. It could 
be noted that middle and low income States have proportionately higher 
level of expenditure on wages and salaries compared to the high income 
States. Thus middle and low income States not only tend to spend higher 
level of expenditure on wages and salaries compared to the high income 
States but also proportionate expenditure on salaries and wages was much 
higher compared to their own revenue mobilisation (table1). West Bengal’s 
per capita revenue mobilisation during the 6th Plan period  and 7th Plan 
period was only Rs. 122.47 and Rs. 240.17 respectively as against the all 
India average of Rs. 138.42 and Rs. 257.45 during the same period. In 
contrast to that, West Bengal’s expenditure on wages and salaries was 
much higher than its own per capita revenue mobilisation. Expenditure on 
wages and salaries had grown at the rate of 17.1 per cent per year for all 
States over the period 1980-81 to 1987-88 as against 15.9 per cent  in West 
Bengal. Though the growth rate of wages and salaries of West Bengal was 
slightly lower than all States average, which, however, was offset by a still 
lower level of per capita own revenue mobilisation of West Bengal during 
the two successive Plan periods. (table 1) 
 
Another major reason for the rapid growth of government expenditure on 
wages and salaries at the States level is the phenomenal increase in 
employment in State governments’ institutions as well as in government 
schools, aided institutions (quasi government) and local bodies. In 14 major 
State governments  the net employment increased from 4.9 million in 1981 
to 6.6 million in 1987 i.e., the rate of growth being 3.6 per cent per year. In 
case of West Bengal the growth rate of net employment was much higher 
than the all India level. Thus, the compound growth rate of the West Bengal 
government employees over the period 1981-87 was 4.87 as against the all 
India average growth rate (3.62 ) which is evident from the table 2 below.  
 
It seems that State governments in general have been feeling obligated to 
expand there office in order to cope with the acute unemployment situation 
and inadequate absorption of such employment in private and Central 
government sectors.131  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
131. During 1981-94, employment in the State governments sectors of India increased from 
7.5 million to 10.3 million i.e., an increase of 36%. Contrary to that Central government 
sectors employment grew from 5.9 million to 7 million, an increase of 17.2% during the 
same period. Most of this growth occurred between 1981-91, when the State governments 
expanded by about 31% and in contrast to that  the Central government by 17.5%. The 
employment scenario in the country has continued to be grim outside the government 
sector in general. The private sector employment in large and small enterprises grew from 
7.3 million to 7.9 million an increase of 7% over 13 years between 1981-94 which, however 
took place mostly in service sectors. During this same period the number of the registered 
unemployed increased from 17.8 million to 36.7% million. (Nair, S, Quarterly Journal of The 
Indian Institute of Public Administration, , January-March 1998, Vol. XLIV, No.1, pp. 42-43)  
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Table: 2 
Total   State Government Employees  as on 
 March 31, (Thousands) 
States 1981-82 1987-88 Compound 
Growth 
Rate 
Andhra Pradesh 391.22 502.30 4.25 
Gujarat 223.93 266.68 2.95 
Haryana 200.38 243.24 3.28 
Karnataka 383.97 478.76 3.75 
Kerala 285.12 344.19 3.19 
Madhya Pradesh 565.40 706.17 3.77 
Maharastra 500.39 605.83 3.24 
Orissa 227.81 281.41 3.58 
Punjab 265.57 291.68 1.58 
Rajasthan 364.92 430.32 2.79 
Tamil Nadu 451.80 612.30 5.20 
Uttar Pradesh 685.52 832.53 3.29 
West Bengal 353.80 470.72 4.87 
All States 4899.82 6066.12 3.62 
Source: Rao, M.G, Proposals for State Level Budgetary Reforms, 
EPW, February 1, 1992, p. 214 
 
Furthermore,  there are also other important reasons for the rapid growth of 
State government’s employment. During the Centralised Planning period 
the emphasis has been on increasing Plan expenditure often by sacrificing 
more productive expenditure on maintenance in an objective to tap more 
funds from the Planning Commission. This too has left a legacy of large 
committed expenditure in the growing departmental heads and consequent 
increase in the employment for new Plan projects. Thus over the years “a 
number of new programmes under the Plans are taken up year after year 
even when existing projects and programmes can not be adequately funded 
due to shortages of resources”. (Rao, 1992, p. 213)  
 
Table: 3 
Estimated Employment in Public Sector in West Bengal Between 1980 and 2000 
                                                                      (Number in Thousand) 
Year Ended 
December 
Central 
Government 
State 
Government 
Quasi 
Government 
Local Bodies Total 
1980 451.0 366.0 651.2 112.1 1580.3 
1985 428.0 412.3 765.9 114.8 1721.0 
1990 415.0 427.2 696.7 147.0 1685.9 
1991 421.6 428.9 703.1 144.5 1698.1 
1992 413.3 431.6 695.0 148.7 1688.6 
1993  416.2 430.0 693.4 148.9 1683.6 
1994  413.3 432.5 681.5 146.2 1666.4 
1995 411.2 432.4 638.6 151.1 1633.3 
1996 411.2 433.7 ® 631.7 143.8 1620.4 ®  
1997 407.2 435.0 ® 640.6 144.9 1627.7 ® 
1998 409.9 436.3 ®  670.6 147.8 ®  1664.6 ® 
1999 (P) 399.0 436.8 669.0 155.1 1659.9 
1999 (March) (P) 409.6 436.8 671.6 147.9 1665.9 
2000 (March) (p) 390.0 437.1 626.2 156.4 1609.7 
R = Revised 
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P = Provisional 
Source: Economic Review, Statistical Appendix, Government of West Bengal, Different 
Issues 
  
Table: 4 
Sector-Wise Distribution of Estimated Employment in West Bengal  
From 1980 to 2000 
                                                                                                    (number in Lakhs) 
Year Ended 
December 
Public Sector Organised Private 
Sector 
Total 
1980 15.80 10.84 26.64 
1985 17.21 9.38 26.59 
1990 16.86 8.90 26.76 
1991 16.98 8.88 25.86 
1992 16.89 8.14 25.03 
1993  16.74 8.79 25.53 
1994 16.63 7.96 24.59 
1995 16.33 7.80 24.13 
1996 16.20 ® 7.96 24.16 ® 
1997 16.28 ® 7.82 24.10 ® 
1998 16.65 ® 8.07 ® 24.72 ® 
1999(P) 16.60 8.07 24.67 
1999 (March)(P) 16.66 8.11 24.77 
2000 (March) (p) 16.10 8.07 24.17 
P = Provisional 
R = Revised 
Source: Economic Review, Statistical Appendix, Government Of West Bengal 
Different Issues 
 
Table 3 indicates that in West Bengal the employment in the Central 
governmental sector has been decreasing from 451.0 thousands in 1980  to 
390. 0 thousands in 2000. In contrast, during the same period (1980-2000) 
employment in State government sectors, quasi government sectors and 
local bodies have been indicating an increasing tendency. As for State 
government sectors the number of employees has increased from 366 
thousands in 1980 to 437.1 thousands in 2000 and in quasi government 
sectors the number of employees increased from  651.2 thousands in 1980 
to 671.6 thousands in 1999 and then decreased to 626.2 in 2000. On the 
other hand private sectors seem to have followed the trend of the Central 
government by absorbing decreasing number of people. (table 4) Thus total 
number of employees in organised private sector has decreased from 10.84 
lakhs in 1980 to 8.07 lakhs in 2000. (table 4) 
 
However, in many State governments higher growth of  labour force in State 
sectors, quasi government sectors and local bodies coupled with change in 
the principles of wage determination in the post 1986 period led to steep 
increase in  revenue  expenditure.  Prior to 1986, pay scales in the Central 
and the State governments were different and most State governments had 
lower scales. In 1986, State governments accepted the principle of common 
pay scales according to the recommendation of the Fourth Pay 
Commission. Thus increased pay scale coupled with overstaffing led to 
growth of wage bill and hence revenue deficit in most State government’s 
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budget (Nair, 1998, p. 43). Table 5 indicates the proliferation of revenue 
deficit of West Bengal during the whole 1980s which has increased from 
Rs.  –23 crore in 1980-81 to Rs. --477 crore  in 1989-90. Therefore the 
State’s revenue deficit increased by 1973 per cent during  the decade of 
1980s. 
 
 
 
Table: 5 
Growth of Revenue Expenditure in West Bengal and Estimated Deficit Between 1980-
81 & 1989-90 (Rs. in Crore)                                                                                            
Year Total Revenue 
Receipts 
Total Revenue 
Expenditure 
Net Surplus (+) or 
Deficit (-) on 
Revenue Account
1980-81 1092 1115 -23 
1981-82 1224 1312 -88 
1982-83 1379 1622 -243 
1983-84 1533 1739 -206 
1984-85 1779 2151 -372 
1985-86 2343 2260 +83 
1986-87 2510 2697 -187 
1987-88 2912 3027 -115 
1988-89 3338 3475 -137 
1989-90 3494 3971 -477 
Source: Das, P, Public Finance in West Bengal, Firma KLM Private LTD, Calcutta,1992,  
pp. 20-21 
 
 
 
Until mid1980s the revenue deficit of the States was at manageable 
dimension despite the fact that the States have accepted common pay 
scale recommended by the Fourth Pay commission. But during 1990s the 
problem has been accentuated at a considerable level after the 
implementation of the recommendation of the Fifth Pay Commission (1997). 
The latest round of pay revision according to the recommendation of Fifth 
Pay Commission is estimated to have raised expenditure on administrative 
services as much as by 80% in 1998-99. However, for the States in general 
the revenue deficit increased from 0.3 per cent of Gross Domestic product 
(GDP) during the mid-1980s  to a little over 1 per cent of GDP in 1997-98. 
But following the impact of the Pay Commission revenue deficit of all States 
has stepped up to 2.9 per cent in 1999-00. (“Finances of State 
Governments”, EPW, May 26, 2001, p.1903) (table 6) 
 
 
Table: 6 
Revenue Deficit  as Percentage of NSDP in Different States Between 1990-91 & 1999-00 
 
 
Year 
WB MAH 
GUJ 
KAR 
TAN AP 
PNB All 
States@ 
1990-91 -2.9 -0.1 -2.5 -0.3 -1.8 -0.5 -2.9 -0.93 
1991-92 -1.6 -0.4 -1.9 -0.6 -5.2 -0.4 -2.1 -0.87 
1992-93 -1.0 -0.8 -0.7 -0.5 -3.6 -0.3 -2.4 -0.68 
1993-94 -1.9 -0.1 0.2 0.3 -1.2 0.4 -2.5 -0.44 
1994-95 -1.3 0.2 0.4 -0.6 -0.6 -1.0 -2.2 -0.61 
1995-96 -1.7 -0.4 -0.3 0.1 -0.4 -0.9 -1.2 -0.69 
1996-97 -2.6 -0.8 -0.7 -0.8 -1.2 -3.5 -3.1 -1.18 
1997-98 -2.4 -1.2 -1.1 -0.4 -1.3 -0.7 -3.0 -1.07 
1998-99 -4.4 -1.6 -2.8 -1.3 -2.9 -2.4 -4.8 -2.48 
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1999-00 -6.7* NA NA NA NA NA NA -2.90 
Source: Finances of State Governments, EPW, May 26, 2001, pp. 1901-1903 
*Source: Anandabazar Patrika, Bengali Daily, Calcutta, 9th July, 2002      
@   For ‘All States’ totals are percentage of GDP at current market prices       
AP= Andhra Pradesh, GUJ= Gujarat, KAR= Karnataka, MAH= Maharastra,  
PNB= Punjab, TAN= Tamil Nadu, WB= West Bengal 
 
       
Against the backdrop of large revenue deficits faced by almost all States the 
position of West Bengal needs to be discussed. We have already 
mentioned earlier that West Bengal has been lagging behind in terms of its 
own revenue mobilisation compared to the other States. We will turn to  this 
area in the subsequent part of this study. Out of the State’s total revenue 
receipts, own revenue mobilisation of the State is increasing at a lower pace 
than its growing revenue expenditure resulting in huge revenue deficit 
compared to the other States. In 1990-91 the revenue deficit of West 
Bengal  as percent of Net State Domestic Product (NSDP) was 3% and it 
has more than doubled and amounted to 6.7 per cent in 1999-00. For all 
States the revenue deficit as percent of GDP has increased from 0.9 per 
cent in 1990-91 to 2.9 per cent in 1999-00.  Therefore, revenue deficit of 
West Bengal was much higher than the all India average during the decade 
of 1990s indicating severe  budgetary crisis of the State (table 6). 
 
One of the main reasons of high level of revenue deficit of West Bengal 
compared to the other States, as we have mentioned above, is that the 
percentage share of the expenditure incurred on wages and salary and 
pension of the State government employees to revenue receipts of the 
State is continuously much higher in West Bengal than other States in India. 
However, the revenue expenditure incurred on pension and salary as 
against  total revenue receipts of the State was also high during 1980s and 
at that time it was only comparable with Kerala. Over time Kerala has 
managed to  decrease the expenditure incurred on the salary and pension 
considerably. But West Bengal has continuously incurred high proportion of 
expenditure on salary and pension to its total revenue receipts during the 
last two decades. (1980-99) (Anandabazar Patrika, Bengali Daily, Calcutta, 
July 10, 2002) (table 7) 
 
It is worthwhile to note in this context that though almost all States have 
experienced such a hike in revenue expenditure due to increased pay scale 
following the recommendation of the Fifth Pay Commission, but the problem 
of West Bengal has another dimension. In 1977 when Left Front 
government came to power, it was decided that the government will bear 
the expenditure incurred on salary and pension given to almost 95 per cent 
of teachers in the State, engaged in different levels of education system i.e., 
from primary to university. Besides, it was also decided to bear a part of the 
expenditure incurred on salary and pension given to employees of State 
government and local bodies. As a consequence expenditure incurred on 
such item increased from Rs. 6,117 crore in 1997-98 to Rs. 12, 239 crore in 
2002-03.  (Rajya Sarkarer Arthik Sankat: Karan Abong Samadhaner Path 
(Financial Crisis of the State: Causes and Remedial Measures, Finance 
Department, West Bengal Government, 30th January, 2003, p. 2)  
  
Table: 7 
Expenditure Incurred on Pension and Salary as Percentage 
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 to Total  Revenue Receipts of Different States in 1990-91 & 1998-99 
 
States 1990-91 1998-99 
Orissa 44 85 
Kerala 82 61 
Rajasthann 34 65 
Andhra Pradesh 48 47 
Tamil Nadu 53 66 
West Bengal 78 86 
Source: Anandabazar Patrika, Bengali Daily, Calcutta, July 10, 2002 
 
 
Further  fiscal crisis of the States consequent upon NEP 
 
Besides the implementation of the Fifth Pay Commission other exogenous 
factors following the New Economic Policy (NEP) have also affected fiscal 
position of the States. Therefore, tax policy reform, interest policy reform, 
change in overdraft policy of the Central government consequent upon NEP 
has resulted in a declining trend of revenue receipts of the Central 
government which has in turn affected the resource transfers from the 
Centre to the States. As a result of the stagnation in the Central tax 
revenues, Finance Commission mandated tax revenue devolution has not 
increased during the decade of 1990s and the Centre has been also unable 
to maintain growing tempo of the Central assistance in the form of loans 
and grants to the States provided by the Planning Commission. Gross 
Receipts from the Centre as percentage to total expenditure of State 
governments has decreased for all States from 44.8 per cent in 1990-91 to 
39.6 per cent in 1999-00. (EPW, May 26, 2001, p.1922). Contrary to this 
trend, during 1990s, the gross receipts of West Bengal from the Centre has 
not only been considerably higher than all India average but also has been 
showing increasing tendency. It has increased from 47.9 per cent in 1990-
91 to   56.1 per cent in1998-99 though afterwards in 1999-00 it declined to 
47.9 per cent. (table 8) 
 
Different components of Central resource transfers to the States need to be 
mentioned separately. The percentage share of the proceeds from Central 
taxes to the States’ own tax revenue is much higher in West Bengal than 
other States during 1990s. (table 9) In terms of  the distribution of grants 
from the Centre to the States, the percentage share of grants to total 
expenditure of West Bengal compared to the other States is mixed which 
varies from one year to another. (table 10) But in terms of receiving Central 
loan the State has managed to get much higher share than the all India 
average during 1990s. (table 11) 
 
Table: 8 
Gross Devolution of Resources From the Centre to States as Percentage to Total 
Expenditure of the States From 1990-91 to 1999-00 
Year WB 
MAH 
GUJ KAR TAN AP Punjab 
All States 
1990-91 47.9 28.5 26.7 30.2 35.3 41.3 48.1 44.8 
1991-92 46.4 29.4 20.8 28.7 28.3 40.6 29.9 41.6 
1992-93 49.8 25.3 26.9 30.9 33.0 40.2 46.0 43.1 
1993-94 48.9 27.4 29.6 30.5 36.3 43.3 39.5 43.1 
1994-95 49.9 21.0 26.8 34.5 36.0 36.5 25.1 39.7 
1995-96 47.0 22.2 27.1 27.3 28.6 40.4 22.2 39.2 
1996-97 46.3 27.2 27.6 29.9 28.6 38.9 31.9 40.4 
 253
1997-98 56.6 24.4 29.1 32.3 30.1 39.4 25.4 41.8 
1998-99 56.1 28.6 27.1 29.4 25.7 34.0 30.5 38.9 
1999-00 47.9 23.8 30.7 25.9 27.6 38.8 32.9 39.6 
Source: Finances of State Governments, EPW, May 26, 2001, p. 1922 
 
Table: 9 
State-wise Share in Central Taxes as Percentage to State’s Own Tax Revenues From 1985-86 
to 1999-00 
Year WB MAH 
GUJ KAR TAN AP 
PNB All States 
1985-86 55.5 21.0 26.0 33.1 33.4 40.4 17.0 49.9 
1986-87 55.6 21.2 9.7 33.5 33.3 42.1 18.3 50.2 
1987-88 50.3 20.7 23.6 31.9 37.1 40.3 17.0 50.0 
1988-89 43.5 19.2 21.3 29.4 36.3 38.3 16.4 47.9 
1989-90 49.6 21.6 19.8 32.8 38.1 37.8 16.9 50.4 
1990-91 48.3 19.3 11.7 28.3 32.1 43.3 19.2 46.9 
1991-92 50.4 20.5 10.6 27.0 31.9 42.4 19.0 47.1 
1992-93 56.5 21.3 23.5 30.1 34.1 45.6 19.8 51.6 
1993-94 55.3 20.0 24.9 26.7 32.3 44.0 17.6 48.2 
1994-95 48.2 18.2 20.6 26.5 29.7 44.6 16.3 44.6 
1995-96 48.8 15.3 21.4 27.4 25.2 62.2 16.7 45.5 
1996-97 56.8 19.4 19.4 30.0 27.1 60.2 19.3 49.3 
1997-98 67.5 12.6 23.9 33.9 31.4 47.9 21.6 49.7 
1998-99 56.4 20.6 21.6 27.7 25.0 37.8 18.0 44.3 
1999-00 52.4 15.6 20.0 23.1 24.6 37.4 16.0 42.1 
Source: Finances of State Governments, EPW, May 26, 2001, p. 1923 
 
 
Table: 10  
State-wise Grants from the Centre as Percentage of Total Expenditures of State 
Governments, 1985-86 to 1999-00 
Year WB MAH 
GUJ KAR TAN AP 
Punjab All States 
1985-86 13.7 5.6 8.4 7.7 10.1 10.7 9.9 14.11 
1986-87 12.7 7.4 6.6 8.5 7.9 10.6 7.7 13.4 
1987-88 14.0 7.4 11.4 7.3 9.1 9.8 4.6 13.9 
1988-89 15.2 7.4 9.0 8.5 9.5 10.0 7.2 14.4 
1989-90 7.8 6.2 4.2 6.1 7.5 8.3 4.2 11.1 
1990-91 11.8 7.3 5.4 7.7 8.8 11.8 5.4 13.9 
1991-92 11.9 6.7 4.7 7.6 7.5 12.2 4.7 14.0 
1992-93 13.5 6.6 6.1 8.3 8.4 11.7 8.3 14.9 
1993-94 13.7 8.5 8.4 9.4 10.0 13.1 6.4 15.7 
1994-95 10.7 5.1 6.3 7.9 7.7 9.2 3.6 12.4 
1995-96 8.5 5.5 4.4 5.7 6.3 11.1 4.5 11.8 
1996-97 8.7 6.0 6.8 6.5 6.0 10.7 4.8 11.4 
1997-98 7.5 4.4 5.0 6.0 6.1 8.6 3.1 10.6 
1998-99 9.0 3.4 3.7 6.0 5.4 6.6 3.6 9.0 
1999-00 8.4 4.4 5.6 10.1 6.1 10.6 6.7 10.8 
Source: Finances of State Governments, EPW, May 26, 2001, p. 1924 
 
 
 
Table: 11 
State-wise Gross Loans From the Centre as Percentage of Total Expenditure of State 
Governments, 1990-91 to 1999-00 
Year WB MAH 
GUJ KAR TAN AP 
PNB All States 
1990-91 18.7 12.0 16.1 9.2 11.3 12.0 35.4 15.3 
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1991-92 14.8 12.7 11.7 8.5 8.7 11.7 19.4 12.0 
1992-93 14.1 8.7 10.6 9.4 10.0 11.3 29.3 11.0 
1993-94 15.0 9.2 9.5 8.5 10.8 14.2 25.9 10.7 
1994-95 19.8 7.4 10.2 13.8 13.1 12.2 15.8 11.9 
1995-96 19.2 8.9 12.1 7.8 7.9 11.4 11.4 11.0 
1996-97 19.1 12.0 11.4 8.9 8.5 10.1 20.1 11.7 
1997-98 26.6 13.7 13.6 9.0 8.3 11.6 15.4 13.5 
1998-99 31.5 15.6 14.8 10.4 8.2 13.8 21.5 15.1 
1999-00 26.5 13.0 17.0 4.5 9.3 14.5 21.5 15.2 
Source: Finances of State Governments, EPW, May 26, 2001, p. 1925 
 
 
Deepening of fiscal deficit of the States 
 
Although the State has managed to receive a higher volume of Central 
transfers compared to other States, its ever growing expenditure ( 
particularly on unproductive revenue and non-Plan expenditure) could not 
be matched by even a corresponding increase in the total revenue receipts. 
Hence the gross revenue deficit of West Bengal in particular and the States 
in general has been rising sharply during 1990s. Therefore, recourse to 
market borrowing became of urgent necessity to bridge the resource gap of 
the State’s budget. During 1990s, consequent upon NEP, the market 
borrowing became costlier thereby mounting the fiscal deficit of the States 
in general including West Bengal. (Gross Fiscal Deficit = Aggregate 
Expenditure -- Revenue Receipt; Decomposition of  Gross Fiscal Deficit = 
Revenue Deficit + Capital Outlay + Net Lending) In terms of fiscal deficit 
West Bengal’s performance has not been satisfactory either. In 1990-91 
fiscal deficit of West Bengal was around 4.9 per cent of Net State Domestic 
Product (NSDP) of the State and has increased to 9 percent during 1999-
00. In contrast, the average fiscal deficit of all States increased from 3.3 per 
cent in 1990-91 to 4.8 per cent in 1999-00. (table 12)  (“Finances of State 
Governments”, EPW, May 26, 2001, p. 1913 & Anandabazar Patrika, 
Bengali Daily, Calcutta, 9th July, 2002) Thus, compared to other States, 
West Bengal’s fiscal deficit has been rising steeply indicating  further higher 
level of dependence on market borrowing for financing its fiscal deficit which 
would eventually land the State into debt trap.  
 
 
Table: 12 
 State-wise Gross Fiscal Deficit as Percentage of GSDP for Different States From 1990-91 
to 1999-00 
Year WB MAH 
GUJ 
KAR 
TAN AP 
PNB All 
States@ 
1990-91 4.7 2.5 6.4 2.4 3.6 2.8 6.6 3.3 
1991-92 2.8 2.3 6.1 3.1 3.5 2.7 5.0 2.9 
1992-93 2.3 2.8 2.9 4.2 4.1 3.6 4.8 2.8 
1993-94 3.2 1.8 1.1 2.9  2.3 3.1 4.9 2.4 
1994-95 3.2 2.0 2.0 3.0 2.4 3.4 5.2 2.7 
1995-96 3.7 2.4 2.4 2.5 1.6 3.0 3.6 2.6 
1996-97 4.2 2.6 2.7 2.8 3.0 3.1 3.3 2.7 
1997-98 4.2 3.0 3.4 2.1 3.0 2.5 5.1 2.9 
1998-99 6.5 3.0 5.5 3.4 4.1 5.0 6.9 4.2 
1999-00 9.0* NA NA NA NA NA NA 4.8 
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Source: Finances of State Governments, EPW, May 26, 2001, pp. 1905-1913 
 *Source: Anandabazar Patrika, Bengali Daily, Calcutta, 9th July, 2002      
@ For ‘All States’ totals are percentages of GDP at current market prices  
 
 
Therefore, net market borrowing of West Bengal has increased from Rs. 
161.20 crore in 1980-85 to Rs. 664.66 crore in 2000-01 i.e.,  the net market 
borrowing has increased by 1283 percent during the last 15 years (1985-99) 
(table 13). High level of market borrowing of the State inevitably increased 
the net interest payment liability which was constantly eating out a major 
portion of its revenue expenditure and also crowding out capital expenditure 
and hence capital formation. This, interest payment liability of the State has 
more than doubled during the last two decades. Which has increased from 
9.77  per cent of total revenue expenditure in 1980-81 to 21.5 per cent in 
1999-00. (table 14)      
 
 
Table: 13 
Market Borrowing of West Bengal Between 1980-81 and 1999-00  
Year Gross Borrowing*    
(Rs. in crores) 
Net 
Borrowing** 
(Rs. in 
crores) 
1980-85 # 233.58 161.20 
1985-90 # 616.90 534.52 
1997-98 570.81 541.37 
1998-99 705.76 608.41 
1999-00 766.68 664.66 
2000-01 727.36 664.66 
 
*Gross Borrowing = Borrowing in Cash + Amount of Conversion 
**Net Borrowing =  Borrowing in Cash-Amount Repayable in Respect of Maturing Loan 
# The total amount of net and gross borrowing for the years 1980-81 to 1984-85 and 1985-
86 to 1989-90 
Sources: For the years 1980-85 to 1985-90 see Das, P, Public Finance in West Bengal, 
Firma KLM Pvt. Ltd. Calcutta,  1992, pp.40-41;  For the years 1997-98, 1998-99, 1999-00 & 
2000-01 see “Finances of State Governments”, EPW, May 26, 2001, p. 1925 
 
Table: 14 
Growth of Interest Payment to total  
Revenue Expenditure in West Bengal  
Between 1984-85 & 1999-00 
Year Interest Payment 
as Percentage to 
Total Revenue 
Expenditure 
1980-81 9.77 
1984-85 10.9 
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1990-91 11.36 
1991-92 15.06 
1992-93 16.7 
1993-94 16.6 
1994-95 15.7 
1995-96 17.9 
1996-97 18.5 
1997-98 19.6 
1998-99 18.5 
1999-00  21.5 (Budget) 
Source: Different Issues of Budget At  A Glance,  
Government of West Bengal 
 
Fiscal indicators of West Bengal 
On account of high magnitude of interest payment liabilities of the State and 
increased expenditure on salary and wages, resource available for capital 
expenditure and hence capital formation, suffered considerably during the 
last two decades (1980-00). Capital expenditure as percentage of capital 
receipts has declined from 116.15 per cent in 1980-81 to 31.51 per cent in 
1999-00. The declining ratio of capital expenditure over capital receipts 
indicates that more than two thirds of the capital receipts i.e., borrowing is 
utilised for meeting current consumption needs of the State. Capital outlay 
i.e.,  that part of capital expenditure which goes to economic and social over 
heads as percentage of capital receipts declined from 28 per cent in 1980-
81 to 11 per cent in 1999-00. (table 15)(Shankar,  2000, p. 4608)  
 
We have already noted the trend of revenue expenditure of the State 
increasing at quicker pace than revenue receipts leaving huge amount of 
revenue deficit as well as fiscal deficit. That can be also evident from table 
15 below. Revenue receipt of the State which was 98 per cent of revenue 
expenditure in 1980-81 declined to 59 per cent in 1999-00 indicating 
increasing dependence on borrowing for meeting the revenue expenditure, 
consequently resulting in huge magnitude of revenue deficit. Revenue 
deficit of West Bengal which was Rs. 23 crore in 1980-81 rose to more than 
Rs. 8,000 crore in 1999-2000 (RE).  
 
 
Table: 15 
Some Fiscal Indicators of West Bengal Between 1980-81 and 1999-2000 
 
Item 1980-81 1986-87 1993-94 1999-2000 
                (1)     (2)    (3)     (4)     (5) 
Revenue Receipts (Rs. in crore) 
1091.70 2588.37 5921.42 11399.22 
Revenue Expenditure (Rs. in 
crore) 
1115.21 2800.82 6905.75 19455.34 
Surplus (+) /Deficit (-) on 
Revenue Account  (Rs. in crore) 
(-) 23. 51 (-) 212.45 (-) 984.33 (-) 8056.12 
Capital Receipt  (Rs. in crore) 376. 31 852.67 1936.46 11342.94 
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Capital Expenditure of Which 
(Rs. in crore) 
437.10 797.94 1067.21 3574.21 
Capital Outlay  (Rs. in crore) 106.69 219.80 402.04 1248.01 
Surplus (+) / Deficit (-) on Capital 
Account (Rs. in crore) 
(-) 60. 79 (+) 54.73  (+) 872.25  (+) 7768.73 
Revenue Receipts as Per cent to 
Total Revenue Expenditure 
97.89 92.4 85.75 58.59 
Capital Expenditure  as 
Percentage of Capital Receipts 
116.15 93.58 55.03 31.51 
Capital Outlay as Percentage of 
Capital Receipt 
28.30 25.77 20.78 11.00 
Source: For column 2, 4 & 5 see Shankar, K, Parlous State of Government Finances, EPW, 
December 30, 2001, p. 4608;  column 3 is computed from Budget At A Glance, 1987, 
Government of West Bengal 
 
Table: 16 
Percentage of Revenue Expenditure to Total Expenditure  Between 1980-81 and 1999-2000 
 1980-81 1986-87 1993-94 1999-00 
             (1)    (2)    (3)     (4)     (5) 
I. Developmental Expenditure 70.26 69.13 62.09 61.06 
(1) Social Services 48.36 45.96 39.07 42.73 
(2) Economic Services of Which; 21.89 23.17 23.02 18.33 
(a) Agriculture and allied services 13.69 7.5 6.91 4.94 
(b) Rural Development and 
Special Area Programme 
- 7.53 8.65 6.11 
( c) Irrigation and Flood Control 2.66 3.30 3.06 2.97 
(d) Industry and Mineral 1.35 1.09 1.09 1.39 
(e) Transport and Communication 2.61 2.55 2.53 2.22 
II. Non-Developmental of 
Which; 
26.57 27.78 35.38 38.08 
(a) Interest payment 9.77 12.01 16.93 21.51 
III. Compensation and 
Assignments to Local Bodies 
and Panchayat Institutions  
3.17 3.09 2.53 0.86 
Total Revenue Expenditure 
(I+II+III) 
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: for column 2, 4 & 5 see Shankar, K, Parlous State of Government Finances, EPW, 
December 30, 2000, p. 4609, column 5 computed from  Budget At A Glance, 1987, West 
Bengal Government 
 
 
On account of acute financial crisis, quality of expenditure of the State has 
tended to get deteriorated over time. Table 16 indicates the trend of 
developmental and non-developmental  expenditure of West Bengal during 
last two decades (1980-81 to 1999-00). The share of developmental 
expenditure to total expenditure is consistently on the decline and it 
declined from 70 per cent in 1980-81 to 61 per cent in 1999-2000. 
Correspondingly the share of non-developmental expenditure to total 
expenditure increased from 27 per cent in 1980-81 to 38 per cent in 1999-
00. Among the developmental heads the share of social services which 
includes education, medical, water supply, etc. declined from 48 per cent to 
42 per cent during the same period. The share of economic services which 
include agriculture and allied activities, rural development, irrigation, energy, 
industry, transport  and communication etc. also declined from 22 percent to 
18 per cent during the same period. Rural development which comprises 
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rural employment and other poverty alleviation programmes did also decline 
from 7 per cent in 1986-87 to 6 per cent in 1999-00. On the other hand 
interest payment which seem to have occupied the major portion of the non-
developmental expenditure and increased from 9.77 per cent in 1980-81 to 
21.51 per cent in 1999-00 indicating deterioration of quality of expenditure 
over two decades of the State. (Shankar, K, 2000, p. 4608) 
  
Table: 17 
Average Annual Growth Rate of Developmental Expenditure of Different States Between 1976-
80 and 1990-95 
 
Year AP GUJ KAR MAH PNB TAN WB All States 
1976-80 20.7 17.1 17.5 18.9 20.1 13.8 18.9 17.4 
1980-85 16.9 17.6 16.6 15.4 14.7 20.1 14.7 16.1 
1985-90 12.7 13.7 12.7 15.8 15.0 13.7 12.7 13.7 
1990-95 16.6 14.3 15.5 15.7 14.3 16.4 13.8 14.5 
Source:  For the year 1976-80 see RBI Bulletin, October 1988, p. 870 & for other years, RBI 
Bulletin February 1998, p. S 36 
 
Table: 18 
Average Annual Rate of Growth of Non-Developmental Expenditure of Different States 
Between 1976-80 and 1990-95 
 
Year AP GUJ KAR MAH PNB TAN WB All States 
1976-80 16.2 17.1 13.7 12.9 10.6 10.6 12.9 12.3 
1980-85 18.2 13.3 25.7 21.0 23.0 17.0 16.2 19.2 
1985-90 17.5 20.7 12.0 11.4 17.0 17.2 16.7 18.2 
1990-95 19.2 16.9 17.1 16.4 43.4 19.0 17.2 20.9 
Source: For the year 1976-80 see RBI Bulletin, October 1988, p. 871 & for other years,  RBI 
Bulletin, February 1998, p. S 37 
 
Table 17 shows average annual growth rate of developmental expenditure 
and non-developmental expenditure in West Bengal and corresponding 
average of all States during  the last one and half decades (1980-95). 
Average annual growth rate of developmental expenditure of the State was 
14.7 during the period between 1980-81 and 1984-85 which declined to 
12.7 per cent between 1985-86 and 1989-90 and improved a little by 13.8 
per cent between 1990-91 and 1994-95. The growth rate of developmental 
expenditure for all States average was, however, much higher than West 
Bengal during the same period i.e., 16. I, 13.7 and 14.5 per cent 
respectively. Similarly, according to another estimation development 
expenditure of the State as percentage to total expenditure has been 
showing decreasing tendency not only during the whole decades of 1990s 
but also compared to the other States during the period from 1985-86 to 
2000-01.  For West Bengal which has declined from 64.6 per cent in 1985-
86 to 57.9 per cent in 2000-01 as against 70.7 per cent to 59.4 per cent for 
all States during the same period.  (Finances of State Governments, EPW, 
May 26, 2001, p. 1917) 
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It is, however, heartening to note that the growth rate of West Bengal’s non-
developmental expenditure was lower than all States average during the 
period of 1980-95.  Average annual growth rate of non-developmental 
expenditure of West Bengal in the above period was 16.2, 16.7 and 17.2 
respectively which was lower than all States average during the same 
period i.e., 19.2, 18.2 and 20.9. (table 18) 
 
 
Comparative budgetary position of West Bengal during 1990s   
 
An attempt has been made in this section to compare different aspects of  
budgetary situation, efficiency in financial management and sustainability of 
West Bengal’s economy compared to other States during the later parts of 
1990s i.e., from 1994-95 to 1999-00. Balance of Current Revenue (BCR) of 
a State is an important indicator of sustainability of the State government’s 
fiscal situation. As we have discussed above, persistent acute budgetary 
crisis of the State has considerable impact on the position of Balance of 
Current Revenue (BCR) in West Bengal. BCR is defined as revenue 
receipts minus Plan assistance grants minus non-Plan revenue 
expenditure. A positive BCR shows that the State government has surplus 
from its revenues for meeting Plan expenditure. Table 19 shows that West 
Bengal government had no surplus from current revenues in the last five 
years of 1990s and the negative balance has almost doubled during 1999-
2000 compared to 1998-99. The problem of negative BCR of the State and 
consequent recourse to borrowing for Plan financing was also discussed in 
the chapter 4 of this study. Thus the government not only had no balance 
from its own revenue for meeting its Plan expenditure but most of its non-
Plan expenditure had also to be met from outside sources. The position of 
high and ever increasing negative BCR indicated unsustainable financial 
condition of the State. An attempt has been made to compare the BCR of 
different Sates with West Bengal. However, it is quite evident from table 19 
that West Bengal’s BCR position is much worse than all the other States 
mentioned below.  
 
Table: 19 
Balance From Current Revenue (BCR) in Different States Between 1995-96 and 1999-00 
                                                                                          (Rs. in Crore) 
Years/States West 
Bengal 
Maharastra Karnataka Andhra 
Pradesh 
Gujarat Tamil 
Nadu 
Punjab 
1995-96 -706 NA* 1550 -344 561.91 945 -151 
1996-97 -1385 1036 1060 -2512 22.00 409 -1087 
1997-98 -1705 --423 1337 422 -22.07 -163 -1184 
1998-99 -4178 -1420 538 -400 -1221.73 -1914 -2308 
1999-00 -8120 -2298 -601 -23 -1759.20 -3226 -2254 
Source: Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, Civil Report, 1995-96 to 1999-
00, for different States 
 
 
 
Low level of fiscal management 
 
(i) Loans and advances made by the State governments 
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Loans and advances given by the State governments and amount of 
outstanding loan and repayment of such loan is one of the most important 
indicators of fiscal management of any State. The State government gives 
loans and advances to government companies, corporations, local bodies, 
co-operatives non-government institutions etc. for developmental and non-
developmental activities. The position for the last five years of 1990s of 
different States indicates that while closing balance of outstanding total 
loans (CL) increased significantly during 1995-2000, repayment of the 
outstanding loan for all States remained insignificant and has been 
declining over the years. (table 20) 
 
Table 20 indicates that for all States except Punjab repayment of these 
loans has been declining. For Maharastra the repayment of these loans 
decreased from 2.84 percent in 1996-97 to 2.08  per cent in 1999-00. For 
Tamil Nadu the respective figures are 10.6 per cent in 1995-96 to 7.78 per 
cent in 1999-00 and for Gujarat from 4.48 to 2.41 per cent during the same 
period. And for West Bengal the repayment component of these loans not 
only constituted an insignificant part of the total outstanding loans but 
declined much faster than the other States (except Andhra Pradesh) i.e., 
from 2.50 per cent on the 1 April of 1995  to 0.47 per cent on 1 April of 
2000. Needless to say, poor recovery of loans is a contributory factor to the 
worsening financial condition of the government. Despite poor recovery 
rate, the outstanding loan kept on increasing in West Bengal and which has 
increased from Rs. 3742.18 crore in 1995-96 to Rs. 6458. 97 crore in 1999-
00.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table: 20 
Closing balance of total outstanding loans (CL) advanced by the State governments & 
percentage recovery (PR) between 1995-96 and 1999-00  
                                                                                                                          (Rs. in crore) 
Year West Bengal Maharastra Tamil Nadu Andhra 
Pradesh 
Punjab Gujarat Karnataka 
 CL PR CL PR CL PR CL PR  CL PR  CL PR CL PR  
1995-
96 
3742.
18 
2.50 NA NA 3796 10.6
9 
3160 50.8
2 
4347 1.24 4528 4.48 3005
.78 
5.55
1996-
97 
4024.
04 
25.52
@ 
7347
.88 
2.84 4217 15.6
2 
2641 53.2
7 
4694 1.74 4810 4.74 3218
.97 
5.38
1997-
98 
3840.
76 
1.21 7998
.36 
2.41 3507 36.2
4 
3280 29.2
3 
4707 2.01 5107 2.52 3342
.04 
2.09
1998-
99 
4920.
64 
0.61 8342
.30 
3.23 3694 8.74 4916 8.05 4725 2.26 5574 4.77 3494
.74 
3.94
1999-
00 
6458.
97 
0.47 1201
8.38 
2.08 4031 7.78 6667 2.93 4795 2.27 6054 2.41 3666
.62 
3.94
@= The increase is due to conversion of loans of SEB into equity shares (Rs. 821.03 crore) 
which was only a paper transaction and did not result in cash receipts 
CL= Closing balance of outstanding  loan made by the respective State government at the 
close of the year 
PR= Percentage of repayments to total outstanding loan at the close of the respective year 
Source: Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, Civil Report, 1995-96 to 1999-
00, different State governments 
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(ii) Wastage in Public expenditure 
 
Table: 21 
Wastage in Public Expenditure in Different States Between 1995-96 and 1999-00  (Rs. in crore) 
Year          West Bengal              Gujrat           Tamil Nadu 
 Wastage 
of Fund 
(WF) 
Funds 
Blocked 
 (FB) 
Unspent 
Balances 
  (UB) 
Wastage 
of Funds
(WF) 
Funds 
Blocked 
(FB) 
Unspent 
Balances 
(UB) 
Wastage 
of Funds 
(WF) 
Funds 
Blocked 
(FB) 
Unspent 
Balances 
(UB) 
1995-96 100.35 630 902.55 19.88 - 724 105 - 598 
1996-97 300.73 766 1390.41 21.00 - 848 200 101 601 
1997-98 107.14 886 1218.35 46.22 18.76 1347 353 116 495 
1998-99 219.90 949 1384.14 40.14 53.96 1644 1767 215 652 
1999-00 620.64 1006 3353.23 - 107.86 2982 599 215 764 
 
Table: 21  (continued) 
Year   Maharastra Andhra Pradesh  Punjab Karnataka 
 WF FB UB WF FB UB WF FB UB WF FB UB 
95-96 NA NA - 62 - NA 32.95 NA - - NA 3.94 
96-97 97.79 NA - 58 - NA 102.37 0.78 - - NA 8.15 
97-98 243.5
3 
2681.
77 
- 688 - NA 134.87 62.08 - - 458.56 147.71 
98-99 390.3
7 
3099.
23 
- 1071 - 45 40.57 101.52 - - 370.97 85.33 
99-00 711.3
0 
1705.
95 
- 683 - 113 140.25 1380 - - 3894.26 37.54 
WF=  Amount of wastage of funds and diversion of funds  
FB= Funds blocked in incomplete project or non-remunerative expenditure on in-complete 
project 
UB= Unspent balances under deposit heads booked as expenditure at the time of their 
transfer to the deposit head  
Source: Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, Civil Report, 1995-96 to 1999-
00, different State governments 
 
Funds blocked in incomplete projects, unspent balances under deposit heads i.e.,  
booked as expenditure at the time of their transfer to the deposit head, wastage in 
public expenditure and diversions of funds are important indicators of fiscal 
management of a particular State. It is evident from table 21 that in West Bengal 
such wastage of funds has been increasing dramatically during the period from 
1994-95 to 1999-00. Scale of wastage and diversion of funds increased by 518 per 
cent during the above mentioned period. And the non-remunerative expenditure on 
incomplete projects, therefore the amount of funds blocked in such incomplete 
projects has increased by 62 per cent during the same period. And unspent 
balances under deposit head booked as expenditure at the time of their transfer to 
the deposit head has increased by 271 per cent. An attempt is made to compare 
such wastage of funds with other States during the same period. It can be seen 
that except for Maharastra such diversion of funds is much less in other States 
than that in West Bengal.   
 
(iii) Arrears of revenue 
 
Arrears under principal heads of revenue in different departments of the State 
indicates inefficient management of the State’s resources. The position of arrears 
of different departments, as alleged by the Comptroller and Auditor  General 
(CAG) in West Bengal is somewhat understated. While most departments failed to 
furnish the figures of arrears of the collection at the end of March 2001. As 
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Comptroller and Auditor General Report expressed its doubt that if these 
departments of West Bengal are at all aware of the full extent of arrears in their 
departments. Besides, only under Sales tax Rs. 1541 crore was locked up in 
appeal /revision cases as on March 2001. If the arrears of these departments are 
accounted for the extent of arrears is bound to go up. (CAG Report Civil, 31st 
March 2001, p. 16)  It is observed from table 22 that by and large during the last 
two years of the 1990s West Bengal’s total arrears became much higher than the 
previous years. Compared to other States the position of arrears of West Bengal 
has been showing mixed result which varies from one year to another and does 
not indicate any systematic pattern.  
 
 
Table: 22 
Arrears in Percentage of Tax and Non-Tax Revenue Receipts of the States Between 1995-96  
and 1999-00 
Year Tamil 
Nadu 
West 
Bengal 
Maharastra Gujarat Andhra 
Pradesh 
Punjab Karnataka
1995-96 30 12 NA                 12 16 65 13 
1996-97 39 11 23 43 18 42 15 
1997-98 45 13 25 21 15 29 15 
1998-99 59 32* 26 16 18 42 13 
1999-00 71 31** 31 37 20 38 20 
Source: Source: Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, Civil Report, 1995-96 
to 1999-00, different State governments 
*, ** Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, Civil Report, 2000-01 includes 
different percentage for these two years which was 13 & 10 respectively 
 
(iv) Ways and Means Advances and Overdraft 
 
Under an agreement with Reserve Bank of India, the State government had 
to maintain with the Bank a minimum daily cash balance of Rs 2.48 crore. If 
the balance fell below the agreed minimum daily cash balance on any day, 
the deficiency had to be made good by taking Ways and Means Advances 
(WMA)/Overdraft (OD) from the Bank. In addition, special Ways and Means 
and Advances are also made by the Bank whenever necessary. Recourse 
to WMA/OD means a mismatch between the receipts and expenditure of 
the State government and hence reflects poor financial management of the 
government. (CAG Report, Civil, 31st March 2000, p. 16) 
 
During 1999-2000 Ways and Means Advances (including shortfall) of Rs. 
5336.39 crore (231 days) and Overdraft of Rs. 3485.70 crore (105 days) 
were obtained by the West Bengal government i.e.,  totalled 336 days 
during 1999-00. (table 23) on which the government paid interest of Rs. 
21.66 crore in 1999-00. However, at the end of the year Ways and Means 
Advances (WMA) (including shortfall) of Rs. 597.21 crore and Overdraft of 
Rs. 729.09 crore was outstanding. The huge outstanding WMA and 
Overdraft (Rs.1326.30 crore) and the number of days (336) is the evidence 
of the precarious financial condition of the State during 1999-00. Compared 
to six other States, West Bengal took the highest number of 
Overdrafts/WMA and consequently paid the highest amount of interest in 
1999-00. Except for Andhra Pradesh and Punjab all States during 1995-00 
took less number of Overdrafts/WMA than West Bengal. However, Andhra 
Pradesh and Punjab took more Overdrafts/WMA than West Bengal in some 
years which is evident from table 23 below.  
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Table: 23 
Ways and Means Advances and Overdraft for States Between 1995-96 and 1999-00  
 West 
Bengal 
Karnataka Maharastra Tamil Nadu Gujarat Punjab Andhra 
Pradesh 
Year WAM/
OD 
 
Inte-
rest 
 
 
 
 
WAM/
OD 
Inte-
rest 
WAM/
OD 
Inte-
rest 
WAM/
OD 
Inte-
rest 
WAM/
OD 
Inte
re-
st 
WAM/
OD 
Inte-
rest 
WAM/
OD 
Inter- 
est 
1995-
96 
146 3 40 0.34   2 0.08 Nil Nil 82 2 121 2 
1996-
97 
253 14 114 2.37 - - - - Nil Nil 171 5 148 4 
1997-
98 
164 6 46 1.20 - - - - Nil Nil 241 9 201 11 
1998-
99 
80 1 Nil Nil - - 38 - 6 .06 353 14 220 6 
1999-
00 
336 22 4 0.02 19 12.18 257 8 69 1.36 250 12 291 13 
Source: Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, Civil Report, 1995-96 to 1999-
00, different State governments 
 
WMA/OD= Ways and Means Advances /Overdraft  (days) 
 Interest = Interest Payment on Ways and Means Advances/Over Draft taken (Rs. in Crore) 
 
(v) The anarchy of the excess grants. 
 
In this context another financial irregularity exercised by the States may be 
mentioned.  In the Indian federation the legislature should have complete 
control over the public purse.  Thus neither taxes be levied nor money 
spent without the specific sanction of the State Legislature. However, 
some expenditure has been incurred in excess of grants whenever the 
State government feels that the sanctioned budget by the Legislature is 
less than what it requires. In such case, the Constitution provides for their 
regularisation by the respective State Legislature and thus the State 
government is required to submit demands for supplementary grants for 
the approval of the legislature. A study of the audit civil reports of the 
States reveals anarchic conditions caused by the indiscriminate use of the 
provision with regard to excess expenditure and the dismal failure of the 
States to regularise them. Table 24 gives State-wise practice of excesses 
incurred but not regularised. The table also indicates that such an anarchy 
of unregularised excess grants in West Bengal has been much higher 
during the later part of the 1990s compared to most States except Assam 
and Uttar Pradesh. (Sezhiyan,  2002, p. 46) 
  
 
 
 
Table: 24 
Excess Expenditures that Remain to be Regularised in Various States as on March 31, 2001 
States Un-
regularised 
excess 
1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-00 Total 
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upto March 
31, 1995  
Andhra 
Pradesh 
759 236 291 405 311 846 2,848 
Assam 3,155 1,806 1,824 2,618 3,166 3,718 16,287 
Bihar 5,374 405 256 12 1 196 6,244 
Goa 43 0 15 12 1 0 71 
Gujarat 1,950 564 534 734 981 1,296 6,059 
Haryana  60 80 138 450 1,154 1,882 
Karnataka 294 28 104 84 36 333 879 
Kerala 1,214 46 1 36 116 531 1,944 
Madhya 
Pradesh 
1,233 252 224 303 1,276 1,585 4, 873 
Maharastra 266 297 256 896 1,118 1,838 4,671 
Orissa   107 990 126 2,659 3,882 
Punjab   255 313 243 86 897 
Rajasthan 968 468 527 63 64 19 2,109 
Tamil Nadu 734 113 284 300 233 363 2,027 
Uttar 
Pradesh 
10,961 622 712 590 731 8,786 22,404 
West 
Bengal 
   1,442 436 5,217 7,095 
All 25 
States 
36,308 8,073 10,100 16,377 16,558 39,470 1,26,887 
Source: Sezhiyan, E, “ The Anarchy of Excess Grants”, Frontline, November 8, 2002, p. 46 
  
Low level of fiscal management coupled with low level of revenue receipts 
and mounting revenue expenditure led to severe indebtedness of West 
Bengal compared to other States during the later part of 1990s. Interest 
ratio is one of the measures of indebtedness of any State. The higher the 
ratio the lesser the ability of the government to service any fresh debt and 
meet its revenue expenditure from its revenue receipts. In case of West 
Bengal the ratio has steadily increased by nearly 100 per cent from 0.21 in 
1995-96 to 40 in 1999-2000. If the loans, etc. raised through the Public 
Sector Companies are taken into account this ratio would be even higher. 
(table 24). Higher level of revenue deficits of the State led to higher level of 
borrowing consequently thus pushing up the interest burden further.  
Consequently increasing interest burden tend to push up revenue 
expenditure resulting in fewer resources were available for capital 
formation.  
 
 
Table: 25 
Interest Ratio* in Different States Between 1995-96 and 1999-00 
Year West 
Bengal 
Maharastra Karnataka Tamil 
Nadu 
Punjab Andhra 
Pradesh 
Gujarat 
1995-96 0.21 NA 0.04 0.09 0.28 0.09 0.06 
1996-97 0.23 0.02 0.06 0.10 0.04 0.10 0.09 
1997-98 0.26 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.16 0.10 0.07 
1998-99 0.31 0.10 0.09 0.13 0.39 0.11 0.06 
1999-00 0.40 0.13 0.10 0.15 0.30 0.11 0.09 
 
Source: Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, Civil Report, 1995-96 to 1999-
00, different State governments 
*Interest Ratio = Interest Payment – Interest Receipts/Total Revenue Receipts – Interest 
Receipts 
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Compared to other States (except Punjab for few years) interest ratio of 
West Bengal remained much higher through out the whole period of 1995-
96 to 1999-00. (table 25) 
 
The State Domestic Product (SDP) is the total internal resource base of the 
State government which can be used for repayment of debt. An increasing 
Debt/SDP ratio indicates a reduction in the government’s ability to meet its 
debt obligation which signifies increasing risk for the lender. Table 26 shows 
that in case of West Bengal this ratio has risen sharply from 0.29 in 1995-96 
to 0.37 in 1999-00. Compared to the other States this ratio is much higher 
for West Bengal excepting Punjab which also shows high level of Debt/SDP 
ratio as West Bengal between1995-96 and 1999-00. 
 
The State, however, feels that besides a drastic fall in the transfers from the 
Centre during the later part of 1990s a significant portion of the debt burden 
of the State was primarily due to wrong policies of the Centre. The Central 
Plan assistance to the States normally carries a loan component of 70 per 
cent. That apart, in recent years, all the new Central projects relevant for 
the States (such as RIDF; AIBP etc.) have 100 per cent loan component 
with as high as 12 per cent interest in some cases although the Centre can 
now raise domestic loans at only the  interest rate of 7 per cent. In addition, 
in the case of small savings programme, since the net small savings in a 
State is obtained after deducting from the gross small savings collections 
the payment to the savers, the present Central practice of imposing this 
surplus again as loan to the States has created unjustified loan burden on 
the State. Since West Bengal occupied the first position among the States 
in small saving collections, the resulting loan burden is specially unjustified 
for the State.132 (Budget Statement, Minister-in Charge, Finance, GOWB, 
2002-03, pp. 22-23) 
 
Table: 26 
Debt/SDP in Different States Between 1995-96 and 1999-00 
Year West 
Bengal 
Karnataka Maharastra Andhra 
Prdaesh 
Punjab Gujarat Tamil Nadu 
1995-96 0.29 0.20 NA 0.25 0.35 0.20 0.19 
1996-97 0.30 0.19 0.18 0.24 0.34 0.20 0.19 
1997-98 0.32 0.20 0.19 0.24 0.35 0.21 0.19 
1998-99 0.35 0.21 0.18 0.25 0.36 0.24 0.20 
1999-00 0.37 0.21 0.22 0.26 0.35 0.28 0.22 
Source: Source: Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, Civil Report, 1995-96 
to 1999-00, different State governments 
 
                                                          
132 In this context,  the State has demanded  full compensation of any loss of Central devolution 
of taxes to the States, Transfer of the surplus generated from small saving not as loan but as 
grants to the States or sharing the grants between the Centre and the States. Sharing at least 
50 per cent of the additional burden of the States due to pay revision, reduction in the loan 
component in the Central plan assistance and in the Central projects and  also reduction in the 
interest rate on the Central loans. (ibid. pp. 25-26) 
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The asset/liability ratio of a particular State indicates the solvency of the 
government. Thus the ratio more than 1 indicates the solvency of the State 
government. (assets are more than liabilities) Similarly asset/liability ratio of 
less than 1 indicates lack of solvency. However, the liabilities in this 
statement consists mainly of money borrowed by the State governments 
such as internal borrowings, loans and advances from the government of 
India, receipts from the Public Account and Reserve Funds. The assets 
comprise mainly the capital outlay, loans and advances given by the State 
governments and the cash balances. Even though these assets include old 
unrecoverable loans of a significant amount investment in shares of 
companies which are perpetually loss making. Thus much of these assets 
are not capable of generating any income. However, system of accounting 
in State governments do not capture all the assets and liabilities and is 
confined basically to the financial assets and liabilities. Even in that case 
the ratio of assets and liabilities of West Bengal government has shown a 
sharp decline from 0.61 in 1995-96 to 0.41 in 1999-00 which indicates a 
sustained deterioration of the fiscal management of the State.  
 
Table: 27 
Asset /Liabilities Ratio for Different States Between 1995-96 and 1999-00 
Year West 
Bengal 
Karnataka Maharastra Andhra 
Pradesh 
Punjab Gujarat Tamil 
Nadu 
1995-96 0.61 1.05 NA 0.93 0.77 0.99 0.65 
1996-97 0.57 1.00 1.06 0.78 0.71 0.97 0.63 
1997-98 0.55 0.99 0.99 0.78 0.66 0.92 0.60 
1998-99 0.49 0.93 0.93 0.72 0.60 0.83 0.52 
1999-00 0.41 0.85 0.85 0.73 0.55 0.76 0.46 
Source: Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, Civil Report, 1995-96 to 1999-
00, different State governments 
 
 
It is evident from  table 27 that asset/liability ratio has been declining for all 
States. But for West Bengal such ratio is much lower than other States 
excepting Punjab for few years.  
 
Government’s expenditure is broadly classified into two categories viz. 
Plan-and non-Plan and revenue and capital. While Plan and capital 
expenditure are usually associated with asset creation, the non-Plan and 
revenue expenditure are identified with expenditure on establishment, 
maintenance & services, interest payment, salary and pension etc. 
Therefore, an increase in the Plan and capital expenditure can be viewed 
as enhancing the quality of expenditure while in contrast that increase in 
non-Plan  and revenue expenditure more than Plan and capital expenditure 
denotes deterioration in quality of expenditure. However, fiscal deficit 
represents the total net borrowings of the government. These borrowings 
are applied for meeting the revenue deficit (RD) and capital expenditure 
(CE). The relative proportion of these applications indicates the financial 
prudence of the State government and also the sustainability of its 
operations. The revenue deficit is the revenue expenditure in excess of the 
revenue receipts and represents that  portion of revenue expenditure which 
is financed by the borrowing etc. Evidently the higher the revenue deficit, 
the more vulnerable is the State’s financial health. Since fiscal deficit 
represents the aggregate of all the borrowings, the revenue deficit as a 
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percentage of fiscal deficit would indicate the extent to which the borrowing 
of the government are being used to finance non-productive revenue 
expenditure. Thus the higher the ratio, the worse off is the State because 
higher ratio suggests that the debt burden is increasing without any 
enhancement of the repayment capacity of the State.  
 
Table 28 shows the position of the government of West Bengal for last five 
years. It would be seen from  table 28 that 80 per cent of the borrowed fund 
of West Bengal has been applied during the year 1999-2000 for meeting the 
revenue deficit (RD). This has reduced substantially the availability of fund 
for capital expenditure (CE) which has reached an all time low of only 8 per 
cent in 1999-2000, compared to 43 per cent in 1995-96. RD/FD ratio has 
gradually become higher for all States during 1995-96 to 1999-00. But it is 
quite evident that excepting Punjab for some years and with some few 
exceptions of other States the RD/FD ratio of other States are by and large 
much lower than West Bengal during the period. Contrary to that, CE/FD 
ratio i.e., , the portion of borrowed money applied for capital formation is 
much higher for all States than for West Bengal during the same period with 
of course a few exceptions.  
 
 
Table: 28 
Revenue Deficit (RD)/Fiscal Deficit Ratio (FD) & Capital Expenditure (CE)/Fiscal Deficit (FD) 
Ratio for Different States Between 1995-96 and 1999-00 
Year West 
Bengal 
Karnataka Maharastra Tamil Nadu Gujrat Punjab Andhra 
Pradesh 
 RD/FD 
CE/F
D 
RD/F
D 
CE/F
D 
RD/F
D 
CE/F
D 
RD/F
D 
CE/F
D 
RD/F
D 
CE/F
D 
RD/F
D 
CE/F
D 
RE/F
D 
CE/F
D 
1995
-96 
0.46 0.43 (-) 
0.04 
0.85 NA NA 0.25 0.47 0.13 0.72 0.33 0.50 0.31 1.00 
1996
-97 
0.63 0.42 0.30 0.59 .33 .57 0.45 0.38 0.25 0.63 0.93 (-) 
0.16 
1.14 0.05 
1997
-98 
0.57 0.16 0.17 0.75 .38 .48 0.64 0.69 0.34 0.56 0.60 0.39 0.29 0.45 
1998
-99 
0.68 0.10 0.39 0.56 .48 .39 0.72 0.24 0.51 0.41 0.69 0.30 0.47 0.24 
1999
-00 
0.80 0.08 0.54 0.42 .43 .38 0.82 0.12 0.53 0.40 0.85 0.14 0.25 0.40 
Source: Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, Civil Report, 1995-96 to 1999-
00, different State governments 
 
 
 
Trends of the State’s own  tax revenue during the last two decades 
 
During the 1990s the trend of tax revenue of West Bengal to the percentage 
of Gross State Domestic Product (GSDP) at factor cost current prices is 
declining not  only over the period between1990-91 and 1998-99 but at the 
same time in comparison with other States of India. During the last two 
years of 1990s the ratio in case of West Bengal has been showing even 
sharper declining trend compared to the all India average. One of the main 
reasons would be massive sales tax remission offered to potential investors 
showing willingness to set up business in the State as a part of New 
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Industrial Policy pursued by the State since September 1994 which was , 
however, also admitted by the government of West Bengal. (Rajya Sarkarer 
Arthik Sankat: Karan Abong Samadhaner Path (Financial Crisis of the 
State: Causes and Remedial Measures, Finance Department, West Bengal 
Government, 30th January, 2003, p. 5) (Table 29) 
                                                   
 
 
Table: 29 
State’s Own tax Revenue as Percentage of GSDP over 1991-99 
 
Year Andhra 
Pradesh 
Gujarat Karnataka Maharastra Punjab Tamil 
Nadu 
West 
Bengal 
All States
1990-91 7.6 8.6 10.0 7.9 6.8 10.0 6.1 5.3 
1991-92 7.3 9.4 9.6 8.1 6.8 10.1 6.1 5.5 
1992-93 7.7 8.6 9.4 7.2 6.7 9.7 6.0 5.3 
1993-94 6.6 7.9 8.9 6.3 7.1 8.3 5.5 5.4 
1994-95 6.1 7.2 8.5 6.7 7.6 9.4 6.1 5.5 
1995-96 5.2 7.2 9.0 6.4 6.9 9.1 5.7 5.4 
1996-97 5.4 7.0 8.2 6.2 6.2 9.7 5.2 5.2 
1997-98 7.4 7.1 8.4 6.4 6.2 12.3 4.7 5.3 
1998-99 7.0 7.5 7.7 5.7 5.9 8.2 4.3 5.1 
Source: “Finances of State Governments”, EPW, May 26, 2001, p. 1914 
 
According to another estimation West Bengal’s own tax revenue receipts in 
1999-2000 formed only 26  per cent of its total revenue expenditure which 
was the lowest among the major States of India. During the period of 1985-
90 the State’s own tax revenue constituted 48.3 per cent of the total 
revenue expenditure but in 1999-00 its share declined sharply to only 26 
per cent.  (table 30) 
 
 
 
 
Table: 30 
State’s Tax Revenue as Percentage of Revenue Expenditure for Different States 
Between 1985-90 and 1999-00 
Year 
AP GUJ KAR MAH PNB TAN WB 
1985-90 50.6 53.7 54.2 56.3 59.4 56.9 48.3 
1990-95 47.0 57.9 58.6 59.4 47.1 52.5 45.0 
1995-96 41.4 63.7 61.0 61.5 54.1 59.6 46.7 
1996-97 33.9 59.1 56.5 56.2 39.5 61.1 41.1 
1997-98 50.4 58.9 56.7 62.9 38.4 60.4 39.8 
1998-99 51.3 66.6 59.1 55.5 37.5 57.4 42.7 
1999-00 49.9 46.6 50.8 58.4 38.7 52.7 26.2 
Source: Reserve Bank of India Bulletin, February 1997,pp. 41 & ibid.,  February 1999, pp. 
S24; For the year 1999-00 see  Report of the Comptroller of Auditor General of India, Civil, 
1999-00, different State Governments 
 
 
Table: 31 
Percentage Distribution of Tax Revenue of West Bengal Between  1980-81 and 1999-00 
 
Taxes and 
Duties/ Year 
1980-81 1985-86 1990-91 1995-96 1999-2000 
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Sales Tax 54.77 55.19 57.49 59.21 61.01 
Excise Duties 9.87 5.87 7.70 6.46 7.74 
Land Revenue 3.38 11.23 10.22 18.28 11.99 
Stamp Duty 4.77 4.63 4.94 6.70 6.08 
Entertainment 
Tax 
3.27 3.07 1.71 0.93 0.92 
Electricity 
Duty 
3.46 3.25 1.38 1.25 2.62 
Taxes on 
Vehicles  
3.60 3.38 3.36 2.88 3.49 
Taxes on 
Goods and 
passengers 
9.67 6.60 5.66 0.19* * 
Source: Economic Review, Statistical Appendix,  1997-98, p. 189; Economic Review, 
Statistical Appendix,   2000-01, pp. 185, Government of West Bengal 
* Decrease is due to abolition of Entry Tax 
 
Table 31 above indicates that sales tax is one of the most important tax 
revenue for the State which accounted for 61 per cent of total tax receipts of 
West Bengal in 1999-00. Hence it is worthwhile to pay adequate attention to 
the problem of sales tax system of the States in general and West Bengal in 
particular in order to pinpoint the underlying factors responsible for the 
overall declining tendency of own tax revenue mobilisation of West Bengal 
during the last decades.  
 
Economic decline of the State 
 
Persistent economic decline of West Bengal during the last several decades 
has its negative impact on the tax effort. In a way the decline in tax effort is 
a reflection of the economic deterioration of West Bengal. In 1960-61  West 
Bengal’s per capita income (at 1980-81 prices) was higher than the all-India 
average (Rs. 390 as against the all-India average of Rs. 306). Afterwards it 
started declining sharply. During the next twenty years 1960-61 to 1980-81 
West Bengal has recorded the lowest growth rate in per capita income 
barring Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan. In 1981-82 West Bengal’s per 
capita income stood at Rs. 1595 as compared to the National average of 
Rs. 1750.(Bagchi, & Das,  1987, pp. 13-14)  
 
Over the last two decades (1980s and 1990s) in terms of  some economic 
indicators West Bengal has been lagging behind India. The State’s per 
capita State Domestic Product (SDP) at constant (1980-81) prices has 
fallen below the per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of India 
consistently over the last three decades. The rate of growth of GDP in India 
has surpassed (4.17%) the rate of growth of State Domestic Product (SDP) 
of West Bengal at 3.24 % during the period from 1970-71 to 1989-90. 
Although the State (6.8 %) seems to have caught up with the all India rate 
of growth of GDP (6.8 %) between 1993-94 and 1998-99  (Tenth Five Year 
Plan, 2002-07 p. 36). The trend rate of growth of Industrial production as a 
whole between 1980-81 and 1995-96 for West Bengal has lagged far 
behind the corresponding rate for India as whole. (Raychaudhury,& 
Chatterjee,1998, p. 3061) In 1980-81 West Bengal produced 9.8 per cent of 
industrial output of India. This share has declined to 4.1 per cent in 1995-
96. Since then there has been a marginal improvement but nothing 
significant. (Bandyopadhyaya, 2001, p. 4788) Such decline in economic 
sphere has its adverse impact on tax revenue potential of the State. 
  
But economic decline alone can not explain the dismal performance of West 
Bengal in terms of mobilisation of own tax revenue. The reason for low level 
of State’s tax revenue collection, particularly of sales tax revenue can be 
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ascribed to another structural factor namely complex and inefficient sales 
tax system of the State. Proceeds from sales tax, however, constitutes the 
major share of total own tax revenue for all Indian States which normally 
accounts for more than 50 per cent of total own tax revenue. An attempt 
has been made to re-evaluate the sales tax system prevailing in West 
Bengal in order to seek the reasons for its continuous bad performance 
regarding sales tax collection in particular and its own tax revenue 
mobilisation in general compared to the other States.  
 
However, it would be also expedient to analyse the structural limitation of 
existing sales tax system of India in general before going into the particular 
problem of West Bengal. Such sales tax structure tend to particularly limit 
the tax potential of less developed and middle income States (in which 
West Bengal belongs to) as against the high income States. Against the 
backdrop of the general problem of sales tax structure in India the particular 
problem of West Bengal needs to be evaluated.  
Sales tax structure of India 
 
The problem of levy of sales tax has considerable impact on the resource 
base of respective States of India. The point of levy combined with 
differentiated rates of sales tax on the same set of commodities across the 
States and consequent inter-State tax competition made the resource base 
of the States in general and less developed States in particular much 
narrower. However, different systems of sales taxation have been evolved 
in the country. Initially three types of sales tax were levied: the single point, 
the double point and the multi-point, of which the multi-point have the 
characteristics of a general turnover tax. The single point was levied either 
at the first point of sale-on the ex-factory price inclusive of excise duty or at 
the last point of sale from the registered dealer. The double point sales tax 
prevailed mainly in the States of Maharastra and Gujarat where on the 
same commodities the tax was levied both at the first sale as well as at the 
semi-whole stage of sale. (Rao, & Tulasidhar, 1986, p. 290)  
 
However, due to the administrative considerations more and more 
commodities have been brought within the purview of the first point levy. As 
against the first point tax the last point tax is the most desirable form of levy 
from the economic point of view. But administratively last point taxation is 
not preferred because large number of dealers have to be dealt with by the 
tax department.133 (Purohit,1986, p. 299) Therefore, there has been a 
tendency of the States over the years to switch over to the first point levy. 
                                                          
133 The levy of first point sales tax has, however, a distinct administrative advantage. In 
developing countries such as India administration of the retail sales tax is an onerous task 
because of the large informal sector consisting of numerous small scale dealers, many of 
whom operate without a fixed address and most of whom are not adequately educated to 
keep proper records. With the first point tax however, a large proportion of the revenue can 
be collected from a small number of dealers (i.e., almost 80% of the tax is paid by 12 per 
cent of the dealers in Gujrat, 6.5 per cent in Madhya Pradesh, 6 per cent in Karnataka and 
10 per cent in Uttar Pradesh) whose return can be thoroughly scrutinised while the returns 
of the smaller dealers can be summarily assessed. Thus the cost of collection under the 
first point tax is lower, administration easier and enforcement more effective. (Rao, M.G & 
Tulasidar, V.B, Economic Analysis of Sales Taxation in India, Bulletin, July 1986, pp. 291-
292) 
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Consequently the revenue from the first point levy forms an overwhelming 
proportion of the tax revenue in all the States.  As said earlier, from the 
economic point of view the first point tax suffers from many shortcomings. 
The first point tax has a lower taxable base than the last point tax and 
hence with narrow base the rates have to be high in order to raise the same 
amount of revenue. “Finding it difficult to raise the level of sales taxes at the 
first point any further, the States are now resorting to additional levies like 
turnover tax...additional sales tax, surcharges and so on making the system 
totally non-transparent and the tax incidence arbitrary and unpredictable”. 
(Reform of the Domestic Trade Taxes in India: Issues and Options, NIPFP, 
1994, p. 9)  
 
An important phenomenon regarding sales tax in India is that not only the 
point of levy is different from one State to another but also there are 
differentiation of sales tax rates for the same set of commodities across the 
States. Such inter-State tax differences in sales tax rates have adverse 
consequences on State’s economy particularly to the economy of poor 
income States this area will be discussed in the subsequent paragraphs in 
detail.  However, the point of levy and as well as the rates of tax vary from 
one to another States due to varying notions of equity, administrative 
convenience, differences in scope of exempted items and patterns of tax 
incentives for industrialisation. Commodities considered to be of basic 
necessities are exempted from the tax. Some products of the primary sector 
and perishables are not subjected to tax due to administrative reasons. 
(Rao & Tulashidar, 1986, p. 293). What is worrisome, however, is the fact 
that while initially the rate differentiation had been for reasons of 
administrative convenience, equity, and economic efficiency (lower tax rate 
on input and capital goods) in recent years tax competition among the 
States has also contributed to this differentiated sales tax rate more 
intensely than on account of other considerations. (Rao & Sen,1996, p. 57) 
Generally the food surplus States have higher rates of tax on cereals and 
pulses. Given that the demand for food imports is inelastic, these States 
tend to levy higher sales tax rates on these items in an attempt to exporting 
the tax burden on the residents of importing States. Similarly some 
industrially advanced States tend to collect a higher amount of revenue by 
keeping the rate of tax lower than their neighbouring States on 
manufactured goods which have income elastic demand to encourage 
cross-border purchases (tax competition) (Rao & Tulashidar, 1986, p. 293 & 
.Rao & Sen, 1996, pp. 57-58) 
 
Some States with low potential tax base such as West Bengal had to forgo 
some of their revenues by reducing their effective sales tax rates in the face 
of acute competition from the neighbouring States. Sales tax which is the 
single largest source of revenue of West Bengal, has been reduced for 
number of goods on the pretext that sales tax rates in adjoining States are 
lower. It was expected that such reduction in sales tax rates in West Bengal 
would in effect boost net tax collections. Knowledgeable sources in the 
State, however, did not accept this justification given by the government. 
(Mishra, 1986, p. 33) Subsequently, it was noticed that  West Bengal was 
forced to reduce taxes on motorised two wheelers, tractors and some 
machinaries because the earlier high rates had pushed the point of sale to 
neighbouring States with lower tax rates. So it was hoped that the reduction 
of sales tax rate would generate more resources to the State by inducing 
more sales in the State. (S.K, Diminishing Returns from Blaming Centre, 
EPW, April 13, 1985, p. 633) But such reality belies expectations. More 
often such attempts failed to help middle or poor income States including  
West Bengal. It would be evident from the subsequent sections in this study 
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that contrary to the usual expectations such practice often leads to low level 
of buoyancy in revenue generation in all States in general and in low 
income States in particular  
 
However, facing acute resource crisis of own resource mobilisation, the 
States tend to behave like a oligopolists, each trying to maximise net gains 
to their residents. Many States reduced sales and other taxes competitively 
to attract private investment into their respective jurisdictions which is also 
one of the important factors responsible for the differential effective sales 
tax rates as described earlier. However, the sales tax incentive usually have 
been provided in terms of lower tax rate on inputs, tax holidays or interest 
free loans of the collected tax. Such tax incentives particularly negatively 
affect the revenue sources of less-developed States and resulted in 
significant revenue loss without any commensurate gains. As they can not 
be expected to compete on equal terms with its strong neighbours i.e., rich 
income States. (Mehta, & Manay, 1992, p. 6)  
 
The nature and extent of tax incentives offered by the West Bengal 
government could be evident from the comment made by Joyti Basu (The 
then Chief Minister of West Bengal) As he said,  “In the sphere of taxation 
our policy has been one of providing as much fiscal relief as possible... to 
the smaller producers and resellers. Sales tax exemptions limits for a re-
seller dealer has been raised to Rs. 2 lakh of turn over per year, which is 
more liberal than any other comparable industrialised State. Further a 
scheme of only summary assessment has been introduced for dealers 
whose gross turn-over does not exceed Rs. 7.5 lakh per annum. I would 
also mention here that West Bengal is possibly the only State in India where 
largest categories of industries numbering more than one hundred have 
been exempted from payment of sales tax. In addition, in the interest of 
revival of sick industries in the State we have also taken a decision to 
convert the sales tax dues of the sick units to soft loans with a moratorium 
of 3 years and repayment period varying from 6 to 9 years”.134  
 
The studies carried out by Kurian (2000) and later on Tenth Planning 
Commission (Tenth Five Year Plan, 2002-07, pp. 70-73) indicate that the 
net gainer in this game (i.e., the competition among the States for offering 
various tax concessions and other special facilities to new investors) are a 
group of forward States. Backward States are loser from two different sides. 
Firstly, in terms of losing the potential revenue and secondly not being able 
to attract investments from private investors as well as foreigners due to 
their poor infrastructure, low level of economic activities and so on so forth. 
Table 32 indicates that the group of forward States accounted for about two 
third of the total investment proposals while the group of backward States 
accounted for just about 28 per cent of the total amount.  
 
Table: 32 
Investment Proposals Received by the Major States of India from  
August 1991 to December 1999 
States Percentage Share of 
Investment 
Proposals from 
                                                          
134 Jyoti Basu Speaks, A collection of selected speeches of Jyoti Basu, Chief Minister, West 
Bengal, Department of Information and Cultural Affairs, Government of West Bengal,1991, pp. 
41  
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August 1991-
December 1998 
Group of Forward 
States 
 
Andhra Pradesh 8.3 
Gujarat 18.7 
Haryana 3.6 
Karnataka 5.6 
Kerala 1.1 
Maharastra 18.0 
Punjab 3.4 
Tamil Nadu 7.2 
Sub Total 
65.9 
Group of Backward 
States 
 
Assam 0.7 
Bihar 1.2 
Madhya Pradesh 7.4 
Orissa 2.2 
Rajasthan 3.9 
Uttar Pradesh 9.4 
West Bengal 3.3 
Sub Total  
28.1 
All India 100.00 
Source: Kurian, N.J, “Widening Regional Disparities in India Some Indicators”  EPW, 
February 12, 2000, p. 545 
 
The over all impact of these practices leads to low level of tax buoyancy for 
all States. During the 1980s, the buoyancy of revenue from sales tax with 
reference to SDP for all 14 large States suffered. This trend has been 
continuing despite all the additional imposition like surcharge, turn over tax 
etc. and this is said to have further deteriorated during the economic reform 
period. (Reform of Domestic Trade Taxes in India Issues and Options, 
NIPFP, 1994, p. 32) The buoyancy coefficients of 14 major States  was 1.59 
between 1970-71 and 1979-80 and subsequently declined to 1.16 between 
1980-81 and 1989-90. Interestingly enough, decline in buoyancy was much 
sharper in low and middle income States than in high income States. The 
average buoyancy of forward States has declined from 1.48 during 1970s to 
1.24 during 1980s as against from1.60 to 1.12 for the backward States 
during the same time period.  For West Bengal the decline was as sharp as 
from 1.52 during 1970s to 1.09 during 1980s as against the all India figures 
which were 1.52 and 1.16 during the same time period. (table 33) 
 
Table: 33 
Buoyancy coefficients (With respect to State Domestic Product) 
of Revenue from Sales Tax in 14 Major States for the year 1970s and 1980s 
 
States/Year 1970-71 to 1979-80 1980-81 to 1989-90 
Group of Forward States   
Andhra Pradesh 1.69 1.36 
Gujarat 1.40 1.26 
Haryana 1.64 1.19 
Karnataka 1.48 1.34 
Kerala 1.60 1.38 
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Maharastra 1.21 1.12 
Punjab 1.25 1.09 
Tamil Nadu 1.62 1.18 
Average for group of 
forward States 
1.48 1.24 
Group of Backward States   
Bihar 1.49 1.07 
Madhya Pradesh 1.60 1.09 
Orissa 1.60 1.18 
Rajasthan 1.54 1.16 
Uttar Pradesh 1.86 1.18 
West Bengal 1.52 1.09 
Average for group of 
Backward States 
1.60 1.12 
All States 1.52 1.16 
Source: Reform of Domestic Trade and Taxes in India: Issues and Options, NIPFP, New 
Delhi, 1994, p. 33 
 
 
Taxation on inter-State sales tax and lack of harmony in the States’ sales 
tax system 
 
Taxation on inter-State sales tax has been another form of exporting tax 
burden from rich income States to poor income States accentuating inequity 
among different Sates further. A law known as the Central Sales Tax (CST) 
Act was enacted by the Parliament in 1956 to regulate the taxation of inter-
State sales taking place, between dealers or between dealers and 
consumers. While powers to tax inter-State sales under the Constitution 
belong to the Centre, the States have been empowered to levy the CST on 
such sales taking place in their territories and retain the proceeds with a 
view to check evasion of taxes on inter-State trade sales.  
 
Originally, the purpose of levying the CST was to “ensure that some 
revenue accrues to exporting States without raising unduly the burden on 
consumers in the importing State” (Government of India , 1977)135 However, 
over time, the original purpose has taken a backseat and raising revenue 
became the main purpose.( Rao & Sen, 1996, p. 74; Rao, & Tulashidar,  
1986, p. 296) For example to begin with, the tax was levied at the ceiling 
rate of only 1 per cent but over the years the ceiling rate has been raised in 
stages to 4 per cent in order to extract more revenue while undermining the 
objective of containing tax evasion. (Rao & Sen, 1996, p. 74) However, the 
importing State applies its local rate on the resale value of the goods 
imported including the CST paid to exporting State. Thus the importing 
States of the country have to surrender their autonomy while levying the 
State’s Sales tax rates on account of the CST (4%) plus the rate of the 
State’s sales tax (say 11%) would be already excessive. Therefore, the 
importing State is compelled to rule out any possibility of further increasing 
tax  rate. (Purohit, 1990, p. 2732)  
 
However, It is generally seen the case that not only the exports of more 
developed States are larger than their imports and the proportion of final 
goods in their exports is higher than in case of poorer States but also the 
Effective Tax Rates (ETR) on the export tax base of richer States is usually 
                                                          135 Quoted in Rao, M.G & Tulashidar, V.B, Economic Analysis in Sales Taxation in India, 
Bulletin, July 1986, pp. 296 
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higher than those of the poorer States, making tax exportation doubly 
problematic which varies from 3.5 per cent in Bihar to 11.5 per cent in 
Gujarat. Thus the residents of poorer States end up paying taxes on larger 
volume of imports and at higher Effective Tax Rates (table 33) (Rao & Sen, 
1996,  pp. 61-75) The study undertaken by Rao & Sen (1996) indicates that 
of the seven above average income States, all except West Bengal were 
net tax exporters and among less than average income States, except 
Andhra Pradesh and Kerala all were net importers. The extent of 
exportations as percentage of their actual tax collections was high in 
Gujarat and Maharastra i.e., about 41 per cent and 43 per cent respectively. 
In contrast the residents of Bihar paid the highest percentage of their tax 
collections to other States (92 per cent). West Bengal, as it is evident from 
table 33, has become net importer to the extent of 12 per cent. (Rao  & Sen,  
1996,  pp. 61-65) 
 
 
Table: 34 
Consumption Share, Tax Shares and Effective Tax Rates of Different States 
 (1987-88) 
States 
Effective Tax 
Rates (Per Cent) 
Tax Exported/Sales 
Tax Collections (per 
cent) 
Above-Average Income States   
Gujarat 11.47 40.78 
Haryana 7.39 22.86 
Karnataka 8.81 22.94 
Maharastra 11.21 42.81 
Punjab 7.31 20.31 
Tamil Nadu 10.16 33.17 
West Bengal 6.07 -11.90 
Sub Total 1 9.25 26.58 
Below Average Income States   
Andhra Pradesh 7.16 5.25 
Bihar 3.54 -92.40 
Kerala 7.93 28.67 
Madhya Pradesh 
4.20 -61.55 
Orissa 4.00 -69.41 
Rajasthan 4.74 -43.33 
Uttar Pradesh 3.71 -83.02 
Sub Total 2 4.77 -42.21 
All Major States 6.79 0.00 
Source: Rao, M.G & Sen, T.K, Fiscal Federalism in India Theory and Practice, Macmilan 
India Ltd, New Delhi,1996, pp. 65-66 
 
 
Similar trends were evident in the study undertaken by NIPFP (1994) which 
shows that during 1988-91 nearly 30 per cent of the State Domestic Product 
(SDP) in India originated from only four States accounting for less than 20 
percent of the population. A considerable part of the production of these 
States get exported to the remaining 21 States. With an origin based tax the 
producing States are able to export taxes to citizens of consuming States 
and thereby making inroads into their tax base. Table 35 shows that during 
1988-91 the four high income States account for nearly 45 per cent of the 
total revenue from CST. The low income Sates are net importers and hence 
remain net loser in this game. (Reform of Domestic Trade Taxes in India: 
Issues and Options, NIPFP, 1994, p. 29) In 1999-00, though the share of 
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high income States reduced to 39 per cent yet the share of high income 
States in total revenue collection from CST was much higher than low (27 
per cent) and middle income States (16 per cent).  
 
 
Table: 35 
State-wise Distribution of Revenue from Central Sales Tax  
During 1988-91 and 1999-00 
 (per cent)  
States 1988-91® 1999-00 
High Income States   
Maharastra 21.78 17.81 
Gujarat 11.89 10.3 
Haryana 6.19 6.6 
Punjab 5.22 4.17 
       Sub Total 45.08 38.88 
Middle Income States   
Andhra Pradesh 5.07 6.05 
Karnataka 7.84 5.93 
Kerala 2.87 3.09 
West Bengal 8.82 2.91 
Tamil Nadu 9.71 8.93 
        Sub Total 34.31 26.91 
Low Income States   
Bihar 5.22 4.54 
Madhya Pradesh 6.85 5.1 
Orissa 0.56 0.49 
Uttar Pradesh 4.15 4.56 
Rajasthan 1.32 1.56 
       Sub Total 18.10 16.25 
Total for all States 100.00 100.00 
® Average for the Years 1988-91 
Source: For the year 1988-91 see  Reform of Domestic Trade Taxes in India: Issues and 
Options, NIPFP, New Delhi, 1994, p. 30; for the year 1999-00 see   Mukhopadhyay, S, 
“Value Added Tax How Implementation is Going Wrong?” EPW, September 7, 2002, p. 
3701 
                                                                       
Sharp decline of CST  of West Bengal 
 
In the fifties and early sixties West Bengal was a leading manufacturing 
State in the country and accounted for good proportion of the inter-State 
exportation of commodities.  Gradually the State lost its pre-eminence and 
registered sharp decline of the proceeds from the CST between 1960-61 to 
1999-00 which is evident from table 35. In 1960-61 West Bengal’s share in 
CST was 27 per cent which was the highest among all the States. In 1981-
82, the share of the West Bengal in the total revenue from the CST came 
down to 11 per cent and during the subsequent years it further came down 
to 8.71 per cent in 1995-96. In 1999-00 this share was as low as 2.91 per 
cent and was the lowest among all States except Rajasthan (1.56 per cent) 
and Orissa (0.49 per cent). Thus over the years West Bengal has lost its 
position of being a leading exporting State and has become mainly an 
importing State. This situation put the State in a  vulnerable position and 
consequently the State became the victim of the negativity of the CST 
system prevailing in the Indian federation. (table 36) 
                                                  
Table: 36 
Percentage Share of the Each State in the Total Central Sales Tax Collection Between 1960-61 and 
1999-00 
 277
 
States Percentage share of each State in the total Central Sales Tax collection 
            (1)           (2)    (3)   (4)    (5)   (6)    (7) 
 1960-61 1970-71 1981-82 1990-91 1995-96 1999-00 
Andhra Pradesh 2.08 2.35 5.31 5.51 10.64 6.05 
Bihar 12.67 6.48 6.67 5.23 - 4.54 
Gujarat 4.16 8.38 10.70 7.53 11.35 10.3 
Haryana - 4.37 6.36 4.32 9.23 6.6 
Karnataka 2.98 3.84 5.21 5.55 4.92 5.93 
Kerala 3.92 2.31 2.26 2.35 3.41 3.09 
Madhya Pradesh 5.06 6.91 5.40 4.82 6.99 5.1 
Maharastra 23.02 24.32 22.36 15.11 23.6 17.81 
Orissa 2.27 4.13 2.67 0.44 - 0.49 
Punjab - 5.73 5.72 3.72 4.12 4.17 
Rajasthan 1.32 2.16 1.95 9.00 1.67 1.56 
Tamil Nadu 10.78 2.96 9.99 6.76 14.34 8.93 
Uttar Pradesh 4.16 3.25 3.96 2.92 - 4.56 
West Bengal 27.46 16.40 11.26 6.00 8.71 2.91 
All States 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Sources:  For column  2, 3 & 4 see Bagchi, A & Dass, S.K, Sales Tax System in West Bengal, 
NIPFP, New Delhi, 1987, p.  23; for column 5, 6 & 7 see Mukhopadhyay, S, ‘Value Added Tax How 
Implementation Is Going Wrong’, EPW, September 7, 2002, p. 3701  
 
  
Existing sales tax structure of West Bengal and its evolution 
 
The study undertaken by Bagchi & Dass (1987) covering the period 1960-
61 to 1981-82 throws some light on the structural complexity of West 
Bengal’s sales tax administration. The report published every year by the 
Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG), Revenue Receipts, also 
provides information regarding sales tax structure of West Bengal. This  
section of the study attempts to take a look of the administrative problem 
and complexity in sales tax structure of West Bengal covering the period 
1980-81 to 1999-00 with the help of above mentioned study and reports 
published every year.  
 
The tax on sale and purchase of commodities is currently administered in 
West Bengal by four sales tax laws. These are:   
 
The Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941; 
The Bengal Raw Jute Taxation Act, 1941; 
The West Bengal Sales Tax Act, 1954; and 
The West Bengal Motor Spirit Sales Tax Act, 1974. 
 
The Central Sales Tax Act of 1956,  also has to be included in this list which 
empowers the States to administer and retain the proceeds from inter-State 
sales tax. So there are as many as five sales tax legislations operating in 
West Bengal. However, it was recommended that the  sales tax system of 
the State should be consolidated and  reduce the number of  sales tax 
legilations in West Bengal. As NIPFP (1994) observes, “A consolidated law 
was reported to be ready for placing in the Assembly in West Bengal since 
long but its enactment is still to come. Taxpayers dealing with commodities 
subjected to tax under five legislations are still required to file as many 
returns every year and assessment have to be made for each of them 
individually (unless the case in question comes under the Self Assessment 
Scheme). As a result, assessments in arrears keep piling up and the 
government of the State is obliged to clear the backlog by declaring 
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periodically the pending assessment as deemed to have been completed”. 
(Reform of Domestic Trade Taxes in India Issues and Options, NIPFP, 
1994, p. 13) 
 
Sales taxation originated in the State with the introduction of a general sales tax 
on retail sales through the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941. Bengal was 
the second State (then Province) in India to introduce a general (as 
distinguished from a selective) tax on sales. Initially the scheme was fairly 
simple. It was levied only on retail sale. The basic structure of the tax did not 
undergo any change until 1954 other than changing the rates. Evasion and the 
pressing need for more revenue led to an extensive change in the structure of 
sales taxation after Independence, particularly after the mid-fifties. In order to 
facilitate administration and curb evasion, the point of levy was shifted to the 
first-point in the case of few specified commodities. This was brought about 
through a separate legislation in the form of the West Bengal Sales Tax Act, 
1954. The commodities coming under the first point taxation called notified 
commodities were originally small in number. And the scope of the first point 
taxation was restricted mainly to commodities whose manufacture or processing 
was well regulated in the State and those not in the nature of raw materials or 
whose import into the State was well canalised. Over the years the number of 
the commodities taxed at the first point increased mainly due to the 
administrative reason of better compliance. Thus when sales tax is levied at the 
first point, it is rather easier to administer it yet at the cost of loss of revenue 
while consequently the base becomes narrower. 
 
In order to get rid of this problem, multiple point taxation was introduced in West 
Bengal by imposing the tax on intermediate sellers-that is, sale by a registered 
dealer to another was made taxable at the rate of 1 per cent since 1969. Earlier 
intermediate sales did not attract any tax and tax was leviable only at one point 
mostly sales by the last registered dealer to an unregistered dealer or to final 
consumers. Since then sales tax in West Bengal is generally levied on a 
multiple point basis. Under this system, tax is levied at every point of sales by 
registered dealers thereby increasing the total tax incidence and the ultimate 
price of the commodity. However, if tax is levied only at the first point of sale, 
the number of tiers of taxation and the cost of commodities are lessened and 
this helps the growth of industry and trade. But, as we have mentioned earlier, 
there is a risk of loss of revenue when commodities are brought under first point 
taxation from multiple point taxation. Thus besides having a narrow base under 
the first point of levy, it is not possible to realise tax in case of tax evasion at any 
subsequent transaction while in case of multiple point taxation it would be 
possible to realise tax even if one tier is evaded.  
 
Therefore, the system of sales tax in West Bengal operating until 1999-00 was 
an extremely complex one. (In the budget of 1999-00 simplification of sales tax 
system of West Bengal was proposed which would be discussed subsequently). 
Starting as a simple uniform levy on retail sale of all commodities with a few 
exemptions, the  sales tax system of the State developed into a formidable 
structure containing elements of both first point and last point as well as multiple 
point taxation. The rates too were no longer uniform and it  varied all the way 
from 1 to 18 per cent.  
 
It is pertinent to note that in the budget of 1999-00 with a view to promoting 
trade and industries within the State, simplifying procedures for better 
compliance, providing relief to the ordinary consumers and abolition of multiple 
point taxation was proposed by the Finance  Minister. From 1999-00 it was 
suggested that out of total 550 commodities about 530 commodities be taxed at 
the first point of sale. And the rest 20 commodities were to be taxed at first point 
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as well as the second point sale in order to make the tax system simple and to 
achieve better tax compliance. (Budget Statement, 1999-00, Minister-in-Charge, 
Finance Government of West Bengal, pp. 36-38) 
 
Administrative problem of sales tax system 
 
The decline in West Bengal tax effort in sales tax relatively to other States must 
be partly attributed to administrative factors besides structural complexities of 
the sales tax system. Undoubtedly, such complex tax structure made it 
extremely difficult to administer the system efficiently thereby increasing the 
cost of collecting tax proceeds compared to other States and has given rise to 
huge backlog in the sales tax arrears as well as  unresolved disputes before the 
appellate authorities and courts. And arrears of revenue in Sales tax has been 
showing increasing trend too. At the end of March 1998 it amounted to  Rs. 
1311.85 or 46 per cent of the total sales tax receipt of the State for the year. 
This amount is somewhat understated. Because during the audit observation, it 
was found that the information provided by the sales tax department of the 
State about the position of arrears was not correct i. e., actual figure, as 
observed by CAG, would be much higher than Rs. 1311.85 crore. (Report of the 
Comptroller and Auditor General, Revenue Receipts, March 1999,  p.11) We 
like turn to this area later. Now different dimensions of administrative problem 
experienced in the last two decades may be analysed.  
 
Non-maintenance/defective maintenance of registers and other irregularities 
 
The study undertaken by Bagchi & Dass (1987) covering the period from 1960-
61 to 1980-81 came to the conclusion that the complete failure of the 
information system of sales tax system of West Bengal which had a retarding 
effect on better management of sales tax collection of the State. Later on during 
1990s similar observation was also made in Comptroller and Auditor General 
(CAG) report. As the study undertaken by Bagchi & Dass (1987) felt that the 
most disheartening aspect of the sales tax administration of the State was the 
virtual collapse of the information system. There was no reliable information 
about the number of dealers assessed for tax from year to year or about the 
aggregate volume of their turnover. Even the total number of dealers coming 
under the sales tax net every year is not known. (Bagchi & Dass,1987, p. 22 ) 
 
In 1990 CAG report (Revenue Receipts) came to a similar conclusion. This 
report observed  that notification of number of registered dealers had not been 
maintained properly. Adequate attention had not been paid to the proper 
maintenance of various sales tax registers with the result that no check had 
been or could be exercised in order to ensure that the dealers had actually 
submitted their returns in time and whether taxes due in all cases had been 
collected and refunds of tax where due had been made in time etc. (The Report 
of the Comptroller and Auditor General, Revenue Receipts, Government of 
West Bengal,  March 1990, p. 26) 
 
The increase in the number of registered dealers ranged from 1.25 to 3.50 per 
cent between 1989-90 and 1991-92. However, the Commercial Taxes 
Directorate of the State could not furnish consolidated information about the 
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number of applications received for registration, applications rejected, 
registrations granted and cancelled during the last  3 years ending on March 
1992. As a result the overall picture of new registration, the pendency of 
applications for registration and cancellation of registration certificates could not 
be ascertained in audit. (The Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General, 
Revenue Receipts, Government of West Bengal,  March 1993, p. 12) 
 
The CAG report went on to say that under the sales tax laws, various registers 
like Registers of Dealers, Registers of Cancellation of Registration Certificate, 
Register of Security Deposit, Register of Information received from Central 
Section etc. are required to be maintained. In the course of audit it was revealed 
that the Register of Dealers and Register of Cancellation of Registration 
Certificate were not being maintained properly. And the Register of Security 
Deposit and the Register of Information received from Central Section were not 
at all maintained. In the absence of these important registers and lack of 
improper maintenance of some others, it could not be ascertained in audit 
whether the security demanded was obtained, proper action on the directives of 
the Central Section was taken, returns were submitted by dealers at periodical 
intervals, tax liability of the registered dealers was timely/correctly determined 
and the unused declaration forms were surrendered by the dealers whose 
registration certificates were cancelled. (The Report of the Comptroller and 
Auditor General, Revenue Receipts, Government of West Bengal,  March 1993, 
pp. 19-20) 
 
Lack of regular market survey for registration 
 
Lack of regular market survey to detect dealers liable for registration but not yet 
registered resulted in evasion of tax. A suitable machinery for conducting 
regular market surveys is required to detect the dealers liable for registration but 
carrying on business without registration. No such machinery for carrying out 
regular market survey has, however, been provided in the State with the result 
that many eligible dealers remained unregistered and evaded payment of tax. 
However, the department conducted surprise raids in vigilance operation in 
order to detect unregistered dealers on the basis of information received 
beforehand but no regularity of such raid is maintained. (The Report of the 
Comptroller and Auditor General, Revenue Receipts, Government of West 
Bengal,  March 1993, pp. 12-13) 
 
Outstanding inspection reports and audit observations 
 
One of the important irregularities of sales tax collection is related to increasing 
number of outstanding inspection reports and audit observations by Comptroller 
of Auditor General. During the audit observations (conducted by CAG) incorrect 
assessments, under-assessments, non-levy or short levy of sales taxes as well 
as irregularities and deficiencies in initial records of assessment are usually 
noticed. Some audit observations which could not be settled on the spot are 
communicated to heads of offices and to higher authorities through inspection 
reports for prompt settlement. However, table 36 indicates number of 
outstanding  audit observations which were yet to be settled by the sales tax 
department of the respective States until December 1999.  
 
 281
It should be noticed that earliest year to which inspections are related  is 1988-
89 for West Bengal. That means some cases were not settled even after 10 
years lapsed. The amount of money involved in this outstanding assessment of 
sales tax was Rs. 74.79 crores of West Bengal. And percentage of money 
involved in this pending assessment  to sales tax of West Bengal is 2.39. (table 
37) 
 
 
 
Table: 37 
Outstanding Inspection Reports and Audit Observations in Different States as in 1999 
 
States Number Of 
inspection 
reports 
Number 
Of audit 
observat
ions 
Money  
Involved 
(Rs. in crore)
Earliest 
years to 
which 
inspection 
report 
relates 
Total sales 
tax receipts  
1998-99 
(Rs. crore) 
Percentage 
of money 
involved to 
total sales 
tax 
collection 
Karnataka 1584 5178 74.99 NA 4265.17 1.75 
Andhra 
Pradesh 
2067 6183 159.35 1992-93 to 
1998-99 
5251.34 3.03 
Gujarat NA NA NA NA - - 
Tamil Nadu 1523 27947 41.98 NA 6112.94 0.68 
Punjab* 1046 2771 75.01 NA 1489.65 5.03 
Maharastra 1895 4762 47.34 1989-90 to 
1998-99 
8066.61 0.58 
West Bengal 355 1,446 74.79 1988-89 3117.97 2.39 
Source: The Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG), Revenue Receipts, 
different State governments,  1999 
 
 
Arrears in sales tax collection  
 
The system of collection and recovery of arrears of sales tax and its 
effectiveness and deficiencies of the administration is analysed time to time 
by CAG in its reports. The CAG expressed its concern over the fact that the 
sales tax department was ignorant of the full extent of arrears and the 
department didn’t have a system to monitor collection and ensure 
accountability for lapses. Some charges were pending realisation for 
periods varying up to 25 years because of inaction and failure of the 
department to initiate follow up action for recovery of arrears of the 
department. (The Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General, Revenue 
Receipts, Government of West Bengal, 1999, pp. 9-11) 
 
We must take a closer look at the sales tax arrears which laid at different 
stages in order to get the total amount of arrears of sales tax collection of 
the State. Until  31st March 1998 total arrears of Rs. 1311 crore lied at 
various levels i.e.,  with the department, in appeals, in revision and review, 
in High Court, Supreme Court and  in certificate proceedings. (table 38) As 
we have mentioned before the total amount of arrears of Rs. 1311 crore is 
somewhat understated. While as per information furnished to CAG by the 
Directorate, the amount involved in appeal cases as on 31st March 1999, 
was Rs. 155 crore (which involved 24,145 cases). However during the test 
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check by CAG it was noticed that the amount pending in appeal was Rs. 
297.68 crore in respect of 1,944 cases in 5 circles only out of the total17 
circles. Thus it is quite evident that actual amount of total arrears would be 
much higher than Rs. 1311 crore. (Table 38) (The Report of the Comptroller 
and Auditor General, Revenue Receipts, Government of West Bengal, 
1999, p. 11) An attempt has, however, been made to compare the position 
of arrears of West Bengal with other States during 1998-99. (table 39) 
 
 
Table: 38 
Position of Sales Tax  Arrears at Different Stages in West Bengal  up to March 1998 
 
Year Arrears pending collection at the end of the year 
(Rs. in Crore) 
 
Sales 
tax 
receipt 
(Rs. in 
crore) 
Percentage 
of arrears 
to total 
sales tax 
receipts 
 With the 
department  
In 
Appeals 
In 
revision 
and 
review 
In High 
Court and 
Supreme 
Court 
In certificate 
proceedings 
Total   
1994-95 310 190 - - 302.48 802.48 2091.18 39 
1995-96 316 165 - - 384.40 865.40 2447.23 35 
1996-97 309 136 - - 446.80 891.80 2704.16 33 
1997-98 343.21 155 55.64 232.61* 525.39** 1311.85 2844.31 46 
 
Source: The Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General, Revenue Receipts, 
Government of West Bengal, March 1999, p. 11 
 
 
 
 
 
Table: 39 
Total Arrears in Sales Tax Collection at Different Stages of Different States Until 1999 
                                                                                                 (Rs. in crore) 
States Total sales 
tax receipts 
Total arrears in 
sales tax at 
different stages 
As until 1999 
Arrears 
more than 
five years 
Old 
Percentage 
of total 
arrears in 
sales tax 
receipts 
Maharastra 8066.61 4250.55 852.61 52.69 
Karnataka 4265.17 NA NA - 
Andhra 
Pradesh 
5251.34 1200.65 254.04 22.86 
Tamil Nadu 6112.94 5104.15 1046.15 83.49 
Punjab 1489.65 125.41* 39.21 8.41 
Gujarat 4795.84 1101.48 268.85 22.96 
West Bengal 3117.97 1311.85** 269.80 42.07 
Source: The Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General, Revenue Receipts, different 
State governments,  1999  
• Does not include arrears in respect of Amritsar-I and II and Ludhiana I and III 
districts.  
• ** This figure is related to as on 31st March 1998  
 
Arrears in assessment of sales tax 
 
The increasing number of arrears of assessment of sales tax indicate 
inability of the sales tax department to dispose off all the assessment cases 
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in time. The details of cases due for assessment and cases disposed of 
during the year and number of cases pending finalisation during the 
years1997-98 and 1998-99 as furnished by the Sales Tax department in 
respect of sales tax is evidenced in table 40. Table 40 indicates that the 
percentage of arrears cases due for assessment to total cases pending  at 
the end of 1997-98 and 1998-99 are  64 and 56 respectively. Therefore  
only 35 per cent of total cases due for assessment was disposed of in 1997-
98 and only 44 per cent in 1998-99. An attempt is made to compare the 
arrears in assessment of sales tax of West Bengal with other States during 
1998-99. As it would be evident from table 40 that all other States  had 
higher percentage of cases disposed of during the year 1998-99 except 
Maharastra (32 per cent ) and Gujarat (39 per cent) as against 44 per cent 
in West Bengal. (table 41) 
 
 
 
 
Table: 40               
Arrears in Assessment of Sales tax in West Bengal in 1997-98 and 1998-99 
Year Opening 
Balance  
Cases due for 
assessment 
during the 
year 
Total Cases 
finalised 
during the 
year 
Balance at 
the close of 
the year 
Percentage 
of column 5 
to column 4  
Percentage 
of column 6 
to column 4
  (1)   (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
1997-98 1,58,637 2,53,530 4,12,167 1,46,668 2,65,499 35.58 64 
1998-99 2,65,499 2,52,958 5,18,457 2,27,570 2,90,887 43.89 56 
Source: The Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General, Revenue Receipts, 
Government of West Bengal, March 1999, p. 6 
 
 
Table: 41 
Arrears in Assessment of Sales tax Collection for Different States in 1998-99 
States Total cases due 
for assessment 
Total cases 
finalised during 
the year (1998-99)
Closing 
balance at the 
end of the 
year (1998-99)
Assess
ment 
finalised  
Percentage 
of column 4 
to column 2
(Assessme
nt due) 
     (1)       (2)     (3)      (4)     (5) 
Maharastra 2023756 644479 1379277 32 68.15 
Karnataka 1432053 709974 722079 50 50.42 
Andhra Pradesh 408562 316693 91869 78 22.48 
Tamil Nadu 196060 161854 34206 83 17.44 
Gujarat 2655041 1016360 1638681 39 61.71 
West Bengal 518547 227570 290887 44 56.09 
Source: The Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General, Revenue Receipts, different 
State governments,  1999  
  
 
Administrative problem regarding granting sales tax incentives  
 
Most States provide a variety of exemptions either to lessen the regressivity 
of the tax, or as incentive to industry. Industrial incentives take various 
forms such as deferment of sales tax, sales tax holiday, repayment of term 
loans from sales tax collected etc. Such incentives are generally limited to 
new industrial enterprises or units located in specific areas, small scale 
enterprises and the amount of sales tax forgone or deferred under the 
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incentive provisions is usually tied to the amount of fixed capital investment 
by the enterprises. (Reform of Domestic Trade Taxes in India: Issues and 
Options, NIPFP, 1994, p. 13) 
 
In West Bengal the following incentive schemes were introduced between 
April 1976 and June 1990 to promote the growth and development of 
industries in the small, medium and large scale sectors. The West Bengal 
Incentive Schemes, 1993, also provides set of incentive schemes for newly 
set up small scale industrial unit.  
 
(i) Exemption136 of sales tax for newly set up small industries. 
(ii) Deferment137 from payment of sales tax for newly set up medium and 
large scale industries138 and their expanded portion.  
(iii) Remission139 of tax for newly set up medium and large scale 
industries and their expanded portion. 
 
The implementation of the incentive schemes is governed under the Sales 
Tax Statutes and also under the relevant schemes framed by the 
Commerce and Industries Department of the State. It is necessary to 
evaluate the implementation of the incentive since allowance of exemption 
and concession of sales tax involves forgoing of considerable revenue. It is 
essential that such allowance should be recorded for the sake of 
subsequent evaluation of the schemes. A review of records in audit made 
by Comptroller of Auditor General of India (CAG) revealed that no control 
register in respect of incentives of sales tax exemptions was being 
maintained either at the level of the official issuing Eligibility Certificate 
(EC)140 or at the level of the assessing officers maintaining records of the 
amounts of tax exempted and names of beneficiary units to whom they 
were granted.  
 
In respect of incentives under deferment and remission schemes, a control 
register was, however, maintained by the Special Cell, wherein it was 
indicated that during the period from 1990-91 to 1994-95, 74 industrial units 
out of the total number of 121 units availed interest-free sales tax deferment 
of Rs. 20.74 crores and 58 units out of the total number of 115 units availed 
of sales tax remission of Rs. 15.72 crores. Incentives availed of by the 
remaining units in the shape of deferment and remission of tax could not be 
ascertained in audit as the control register was duly updated. This being 
                                                          
136 ‘Exemption’ denotes non-levy of a tax for a prescribed period (Report of the Comptroller of 
Auditor General of India, Revenue Receipts, Government of West Bengal, 1996, pp. 15) 
137 ‘Deferment‘ denotes delayed payment of tax up to a prescribed limit after expiry of 
prescribed period. (ibid.) 
 
138 ‘Medium and large scale industrial unit’ means a unit having gross value of fixed capital 
assets  exceeding Rs. 10 lakhs as per prescribed norms (ibid.) 
 
139 ‘Remission’ denotes relinquishment of tax up to a prescribed limit (ibid.) 
140 To avail of the benefit of the sales tax concessions, the eligible unit has to obtain an EC from 
the Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes concerned . The EC specifies the category of 
unit, it’s location, type of commercial goods to be manufactured date of first sale of such goods 
produced or first commercial production. The EC shall be granted on application and shall be 
valid for a period not exceeding twelve months at a time, subject to renewal for every period of 
twelve months thereafter on application. (Report of the Comptroller of Auditor General of India, 
Revenue Receipts, Government of West Bengal, 1996, pp.18) 
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pointed out (between January and May 1996) in audit conducted by CAG 
the assessing officer admitted that no control register in respect of incentive 
of tax exemption schemes in the form of deferment and remission was 
properly being maintained. (Report of the Comptroller of Auditor General of 
India, Revenue Receipts, Government of West Bengal, 1996, pp. 18-19) 
Furthermore, It was noticed that in several occasions irregular exemption of 
tax was granted due to failure of the Commercial Taxes Directorate to 
exercise control over the issue of EC and lack of co-ordination between the 
Commercial Taxes Directorate and the Industries department. (ibid., pp. 18-
25) 
 
Several times grant/renewal of ECs without valid registration of the small 
scale industries (SSI) department resulted in substantial loss of revenue of 
the State. Valid certificate of registration from the SSI department is 
necessary for receiving grant/renewal of EC for availing tax exemption. It 
was observed in a CAG audit that there was no control over the issuance of 
EC by the Commercial Taxes Directorate. ECs were being issued without 
submission of registration certificates. Such invalid ECs resulted in a loss of 
revenue of to the extent of Rs. 179.22 lakhs in 26 small scale units over the 
period from May 1986 to December 1993. (Report of the Comptroller of 
Auditor General of India, Revenue Receipts, Government of West Bengal, 
1996, pp. 18-19) 
 
However, there are several examples of inefficiency in implementing 
incentive schemes by the Commercial Tax Directorate of which following 
are noteworthy. Under Bengal Sales Tax Rules, 1941 an industrial unit shall 
be eligible for tax incentives subject to fulfilment of the prescribed 
conditions. Violation of prescribed conditions for the grant of EC resulted in 
irregular allowances of tax exemptions. Failure of the Department to 
maintain control records in order to monitor the expiry/rejection of EC led to 
allowance of undue tax concession. In several times tax exemptions were 
granted even after expiry /rejection of EC. In several occasions tax 
exemptions were allowed beyond the prescribed period and tax exemption 
were granted without Eligibility Certificate (EC). All these resulted in 
considerable amount of  revenue loss of the State. 
 
Cost of collection of sales tax 
 
Cost of collection is one of the important indicators of efficiency in the sales 
tax system. An attempt has been made to compare the cost of collection of 
sales tax in West Bengal for the years 1997-98 and 1998-99 with other 
States. The cost of collection of sales tax in West Bengal is much higher  
compared to other States during the two time periods 1997-98 (1.42) and 
during 1998-99 (1.95) indicating inefficient administration of sales tax 
structure.  (table 42)   
 
Table: 42 
Cost of Collection of Sales Tax in Different States in 1997-98 and 1998-99 
   Cost of collection of sales tax States 
1997-98 1998-99 
Maharastra 0.82 0.68 
Punjab 1.58 1.90  
Gujrat 1.18 0.93 
Karnataka 0.99 0.96  
Andhra Pradesh 1.30 1.32 
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Tamil Nadu 1.24 1.62 
West Bengal 1.42 1.95  
All India  Average 1.28 NA 
Source: Different issues of CAG Report,  Revenue Receipts,  
Different State Governments 
 
 
 
 
Declining trend of the States’ non-tax  revenue  
 
 
Non-tax revenues of a State consists of administrative receipts from 
general, social and economic services, surpluses from departmentally run 
undertakings as well as interest receipts and dividends from non-
departmental public enterprises. Non-departmental public enterprises 
mainly comprises Statutory Corporations, Government Companies, Joint 
Stock Companies and Co-operative Banks & Societies. This study intends 
to concentrate on the performance of Statutory Corporations and 
Government Companies of West Bengal during 1990s. An attempt has also 
been made to compare the State’s performance as regards non-
departmental enterprises with other States during 1990s.  
 
The percentage share of non-tax revenue of West Bengal to the Gross 
State Domestic Product (GSDP) has not only been quite low but also has 
been declining over the whole decade of 1990s. In 1991 the non-tax 
revenue constituted 0.6 per cent of its GSDP but it decreased to only 0.3 
per cent in 1998-99. In contrast,  for all States the percentage of non-tax 
revenue to Gross Domestic Product (GDP)  were 1.6 per cent  in 1990-91 
and 1.4 percent in 1998-99 respectively.  However, it is quite evident that 
West Bengal’s non-tax revenue over 1990s and also compared to other 
States has been declining significantly. (table 43) Likewise, West Bengal’s 
non-tax revenue as proportion to total revenue expenditure was as low as 3 
per cent in 1999-2000 (BE) which was the lowest among all the States. 
(Shankar, K, 2000, p. 4608).Table 44 below indicates the declining trend of 
non-tax revenue as percentage of total revenue expenditure compared to 
other States during the period from 1985-86 to 1999-00. The non-tax 
revenue as percentage of total revenue expenditure has been decreasing 
from 6.3 per cent during the period of 1985-90 to 3.0 per cent in 1999-00. 
As it is evident from table 44 that the percentage share of non-tax revenue 
to total revenue expenditure for other States is much higher than West 
Bengal during 1985-86 and 1999-00.  
 
Table: 43 
Non-Tax Revenue of Different States as Percentage of Gross State Domestic  
Product (GSDP) from 1990-91 to 1998-99 
 
Year AP GUJ KAR MAH PNB TAN WB All States 
1990-91 2.5 1.4 2.2 2.8 1.3 1.2 0.6 1.6 
1991-92 2.2 3.7 2.1 2.4 7.2 3.0 0.6 1.9 
1992-93 2.3 2.9 2.4 2.1 1.3 1.4 0.6 1.7 
1993-94 2.4 2.8 1.7 1.9 1.4 1.2 0.6 1.8 
1994-95 2.3 2.3 1.7 2.1 5.9 1.2 0.6 2.1 
1995-96 2.2 2.2 2.1 1.6 4.6 1.1 0.5 1.9 
1996-97 2.0 1.8 1.9 2.0 4.4 1.1 0.5 1.7 
1997-98 1.8 2.4 1.6 1.7 4.8 1.6 0.5 1.6 
1998-99 1.9 2.7 1.6 1.4 2.7 1.0 0.3 1.4 
Source: ‘Finances of State Governments’,  EPW, May 26, 2001, p. 1915 
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Table: 44 
Non Tax Revenue as Percentage of Total Revenue Expenditure of Different States, 1985-
00 
 
Year AP GUJ KAR MAH PNB TAN WB 
1985-90 15.2 18.5 16.3 20.6 14.1 9.0 6.3 
1990-95 15.5 18.0 12.7 18.6 20.5 8.6 4.4 
1995-96 14.9 13.4 12.5 17.2 20.2 6.3 4.6 
1996-97 11.3 15.3 13.2 18.0 28.1 6.8 4.0 
1997-98 12.1 14.5 11.0 15.5 31.5 6.5 4.1 
1998-99 12.0 13.9 10.8 12.2 34.6 5.7 3.9 
1999-00 13.53 17.06 10.57 13.32 23.16 6.54 3.0 
Source: Reserve Bank of India Bulletin, February 1997, p. 42 & ibid.,  February 1999, p. S25; 
For the year 1999-00 see  Report of the Comptroller of Auditor General of India, Civil, 1999-00, 
Different State Governments     
 
The study undertaken by Rao & Mundle (1992) covering the the decade of 
1980s indicates that the non-tax revenue in total revenue receipts of all 
States was not only low but also has showed declining tendency over the 
whole decade of 1980s. The only item of non-tax revenue to have 
registered high growth rate in the 80s is the cess and royalty on mines and 
minerals. However, table 45 indicates the inter-State difference in the 
growth rate of non-tax revenue both after excluding and including royalty 
and cess on minerals between 1980-81 and 1988-89.  As it is evident from 
table  45 that the rate of growth of non-tax revenue ranging from as little as 
0.2 per cent per annum in the case of West Bengal to as much as 33 
percent in the case of Bihar after including royalty and cess on minerals. All 
States as indicated from table 45 had insignificant contribution to non-tax 
revenue but of them West Bengal’s performance was the worst. (Rao &  
Mundle,1992, pp. 108-109) 
 
 
Table: 45 
Inter-State differences in Growth  of Non-Tax Revenue of the States over  
1980-81 to 1988-89  (Per cent) 
 
States Growth Rate of Own 
Non-Tax Revenue 
Excluding Royalty 
and Cess on 
Minerals 
Growth Rate of 
Own Non-Tax 
Revenue 
Including Royalty 
and Cess on 
Minerals 
Andhra Pradesh 16.68 16.41 
Bihar 15.18 32.99 
Gujrat 11.30 17.82 
Haryana 12.44 13.16 
Karnataka 13.24 13.18 
Kerala 1.68 1.82 
Madhya Pradesh 10.61 15.73 
Maharastra 11.01 11.53 
Orissa 12.40 10.06 
Punjab 8.58 8.59 
Rajasthan 6.66 8.68 
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Tamil Nadu 14.26 14.19 
Uttar Pradesh 10.20 10.60 
West Bengal -0.64 0.18 
All States 9.88 14.23 
Source: Rao. M.G & Mundle, S, “An Analysis of Changes in State Government 
Subsidies: 1977-87”, Bagchi, A, Bajaj, J.L & Byrd, W.A (ed.) State Finances in India, 
NIPFP, Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, 1992,  pp. 125-126 
 
 
Non-tax revenue from  non-departmental sources 
 
Now we can discuss about the contribution of non-departmental public 
enterprises in the form of interest receipts and dividends to the States non-
tax revenue. Though the contribution of non-departmental public enterprises 
does not constitute any formidable part of the own non-tax revenue of the 
State, the significance of non-departmental enterprises lies elsewhere. The 
State Government every year invests on non-viable, non-profitable public 
sector enterprises in terms of equity, loan, grant and subsidy, which forms 
considerable portion of budgetary outgo. Over the years the paid up capital 
by the State government has been increasing and on the other hand 
contribution by the public enterprises has been decreasing although the fact 
that these enterprises have been making loss. Besides, guarantee given by 
the State governments to these loss making companies, constitutes a 
substantial amount of liabilities of the government, has been also increasing 
resulting in deterioration in the State finances.  
 
As on 31st  March 1999 there were 65 government companies including 11 
subsidiaries and two companies (under the purview of Section 619B of the 
companies act, 1956) and 12 Statutory companies were in operation.  
These have been engaged in different production, development, financing, 
and trading activities like engineering, textiles, iron and steel, electronics, 
agriculture and dairy, tourism, forest, transport, power, chemicals etc.  
(Different issues of CAG, Commercial) 
 
Aggregate paid up capital and the share of the government of West Bengal 
in total paid up capital 
 
During1990-91 total investment in Government companies was Rs. 2302.93 
crore, of which long term loan was Rs. 1616.29 crore and aggregate paid 
up capital in these Government companies were only Rs. 686.64 crore.  Of  
the total paid up capital (Rs. 686.64 Crore) the share of the State was Rs. 
666.89 crore, the share of the Central government was Rs.  5.58 crore and 
the share of holding companies and others were Rs. 14.17 crore. At the end 
of 1997-98 the total investment was Rs. 3939.70 crore in Government 
Companies. Of which share of  long term loan was Rs. 2333.25 crore and  
aggregate paid up capital was Rs. 1606.45  crore. Of the total paid up 
capital  (Rs.1606.45 crore) the share of the State was Rs. 1585.94 crore, 
the share of Centre was Rs. 7.66 crore and the holding companies and 
others was Rs. 12.94 crore. As it can be seen that over the period the share 
of long term loan which remain outstanding for longer period and larger part 
of which remain irrecoverable has been increasing and the share of paid up 
capital has been showing a declining tendency. (table 46) 
 
Table: 46 
Investment by the State, Central and Others in Government Companies During 1990-91 to 1999-00 
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Year Long term 
loan 
Percentage of  
long term loan to 
total investment 
Paid up capital Percentage of 
paid up capital 
to total 
investment 
Total 
investment 
1990-91 1616.29 70.18 686.64 28.82 2302.93 
1991-92 1651.27 67.93 779.39 32.07 2430.66 
1992-93 1704.49 67.36 825.59 32.64 2530.08 
1993-94 1971.01 68.03 926.12 31.79 2897.13 
1994-95 1822.44 56.38 1409.54 43.62 3231.98 
1995-96 1838.04 53.45 1600.25 46.55 3438.29 
1996-97 1786.75 53.48 1553.81 46.52 3340.56 
1997-98 2333.25 59.22 1606.45 40.78 3939.70 
1998-99 4035.39 70.77 1649.20 29.23 5701.84 
1999-00 6911.93 79.46 1710.86 20.54 8698.51 
Source: Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, Commercial, Government of West 
Bengal, different issues 
 
 
It can also be seen from table 47 that  the share of holding companies in the 
total paid up capital is decreasing over the years. The share of holding 
companies as evidenced from  table 47 has declined from Rs. 20.14 crore 
in 1992 to Rs. 8.62 crore in 1998. On the other hand the share of the Centre 
has increased at a lower pace and increased from Rs. 5.58 crore in 1990-
91 to Rs.7.66 crore in 1997-98 i.e., an increase of 37.27 per cent. In 
contrast to that the share of the State government has been increasing 
dramatically over the years from Rs. 666.89 crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 
1585.94 crore in 1997-98 i.e., it has increased by 137 per cent. This 
indicates that economically non-viable government companies have been 
gradually becoming increasingly dependent on the State government for 
their existence.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table: 47 
Share of the State Government and Holding Companies in Total Aggregate Paid up Capital  During 
1991to 2000 
As on 31st 
March of 
the Year  
 
Number of 
Government 
Companies 
Share of the 
Central 
Government 
(Rs. in crore) 
Share of the 
State 
Government 
(Rs. in crore) 
Share of 
Holding 
Companies 
(Rs. in crore) 
Share of 
Others 
(Rs. in 
crore) 
Aggregate 
Paid up 
Capital 
(Rs. in crore) 
1991 57  (7) 5.58 666.89 14.17 * - 686.64 
1992 61 (7) 3.76 750.71 20.14 4.78 779.39 
1993 63 (7) 3.86 790.57 24.03 7.13 825.59 
1994 63 (7) 3.86 899.21 16.50 6.55 926.12 
1995 60 (7) 5.89 1386.86 13.53 3.26 1409.54 
1996  - - - - - 
1997 60 (9) 7.66 1533.65 8.22 4.28 1553.81 
1998 61 (10) 7.66 1585.94 8.62 4.23 1606.45 
1999 65 (12) - - - - @ 
2000 69 (11) - - - - # 
Source: Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, Commercial,  Government of West 
Bengal, different issues 
Figure in brackets denotes  number of Statutory corporations of the respective years  
* This amount include share of others 
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@ # The separate amount of share of the State Government, Central government and holding 
companies in total paid up capital is not available during 1998-99 and 1999-00. 
 
 
 
Guarantees given by the State government to government companies and 
statutory corporations. 
  
Guarantees are given by the State governments for due discharge of 
certain liabilities like repayment of loans, share capital, etc, raised by the 
statutory corporations, government companies and co-operative institutions 
etc. and payment of interest and minimum dividend by them. They 
constitute contingent liability of the State. (Report of the Comptroller and 
Auditor General of India (CAG), Civil, Government of West Bengal (GOWB) 
2000-01, p. 19) 
 
Guarantees are also given by the State in order to compensate for declining 
share of capital expenditure which has adverse effect on infrastructural 
development. Over the years revenue expenditure of State governments 
has increased steadily on account of salaries, pensions, interest payments 
and other administrative expenses. Thus increasing revenue expenditure 
has been crowding out capital expenditure of the States. Therefore, in order 
to meet the growing requirements of financing infrastructure and 
compensate for the decreasing capital expenditure States have been 
compelled to resort to issuing larger and larger amount of guarantees on 
behalf of the public sectors which are entrusted with infrastructural and 
other developmental activities. (Thorat & Roy, 2001, pp. 3-4) 
 
Article 293 of the Constitution empowers the State governments to give 
guarantees within such limit as may be fixed from time to time by the State 
legislature. But no law under Article 293 of the Constitution had been 
passed by West Bengal State Legislature laying down the maximum limits 
within which government may give guarantees on the security of the 
Consolidated Fund of the State government. Thus in reality,  implicit ceiling 
in government guarantees is the size of the Consolidated Fund. (CAG, Civil, 
GOWB, 2000-01, p. 19)  
 
Outstanding guarantees given by the States, however, indicate the risk of 
exposure of a State government and should therefore be compared with the 
ability of the government to pay with its revenue receipts. Thus the ratio of 
the total outstanding guarantees to total revenue receipts of the government 
would indicate the degree of vulnerability of the State government. The ratio 
of outstanding guarantee to total revenue receipt of West Bengal has 
increased from 0.29 in 1996-97 to 0.38 in 1999-00 indicating an adverse 
trend. However, other States, shown in table 48, had considerably higher 
ratio more than even West Bengal, during the period from 1995-96 to 1999-
00 indicating a vulnerable position of the States’ budget in general.  
 
Table: 48 
Ratio of Outstanding Guarantees to Total Revenue Receipts of Different States Between 1995-96 
and 1999-00 
Year West 
Bengal 
Maharastra Karnataka Tamil 
Nadu 
Andhra 
Pradesh 
Gujarat Punjab 
1995-96 0.39 NA 0.55 0.34 0.44 0.76 0.49 
1996-97 0.29 0.40 0.51 0.36 0.71 0.72 1.03 
1997-98 0.33 0.41 0.53 0.33 0.52 0.61 0.79 
1998-99 0.36 0.51 0.71 0.43 0.71 0.60 0.59 
1999-00 0.38 0.04 0.76 0.35 0.80 0.63 1.33 
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Source: Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, Commercial, different 
issues for different State Governments 
  
 
The guarantees given by West Bengal government against loans and 
credits given by banks etc. to the government companies from 1990-91 to 
1999-00 are shown in table 49. Over the years, the amount of guarantees 
given by the West Bengal government does not indicate any definite 
pattern. The amount of guarantees outstanding have increased significantly 
during the period from 1990-91 to 1995-96 (i.e., from Rs. 595.77 crore in 
1991 to Rs. 958.53 crore in 1995)  and then it declined sharply and again 
registered sharp increase during the later period of the1990s (i.e., Rs. 
2397.97 crore in 1999-00). The outstanding guarantee fee charged on total 
guarantees given has been  also showing increasing tendency. The 
government companies need to pay guarantee fee in consideration of 
guarantees given by the government. The payment of guarantee fee was in 
arrears to the extent of Rs. 6.08 crores as on 31st March 1991 in respect of  
17 companies against Rs. 10.03 crore as on 31st  March 1999.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table: 49 
Total Guarantees Given by Government of West Bengal to Government Companies and Guaranteed 
Amount Outstanding From 1991 to 2000 
As at 31st 
March of 
the Year  
Number Of 
companies 
guarantee 
given 
Total amount 
guaranteed 
(Rs. in crore) 
Guaranteed 
amount 
outstanding as 
on 31st March 
(Rs. Crore) 
Number Of 
companies in 
arrears in 
payment of 
guarantee 
Fees  
The total  
arrears of 
guarantee fee 
as on 31st 
March 
(Rs.  crore) 
1991 29  595.77 109.29 17 6.08 
1992 31  775.81 618.79 16 8.40 
1993 35  772.13 266.12 22 2.40 
1994 34 998.39 902.31 21 15.83 
1995 23 958.53 689.59 16 5.61 
1996 9 18.27 707.70 18 9.35 
1997 10 109.69 811.72 18 25.69 
1998 7 40.33 32.91 12 5.61 
1999 9 373.15 1511.20 25 31.81 
2000 10 1292.85 2397.97 31 10.03 
Source: Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, Commercial, Government 
of West Bengal, different issues 
  
 
Budgetary outgo  from the State 
 
West Bengal government’s budgetary outgo during the years 
from 1992-93 to 1999-00 in the form of equity capital, loans, 
subsidy and grant given to government companies is  detailed in 
table 50. In 1992-93 Rs. 46.20 crore was invested in the form of  
equity capital to government companies which has increased to 
Rs. 73.66 crore in 1999-00, i.e.,  increased by 59 per cent. 
Similarly loans and subsidies given by the State government 
increased by 1423 per cent (i.e., from Rs. 57.70 crore to 879.15 
crore) subsidy has increased by 9079 per cent (i.e., from Rs. 
0.64 crore to Rs. 58.75 crore) respectively during the same 
period. On the other hand grants given to State government 
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companies during the last two years of 1990s has increased from 
Rs. 0.15 crore in 1998-99 to Rs. 16.99 crore in 1999-00. Thus 
economically non-viable companies have been supported by the 
State in the form of equity capital, loans, grants and subsidy 
which are said to constitute increasingly a major part of the 
State’s budget. Furthermore, the State government usually 
forgoes some of these liabilities of the government companies by 
way of loans being written off, interest waived, converting loans 
into equity capital, waiving penal interest. In this way the State 
government loses considerable amount of money without 
receiving anything in return from the loss making government 
companies. (table 50) 
 
Table: 50 
Budgetary Outgo of West Bengal Government in the Form of Equity Capital, Loans, Subsidy 
and Grants Given to These Companies During 1992-93 to 1998-99 
Years Equity Capital 
Outgo from 
Budget (Rs. in 
crore) 
Loans Given out 
from Budget (Rs. 
in crore) 
Subsidy given 
by Government 
(Rs. in crore) 
Grants 
 
(Rs. in crore) 
 
 
Total 
Budgetary 
Outgo 
(Rs. in crore) 
1992-93 46.20 57.70 0.64 - 104.54 
1993-94 100.53 75.14 17.79 - 193.46 
1994-95 487.65 89.75 32.15 - 609.55 
1995-96 222.48 149.47 38.38 - 410.33 
1996-97 30.29 84.89 56.37 - 171.55 
1997-98 50.39 558.10 32.35 - 640.84 
1998-99 38.80 1030.63 48.91 0.15 1118.49 
1999-00 73.66 879.15 58.75 16.99 1028.25 
Source: Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, Commercial, different 
issues for different State Governments 
  
 
Finalisation of accounts   
 
Finalisation of accounts is another most important aspect of financial 
management and discipline. Of 69 government companies only 14 
companies and out of 11 statutory corporations only two corporations had 
finalised their accounts for the year 1999-00 within 30th September 2000. 
The accounts of the remaining 51 government companies and 7 statutory 
corporations were in pending for periods ranging from 1 year to 16 years as 
on 30th September 2000 as indicated in table 51. The accounts of 4 
companies and one corporation had not been finalised since inception. 
 
The main reason for pendency of accounts were delay in compiling the 
accounts by the companies. The earlier delay in finalisation of accounts 
caused accumulated backlog. The absence of qualified staff and delay in 
completion of audit by the Statutory Auditors also resulted in arrears in 
finalisation of accounts in some cases. So far no effective measures had 
been taken by the State government for timely finalisation of accounts. As 
these companies did not adhere to the time schedule the investment made 
in these companies remained outside the purview of audit and their 
accountability could not be ensured. 
 
 
Table: 51 
Latest Position of Finalisation of Accounts of Government Companies and Statutory  
Corporations in West Bengal 
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Serial No. Year from which 
accounts are in arrears
Number of years 
for which accounts 
are in arrears 
Number  Of 
Government 
Companies whose 
accounts are in 
arrears 
No. Of Statutory 
corporations 
whose accounts 
are in arrears 
1 1984-85 16 1 - 
2 1991-92 9 1 - 
3 1992-93 8 3 - 
4 1993-94 7 1 1 
5 1994-95 6 2 - 
6 1995-96 5 5 - 
7 1996-97 4 2 1 
8 1997-98 3 3 1 
9 1998-99 2 11 4 
10 1999-00 1 22 - 
Total   51 7 
 
Source: Report of the Comptroller of Auditor General of India for the Year ended 31st March 2000,  
Commercial, Government of West Bengal, p. 11   
 
 
The profit and loss situation of these companies 
 
According to the latest finalised accounts ( 31st March 2000) of  69 
Government companies and 11 statutory corporations, 49 companies and 6 
corporations had incurred an aggregate loss of Rs. 237.00 crore and Rs. 
690.32 crore respectively. The remaining 15 companies and 4 corporations 
earned an aggregate profit of Rs. 16.09 crore and Rs. 2.12 crore 
respectively. Moreover, the accounts of 4 companies and one corporation 
had never been finalised since inception. And one government company 
prepared its accounts only in the (1983-84) the construction period. (Report 
of the Comptroller of Auditor General, Commercial, Government of West 
Bengal,  2000, p. 12) 
 
Capital erosion 
 
According to the latest accounts as on the 31st March 2000, out of the 49 
loss making companies, 41 companies in which government had invested 
Rs. 1247.35 crore, had accumulated losses aggregating Rs. 1863.99 crore.  
which exceeded their aggregate  paid up capital  of Rs. 349.07 crore. The 
net worth of all these companies remained negative. The loans given by the 
government to the companies are doubtful debts on account of this negative 
net worth. The loan funds are used to finance losses after paid up capital 
gets fully eroded. So there is little likelihood of the loans being repaid to the 
government. The main reasons for such poor performance of these 
companies as analysed by CAG are obsolete plant and machinery, low 
capacity utilisation, heavy interest burden, high employees cost, shortage of 
working capital and market constrains. In spite of the poor performance 
leading to complete erosion of paid up capital, the State government 
continued to provide financial support to these companies in the form of 
contribution towards equity, further grant of loans, conversion of loan into 
equity, subsidy etc. The total financial support provided during 1999-00 to 
these 32 companies amounted to Rs. 231.30 crore (Report of the 
Comptroller of Auditor General, Commercial, Government of West Bengal,  
2000, p. 15) Although the companies were accountable for proper utilisation 
of public fund they did not introduce an effective cash management system 
in order to utilise the fund available to them efficiently and economically.  
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Return on capital Invested 
 
An attempt was made to indicate return on total capital employed in the 
government companies over the period 1993-94 to 1999-00. Table 52 
indicates that such return has registered sharp decline from 2.35 per cent in 
1993-94 to 1.20 per cent in 1998-99.  And in 1999-00 the return of the total 
capital employed in government companies was negative. An attempt has 
also been made to look into the position of the overall investment made by 
the West Bengal government in non-departmental public enterprises as a 
whole and their respective return. Investments are made out of the capital 
outlay by the government to promote developmental, manufacturing, 
marketing and social activities. The details of investment and the returns 
realised during the last five years by way of dividend and interest are given 
in table 52. Thus while the government was raising high cost of borrowing 
from the market to invest in government companies etc. In contrast, these 
companies have been giving insignificant returns. (table 53) As compared to 
other States it would be clear that the return on investment made by the 
West Bengal government in non-departmental public undertakings is the 
lowest among some major States during the period between 1995-96 and 
1999-00. (table 54) 
 
 
Table: 52 
Capital Employed in Government Companies and Return on Capital Employed Between 1993-94 
and 1999-00 
                                                                                      
Year Capital Employed 
(Rs. in Crore) 
Return on Capital 
Employed 
(Rs. in crore) 
Percentage of 
Return 
1993-94 1412.77 33.14 2.35 
1994-95 1779.77 14.32 0.80 
1995-96 2267.31 92.13 4.06 
1996-97 2373.86 83.62 3.52 
1997-98 3386.56 69.26 2.04 
1998-99 4291.67 51.34 1.20 
1999-00 5440.36 -2.53 - 
Source: Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, Commercial, Government of 
West Bengal, different issues 
 
 
 
 
Table: 53 
Investment and Return of Non-Departmental public enterprises of West Bengal Between 1995-96 
and 1999-00  
Investment at the 
end of the year 
Return Percentage of 
Return 
Rate of interest on 
Government 
Borrowings 
Year 
                    (Rs. in crore)        
1995-96 2268.23 0.40 0.02 14 
1996-97 3260.76 0.53 0.02 13.85 & 13.75 
1997-98 3408.14 1.85 0.05 13.05 
1998-99 3531.68 0.44 0.01 12.15 & 12.5 
1999-00 3654.30 1.23 0.03 11.85 & 12.25 
Source: Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, Civil, Government of West 
Bengal, Different Issues  
 
Table: 54 
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 Investment and Return of Different State Governments Between  1995-96 and 1999-00 
Year Maharastra Karnataka Andhra 
Pradesh 
Gujarat Tamil 
Nadu 
Punjab West 
Bengal 
1995-96 NA 0.28 0.12 1.01 3.46 0.03 0.02 
1996-97 0.49 0.38 0.24 0.66 2.08 0.04 0.02 
1997-98 0.47 0.34 0.16 0.40 1.40 0.09 0.05 
1998-99 0.11 0.25 0.27 0.61 1.56 0.05 0.01 
1999-00 0.06 0.34 0.08 0.71 1.54 0.40 0.03 
Source: Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, Civil,  Different Issues for 
Different State Governments 
  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In recent years all the States have been facing revenue crisis which 
resulting from both the impact of New Economic Policy (NEP) and in-built 
inefficiency of the States’ fiscal base of the Indian federation coupled with 
unequal balance of fiscal power in favour of the Centre and against the 
States. Consequent upon the NEP, the revenue base of the Centre has 
been decreasing over time and as a result the statutory revenue devolution 
from the Centre to the States have also been decreasing.  
 
Contrary to the usual trend the State-West Bengal did manage to secure an 
increasing level of revenue from the Centre in the form of tax receipts and 
grants and loans compared to other Indian States during the decade of 90s. 
But on the other hand in terms of the State’s own revenue mobilisation its 
performance in comparison with other States has remained unsatisfactory  
particularly in respect of non-tax revenue.  
 
In terms of fiscal indicators West Bengal’s performance is the worst of all 
with high deficit in both fiscal and revenue account and mounting interest 
liability of the State. Subsequently the State is getting trapped into the 
vicious circle i.e., more borrowing being required in order to repay the debt 
raising the further higher level of indebtedness of the State. Evidently, this 
has been crowding out capital expenditure and hence capital formation and 
the ability of the States for Plan financing through positive BCR. That apart, 
low developmental expenditure including low level of expenditure on social 
services also had adverse impact on over all infrastructural development. In 
this connection it should be noted that the pre-existing structural constraints 
of the Indian federation have had retarding effect on the revenue base of 
the States in general and low and middle income States in particular. But it 
should not be overlooked that fiscal prudency and efficient management of 
existing resources of the States also plays an important role in enhancing 
their revenue mobilising capacity.  In this respect the study covering the 
past two decades reveals that West Bengal compared to other States failed 
to manage its resources efficiently. Thus consequent fiscal indiscipline 
coupled with lack of adequate effort made to exploit the full potential of its 
revenue base i.e., both in terms of own tax and own non-tax revenue 
aggravated the problem further.    
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Chapter: 7 
 
Federalism From  Below-A Case Study of West Bengal 
 
The problem of federalism in India may be seen from two different angles-
federalism from above and below. Federalism from above deals with 
vertical devolution of resources between the Centre and the States and 
horizontal transfer of resources among the States through different multiple 
resource transfer agencies i.e., Finance Commission, Planning Commission 
and also through Central Ministers for Centrally sponsored schemes. 
Federal fiscal transfers in India so far failed to attain one of the most 
important goals-regional balance and equity. Finance Commission and the 
Planning Commission while devolving funds among the States ignored  
certain State specific and region specific factors and flatly concentrated on 
the common factors such as population, poverty and backwardness etc. 
thereby tending to accentuate regional inequity and imbalance.141 Of 
different modes of resource transfers, statutory transfer (transfer made by 
the Finance Commission) has shown less regressive tendency than Plan 
transfer and discretionary transfers. Such limited progressivity is, however, 
remained practically ineffective for statutory transfer forms only a minor part 
of the total resource transfers from the Centre to the States while the major 
part of the transfers is of discretionary nature controlled by the Central 
Ministers and the Planning Commission (Plan transfer has also some 
discretionary element). It is observed that more the amount of discretionary 
transfers the more would be the tendency of unequal horizontal 
distribution.142 Evidently, these factors tend to accentuate regional 
disparities and imbalance at the intra-State level as well as at the inter-State 
level. The ongoing economic reforms since 1991 with de-control and de-
regulations of their central focus seems to have further widened the regional 
disparities in the Indian federation. 143 
 
It is often argued that turning Panchayat Raj Institutions (PRIs) (local level 
governments) into an institution of self governance by devolving functions, 
functionaries and financial power would not only help to reduce inter-
regional and intra-regional disparities but also reduce the pressure on the 
State government’s funds for running the PRIs. This notion is particularly 
                                                          
141 Sarma, J.V.M, ‘Federal Fiscal Relations in India Issue of Horizontal Transfers’ EPW, 
July 12, 1997 
142 Different important studies were undertaken concerning this area of which, Rao, H, 
Centre-State Financial Relations, Allied Publishers PVT, New Delhi, 1981; Bajaj, J.L, 
Sinha, K.S & Agarwal, O.P, Finance Commission and Backward States, Print House, 
Lucknow, 1985; Gulati, I & Geroge, K.K, Centre-State Flows and Inter-State Disparities, 
Criterion Book, New Delhi, 1988;  Sen, T.K & Rao, M.G, Fiscal Federalism in India Theory 
and Practice, NIPFP, Macmillan India Ltd., 1996; Prakash, Om, Centre-State Financial 
Relations in India, Atlantic Publishers, New Delhi, 1994 are noteworthy. 
143 Ahluwalia, M. S, Economic Performance of States in Post-Reforms Period’, EPW, May 
6, 2000, pp. 1638-1641, Kurian, N.J, ‘Widening Regional Disparities in India Some 
Indicators’, EPW, February 12, 2000 
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relevant in the backdrop of acute budgetary crisis faced by almost all the 
States since the mid 1980s which has been continuing till date. The 
financial crisis of the States gets further deepened by the ever increasing 
dependency syndrome of the PRIs on the State governments for grants. 
While it is supported by different studies undertaken from time to time that 
by and large own resource mobilisation of the PRIs forms negligible part of 
their total expenditure. (Ninth Planning Commission, 1997; ‘Local 
Government Finances in India’, 1998; ‘State-Local Fiscal Relations in India’, 
1998; Eleventh Finance Commission, 2000; Rajaraman, NIPFP, 2001; 
Mathur, NIPFP, 2000) Knowledgeable commentators on the subject 
observed  “....by failing to mobilise resources the Panchayats have served 
to increase the cost of governance at and below the district level because 
now their cost has to be added to the continuing cost of the pre-existing 
bureaucracy”.(Mukarji & Bandyopadhyay Committee,1993, p.10) In addition 
to that, transfers of some departments to the local governments which are 
mainly of  local nature would reduce the cost of running such departments 
from the State level. According to an observer, ”To encourage local 
initiatives, the State governments must discourage centralisation of cadres 
and services and promote the concept that Zila panchayats and municipal 
boards, etc., should pay the stuff according to their capacity to pay.”144  
 
During 1990s there was a distinct trend of furthering the status of the PRIs 
which actually started from the late 1980s with the introduction of 64th 
Amendment Bill, 1989 with a view to provide self-governance status to the 
PRIs. However, the Bill could not be passed due to the lack of adequate 
support in the Parliament. Finally in 1993 PRIs was given constitutional 
status and amendment to the Constitution (73rd and 74th Amendment, 1993) 
was made to provide functions, functionaries and financial powers to the 
PRIs. It was, however, to what extent the empowerment of the PRIs would 
be ensured left to the discretion of the State governments. In course of time 
it was noticed that, majority of the States had failed to attain the intended 
level of decentralisation in terms of parameters set by the Eleventh Finance 
Commission (2000) and the Ninth Planning Commission (1997) which 
would be discussed in detail later on.  
 
In contrast, West Bengal has made some progress on some basic 
parameters of decentralisation. West Bengal belonging to the second 
generation of PRIs, and late starter in the race of grass root democracy, in 
many respect is far ahead of them and sets the example of initiating the 
PRIs movement.145 The State has successfully conducted six PRIs 
                                                          
144Bajaj, J.L, ‘Impact of Pay Revision on State Government’s Finance’, EPW, May 29, 
1999, p. 1351 
 
145PRIs were revitalised by the second generation State governments like Andhra Pradesh, 
Karnata and West Bengal following the recommendations of Ashok Mehta committee 
(1978). (Raghavulu, C.V & Narayana, The Indian Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 
XXXVII, 1991, pp. 35). These State governments ruled by regional parties followed the 
recommendations of the Mehata Committee of establishing politicized Panchayat with open 
participation of political parties in PRIs election. Whereas the first generation of Panchayat 
initiated by the Congress State governments following  the recommendations of the 
Balwantri Mehata committee (1957),  was basically party-less Panchayat. The operative 
part of the Committee’s report was to set up PRIs. When on October 2, 1959 Jawharlal 
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elections (1978, 1983, 1988, 1993, 1998, 2003) at regular intervals of five 
years which no other State in India can claim to have done. But with the 
furtherance of the concept of decentralisation of power and providing 
Constitutional status to the PRIs to act as a third tier of government in the 
Indian federation in 1990s, West Bengal seems to have failed in keeping 
pace with the changing environment. Having ensured basic political and 
administrative decentralisation to a certain limit, it appears to have 
stagnated at the previous level.146  
 
This discussion of devolving financial and functional power to the PRIs 
seems to be more relevant in case of West Bengal on account of mainly two 
reasons. Firstly, intra-regional disparities in West Bengal seems to be more 
acute than in any other States. Secondly, during 1990s the State has been 
facing severe budgetary crisis compared to other States. Intra-regional 
inequity, however, is a deeply entrenched phenomenon in West Bengal 
since the pre-Independence days which arose from lopsided 
industrialisation development in the State and stagnant agriculture on 
account of Permanent Settlement. This acute intra-State imbalance is one 
of the structural legacies of West Bengal’s economy which continues till 
date.  A comparative study of the inter-district inequity covering the two time 
periods 1980-81  and 1990-91 in West Bengal with those in other States 
reveals that the extent of relative deprivation at the district level is much 
more acute in West Bengal as compared to all India level. Therefore, inter-
State variation in India during these two time periods (1981 and 1991) was 
much lower than intra-regional deprivation in West Bengal implying that the 
pattern of relative deprivation in West Bengal has not changed over time. 
The relative deprivation index in West Bengal indicates that the more 
urbanised regions have higher levels of human development depriving the 
less urbanised ones. The Human Development Index (HDI) used in this 
study consisted of literacy rate above seven years of age,  infant survival 
rate, and per capita real domestic product. (Bhattacharya, 1998, p. 3031) A 
more recent study in this area also reinforced such acute intra-State 
disparity in development of West Bengal.  (Chatterjee & Ghosh, 2003)  
 
During the last two decades, as observed by different Studies 
(Westergaard,1986, p. 84; Swaminathan,1990, p.18; Kholi,1983, p. 802; 
Dasgupta,1995, p.2699) West Bengal has experienced successful 
implementation of different rural development programmes and participatory 
decentralised planning model since 1985 through active participation of  the 
PRIs as a tool of a economic development at the local level. Moreover, 
institutional change in rural economy introduced through land reform, 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Nehru inaugurated the Panchayati Raj at Nagpur, Rajasthan he characterised it as “the 
most revolutionary and historical step in the context of new India”. By the mid-1960s 
Panchayats had come into beingin allmost all parts of the country. (Mathew, G, “The 
Federal Principle of Local Government”, in Mukerji, N & Arora, B (ed.)Federalism in India 
Origins and Development, Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, 1992, p. 242)  
 
146 A recent inter-State study undertaken by Jain (1999) covering all states put West Bengal  
behind different States in terms of several indicators of decentralisation. That would be 
discussed in detail in the later part of the study. Mentioned in Ghatak & Ghatak, EPW, 
January 5, 2002, p. 53 
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registration of the share croppers, successful running of five consecutive 
local governments. All these contributed to increasing agricultural growth 
and reduction of general poverty level in rural West Bengal. (Lieten, 1996, 
p.48; Rawal & Swaminathan,1998; Sanyal, Biswas & Bardhan,1998) But it 
is quite disheartening to note that despite the active participation of the 
PRIs in development programmes and decentralised planning in West 
Bengal the relative deprivation at the inter-district level has not changed 
over time. And the wide variation in the HDI between the urban and non-
urban region seems to have deepened both over time and compared to the 
all India situation.     
 
West Bengal has been facing acute budgetary crisis and it is said to be one 
of  the most indebted States of the Indian union with the exception of Uttar 
Pradesh in 1999-00. The rate of growth of public debt of West Bengal 
during 1990-99 was 19 per cent which was highest for any State with the 
exception of Himachal Pradesh (19.9 per cent)147. Furthermore, the revenue 
deficits of West Bengal in terms of  Gross State Domestic Product (GSDP) 
in 1999-00 was 6.7 per cent, the corresponding figure for all India was only 
2.9 per cent.148  
One of the main reasons for such acute crisis was the proliferation of State 
apparatus and consequent increase in revenue expenditure even as the 
PRIs have been working well in this State for last three decades (from 1978 
till date).  According to an estimation, considering the period between 1981-
82 and 1987-88 the compound growth rate of State government employees 
of West Bengal (4.87) was much higher than all India (3.62) average and 
was highest among all the States  except Tamil Nadu (5.20).149 Further, 
from 1980 to 1999 (March) the number of employees of the State 
government increased by 70.800 those of quasi government by 20.400  and 
local bodies by 35.800. Therefore, “It seems that the government machinery 
far from diminishing has expanded during the very period that the 
Panchayats have been in existence.” (Mukarji and Bandyopadhyay 
Committee, 1993, p.21) Successful running of the PRIs in West Bengal has 
not resulted in any reduction in the machinery of the State government.  
 
Some scholars  (Kanna, 1993, p. 2645; Pal,1995, p. 34)  urgently feel that it 
is rather expedient to transfer education, health and other related 
departments of local nature to the PRIs which would in the process reduce 
the volume of the State bureaucracy to an equal proportion and 
consequently minimise the cost of running these departments at the State 
level. At the same time it has to be ensured that local functions should be 
funded from local resource mobilisation thus certainly not through the 
transfers from the States. Local bodies would have a positive incentive to 
levy local taxes only if a function or set of functions are funded exclusively 
                                                          
147 Sankar, K, ‘West Bengal Parlous State of Government Finances’, EPW, December 30, 
2000, p. 4607 
 
148 Ananda Bazar Patrika, (Bengali Daily), Calcutta, 9th July 2002  
149 For details see, Rao, M.G, Proposals for State Level Budgetary Reforms, EPW, 
February 1, 1992, p. 214 
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from local revenues. Even where the local fiscal domain is inadequate for 
core local functions, exclusive assignment of a subset of functions is 
possible even in the poorest regions. (Rajaraman, 2001, pp.31-32) 
Furthermore, if local governments are entrusted with running departments 
of local nature, that would not only ensure efficient management of these 
departments but also local government would tend to seek low cost option 
that would in turn minimise the financial pressure on the State governments. 
(Rajaraman, 2001, p.32) Bardhan (1996) concluded from some case 
studies that effective functional and financial decentralisation has seemed 
to have ensured accountability which in turn has improved the quality of 
public services and cost efficient catering of these services. (Bardhan, 
1996, pp. 140-142) Lieten (1996) also put forward similar argument 
regarding the necessity of  functional decentralisation to the PRIs of West 
Bengal.150 
 
Therefore, it is usually expected that successful functional and financial  
decentralisation of the PRIs in West Bengal would lead to better deliverance 
of local public services. But as Drez & Sen observed the Left Front 
government despite its skills of popular mobilisation has not been able “to 
achieve a real transformation in the fields of education and health”151 which 
have a significant bearing on the living condition of the rural poor. Similar 
concern about  the education system of West Bengal particularly the 
primary education of West Bengal was expressed by Ashok Mitra 
Commission on Education, 1992, and several other studies undertaken on 
this area152. Recently the Pratichi Education Report (2002) based on three 
                                                          
150 “It has long been agreed that the State departments (PWD, electricity, health, 
agricultural extension, education etc.) are inefficient, inert, over-staffed and corruption-
prone institutions. On the other hand, the local bodies would be interested in tackling the 
issues directly (both because they are directly affected and the electorate expects them to 
act). A massive transfer of staff from the state to local structure is urgently called for. Social 
control over the works implemented will improve quality and speed, and reduce corruption”. 
(Lieten, G.K, Development, Devolution and Democracy village Discourse in West Bengal, 
1996, p. 230 
151 Quoted in Basu, J (ed.) People’s Power in Practice 20 Years of Left Front in West Bengal, 
Calcutta National Book Agency, Calcutta, 1997, p. 80 
152 The proportion of the State budget allocated for education in 1990-91 was 26.89 per 
cent which was much higher than the all India average (19.94) during the same period. But 
as much as 95 per cent of the total outlay goes to pay the emoluments in primary and 
secondary education as against 80 per cent in higher education in West Bengal. It was 
concluded that West Bengal’s education system is one of the most wasteful among the 
leading States of India.  Moreover, in terms of literacy rates the State remained significantly 
lower than Gujrat, Maharastra, Tamil Nadu and Kerala. In terms of school enrolment it is 
worse off than Gujrat, Kerala, Punjab, and Tamil Nadu. Out of total primary schools in the 
State in 1986,   5.02 per cent primary schools classes used to be held in open space and 
44.01 per cent did not have adequate building facility i.e., the building of these schools 
varied from partly pucca building, Kachcha building, thatched huts, tents to open space. 
And 29 percent of  the total primary schools of the State had only one class room. (Ashok 
Mitra Commission on Education, 1992, pp. 26; Singh, A, ‘Combining Moral Commitment 
with Pragmatism Ashok Mitra Commission on Education’, EPW, July 17-24, 1993, p. 1504; 
Majumdar, T, ‘An Education Commission Reports’, EPW, May 8, 1993; pp.919-920. After 
10 years the situation did not change much. In 1996 almost similar observation was also 
made in the report prepared by the Directorate of School Education. (Ananda Bazar 
Patrika, Bengali Daily, Calcutta, 19th August, 1996)            
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districts of West Bengal expressed the concern over the precarious 
condition of primary education of West Bengal.153 The study  undertaken by 
Bajpai, & Sachs (1999) covering the period 1990s regarding overall State-
wise performance of social indicators such as infant mortality rate, drop out 
rates at the primary stage of education, teacher/pupil ratio, percentage of 
children attending school observed that West Bengal by and large has been 
lagging behind Maharastra, Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Punjab, Gujrat and 
Haryana with few exceptions.154     
 
In this connection an argument made by the West Bengal government is 
worth noting.  As the government feels  that ”Panchayats can not be blamed 
for the poor achievements on the health and education front. In fact the 
functional domain of Panchayats does not extend to these areas which 
remain under the charge of the State Government which also suffers from 
the lack of necessary infrastructural facilities.” (Basu,1997, p.80) In view of 
the above, functional and financial decentralisation of West Bengal’s PRIs 
and the debates regarding the performance of West Bengal PRIs will be 
taken up in the subsequent paragraphs of this study in order to understand 
the conceptual limitation of the West Bengal government as regards 
enhancing the status of PRIs.  
 
Centre-led, Centrally controlled decentralisation during 1990’s 
 
At the time of Independence India adopted the Centralised Planning model 
(which ignores the local or State level priorities in the field of planning)  
without paying much heed to the Gandhian thought of self governance or 
Purna Swaraj.155 As an after thought Article 40 was included in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
153 “ West Bengal still stands at a dismal 18thposition in literacy rates among 35 Indian 
States and the Union territories. The rate of literacy among the scheduled castes remains 
as low as 42.21 per cent. Almost 15 per cent of the population in the age group of 6-11 
years were out of school in 1997-98. There is on an average 2.98 teachers per school, a 
suffocating student-teacher ratio of 54:1 far higher than the declared ratio (40:1) of the 
government.... The focus of the investigation was on three West Bengal districts-Birbhum, 
Medinipur, and Puruliya”. ( ‘Schools out of Shape’, EPW, October 26, 2002, p. 4345) 
154 For details see Bajpai, N & Sachs, J.D, The Progress of Policy Reform and Variation in 
Performance at the Sub-National Level in India, Development Discussion Paper No. 730, 
Harvard Institute of International Development, Harvard University, November 1999, pp. 
22-23  
155 Gandiji unequivocally stood for power of the people. In his concept of Swaraj (Harijan 
July 28, 1946) “Independence must begin at the bottom. Thus every village will be republic 
or Panchayat having full powers ...every village has to be self sustained and capable of 
managing its affairs”. (Suri, P.C, Mainstream, September 10, 1988, p. 16) Therefore, 
Gandhian village is to be self sufficient, a self-ruled community of the people in which 
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Constitution156 which spells out that the State governments should take 
necessary initiative to ensure self government of the PRIs. But such notion 
was neglected after Independence and there was no legislation to 
implement it until October 2, 1959, Gandhiji’s birthday when for the first time 
Panchayat Act was passed. And by the mid 1960’s almost all States passed 
their respective Panchayat Act. 
 
After Independence the necessity of activating the PRIs came to the fore in 
connection with the Community Development Project and National 
Extension Services introduced in 1952 (Mathew,1992, pp. 241-242). Initially 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
economic and political power is decentralised and each village is self reliant economically. 
For Gandhi, village remained the central and focal point. Contrary to that  the Nehruvian 
model of development pursued after Independence promoted centralisation in which village 
remained at the periphery. Gandhi felt that heavy capital-based modern industries would 
siphon off funds from rural area and subsequently destroy indigenous industries of rural 
economy leading to unemployment and in the course of time would widen the disparity 
between urban and rural area. (Khandewala, S.V, Mainstream,1999, pp. 274-275 ) For 
details also see Rao, Dr. N.R, Panchayati Raj A study of Rural Local Government in India, 
Uppal Publishing House, New Delhi, 1992, pp. 33-36; Mathew, G, “The Federal Principle in 
Local Government” in Mukarji, N & Arora, B (ed.) Federalism in India Origins and 
Development, Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, 1992, pp. 239-240) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
156Article 40 of the Directive Principles of State Policy says: The State shall take  steps to 
organise village Panchayats and endow them with such powers and authority as may be 
necessary to enable them to function as units of self-government. (Roy, B, Mainstream, 
January 29, 1994, p. 31)  
 
It is worth reminding that Nehru and other Congress leaders were opposed to Panchayats. 
It is in this context that Ambedkar, in his famous speech of November 4, 1948 described 
the village “as a sink of localism, a den of ignorance, narrow mindedness and 
communalism” and proudly declared that the constitution had “discarded the village and 
adopted the individual as its unit.” (Dhavan, R, Mainstream, July 29, 1989 pp.6 ) When M. 
Gandhi discovered that there was no mention of Panchayati Raj in the earlier draft of the 
Constitution, he insisted on its inclusion in the revised draft, because PRIs was an 
important component of his vision of future India. He felt that people’s voice should be 
reflected in our independence through Panchayats and therefore the greater is the power 
of PRIs the better it is for the people. (Hirway, I, EPW, July, 22, 1989, p.1663 ) On 
November 22, 1948, the discussion was revived when the desirability of village Panchayats 
was introduced and consequently Article 40 of the constitution was included at  Gandhiji’s 
insistence in the chapter on Directive principle’s of State policy. ( Hirway, I, EPW, July, 22, 
1989, p. 1663) 
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the implementation of such projects were entrusted to the local level 
bureaucracy. In the course of time it was found that the implementation of 
such projects started faltering and successful implementation of these 
projects would not be possible without active participation of the PRIs. Only 
then for the first time after Independence, urgent need for involving the local 
people through the organisation like PRIs was felt. Balwantari Mehta 
Committee (1957) was set up and was entrusted with the task of reviewing 
the “economy and efficiency” of the Community Development Project. The 
Committee concluded that without effective involvement of local level 
governments, any Community Development Project is bound to meet 
failure. The operational part of the Committee’s suggestion was the setting 
up of PRIs bodies and in conformity to this all States subsequently passed 
respective Panchayat Acts. It was, however, left to each State to enact laws 
necessary to construct  their own local level government. Thus from the 
very beginning PRIs were mainly associated with the successful 
implementation of Community Development Project and were perceived as 
an implementing agency for these projects handed down from above. 
Which is, however, a limited view in contrast with what was envisaged by 
Gandhi and consequently incorporated in Article 40 of the Directive 
principles of the States.  
 
The PRIs registered declining trend since the late1960’s. However, the 
Mehta Committee (1978) identified three interesting phases of growth of the 
PRIs namely ascendancy (1959-64), stagnation (1965-69), and decline 
(1966-77). The ill-functioning of the PRIs had compelled the Committee to 
conclude that the grass root institutions are the institutions without a ‘root’ 
and a caricature of local government. (Singh & Mishra, 1991, p. 688) 
Several reasons contributed to this decline as described by the Committee. 
Of which the growing indifference of the State governments to devolve 
power to the PRIs was noted to be the most important one. Hirway (1989) 
also made similar observation as she concluded that both the Centre and 
the States governments are responsible for the decline of the first phase of 
PRIs started from 1959.157   
 
The PRIs were again revived in the mid 1980’s. Particularly it started with 
the  setting up of the Mehta Committee (1978) by the then Janata 
Government. The Committee expanded the role of the PRIs from mere 
implementing agency of the rural development programme handed down 
from above to an instrument of decentralised planning. Since the mid 1980s 
there has been a growing interest within the Union government in reviving 
the role of the PRIs. Seventh Planning Commission (1985) and the Eighth 
Planning Commission (1992) also suggested in favour of revitalising the 
PRIs. One important step taken by the Union government in 1984 was that 
the then Prime Minister himself wrote to the Chief Ministers of different 
State governments to take appropriate action without further delay for 
                                                          
157  For details see Hirway (1989). She mentioned several reasons for the decline of PRIs. 
Among them structural inadequacies, socio-economic and political structure, the role of 
bureaucracy, constitutional constraints and unwillingness of governments to share power 
with lower bodies are most noteworthy. (Hirway, I, Panchayati Raj at Crossroads‘, EPW, 
July 22, 1989, pp.1664-1665) 
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holding of overdue election to the PRIs as well as for revitalising their 
functioning. (Reddy,1990, p. 24) The then Central government also 
introduced the 64th Amendment bill, 1989 with a view to enhance the status 
of the PRIs.158 Later on two Committees namely G.V.K Rao Committee 
(1985) and L.M. Singhvi Committee (1986) were set up by the Central 
government  and were entrusted with re-evaluating the role of the PRIs. The 
whole decade of 1980’s saw resurgence of rural local bodies in India which 
have culminated in the introduction of the 64th Amendment Bill, 1989. But it 
was not until the 73rd and 74th amendment to the Constitution in 1993, that 
the PRI’s were given a constitutional status and formal acceptance of the 
third tier government in the Indian federation was introduced.  
 
Against the backdrop of such evolution of the PRIs, it can be said that the 
growing indifference of the State governments and also of the Union 
government played a big role in its decline. The States have been showing 
reluctance in devolving power to the PRIs from the very beginning and it 
continues till date. From the very start the States were entrusted with 
devolving power to the local bodies. In 1959 with the inauguration of the 
PRIs in India, the National Development Council affirmed the basic 
principles of democratic decentralisation and left it to the States to work out 
the suitable structures for each State. (Mathew, 1992, p.242). Furthermore, 
in the Constitution of India the subject of local government was included in 
the State list. It is the State governments which bear the primary 
responsibility to implement further decentralisation of PRIs.(Khanna, 1994, 
p.18)  
 
It appears that the States often have violated the constitutional verdict of 
accepting PRIs as third tier of government even after the formal introduction 
of 73rd constitutional amendment. The State governments by and large are 
reluctant to decentralise power and tend to suppress even the existing 
Panchayat bodies by creating parallel structures. (Mathew,1999, p. 12; 
Aiyar, 2002, p. 3294) The PRIs, with few exceptions remained by and large 
agencies of the State governments instead of being self governments. (Pal, 
                                                          
158 One of the several reasons for which the 64th Constitution Amendment bill came up is 
“the failure to hold regular and periodic election, prolonged suppressions, inadequate 
representation to the weaker sections like SC and STs and women, lack of financial 
resources and inadequate devolution of powers and responsibilities on them” (The 
Constitution 64th Amendment Bill, 1989, quoted in Sarkar, N.K,  Mainstream, December 9, 
1989, p. 15) Similar observations also made by Hirway (1989). The 64th amendment bill 
was introduced due to the fact that firstly, it was felt that State governments were not very 
enthusiastic in implementing PR in their respective States as they were not prepared to 
share power with lower level of bodies. In fact it is observed that some State governments 
took the power back from PR bodies gradually. Therefore it was  needed to amend the 
Constitution to ensure power to PR bodies. Secondly, Local self-government and 
Panchayati Raj bodies are in the state list in the present Constitution, with the result that 
the Centre can not pass any legislation in these areas unless the Constitution is amended 
for the purpose. (Hirway, I, EPW, July 22, 1989, p. 1666) 
 
 
 
 305
2001, p. 1780) Functional decentralisation to PRIs was far from being 
implemented as was listed  in the 11th and 12th schedule of the Constitution.  
(Datta, 1996, p. 149;) Some States even deny to implement the basic 
parameters of decentralisation such as holding elections and so on. Thus 
PRIs elections were not held for many years in some States. And some 
State governments begun to postpone elections and even dissolved or 
suspended a large number of these institutions. There seem to be no 
political pressure or legal requirements to make the State governments to 
take Panchayat seriously.159  
 
It seems to us that such reluctance by the States may be analysed by the 
structural lacuna of the Indian federal structure. There have been parallel 
trends of centralisation and decentralisation in India particularly after the 
late 1980s. It is, however, widely discussed that Indian federal finance has 
undergone centralisation in fiscal power since its very onset. The quality of 
resource transfers from the Centre to the States have deteriorated over 
time. Statutory transfer has been overshadowed by the discretionary 
transfers and the magnitude of statutory transfer has been declining over 
time. Evidently, the functions of the Finance Commission are being 
undermined by the directives given by the Centre in the form of additional 
“Terms of Reference”. In the course of time fiscal powers of the States are 
being encroached upon through the enactment of laws passed by the 
Centre. Consequently fiscal power enjoyed by the States at present is much 
less than what was envisaged in the Constitution.  
 
Contrary to the ever-increasing encroachment by the Centre in the State’s 
domain, the Centre has actively pursued decentralisation between the 
States and the local governments since the mid 1980s. From that time there 
has been a parallel process of pursuing decentralisation between the States 
and the local governments and centralisation between the Centre and the 
States in the Indian federal structure. Furthermore, not only centralising 
trends have been increasingly evident in the Centre-State relations there 
have been also some centralising features in the very attempt of 
decentralising  power between the States and the local governments. In 
1989 the decentralisation attempt taken by Rajiv Gandhi the then Prime 
Minister of India, carried lots of features of centralisation in the name of 
                                                          
159 From the very first day of Panchayati Raj in the country several States went on 
postponing Panchayat elections. These include, Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Karnataka, Jammu 
and Kashmir, Bihar and Orissa. When the five year term of Panchayat was over, 
postponement started in Assam, Karnataka, and in Madhya Pradesh. It is clear that 
constitutional mandate has been violated by the States. The State Election Commissions 
are not acting as independent constitutional bodies and many of them actualy succumb to 
the pressures of the State governments. Some of them have withheld Panchayat elections 
even after the election process had started. There are however, some exceptions. Orissa 
State Election Commission in one such which urged for Supreme Court’s intervention to 
conduct the Panchayat election in 1997. Anhra Pradesh State Election Commission too 
went to the Andhra Pradesh High Court against the State government’s ordinance to 
postpone the elections to the middle and upper tiers of the Panchayats. (Mathew, G, EPW, 
January 20, 2001, pp. 183-184) 
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decentralisation.160These two opposite trends, which seem to have been  
working at the cross purpose, became more intensified since the economic 
liberalisation,1991 which introduced a notion of ‘development-through-
decentralisation.’  
 
The decade of 1990s, however, witnessed further assault on the State 
autonomy in the Indian federation. So far Centre-State relations was 
concerned, on the one hand the States were left at the mercy of Central 
institutions and their statutory right of receiving grants (Plan and non-Plan 
both) were linked with the progress made by the States in pursuing fiscal 
reform programmes dictated by the Centre and Central institutions.161 On 
the other hand the Centre took vigorous attempts to carry forward 
decentralisation of power in the domain of State-local relations. Attempts 
were taken by the last two Finance Commissions i.e., Tenth and Eleventh to 
link grants with the progress made by the State governments in 
decentralising power to the PRIs as a measure to make the delinquent 
States committed to the devolution of power to the PRIs. The Centre took 
bureaucratic measures, centralised steps and bills such as 87th Amendment 
bill 1999 to ensure efficiency in the process of decentralisation at the State-
local area.162 Furthermore, the Centre initiated the process of 
decentralisation by providing the cost of establishing PRI’s on a uniform 
basis. The parameters of decentralisation are fixed by the Centre and which 
                                                          
160 “ It seem that the proposed bill tends to increase the  power of the centre and reduces 
the same of state governments. First of all the bill has taken PR out of the state list and put 
it in the concurrent list so as to allow the centre to pass legislation in this area. Secondly, 
the provision of holding PR election under the supervision of the chief election 
commissioner and not under state government once again gives more powers to the 
centre. Thirdly, the provision of providing finances to panchayats through the finance 
commission and not through State governments also reduces the power of states (giving 
funds for Jawhar Rojgar Yojana directly to panchayats is indicative of the same trend). 
Fourthly, the power of dismissing panchayats now vests with governors which also 
increases central control over panchayat bodies. And lastly, the provisions like 30 per cent 
representation to women, proportionate representation to SC/ST etc, which are decided at 
the centre without consulting state governments is another encroachment on powers of 
state governments”.   ( Hirway, I, EPW, July 22, 1989, p. 1666) 
 
161 See for details Ghosh, A, “Bureaucratic Centralisation The Eleventh Finance 
Commission adds a nail to the coffin of federal finance“, Frontline, February 16, 2001; Rao, 
M.G, “Linking Central Grants to Revenue Deficit Reduction by States“, EPW, June 3, 2000 
162 The 87th amendment bill proposes in effect the abolition of elected Panchayats at the 
intermediate level and in some cases of elected Zila Parishadas. The bill if enacted will 
contradict the objects and reasons of the 73rd Amendment to the Constitution 1993 that has 
meant to strengthen the PRIs. (Pal, M, EPW, May 26, 2001, p. 1780)  The reason of the 
introduction of the 87th bill is that  in the working of Panchayats it was found that elected 
members of the territorial constituencies of the Panchayats at the intermediate level and 
the district level have no substantive functions to perform. Representatives of the village 
and intermediate level Panchayats are denied any role in the elections of chairpersons of 
the higher level. The question arose in this respect that Article 243-G of the Constitution 
makes it clear that that it is the legislature of the State which has to devolve power to the 
PRIs. Now if intermediate levels of the PRIs i.e., Panchayat Samiti and Zila Parishad have 
no sufficient functions to perform the fault lies with the State government and not with the 
very existence of PRIs. (Bandyopadhyay, D, EPW, April 29, 2000, p. 1503)  
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are to be followed by the States in order to receive funds required to 
continue the very process of decentralisation. The detailed guideline of 
parameters of decentralisation were laid down by the Centre over which 
States in any case had no say. This model of decentralisation is thus, 
Centre-led, centrally-controlled, centralised model of decentralisation. 
Therefore, the whole endeavour of empowering the PRIs during 1990s 
appears to be tremendous centralised attempt at decentralising  power.  
 
Against the backdrop of such omnipotent centralisation in the Indian federal 
structure the States feel rather insecure in devolving power to local 
governments which in practice affects the decentralisation from the States 
to local bodies. Mukarji (1989) aptly feels that, in the descending cascade of 
decentralisation from the Union to the States and from the States to sub-
State level, if the cascade stops at the first stage the State would be choked 
with powers and consequently would be reluctant to decentralise power to 
local bodies. On the other hand if the cascade starts from the second stage 
the States would be unable to devolve function to the PRIs for fear that it 
may reduce its importance too much. (Mukarji,1989, p.468)  So the problem 
of federalism from below should be seen from this perspective without de-
linking it from the overall scenario of Centre-State relations in the Indian 
federation. 
 
With a view of aforementioned centralised attempt of empowering the PRIs,   
a few necessary steps were taken during 1990s to amend the Constitution 
for providing more power to the Union Finance Commission in order to 
enable this body to handle the State-local relation. However, this is for the 
first time in the Indian federation that the Union Finance Commission was 
entrusted with supervising the matter of decentralisation between the States 
and the local government instead of entrusting this matter on the State 
Finance Commissions of respective State governments. Moreover, the 
Central institutions such as the Finance Commission and the Planning 
Commission have set some parameters in this regard and the progress 
made by the States in empowering local bodies tend to be evaluated in 
terms of these parameters.  
 
Central Institutions and Appraisals of PRIs during 1990s  
The Tenth Finance Commission (1992) of India were entrusted to review 
the functions and position of the PRIs through amending the Constitution. 
The Provision of Article 280 of the Constitution, in which Finance 
Commissions have been constituted prescribe (a) mandatory terms of 
reference as laid down in clause (3) of Article 280. According to the clause 
(a) the distribution between the Union and the States of the net proceeds of 
taxes which are to be, or may be divided between them and (b) the 
principles which should govern the grants-in-aid of the revenues of the 
States out of the Consolidated Fund of India.  
Until recently the Union Finance Commissions were only entrusted to 
recommend revenue share between the States and the Centre. Subsequent 
to the setting up of  the Tenth Finance Commission (1992) The Article 280 
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(3) of the Constitution was amended in order to assign yet another 
mandatory duty to the Union Finance Commission. Following the 73rd and 
74th amendment to the Constitution, two new sub-clauses (bb) and (c) have 
been introduced in clause 3 of Article 280. These sub-clauses make it 
obligatory for the Union Finance Commission to recommend measures 
necessary to augment the Consolidated Fund of a State in order to 
supplement the resources of the Panchayats/Municipalities in the State on 
the basis of the recommendations made by the Finance Commissions of 
the States. (Report of the Tenth Finance Commission, 1992) 
 
The Tenth Finance Commission (TFC) for want of State Finance 
Commission (SFC) reports made an ad hoc provision of Rs. 4381 crore to 
the PRIs for the period 1996-2000. All the States were given grants 
amounting to Rs. 1095 crore during 1996-97 which in turn decided to be 
given to the three tiers of the Panchayat bodies. However, release of funds 
during 1997-98 and the subsequent years required the State governments 
to make progress in the desired direction of decentralisation spelt out in the 
73rd constitutional amendment. Besides, holding of Panchayat elections 
regularly became mandatory too for the release of the grants provided by 
the TFC. (Department of Rural Development, Government of India, 
Panchayati Raj, Chapter 5,   p. 59)  
 
The basic constraint of the TFC as observed by the EFC was that the 
recommendation of the TFC for releasing fund to local bodies had to be 
done on the basis of State Finance Commission (SFC) reports of the 
respective State governments. The recommendation, however, could not be 
followed the fullest measure for several reasons i.e., under the 
Constitutional provisions there was no synchronisation of the periods 
covered by the reports of the SFCs of different States with the Union 
Finance Commission. The solution only lies in amending  the concerned 
Article of the Constitution. Consequently it was felt necessary to delete the 
words “on the basis of recommendation made by the Finance Commission 
of the State” (appearing in the sub-clauses (bb) and (c) of the Article 280 (3) 
of the Constitution) in order to provide freedom to the Union Finance 
Commission to recommend financial devolution to those States where 
either SFCs failed to submit their reports or were not al all constituted by the 
respective State governments. Moreover, “many SFC reports have not 
addressed the specific terms listed in Articles 243 I and 243 Y nor have they 
provided clear idea of powers, authority and responsibilities actually 
entrusted to the local bodies” (Report of the Eleventh Finance Commission, 
June 2000, p. 74)  thus made it difficult for the EFC to count on the 
recommendation of the SFCs for devolution of funds.  
 
However,  the EFC was given one very important responsibility of 
recommending measures to make Panchayat functionally, financially and 
administratively viable. The major recommendations of the Commission 
pertaining to the Panchayats can be related to: measures regarding 
augmentation of consolidated funds of the States in order to supplement the 
resources of PRIs, reforms in local taxes and rates in order to improve the 
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revenue mobilisation of local bodies, accounts and audit of PRIs to be 
entrusted with C& AG and necessary legislative and administrative steps 
were suggested by the EFC which would enable the PRIs to function as a 
self government.  
 
The EFC also provided a total yearly grant of Rs.1,600 crores for PRIs, 
starting from the financial year 2000-01. The criteria chosen for devolving 
the grants are as follows: rural/urban population of the State (40 per cent) 
index of decentralisation (20 per cent)163, distance from the highest per 
capita income (20 per cent), revenue efforts of the local bodies (10 per cent) 
and geographical area (10 per cent). (Report of the Eleventh Finance 
Commission, 2000, pp. 75-81).This is pertinent to note that the index of 
decentralisation (20) and that of the revenue effort of local bodies (10) 
together constitute 30 percent weight for devolving funds to the local 
bodies. Therefore it is clear that one third of total grants to be devolved to 
local bodies through the State governments is contingent on the progress 
made by the States on decentralisation of power to the PRIs. 
 
It is observed that the centralised attempt of providing incentive funds in 
order to accelerate the process of empowering the PRIs failed to have 
much impact on the process of decentralisation between the States and the 
local governments, for flow of funds from other sources greatly 
overshadowed the incentive funds in volume and quantity. The total rural 
annual developmental expenditure through Central Ministries for the 
Financial year 2001-02 amounted to Rs. 16389 crore i.e., more than ten 
times the EFC’s annual provision of Rs.1600 crore. If we add other loan 
facilities such as under the Rural Infrastructure Development Fund (RIDF) 
provided by the government of India, the figure gets much 
higher.(Rajaraman, 2001, pp. 20-21) The study undertaken by Rajaraman 
(2001) further observes that the united grants by the central rural 
development actually slackens the revenue effort of the local bodies. Thus 
the end result of such collateral flow of funds, in reality damages the fiscal 
capacity of the PRIs. (Rajaraman, 2001, p.30) That apart, massive annual 
developmental expenditure flows through Central Ministers targeted at rural 
areas dwarfs any attempt of providing an incentive funds by the TFC and 
the EFC for empowering PRIs. Such concern was also expressed both by 
the TFC and EFC in their respective reports. Interestingly enough, it 
appears that not only that the attempt of the Union Finance Commission for 
elevating PRIs to self governance by providing incentive funds has become 
ineffective but also different Central institutions seem to work at cross 
                                                          
163 Index of Decentralisation set by the EFC (200) includes, Enactment of State Panchayat 
Legislation in conformity with the 73rd Constitutional amendment act; Intervention/restriction 
in the functioning of the Panchayat; Assignment of functions to the Panchayat in the State 
Panchayat Legislation vis-a-vis the Eleventh Schedule; Transfer of functions to the 
Panchayats by way of rules/notifications/orders of State Governments; Assignments of 
Taxation powers to the village Panchayats as per State Panchayat Acts; Levy of taxes by 
the village Panchayats; Constitution of State Finance Commission and submission of 
Action Taken Reports; Action taken on the major recommendation of the SFC; Elections to 
the Panchayats; Constitution of the District Planning Committee (DPC) 
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purposes i.e., delaying the process of decentralisation rather than 
accelerating  it.  
 
As it was already discussed the endeavour of empowering PRIs in 1990s 
seems to be Centre-led, Centrally controlled decentralisation. Centre has 
provided uniform parameters of decentralisation within which States can 
meaningfully exercise their discretion. (Rajaraman, 2001, p.2) But such 
Centre-led decentralisation attempt was not able to take away the 
discretionary attitude of the States completely that can be evident from the 
evaluation made by the Ninth Planning Commission. Ninth Planning 
Commission (1997) made an attempt to apprise the  progress made by the 
States in decentralisation of power in line with 73rd Amendment to the 
Constitution. In doing so, the Planning Commission set some parameters. 
These parameters include following features: conducting of Panchayat 
election, devolution of financial powers, devolution of functions and 
functionaries, constitution of District Planning Committee (DPC),  Status of 
Gram Sabha (Village Meeting), implementation of the Act 40 of 1996, 
checks and balances over PRIs and accountability.  However, the Ninth 
Planning Commission feels that the progress made by most of the States to 
decentralise power in terms of the parameters mentioned above is 
completely unsatisfactory. Thus it seems that even after the formal 
introduction of the 73rd Amendment and renewed activism of the Centre and 
the Central institutions, most States in the Indian federation failed to  
devolve minimum decentralisation to PRIs. It remains to be seen to what 
extent such decentralisation has taken place in West Bengal against the 
back drop of such broad parameters.  
 
West Bengal A Case Study 
 
In pursuance of the study of federalism from below with reference to West 
Bengal, it is, however, necessary to deal with two different debates 
regarding self-governance status of PRIs in West Bengal. Self governance 
in respect of Gandhi’s Purna  Swaraj and self-governance in terms of 
‘feasibility frontier’. The advocates of the ‘feasibility frontier’ while evaluating 
the success of West Bengal’s PRIs are of the opinion that within the given 
structure of decentralisation pyramid of India due attention has not been 
paid to the decentralisation of power between the Centre and the States 
and as a result  complete decentralisation of power from the State to local 
governments remains a far cry. Therefore, as they feel that the PRIs have 
been functioning quite well in West Bengal even under the given structural 
constraint of the Indian federation. On the other hand advocates of self 
governance in terms of Purna Swaraj feel that no substantial or limited 
progress (as claimed by the advocates of ‘feasibility frontier’) could ever be 
made unless the true notion of self governance is actively pursued. The 
term self governance, as it was perceived by Gandhi could only be 
achieved by addressing three dimensions of decentralisation-political, 
administrative and financial. Some advocates of self governance influenced 
by the Gandhi’s Purna Swaraj focused on political decentralisation and 
some others focused on the other two aspects of decentralisation namely 
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functional and financial. However, advocates focusing on political 
decentralisation believe in true enfranchisement of rural poor. Such 
enfranchisement of rural poor, is according to them, not only ensured by 
holding regular election of politicised Panchayat but by empowerment of 
rural masses in real sense. Yet another group tends to focus on the 
financial and administrative decentralisation. They feel that self governance 
status of PRIs would not be achieved without successful devolution of 
function, functionaries and financial power to them. 
 
Left Front government and status of local government  
 
After having been voted to power the Left Front government of West Bengal 
in its election manifesto (1977) had promised to hold election to the 
Panchayat institutions and wanted to further the process of decentralisation 
of power. The first West Bengal Panchayat Act during the post-
Independence period was passed as far back as in 1957. The 
implementation of this Act was, however, very slow. By 1963 just 50 per 
cent of the villages and 60 per cent of the rural population were covered by 
the Panchayat system.(Shiviah, Srivastava & Jena, 1980, p. 124) In 1973 
West Bengal Panchayat Act was enacted and continued until it was 
replaced by West Bengal Panchayat Act 1994.The Panchayat Act (1973) 
provided for direct popular election of all three tiers of PRIs. But it was not 
until 1978 that for the first time in West Bengal mass participation of rural 
people in the  election of the three tiers of the PRIs took place. It was the 
first election to the Zila Parishad in 15 years and to the Gram Panchayats in 
20 years. (Westergarrd, 1986, p. 15)  
 
Having been voted to power one of the important objectives of the Left 
Front government was pursuing decentralisation as a means of giving 
power to the local governments by undermining the pre-existing 
bureaucracy. An attempt was made to transfer all developmental activities 
of the government to the Panchayats. The electoral slogan of the Left Front 
government in 1978 elections was “destroy the centres of vested 
interests”.(Datta,1998, p. 126) Consequently, decentralisation of power in 
West Bengal aimed at involving the village people not only in the process of 
implementation of development programmes but also in the process of 
preparation and monitoring of developmental plans by building up 
decentralised structures at the grass root level. (Basu, 1997, p. 68)  
 
Contrary to West Bengal, the role of bureaucracy at local level is 
predominating in most of the States of India. The District Rural 
Development Agency (DRDA) through which implementation of various 
anti-poverty programmes are carried out is still headed by the district 
magistrate despite a decision taken by the Central government that it will be 
chaired by the Zilla Parishad’s elected chief. Thus in all other States except 
Karnataka and West Bengal, DRDA is dominated by the officialdom. (Datta, 
1998, p. 122) It is, however, claimed that the Left Front government earlier 
had established the precedence of the people’s elected representatives 
 312
over the bureaucracy. Therefore, the domination of the chairman of the Zila 
Parishad over the district magistrate and the chairman of Panchayat Samiti 
over the Block Development Officer was established in West Bengal. (Basu, 
1997, p. 72).  
 
The function of the PRIs of West Bengal have undergone three distinct 
phases. In the first phase, after 1978 the local level institutions were mainly 
entrusted with the execution of land reforms as well as with management of 
the several rural development programmes. The second phase started from 
1980 when as many as 27 rural development programmes were entrusted 
to the local bodies. Finally, the third phase started since 1985 during which 
PRIs of the State were allowed substantial participation in district Planning. 
(Khanna,1994, p. 311) Furthermore during the last phase involvement of 
PRIs was encouraged in the resource mobilisation through different 
incentive schemes. Decentralisation in Resource Mobilisation (1992) was 
introduced in West Bengal where 50 per cent of collection in excess of 
district targets in respect of some taxes are ploughed back to the district as 
an additionality of  district plan funds. And small savings collections of the 
State was also encouraged, where 37.5 per cent of small saving collection 
above the district target are ploughed back to the district as district plan 
additionality.  
 
Self governance status of PRIs of West Bengal-two debates 
 
(i) Gandhi’s Purna Swaraj in terms of political decentralisation to PRIs 
 
However, it remains to be seen how far the participatory decentralised 
model and precedence of people’s representation over bureaucracy was 
able to bring about enfranchisement and empowerment to the rural poor in 
the State. More importantly  how far it ensured its hegemony at the power 
structure of Panchayat in West Bengal. The advocates of self governance in 
respect to political decentralisation tend to evaluate success of Panchayat 
of West Bengal in terms of  the above mentioned parameters. As they feel 
that in the rest of India PRIs have been perceived as mere implementing 
agencies of the development programmes handed down from above. And 
even in this narrow domain of functioning given to the PRIs, bureaucracy 
tends to dominate. Against the backdrop of this national trend, it is, 
however, felt that the situation prevailing in West Bengal (led by the Left 
Front government where CPI (M) enjoys almost absolute majority) is not 
fundamentally different. Hierarchy of bureaucracy over the PRIs which 
existed during the pre-Left Front era in West Bengal and still exists in the 
rest of India was replaced by the Party hierarchy during the Left Front era. It 
was argued that CPI (M) has made marginal progress as compared to the 
rest of India by making a superficial attempt of establishing peoples 
representatives over bureaucracy. But in practice it did not mark any 
difference from the notion exercised elsewhere. Bhattacharya (1998) went 
on to say that the CPIM perceives PRIs as an institution to be utilised as the 
platform or mass contact to be built by involving the people in the 
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development activities and for the Party (CPI(M) the developmental role of 
Panchayat is not an end in itself. The Party exercises excessive control 
over it and the very organisational structure of the Party denies the 
democratic norm which a grass root institution such as Panchayat requires. 
Several years ago Törnquist (1991) arrived at the similar conclusion. As he 
observed top-down approach of functioning of the PRIs in the State and felt 
that “..despite the impressive decentralisation of powers, even the 
panchayats on the lowest level ...top down approaches seem common. 
Where the CPI-M is in power,  the real decisions are made within the party”. 
(Törnquist, 1991, p. 68). Bhattacharya (1998) further feels quite in line with 
this argument that the Panchayat as self governing institutions and grass 
root democratic organisation is incompatible with the omnipotent presence 
of the Communist Party.164  Therefore decentralisation is not accompanied 
with democracy and decentralisation has given legitimacy to centralisation. 
Thus there is a virtual absence of democracy at the local level and hence 
the PRIs in West Bengal failed to be elevated to a status of self 
governance. (Bhattacharya, H, Micro foundation of Bengal 
Communism,1998, pp.102-137; Bhattacharya, H, “Democracy and Rural 
Governance in West Bengal since 1978”, 1998, pp. 227-238)  
 
Some scholars namely Westergarrd (1987) Webster (1990)165 Tornquist 
(1991) Acharay (1993), Kumar & Ghosh (1996) have raised the question of 
real enfranchisement of the rural poor and felt that there is a tendency of 
excluding land-less labour and poor peasants from exercising control in the 
power structure of Panchayats. Webster (1990) also expressed his concern 
over substantial danger of resurgence of the bureaucracy in the functioning 
of PRIs.  Acharay (1993) and Westergarrd (1987)  felt that there is a lack of 
adequate quality representation of rural poor in the Panchayat. Though the 
rural poor are being represented in the PRIs of West Bengal but 
unfortunately they fail to make adequate influence on the decision making 
body of the Panchayat. “There developed a new institutional structure, 
decentralised in form but still dominated by the middle and rich peasants. 
The agricultural labourers and poor peasants though not in proportion have 
their representations in the new structure but their participation in the 
decision making process is still a far cry”. (Acharay, 1993, p. 1080)  
Westergarrd (1987) felt the same. ”In terms of the popular participation 
framework it may be concluded that poor are represented in the institutions 
of power, but by and large this representation has not resulted in any 
significant increase in their control over these institutions”. (Westergarrd, 
1987, pp.109-110) Similar conclusion was arrived at by Tornquist (1991) in 
                                                          
164 The party sources clearly establishes that the Panchayats are emptied of all real content 
as the important decisions are taken at the level of Panchayat Sub Committee (PSC) 
violating the elementry principle of democratic decentralisation where people’s participation 
is sought to be ensured. Thus centralising operational mechanism of the CPIM for running 
Panchayat is evident. At each level of the Panchayat the party forms Panchaytat Sub 
Committee (PSC) which is the Party’s Parichalana (organisational) Committee (PC) All 
elected party members of Panchayat Samiti and Zila Parishad will act under the respective 
committees. The final decision at each level will be taken by the PSC, although the elected 
members would make the recommendations. (Bhattacharya, H, Micro Foundations of 
Bengal Communism, Ajanta, Books International, New Delhi, 1998, pp. 108-114) 
165 Mentioned in Lieten. G.K, “Caste, Gender and Class in Panchayats case of 
Barddhaman, West Bengal“, EPW, July 18, 1992, p. 1568 
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line with the other scholars. He felt, the emphasis is more on representation 
than on the participation or even consultation of those who are affected by 
various measures. Therefore, ”..the weak peasants are not entrusted and 
empowered.... but are given some support (although not negligible) and 
protection, and are being mobilised in favour of top-down campaigns.” 
(Tornquist, 1991, p. 68)  
 
It is worth mentioning that recent amendment to the Pachayat Act, 2003 
initiated by the West Bengal government entrusted  all rural developmental 
programmes to the Village Development Council comprising some 
nominated experts on this area with a view to ensure an objectivity and 
efficiency in undertaking such activities. Evidently the opposition was raised 
from different sections of people who argue that this would even induce 
more partisan use of such developmental funds. That apart it would clearly 
undermine the power of the elected local bodies and undermines the spirit 
of  democratic decentralisation. (Anandabazar Patrika, Bengali Daily, 11th & 
12th July 2003)  
  
(ii) Gandhi’s Purna Swaraj in terms of fiscal power decentralisation to the PRIs 
 
Panchayat of West Bengal is yet to be considered self governance since 
they hardly enjoy any fiscal autonomy. The debate in this line was first 
initiated by Mukarji & Bandyopadhyay Committee (1993). Which was of the 
opinion that self governance status of PRIs is conditioned upon achieving 
fiscal as well as functional and administrative decentralisation. So long it is 
not achieved it ceases to function as self governance. Therefore present 
limitation of the Panchayat system of West Bengal could be understood 
from two sides namely conceptual and programmatic (Mukarji & 
Bandyopadhyay Committee, 1993, p. 4)  Concerning conceptual limitation 
of the Panchayat, the Committee argued that West Bengal has been 
carrying the legacy of the narrow view where local governments were 
basically perceived as mere implementing agencies of the schemes handed 
down by the higher level of governments without having any power--neither 
administrative nor financial. Programmatic limitation is just the continuation 
of the conceptual limitation. Once the conceptual aspect fails to 
acknowledge  the PRIs as self governance it automatically leads to 
programmatic limitation i.e., inadequate empowerment of PRIs as far as 
functional, administrative, and financial decentralisation are concerned.    
 
In an attempt to measure the autonomy of the local government of West 
Bengal, Mukarji & Bandyopadhyay Committee set some parameters. More 
or less the same parameters have also been used by the Ninth Planning 
Commission (1997) and the Eleventh Finance Commission (1998). Of 
which the most important are degree of fiscal autonomy of the PRIs along 
with devolution of functions and functionaries. It is, however, axiomatic that 
local governments can not act as self governance without the effective 
means of planning at the local level reflecting local priorities. West Bengal 
already has gained certain amount of experience in planning from below but 
how far such decentralised planning model reflects local priorities and 
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ensures involvement of the local people remains to be seen. Hence 
‘decentralisation of planning without financial autonomy does not carry 
much sense’ therefore it is necessary to discuss in the subsequent sections 
of this study how much financial autonomy is enjoyed by West Bengal’s 
Panchayat so as to carry out local planning effectively.  
 
Functioning  of decentralised planning model in West Bengal 
 
Decentralised development planning has been in practice in West Bengal 
since 1985-86. For  this purpose  three-tier planning organisation was set 
up in every district and PRIs were very intimately involved in it. 
Decentralised planning organisation comprises the District Planning and 
Co-ordination Council (DPCC), District Planing Committee (DPC) and Block 
Planning Committee (BPC) in every district. In West Bengal district plan is 
prepared first, thereafter funds flow from the State along two channels. For 
small non-technical schemes they are allotted to Gram Panchayats (GPs), 
Panchayat Samitis (PSs) and Zila Parishads (ZPs) on the basis of 
prescribed spending ceiling. For other schemes they are put under various 
budget heads and released by the respective departments to their 
respective district level officers.  
Any successful functioning of decentralised planning should be based on 
three main pillars i.e., decision making power of the local governments in 
formulating local plan, mobilisation of local funds for implementing local 
planning by the local governments. However, if local funds could not be 
mobilised, for whatever reasons, in this situation at least ensuring certainty, 
regularity and transparency in receiving funds from the higher level of 
governments. And lastly undermining the influence of the bureaucracy in 
formulating and implementation  of planning at the local level.  It remains to 
be seen as to what extent aforesaid conditions are fulfilled in exercising 
decentralised planning model in West Bengal.    
 
As regards transparency in the process of planning and uncertainty in 
receiving funds for executing local planning Mukarji & Bandyopadhyay 
Committee (1993) observed that, firstly, there is hardly any relationship 
between the district plan and the allocation eventually made in the State 
budget. Secondly, budget does not show at one place the total amount 
allotted for particular district. And Mukarji & Bandyopadhyay Committee did 
not find any copy of the budget in any of the district it visited. Finally, for 
schemes executed by the Panchayat, funds are received in numerous 
unpredictable instalments throughout the year making rational 
implementation difficult. (Mukarji & Bandyopadhyay Committee, 1993, p. 
11) 
Local level decision making power in the planning process considered to be 
one of the most important aspects of the success of any decentralised 
planning. The study undertaken by Bandyopadhyay (1997) observes that  
there is very little scope of local level decision making in the decentralised 
planning model exercised in West Bengal thus denying one of the most 
important conditions of successful functioning of decentralised planing. An 
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annual plan of a district of West Bengal, as felt by Bandyopadhyay (1997), 
is nothing more than disaggregation of allocation made against different 
plan schemes allotted to different departments and eventually incorporated 
in the annual budget of the State government. “Again departmental budgets 
are voted by the legislature and a department, generally, though not 
necessarily, represents a particular sector. When departmental allocations 
come to the district, the local authorities are faced with a take-it-or-leave-it 
situation. They have no right to suggest less investment in sector A or more 
investment in sector B.” (Bandyopadhyay, D, 1997, p. 41)  
Evidently allocation for a district of West Bengal in all the sectors come in 
schematic form leaving little role to play by a district to design it’s own 
schemes. “In the circumstance, can one call the 1985 model an exercise in 
decentralised planing?.... A close examination reveals that the local 
authorities had decision making power only in respect of two functions, 
namely, (A) to choose the location of a scheme, or in other words, to decide 
in what manner the schematic allocation should be distributed among 
different Blocks/Villages, (B) to choose the individual beneficiaries of a 
scheme. Both these functions were, in any case, decentralised even before 
the District planning exercise started”. (ibid. p. 41)                                                                               
Similar observation was also made by the First State Finance Commission 
of West Bengal (1995). The Chief Minister and the Finance Minister of the 
State mentioned on several occasions that about one half of the plan 
budget is being spent for the districts every year. The Commission tried to 
collect data from all departments of the State to find out what proportion of 
their plan expenditure are spent for districts. The information it got was 
incomplete and entirely unsatisfactory. (State Finance Commission, West 
Bengal, 1995, p. 3) The Commission went on commenting that “The 
Planning process within a district needs re-orientation. At present, in the 
preparation of district plans, a parallel process of planning is followed. On 
the one hand the three tiers of Panchayats and Municipalities in a district 
prepare a plan based on funds provided directly to them by poverty 
alleviation and similar programmes; on the other, departmental plans are 
handed down to district officials from above. The two are added up at the 
DPC level called a district plan. The dichotomy continues. The departmental 
plans are implemented independently by related officials and lower tiers of 
Panchayats in particular have no say in the matter unless they are 
requested to lend a helping hand. At the Panchayat Samiti (PS) level (block 
level) the dissociation is nearly complete and departmental officials follow 
their own ways with PSs having virtually no voice. This is the consequence 
of the traditional vertical line of functioning. The district plan as it stands 
today is really a splintered plan. The amount of money spent in 
departmental plans in a district is much more than that handled by 
Panchayats and Municipalities. The operational part of district planning 
process continues to be dominated by officials rather than people’s 
representatives.“ (State Finance Commission, West Bengal,1995, p. 6) 
 
Financial devolution to the PRIs and the role of the State Finance 
Commissions of West Bengal 
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Till 1993 West Bengal government followed West Bengal Panchayat Act 
(1973) passed by the then Congress government which, however, 
completely ignored the aspect of self governance that can be a guiding 
principle of the local governments. (Mukarji & Bandyopadhyay 
Committee,1993, p. 4). Self-government needs at least partial autonomy 
that could be achieved through not merely financial resource devolution but 
also financial power devolution to the local bodies.  
In constitutional line of 73rd amendment, West Bengal Panchayat Act was 
amended in order to incorporate some features of self governance into the 
PRIs. Consequently First State Finance Commission of West Bengal (1995) 
was set up which was entrusted to review potential resource base of PRIs 
and was required to make necessary suggestion to the State for devolving 
financial power to PRIs with a view to make them function as a self 
government. it remains to be seen to what extent State Finance 
Commission of West Bengal (WBSFC), 1995 performed this task. 
West Bengal First State Finance Commission (WBFSFC), 1995 started with 
the axiom that local government normally possess built-in-inefficiency in 
becoming completely self reliant. Such constraints are faced by local bodies 
all over the world. They began with describing these constraints as follows: 
“Generally speaking local governments anywhere on the globe are not self-
sustaining. They need subventions in various forms from above. One may 
also note that people living in these localities are taxed by the Union and 
State Governments in the form of income tax, wealth tax, excise duties, 
sales tax etc. and thus, the cream is skimmed off. Local bodies are left with 
the most inelastic and trivial sources of taxation. In view of this, it is 
generally accepted that local bodies should be helped with adequate funds 
from above.” (WBSFC, 1995, p. 3)  
So the focal point of the recommendation of the WBFSFC (1995) is quite 
clear : that the local bodies need to be given funds from above and they are 
incapable of being self sufficient.  The same notion was also echoed by the 
West Bengal government while submitting their memorandum to the 
Eleventh Finance Commission, 1998. “The crux of the problem is that there 
is a considerable gap between what is being spent by a 
panchayat/municipal body and what it so far has been able to raise out of its 
own resources. This resource gap is to be filled by giving funds to the local 
bodies in the form of entitlements which can not be varied at sweet will. A 
part of such entitlements may obviously come from the State Government 
as its justifiable share in tax collection of the State Government. But the 
balance is to be provided in terms of grants some way or other under the 
recommendations of the Eleventh Finance Commission” (Memorandum to 
Eleventh Finance Commission, Government of West Bengal, 1998, p. 16) 
That apart, WBFSFC (1995) feels that the fund allotted by the State 
governments for various development activities and the fund allotted by the 
Union government for special programmes like Jawahar Rojgar Yojana to 
PRIs often bear an ‘air of uncertainty’. Because it is within the power of the 
Centre and the State to reduce the size of these schemes or to abolish 
those altogether. Now with local governments are being endowed with the 
status of self governance through the amendment to the Constitution (73rd 
and 74th , 1993) this uncertainty should end. Again it should end by 
providing them statutory right of receiving untied funds i.e., should not 
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require to follow any schemes formulated by any higher authorities. That 
would in turn provide them necessary freedom to prepare their own 
schemes based on local priorities.  
 
In this respect the concept of ‘entitlement’ was introduced to overcome the 
uncertainty of devolution of funds from the State to the local government. 
Entitlement fund consists of global share of the net proceeds of State’s 
taxes i.e.,  total net proceeds of taxes collected by the State in a year. And it 
was recommended by the WBFSFC (1995) that out of the total net 
proceeds of taxes of the State, 16 per cent should be transferred to local 
bodies as an entitlement. These will be treated as an untied funds at the 
disposal of the local bodies. Eventually the local bodies would benefit from 
across the board buoyancy instead of sharing specific tax or taxes. 
Furthermore under global sharing the level of devolution would be 
predictable and the total revenue do not fluctuate as much as proceeds 
from specific taxes.166  
 
However, it is pertinent to note that WBFSFC (1995) has mainly restricted 
itself to the concept of ‘entitlement’ which is basically revenue sharing 
formula. Therefore, at best local bodies can expect to receive funds from 
the State regularly as their statutory right. Consequently the Commission 
put little emphasis on recommending any substantial financial power 
devolution to the local bodies. Except providing suggestion as regards 
exploiting some resource potential of the local governments which has been 
lying unutilised for ages. Of such unutilised potential local resources, 
irrigation rates and taxes on entertainment were particularly mentioned. 
WBFSFC (1995) suggested that due attention should be paid to the 
irrigation rates which is being neglected. Besides,  collection of these rates 
and the related responsibility of supplying water and routine maintenance 
should be handed over to Zila Parishads. Also taxes on entertainment now 
collected by the State government, as WBFSFC (1995) suggested, could be 
handed over to local self government. (WBSFC, 1995, p. 4) 
WBFSFC (1995) also seemed to rely on involvement of the PRIs of West 
Bengal in the decentralisation of revenue mobilisation programme and 
expected the contribution of the PRIs in the form of different voluntary 
initiatives with a view to enable them to function as self government. The 
Commission expressed that ”we would like to invite attention to another 
aspect namely, voluntary contributions. Contributions in the forms of land, 
                                                          
166For distribution among the districts several factors are taken into account. a) Firstly, 
Population (50%), level of non-literacy  (10 %), proportion of backward population , (10%) 
area of the district (10%), rural population (10%) inverse ratio of per capita bank deposits 
and working capital of primary agricultural co-operatives (10%) ; b) Secondly, within the 
allocation should be divided between Panchayats, Municipalities and special areas on the 
basis of total population; c) the inter-tier allocation of funds are: Zila Parishad (30%) all PS 
together 20 per cent, all GPs together 50 per cent.  d) For horizontal fund sharing among 
Panchayats Samitis is based on population (50 %) SC/ST population (25 %) and non-
literacy 25 % e) Similarly, for sharing funds among GPs the same criteria as in case of 
Panchayat Samiti will be followed. (Jena, A.C, 1999, p. 139) 
 
 319
labour, technical advice and money came forth in many Panchayats 
repeatedly in the last decade and a half and this should be widely 
encouraged. Apart from enhancing resources this generates a sense of 
participation amongst the people and is an important element in sustaining 
democratic decentralisation. “ (WBSFC, 1995, p.5 ) 
WBFSFC (1995) also suggested some measures of co-operative effort of 
revenue collection both by the PRIs and the State government which has 
been existing in the State since 1992 at the Zila Parishad (ZP) level. 
However, it was suggested by the WBFSFC (1995) that the departments in 
charge of tax collection in the State  can adopt a new approach. In lieu of 
collection taxes in an isolated manner, the collecting officials can work in 
co-operation with Panchayat and municipal functionaries. The latter may be 
able to provide additional information in regard to possible tax evasion and 
making it easy for tax collecting officials to investigate those cases. Officials 
would in turn inform the local functionaries about the result of their 
investigation. Since 1992 ZP’s have been participating in collection of some 
taxes namely, stamp duty/registration fee, entertainment tax, motor vehicles 
tax and royalties/cesses on major and minor minerals and 50 per cent of 
collection in excess of district target are ploughed back to the districts as 
part of the district plan. WBFSFC (1995) suggested that this experiment be 
generalised now and participation of local bodies be extended to collection 
of all taxes along with the incentive scheme which has been in operation in 
the State in relating to small savings collections. Greater involvement of the 
PRIs is expected to yield good return as there will be built-in-incentive to 
maximise State revenues. (West Bengal State Finance Commission, 1995, 
p. 14) 
Meanwhile the report of the Second State Finance Commission of West 
Bengal, 2002 (WBSSFC) was introduced which is yet to be published 
officially. The WBSSFC (2002) re-emphasised the necessity of providing 
untied fund as an entitlement to the local bodies and felt that this could be 
one of the major means of augmenting resources of the PRIs. Again 
WBSSFC (2002) criticised the State government for not implementing the 
recommendation of WBFSFC (1995) as regards entitlement funds properly. 
Thus the WBSSFC (2002) followed almost the same notion as the 
WBFSFC (1995) that PRIs are suffering from built-in-efficiency in mobilising 
own resources and hence will continue to be dependent on the higher level 
of governments for funds. But at the same time the WBSSFC (2002) also 
admitted the need of augmenting resource base of the PRIs through own 
resource mobilisation in view of the major fiscal crisis of West Bengal since 
the mid 1990s. The Commission, however, feels that it might pose 
considerable problem if PRIs continue to remain completely financially 
dependent on the State. Nevertheless, the recommendation of  WBSSFC 
(2002) was mainly confined to ensuring untied funds to the local bodies of 
West Bengal without recommending any substantial devolution of fiscal 
power to them. 
The WBSSFC (2002) came to realise that the First State Finance 
Commission’s (WBFSFC), 1995 recommendations did not receive the 
attention it deserved. The main emphasis of the WBFSFC (1995) was 
creation of entitlement funds separated from departmental allocations in 
each year’s budget of the State. Therefore the WBFSFC (1995) 
 320
recommended earmarking of 16 per cent of the net proceeds of the State 
taxes for the purpose of creating an ‘entitlement fund’ without any 
precondition for their utilisation. Such funds should not be tied with any 
schemes formulated by any higher authorities and should ensure automatic 
and regular flow of funds in lump sum to local bodies in order to make them 
function as a self governance.  
Though the recommendation of the First State Finance Commission was 
made in 1995 the State started allocating to local bodies only since the 
fiscal year of 1999-00. Eventually, in 1999-00, 2000-01 and 20001-02 some 
allocations of planned funds were being provided as lump sum grants-in aid 
from different departments to the local bodies mainly to the ZPs (Zila 
Parishadas). In 1999-00 a sum of Rs. 515.73 crore was allotted as grants-
in-aid from different departments to the local bodies. This figure was 
subsequently revised at Rs. 218.96 crore in 1999-00. In the fiscal year 
2000-01 the above allocation amounts to Rs. 1230.92 crores. Which has 
been subsequently revised to a sum of Rs. 900 crore. The allocation in 
2001-02 has been shown as Rs. 1580.02 croes in the vote on account 
estimates. (WBSSFC, 2002, p. 249) Evidently, the State was not able to 
keep pace with the required amount of grants i.e., 16 per cent of the 
proceeds from all taxes as recommended by the WBFSFC. 167  
It is disheartening to note that “Though the fund is being allotted by various 
departments as untied grants-in-aid yet in actuality, the departmental 
schemes are continuing to be executed by the local bodies funded by the 
departmental authorities presumably in consultation with them. Excepting 
for the change in the designation of the departmental officers as the ex-
officio officers of the local bodies there seems to be no basic change in the 
methodology for formulation of the plans. It may be observed that 
departmental officers at the district levels had been consulting the local 
bodies in prioritisation and implementation of the schemes over a fairly long 
period. The objective of the SFC to grant a part of the budgetary resources 
to the local bodies without any condition for accommodating schemes 
already formulated at a different level is not being served by the current 
practices.” (Interim Report of the WBSSFC, 2002, p. 249) Therefore, such 
kind of transferring of funds to local bodies, as mentioned above, does not 
provide the assurance and prior knowledge to the PRIs of West Bengal 
regarding the untied entitlement essential for planning based on local needs 
and perceptions. “The departments requested the ZPs (Zila Parishadas) to 
utilise GLB (grants-in-aid to local bodies) funds  for schemes and 
programmes already identified and proposed at the departmental level, 
giving ZPs only the option to select and prioritise schemes to be executed. 
The objective of the recommendations of the First SFC were hardly met by 
this kind of transfer of fund by the departments even when the total 
allotment approximated 16 per cent of the tax resources as recommended 
by the First SFC. Only a small amount of fund was released as untied 
entitlements to the local bodies.” (WBSSFC, 2002, p.2) 
                                                          
167 According to the calculation made by the West Bengal Second State Finance 
Commission Rs. 700 crore would accounts for 10 per cent of the net tax proceeds of the 
state. Evidently except the financial year 2001-02 which might also have been 
subsequently revised. Therefore,  the state can not reach to the 16 per cent level.   
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Evidently, the report of the WBSSFC (2002) reveals that the objective of 
providing statutory rights of local bodies to receive entitlement funds, both in 
terms of quality and quantity, was not attained in West Bengal. As far as 
quantitative reduction of entitlement funds was concerned the WBSSFC 
(2002) admitted the fact that the State has been through acute budgetary 
crisis since the mid 1990s. And such crisis might prevent the State from 
devolving entitlement funds. In West Bengal Medium Term Fiscal Reforms 
(MTFR) was introduced. Which is aimed at substantially reducing the 
revenue deficit during the period 1999-00 to 2003-04 by increasing the level 
of tax revenue and reducing the non-plan revenue expenditure. Eventually 
the WBSSFC (2002) felt the urgent need of readjusting the size of 
entitlement funds and wanted to fix it at 10 per cent of the net tax proceeds 
of the State instead of 16 per cent. In spite of the severe financial crisis, as 
the WBSSFC (2002) felt that for adopting the principle of untied entitlement 
(that is readjusted at 10 per cent) the limitation of financial resources of the 
State would not pose any problem.  
As mentioned above the Second State Finance Commission of West 
Bengal, 2002 followed the same notion as it’s counterpart that the PRIs will 
continue to be mainly dependent on the funds from above. As they felt that  
“We also do not see immediate possibility of large-scale own resource 
generation by LSGs (Local Self Governments). These bodies will continue 
to be dependent on grants from the State Government for meeting their 
non-plan and plan expenditure.” (WBSSFC, 2002, p. 16) But despite taking 
this position the Commission also admitted the necessity of mobilising own 
resources by the local bodies which marked the difference of WBSSFC 
(2002) from it’s previous counterparts. As WBSSFC (2002) again feels that 
“The LSGs, however, would have to make greater efforts towards mobilising 
more own resources to make them true self-governing institutions.” 
(WBSSFC, 2002, p. 16) “Funds flowing from the state may not large enough 
to satisfy all the demands raised in the meetings of the Panchayats. Given 
the constraints the aspirations of the people are to be met , additional 
resources will have to be mobilised by the people themselves. The planning 
meeting of Gram Sansads (Village Council)  would provide an opportunity to 
motivate people to generate and mobilise local resources to meet the gap.” 
(WBSSFC, 2002, p. 5) 
However, like it’s counterpart even though the WBSSFC (2002) admitted 
the necessity of augmenting own resources of PRIs quite strongly, in 
actuality the WBSSFC (2002) did not provide any substantial and specific 
recommendation in this regard. Excepting giving some suggestion in 
respect to exploiting several resources of local fiscal domain which have 
been lying unutilised for long. And readjustment of the proceeds from 
shared resources between the State and the local governments.   
It is, however, usually held by most experts that dependence on the State 
governments for grants by the local bodies leads to fiscal profligacy and 
inefficiency. The case study based on Kerala during 1990s revealed that 
untied grant provided to the PRIs by one rupee reduced own tax revenue by 
more than one rupee through slackening their own tax effort. (Rajaraman, 
2003, p.  35) Contrary to the usual notion, the WBSSFC (2002) feels that 
untied grants provided to Gram Panchayats (GPs) could be transformed 
into permanent resource base of GPs. Which would in turn help them to be 
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self sufficient. The Commission observed that the type of schemes so far 
preferred under the untied grants were mainly constructions of roads & 
culverts, excavations of canals for irrigation and tanks for fisheries, 
maintenance and repair of old buildings, construction of school buildings 
and Integrated Child Development Scheme (ICDS) centres, social forestry, 
etc.  Creation of such assets as felt by the WBSSFC, have high potential  
for generating future resource for GPs. (WBSSFC, 2002, p. 5)  
Besides, giving suggestion of utilising untied funds efficiently with a view to 
create future potential resource base of the local bodies, the WBSSFC also 
felt that it is of urgent necessity for local bodies to look for other sources of 
income. One way of augmenting the resources, as felt by WBSSFC,  could 
be increasing the share of the proceeds from some taxes and duties 
(namely entertainment tax) or bringing some resources under the purview of 
the local governments which are at present levied and collected by the 
State but the proceeds of which are shared with the local governments (i.e., 
land revenue and cess) Moreover WBSSFC (2002) also mentioned that the 
PRIs could mobilise resources by increasing optional rates fees on items 
listed in the relevant local government’s Acts which have not been used so 
far effectively due to lack of by laws to be constructed by the State 
government in order to put such financial power in reality.  
 
So in sum, it could be concluded that both WBSFCs started with the 
common axiom that local governments are normally suffering from built-in-
efficiency of own resource mobilisation and the consequent need of being 
funded from above. Subject to this given universal constraint they both 
wanted to minimise the uncertainty of receiving funds from the State to PRIs 
by providing them statutory rights of receiving untied funds regularly.  
However, in view of the acute budgetary crisis of the State the Second 
State Finance Commission (2002), recommended to reduce the share of 
the entitlement funds to be devolved to PRIs. Furthermore, though the 
recommendations of both the Commissions mainly based on providing 
grants and indirect method of augmenting resource base of PRIs, the 
Second State Finance Commission seems to have admitted the necessity 
of own resource mobilisation of local governments. But even such 
welcoming trend, WBSSFC (2002) did not provide any substantial 
recommendations in this regards.  
 
The First State Finance Commission (1995), as mentioned above, mainly 
relied on indirect means of mobilisation of own resources by local 
governments. As the WBFSFC (1995) suggested involvement of all tiers of 
local bodies in decentralisation of resource mobilisation programme that 
has been existing in this State for last one decade at the ZP’s level. Which, 
however, failed to have any impact on the self sufficiency of ZPs. While 
degree of financial autonomy of ZPs of West Bengal is least amongst the 
three tiers of the PRIs which would be evident in later part of our study. 
Moreover, WBFSFC (1995) wanted to encourage voluntary contribution of  
village people under the guidance and supervision of local governments in 
order to enhance sense of participation and creation of common property at 
the rural area. Needless to say all these methods tend to have indirect and 
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intangible effect on financial power of PRIs. Since voluntary contribution 
and decentralisation of resource mobilisation of power could not be the 
substitute of devolving financial power to PRIs.  
  
It appears that WBSFCs followed the same notion as the SFCs of all other 
States which is evident from the studies undertaken by Rajaraman (2001) 
and the Ninth Planning Commission (1997). Ninth Planning Commission 
observed that all SFCs of different States have so far put greater emphasis 
on internal revenue mobilisation, but none has suggested any effective 
mechanism for the PRIs to generate their own revenue. Thus SFCs neither 
recommend nor foresee any noticeable change in the tax (including the 
non-tax) jurisdiction of local bodies. Hence SFCs in general place greater 
reliance on transfers from the States to the PRIs for bridging the gap 
between the local bodies’ revenue and expenditure. In real terms no 
improvement in local resource base is likely from the recommendations of 
the SFCs. (Ninth Planning Commission, 1997, p. 261) 
 
Similar observation was made by Rajaraman (2001) as she noticed that 
SFCs recommendations were in general confined to transfers from the 
State governments to local bodies instead of advocating in favour of 
financial power to the PRIs. While the SFCs generally adopted the soft 
option and did little to expand the local fiscal domain and merely 
recommended tax-specific transfers from the State government, and/or a 
certain percentage of general revenues. “The reasons for absence of 
substantial expansion of the local bodies seems to be a widespread 
perception that the local bodies are unable to enforce compliance”. 
(Rajaraman, 2001, p. 5) She further concluded that the formal introduction 
of the third tier of the PRIs and consequent setting up of State Finance 
Commissions in different States hardly had any impact on the local fiscal 
domain in India. It is observed that the States with higher pre-Amendment 
per capita Panchayat  revenue collection i.e., Haryana, Kerala Andhra 
Pradesh, Punjab are those that also register higher growth in Panchayat 
revenues during the post-Amendment period. (Rajaraman, 2001, p. 8) In 
striking contrast to the above observation, there has been a substantial fall 
of the percentage of own revenue of Panchayat in total revenues of West 
Bengal (from 17.07 % to 5.08%) during 1990-91 to 1997-98. The reason for 
such decline is that the State-local flows in the form of grants have  
outstripped the own revenue growth of the Panchayat in West Bengal. 
There are other States where the own revenue component have risen 
dramatically because of stagnation in the State-local transfers (i.e., Andhra 
Pradesh, Gujrat, Punjab) (ibid pp. 8) Thus there is a clear revenue 
additionality in the local government’s exchequer consequent upon transfer 
from the State government to the PRIs but not through the augmentation of 
own resource mobilisation of the PRIs of West Bengal.  
 
Is providing grants to the local bodies a pragmatic option? 
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In view of the above it can be concluded that so far in West Bengal along 
with rest of the States PRIs failed to enjoy financial autonomy and these at 
large remained dependent on grants. Both the State Finance Commissions 
of West Bengal mainly wanted to reduce the uncertainty of receiving grants 
from the State government by making it a statutory right. Thus introduction 
of some element of certainty of receiving funds from the State to local 
bodies was urgently felt by the West Bengal State Finance Commission 
(WBSFC) instead of devolving adequate financial power to PRIs.  
 
But the question is how far the State government is able to provide such 
grants when the State itself facing acute budgetary crisis. And the State in 
particular and all States in general are constrained by possessing less 
buoyant and inelastic source of revenue provided the fiscal federal structure 
of India. In addition, the crisis of the State governments further accentuated 
by the decreasing volume of central assistance to the States particularly 
since the economic liberalisation. However,  as mentioned earlier, in terms 
of almost all fiscal indicators, West Bengal has been passing through a 
major financial crisis. The State’s own resources constituted only 31 per 
cent of the total aggregate expenditure of the State during 1996-99 as 
against 49 per cent for all the Sates resulted in allocating less funds for 
development and capital expenditure. Due to this financial crisis the transfer 
of resources from the State to local bodies is bound to get decreased. Thus 
the share of compensation and assignment to local bodies and Panchayati 
Raj institutions declined from 3 per cent to 1 per cent during 1980-81 to 
2000-2001.168  
 
In view of this unprecedented financial crisis the State urged for Central 
grants for meeting the obligation of devolving funds to local bodies in the 
Memorandum submitted to the Eleventh Finance Commission (EFC). As 
the State felt that, “.. the resource base of the States is very narrow. 
Because of budgetary constraints of the States, any scheme of devolution 
of resources from the State level to the local Self-Government institutions 
will be at best limited. There is persisting imbalance in the fiscal powers of 
the Central Government and the State Governments. It is therefore felt that 
the Government of India should make available certain funds to the State 
which would further devolve resources to the local Self- Government 
institutions.... At present the establishment expenditure of these local 
bodies is being mostly borne by the State Governments. The resources of 
the State Governments are over-stretched to meet such requirements.” 
(Memorandum to Eleventh Finance Commission, Government of West 
Bengal 1998, p. 15)  
The crux of the problem, therefore, is to how to meet the budgetary gap of 
local bodies. As the State government along with WBSFCs feel that it 
should be met by grants devolved either by the State government or by the 
Central government but not through widening  potential  local fiscal domain. 
Set aside complete financial autonomy of the local bodies what Gandhi 
envisaged and which was termed as ‘lofty ideals’ by Lieten (1996, p. 232) 
                                                          
168 Sankar, K, ‚Parlous State of Government Finances‘, EPW, December 30, 2000, p. 4608 
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as far as pragmatic necessity is concerned  enhancement of financial power 
of the PRIs is urgently called for in order to relieve the State government to 
run this bodies and enable the PRIs to carry out local level functions 
effectively.  
 
That apart, transferring some departments of local nature to the PRIs 
running from the State level would not only reduce the burden on the State 
government but also enhance the quality of public services of local nature. 
The resource crunch in  running the departments of local nature coupled 
with absence of any provision for monitoring and control of local 
government’s cause low level of efficiency in these areas. Over time the 
quality of such services namely primary health and primary education 
getting deteriorated and failed to live up to the expectation of the people. In 
recent years the reports prepared by the West Bengal District Primary 
Education Project (DPEP) pinpoints the problem with the existing system of 
primary education of the State thus critical lack of accountability of the 
schools owing to insufficient local supervision and control. West Bengal 
District Primary Education Project (DPEP) revealed that many other States 
have already transferred the authority of such functions to local bodies. 
Further, DPEP recommended for similar decentralisation in primary 
education in order to improve the quality of education through effective 
accountability, monitor and control by PR bodies on this area. Though  
some measures have been taken in recent times to improve quality of 
primary education of the State but needless to say, without effective 
functional decentralisation of PRIs, the local bodies would fail to control and 
supervise the schools. (Banerjee & Others, 2002, p.4215)  
 
Self governance  vis-a-vis feasibility frontier debate & devolution of financial 
power to PRIs 
 
In view of the above the urgent necessity of devolving financial and 
functional power to PRIs are understood. In West Bengal the debate as 
regards such decentralisation mainly have taken two different shapes—
feasibility frontier and self governance.  The notion of ‘feasibility frontier’, as 
already mentioned above, describes that West Bengal has been operating 
under several constraints i.e., constitutional, structural and class (Basu, 
1997, p. 65) As far as federal-State fiscal relation is concerned, there has 
been a persisting imbalance in the fiscal power distribution between the 
Central government and that of State governments. This imbalance seems 
to be a major handicap to provide self governance status to the PRIs in 
West Bengal. Consequently limits the State government in advancing the 
decentralisation of power in the area of State-local relations in general and 
financial power in particular. At its level best the State can introduce some 
programmatic/operational reforms with limited administrative, functional and 
financial decentralisation to PRIs. This is, however, considered more than 
perceiving the PRIs as an implementing agency of schemes handed down 
from the above but less than the concept of self governance as Gandhi 
(incorporated in the Article 40 of the Constitution) and 73rd and 74th 
amendment to the Constitution envisaged.  
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This is the main axiom from where advocates of development debates or 
’feasibility frontier’ begins. According to them, the success of 
decentralisation of the  PRIs in West Bengal should be judged in terms of 
this existing constraint imposed upon them from above. West Bengal so far 
has made some progress in initiating the process of decentralisation of 
power and in many respects remained far ahead of other States measured 
against various decentralising parameters, as also admitted by several 
studies. (Mukarji & Bandyopadhyay Committee, 1993, Jena, 1999, WBSFC, 
1995, Lieten, 1996) Therefore, the idea of providing self governance status 
to PRIs, as advocates of ‘feasibility frontier’ feel, should be perceived in the 
context of such limited capacity or ‘feasibility of the State.  
 
In August 1992, the Minister of Panchayats of West Bengal, Dr. Surya 
Kanto Mishra articulated this view in his concluding speech to a Panchayat 
workshop, Calcutta in the following manner, “I want to make it clear that 
devolution of power can be done to the extent that the State Government 
possesses it. In India there is only one government. The rest are local 
administrative bodies. The State Government does not possess any state 
power, and therefore can not decentralise state power and is circumscribed 
in the devolution of finances to the lower level.”169 Such conceptualisation of 
‘feasibility frontier’ has also received support from Lieten (2000).  “In my 
analysis,” as Lieten proceeds, “I shall keep in mind the ‘feasibility frontier’. 
The LFG is not an autonomous government, uninhibited by the Indian 
Constitution and by the relative strength of class forces and forces of 
production. The terms dictated by the Constitution and monitored by the 
federal government, by the President and by the Supreme Court, are 
obvious.... The idea of feasibility performance, and the assessment of the 
LFG for what it has done and not for what it ideally could have done and 
ethically should have done.... “170  
  
Needless to say financial autonomy of the PRIs is one of the necessary 
conditions for making local bodies function as self governance. But the 
State strongly feels that against the backdrop of the existing imbalance of 
fiscal power distribution between the Centre and the States the possibility of 
substantial empowerment of PRIs and providing self autonomy to PRIs so 
far financial and functional decentralisation is concerned is limited. 
Consequently other indirect means of mobilising funds by PRIs namely 
introduction of decentralisation of resource mobilisation programmes and 
encouragement of voluntary contribution of PRIs at best could be achieved 
subject to this constraint. As we have earlier mentioned that the WBSFCs 
report also seem to have followed the same line with the West Bengal 
government. Both the Commissions were also refrained themselves from 
                                                          
169 Quoted in Lieten, G.K, “ For a New Debate on West Bengal”, Mainstream, February 12, 
1994, p. 22 and also see Lieten, G.K,  Development, Devolution and Democracy Village 
Discourse in West Bengal, Sage Publication, 1996, p.232)  
170 Lieten, G.K, West Bengal After A Quarter Century LFG, Paper Presented at The 16th 
European Conference on Modern South Asian Studies, held at the University of Edinburgh, 
Scotland, September 6-9, 2000, p. 3 
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recommending substantial fiscal power devolution to the PRIs consequently  
acknowledged other form of indirect involvement of PRIs in resource 
mobilisation.  
 
Another measure of involving the PRIs in resource mobilisation so far taken 
in the State is voluntary contribution. It would be relevant to take note of the 
position of government of West Bengal in this matter. The State feels that 
the resource mobilisation effort of the Panchayats can not only be perceived 
in terms of monetary contribution but in terms of other important  
contributions made by them by undertaking public programmes  at the local 
level, thereby reducing cost of the State governments. The study 
undertaken by the then Chief Minister of West Bengal Jyoti Basu  admits, “it 
can not, however, be denied that the performance of Panchayat in respect 
of mobilisation of resources in terms of tax collection has not been very 
commendable”. But the study went on commenting “In respect of resource 
mobilisation by Panchayat in West Bengal it has to be kept in mind that 
Panchayat are playing a very useful catalyst role in raising local contribution 
and unleashing mass initiative for undertaking such public works as 
construction of small bridges and digging small canals for extending 
irrigation facilities etc. This can be regarded as an effort on the part of the 
Panchayats for mobilisation of resources in the sense that resource 
mobilisation is not an end in itself.” (Basu,1997, pp.80-83)  
 
Similar opinion was also expressed by the Minister of Panchayats of West 
Bengal, Dr. Surya Kanto Mishra along with Mr. Basu, “It is a fact that all 
three tiers of the Panchayats are overwhelmingly dependent on the 
government (union and state) for funds. Though our State Act provides for 
raising of tax and various non-tax revenues by the Panchayats, the scope of 
large scale resources mobilisations by the Panchayats is very limited. 
.......However, whatever taxation power are vested with Panchayats have 
also not been optimally used. Over the past few years, the average 
collection of taxes per Gram Panchaytas has been about Rs. 25, 000 which 
is almost insignificant as against average flow of Rs. 10 lakhs as grant. 
However, there has been a considerable amount of resource mobilisation 
through voluntary community contributions in the shape of free labour or 
material though the documentation of such contributions has been sketchy. 
It is noteworthy to mention that voluntary contributions give a sense of 
ownership through participation of the people whereas taxation still 
considered as a coercive measure. “ (Mishra, 2002, p.65) 
 
Moreover West Bengal government feels that indirect contribution of the 
PRIs in resource mobilisation  result in much lower cost of implementation 
of any scheme than otherwise thereby reducing cost of the State 
government. “It has also been noted from our internal surveys that the 
scheme executed by the Panchayat costs significantly less than technically 
similar schemes executed through the conventional procedures, primarily 
because of savings on account of avoidance of contractors and the 
supervision being voluntarily performed by the Panchayat members” (Jyoti 
Basu Speaks, Department of Information and Cultural Affairs, 1991, p. 82)  
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It , however, appears that at least some degree of financial autonomy which 
can be achieved through own resource mobilisation by the PRIs, can not be 
substituted by voluntary contribution of the PRIs in the form of unpaid 
labour, monitoring and implementing Panchayat schemes.  For such 
contributions alone could not help to provide any sort of self sufficiency to 
PRIs. At best that can only substantiate the fiscal powers of the PRIs. Study 
undertaken concerning this area also observes that “...apart from the things, 
it is generally the poorer sections of the community who would end up 
contributing most of free or partly paid labour, allowing the relatively better 
off sections free ride on them” (Ghatak & Ghatak, 2002, p. 56) 
 
The Mukarji & Bandyopadhyay Committee (1993) perceived that the crux of 
the problem of PRIs in West Bengal is conceptual limitation i.e., failing to 
see PRIs as an institution of self governance as it has been the case in the 
rest of India since Independence. This study, however, reveals that in West 
Bengal insignificant fiscal power provided to PRIs or failure of perceiving the 
PRIs as self governance is not only the outcome of conceptual limitation. 
But this limitation has been legitimised by referring to the existing imbalance 
of the distribution of power in general and fiscal power in particular in the 
Indian federation.  
Furthermore, it seems that that two facets of limitation--conceptual and 
programmatic are inter-twined with each other. There is no watertight 
compartmentalisation between these two. Progress of one side is 
dependent on at least some progress made of another side. Therefore the 
programmatic decentralisation of power to the PRIs would not be achieved 
significantly unless empowerment of PRIs (so as to make a self-
government) is  ensured. It appears that the conceptual limitation of the 
PRIs in West Bengal has led to further programmatic limitation.  
A recent inter-State study of Panchayat system undertaken by Jain (1999) 
and Rajaraman (2001) indicates that different States have gone further in 
terms of above mentioned parameters of decentralisation. Thus the degree 
of autonomy of PRIs achieved in other States within the given structure of 
Indian federation is far higher than what has been achieved by the PRIs of  
West Bengal. As we have already observed from the study undertaken by 
Rajaraman (2001) that own resource mobilisation capacity of the PRIs of 
some States are much higher than that in West Bengal. Besides, Jain 
(1999) observes, West Bengal is not only behind Kerala but also behind 
Madhya Pradesh and Karnataka in terms of following indicators such as 
power to prepare local plans, transfer of staff, control over staff and transfer 
of funds. (see Ghatak & Ghatak, 2002, p. 53) 
True, that the omnipotent presence of a unitary bias inherent in the Indian 
federal structure always exerts a limiting effect on the States attempting to 
proceed further in terms of decentralisation of power to the local bodies. 
While some scholars argue in favour of this  but others, however, feel that 
imbalance of distribution of power between the Centre and the States 
should not be any alibi for the States to deny decentralisation of power to 
the PRIs. “While the larger question of centre-state financial relations has to 
remain on the agenda, this should not be used as an excuse for the states 
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to delay or deny devolution of functions and finances to the local bodies” 
(Kannan,1993, p. 2645) Again, it is also argued that the existing trend of 
concentration of power at the hands of the States  would only be offset by 
increasing decentralisation of power to PRIs. “In order to contain the states 
to function within their proper spheres, it may be necessary to strengthen 
local governments which would counteract the increasing trends of 
centralisation in the working of the states. The demand for increased 
devolution of powers on the part of the states could be conceded only when 
it is corresponded by similar devolution to the local government level.” 
(Datta, 1987, p. 316) 
Contrary to the above observations, however, West Bengal government 
feels that the States in general  have been operating under the centripetal 
bias of the Indian federal system and therefore the decentralisation of 
power to the local bodies from the States is inevitably gets limited which 
making it difficult to realise the avowed objective of self governance status 
to PRIs in the arena of the State-local relations. What is possible in the 
given condition is to provide some programmatic/operational side of 
decentralisation. This argument also received support from the following 
study. As the study feels that any decentralisation from the State to local 
governments should be preceded by the decentralisation of power from the 
Centre to the States. Thus ..“does it make sense to speak of 
decentralisation of functions, authority and funds to the district and lower 
levels without such decentralisation from the centre to the states?.... 
Likewise in the realm of economic and financial relations, planning and 
decision making process have become exclusively centralised while the 
present constitutional arrangements and practices on the sharing of taxes 
between the centre and the states remain highly inequitable. ...The 
decentralisation process must begin with the centre shedding its power to 
the states, to be followed thereafter from the state government to PRIs.” 
(Chandrasekhar, 1989, p.1435 ) 
 
However,  despite the existence of predominantly unitary bias of the Indian 
federal structure, it is also true that the States have been constantly 
struggling against this trend with a view to change the balance of power in 
favour of the States particularly since the early 1980s. Different committees 
were set up with the initiative taken by the States as well as the Centre 
during the last few decades. Consequently any conflict arising in the arena 
of the Centre-State relations could no longer be resolved in an extra-
parliamentary manner bypassing statutory options as often done in the past. 
(Sathyamurthy,1989) Thus Centre-State relations has undergone 
considerable change since Independence and the States are now in a 
position of strength to raise their voice against any unitary trend of federal-
State relations in general and federal-State fiscal relations in particular. So 
Centre-State relations as well as States-local relations should be 
understood from this dynamic context of the federal-State relations in India 
rather than a static one. Due attention should also be paid to ensure local 
government’s autonomy, at least partial, while demanding more 
decentralisation of power from the Centre.  
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Decentralisation of power should be actively pursued by the States not only 
for the sake of empowering the PRIs but also with a view to reduce the 
burden on the State government’s exchequer for running these bodies. That 
could be attained by decentralising functions, functionaries and financial 
power to local bodies. The organisation of decentralised planning should be 
preceded at least by some degree of fiscal autonomy of PRIs in order to 
ensure that local needs and priorities be reflected properly. Which 
consequently would reduce acute intra-State inequity in general and West 
Bengal in particular and would eventually enhance the quality of public 
services in the rural area.   
 
Resource raising potential of the PRIs of West Bengal 
 
Much to the people of West Bengal’s surprise there seems to be a 
considerable shift from the previous position of the State as regards 
devolution of financial power to PRIs. A circulation dated 14th October 2003 
given by the Panchayat and Village Development Department, West Bengal 
stated: Panchayats should be economically self sufficient and over time 
PRIs should minimise it’s dependence on the State government for funds. 
That goes without saying that if PRIs do not have any fiscal power and only 
depends on the higher level of governments for funds and confine itself to 
implementing schemes handed down from the above it would fail to take 
any independent initiative of formulating development programmes in the 
respective rural area. Therefore, Panchayat should find it’s own way to 
mobilise own resources instead of depending for funds either on the State 
or on the Centre. The potential source of income of Panchayats which have 
so far been lying unutilised needs to be exploited completely so that 
resource base of Panchayat could be expanded considerably. Panchayats 
should take necessary attempt to construct by laws that would in turn 
enable them to impose optional fees. Article 223 of the West Bengal 
Panchayat Act 1973, empowered Panchayats to make such bylaws. And 
according to the amendment to the West Bengal Panchayat Act 2003 
construction of such by laws by the Panchaytas was made obligatory. By 
laws should be made in such a manner that it should be in accordance with 
the spirit  of the Panchayat Act of West Bengal. Panchayat could amend 
such by laws if it is necessary. After making such bylaws Panchayats are 
required to send it to West Bengal government. If the government feels that 
such by laws are in contradiction with the spirit of the Panchayat Act of 
West Bengal the State under this circumstance would cancel those bylaws.  
 
However, the circulation seem to confine itself to providing necessary 
condition of constructing bylaws which would help Panchayats to impose 
optional fees in the rural areas and did not take much consideration of other 
large areas of tax and non-tax potential of the PRIs. Nevertheless such 
steps, how small it is, should be heartily welcomed. In view of the above 
development we need to discuss vast  potential resource base of PRIs 
which have remained unutilised and need to be also exploited along with 
constructing by laws in order to enable Panchayts to impose optional fees 
on items listed in the West Bengal Panchayat Act.  
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More than one decade ago It was acknowledged by Mukarji & 
Bandyopadhyay Committee,1993; and later on different studies pursued by 
WBFSFC, 1995; Mitra (1996) and Jena (1999) that  that there is a fair 
possibility of going above near-zero autonomy of PRIs of West Bengal. 
Though there are some constraints of raising revenue for local level 
governments in general, it is not the case that virtually no resources can be 
raised. The constraints are legal, political and administrative. But despite 
these constraints there is a possibility of attaining at least some degree of 
self sufficiency.   
Dependence of the local government on the State for resources was first 
categorically pointed out by Mukarji & Bandyopadhyay Committee (1993). 
The committee felt that in West Bengal, Panchayats are not at all  
concerned about self reliance. More or less all Panchayats in West Bengal 
raise only about 1% of their total expenditure. The Panchayats seem to 
become a spending only agencies of money received from above. (Mukarji 
& Bandyopadhyay Committee,1993, p. 10) Studies undertaken by Mitra 
(1996) and Jena (1999) on Panchayat finance of West Bengal hold the 
same view. These studies indicated that over the years there is a definite 
improvement in the revenue base of Panchayats but this can be attributed 
to the grants-in-aid received from the State. 
 
Percentage of own resources of the Gram Panchayat (GP) in this State 
constitutes on an average 7.1 per cent of its total receipts. (Jena, 1999, p. 
143) In spite of some potential of revenue raising, GPs have remained 
totally dependent on the State government for their financing requirements. 
Since there is no in-built compulsion to mobilise their own revenue for 
running their administration. It is to be noted that the GPs dependency on 
the State government for grants is about  92 percent for both development 
schemes and establishment grants. (Jena,1999, p.143)   
 
However, degree of dependence on the State for funds in the case of Zila 
Parishads (ZPs) and Panchayat Samiti (PSs)  are much higher than GPs. 
(WBSFC, 1995, p. 19 &  Jena,1999, pp. 144-145) There has been a virtual 
absence of own revenue mobilisation efforts of Panchayat Samiti resulting 
in a total dependence of PS’s on the State government for grants. (Jena, 
1999, p. 144) The major source of revenue for Zila Parishad comes from 
schematic grants which constitute on an average 97 per cent during the 
period of 1991-96. The contribution of own resources in the total receipts of 
Zila Parishads has been less than 1 per cent and also over time which has 
been showing declining trend. (Jena, 1999, p. 145)  
 
Therefore, the gap between total demand and total collection of taxes has 
widened over time reflecting a definite trend of under-utilisation of the fiscal 
capacity of different tiers of Panchayats of the State. (Mitra, 1996, p. 160) 
Such passivity is more evident at the PCs and ZPs levels than at the GPs 
levels. Which is also evident from the observation made by the WBSSFC 
(2002). “Firstly GPs were found to utilise funds more speedily than other 
tiers of Panchayats. The range of expenditure for the GPs varied between 
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Rs. 4 lakh to Rs. lakh per year. Secondly, given the constraint of varying 
resource potential, the GPs have better record of own resource mobilisation 
than in other tiers.”  (WBSSFC, 2002, p. 15)  
 
It is true that there are some problem faced by PRIs in generating 
resources. But it is not true that virtually no resources could be raised.  
However, potential revenue sources of PRIs could be divided into five 
categories i.e., own revenue (as assigned at par with the Act), shared 
revenue, optional fees and rates i.e., user charges, grants and  others 
prospective areas of revenues. (see chart 3). The problem regarding own 
resource mobilisation of PRIs of West Bengal are summarised as follows: 
 
1. Lack of adequate structure of tax collecting machinery  
2. Under-utilisation of tax potential of PRIs due to being proximate to the 
people and encroachment of the State on traditional  tax domain of PRIs 
3. Overlapping taxing power of three tiers (GPs, PSs, & ZPs) of local 
governments leads to further under-utilisation of financial power of PRIs.  
4. Untapped potential resource base of PRIs consequent upon agricultural 
development of the State 
5. Absence of any initiative taken by PRIs in respect to exploiting non-tax 
revenue potential of local fiscal domain 
6. Absence of proper technical, legal and administrative guidance from the 
State as regards levying user charges or optional fees, rates and tolls. 
Therefore, such optional fees could not be levied by GPs unless by-laws 
are constructed to put that financial power into effect 
 
(i) Lack of adequate structure of tax collecting machinery  
One of the reasons of poor tax collection in the State is the lack of adequate 
machinery for collecting tax. In West Bengal there is a provision to appoint 
“collecting sarkars” or “bill collectors” under the rule 33 of the Gram 
Panchayat. It is observed that for many of the “collecting sarkars” tax 
collection for Panchayat is a part time job and usually they are employed 
elsewhere. Therefore they can not be expected to take up the tax collection 
job on a full time basis as the total remuneration they get in a year is 
negligible amount due to low level of collections. This is one of the factors 
which contribute to poor tax collection and accumulation of arrears 
indicating the average collection rate around 55 per cent of the total 
demand. (Jena,  1999, pp. 93-94) 
(ii) Under valuation of tax potential of PRIs and encroachment of the State 
on traditional  tax domain of PRIs 
Two types of taxation power are entrusted to GPs by the West Bengal 
Panchayat Act of 1973 namely obligatory taxes and optional fees. Tax on 
land and buildings under section 46 (1) (a) of the West Bengal Panchayat 
Act, 1973 is one of the most important taxes at GPs level. At present the 
problem of tax on land and buildings is under-assessment of the land and 
buildings. Therefore lack of adequate machinery of proper valuation of 
properties situated in rural area prevents GPs from realising significant 
amount of resources. (Mukarji & Bandyopadhyay, 1993 & Jena, 1999)  It is 
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observed that even at the lower valuation of the property  the tax rate on 
land and buildings is fixed at a significantly lower level. However, it is 
difficult to expect objectivity from the Panchayat members for valuation of 
land and buildings due to their proximity to the people. It is suggested by 
Jena (1999) that such valuation of property should be entrusted to a body 
which is both impartial and has expertise of doing that. If it is properly done 
the tax on land and building could be one of the buoyant sources of revenue 
of GPs of the State. (Jena, 1999, pp. 89-90)   
Additional stamp duty under the section 46 (5) (a) and entertainment tax 
under the section 46 (5) (b) are also assigned to GPs following the West 
Bengal Panchayat Act, 1973. The problem of generating considerable 
amount of resources from additional stamp duty is that there is a very little 
scope for property transfers in rural areas. Furthermore, entertainment tax 
and additional stamp duty have not been exploited properly over the last 
seventeen years by the GPs and it is for the State government to frame 
appropriate rules and enforce legal provisions so that GPs would be able to 
exploit such financial power. (WBSFC, 1995, p.19)  
 
Thus these provisions remained unutilised so far due to lack of rules to be 
framed by the State government. Interestingly enough instead of taking 
necessary initiative to do so the State started encroaching upon the 
traditional tax domain of local bodies by bringing entertainment tax in the 
tax domain of the State and sharing a negligible proceeds from the 
entertainment tax with PRIs. The First State Finance Commission of West 
Bengal (WBFSFC) 1995, however, recommended that entertainment tax 
should be returned to the local bodies instead of sharing small part with 
them.  
Following the recommendation of the WBFSFC (1995) the State 
government transferred 90 per cent of the proceeds from entertainment tax. 
Though, as the Second State Finance Commission of West Bengal, 2002 
feels,  almost entire amount of the revenue collected on this account is 
being passed on to the local bodies, this tax has not been assigned to them.  
It was, however, expressed by the State government during the discussion 
held between the WBSSFC (2002) and the State that the power of 
imposition of entertainment tax was not passed onto the local bodies 
because the State government already had elaborate machinery for 
collection of this tax. which would become redundant if this taxing power 
was given to the local bodies. (WBSSFC, 2002, p. 9) 
However, profession tax which was one of the important taxes of local 
bodies was also encroached upon by the State. The West Bengal 
Panchayat Act, 1973 empowered PRIs to impose parallel Tax on Profession 
and Employment  under the section 46 (1) (b). But it was deleted during the 
1992 amendment to the Panchayat Act in line with decision of the State 
government to levy a ‘Single point’ Profession Tax. (WBSFC, 1995, p. 19) 
Apart from own tax domain of PRIs of West Bengal, it also entitled to 
receive proceeds from some resources which are levied and collected by 
the State but shared with local bodies. Of which land revenue and cess on 
land revenue are to be mentioned. The ZPs are mainly entitled to receive 
certain assigned revenues like 5 per cent share of land revenue and road 
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cess and public works cess. However, some problems related to devolution 
and collection of land revenue and cess prevent these resources from being 
a significant source of income of local bodies of the State. Firstly, land 
revenue and collection of cess until the introduction of West Bengal Land 
Reforms (Amendment) Act, 2000  was not a significant source of revenue. 
And over the years the collection of cess became very poor. As Rajaraman 
(1996) observes “The lack of interest of state governments in restructuring 
the land revenue is due far more to the fact of it being a shared tax, as to 
the political difficulties of taxing agriculture.”  (Rajaraman, 1996, p.1076) 
It is heartening to note that the collection of land revenue of the State in 
recent years started increasing significantly due to upward restructuring of 
land revenue through the introduction of West Bengal Land Reforms 
(Amendment) Act, 2000. Consequently the percentage rate of growth of 
land revenue collection of the State increased from 27.35 in 1995-96 to 
244.1 during 2000-01 (WBSSFC, 2002, p. 8). Evidently collection of cess on 
land revenue also registered significant growth and it  increased from Rs. 1, 
42, 74, 258 crores in 1998-99 to Rs. 2, 52, 72, 600 crores in 2000-01 i.e., 
77 per cent increase over last three financial years. (WBSSFC, 2002, p. 10) 
The other problem was, however, in respect to the proper mechanism of 
sharing of the proceeds from the land revenue and cess between the State 
and local bodies i.e., different ZPs of the State. As regards sharing of the 
proceeds from land revenue with Panchayats Rajaraman (1995) feels that it 
is most usually not by origin (jurisdiction of collection) but by formula. The 
formula may be fairly simple in proportion to population for example but any 
departure from sharing by jurisdiction takes away all local interest in 
compliance or enforcement.  “If land revenue continues to be shared state–
level tax it should be shared by jurisdiction.” (Rajaraman, 1996, p. 1076) In 
West Bengal along with the most States land revenue continue to be shared 
by the formula not by the origin thereby neutralising any incentive of 
collection of land revenue from the districts. 
As regards sharing the proceeds from cess on land revenue, it is noticed 
that the shared revenue also failed to become predictable source of income 
of local bodies. While the present arrangement of sharing cess is 
cumbersome and time consuming. (WBSSFC, 2002, p. 10) Moreover, 
collection of these cesses varies from year to year and district to district. 
(Jena, 1999, p. 50) Therefore, though the income of certain ZPs (such as 
Burdwan ZP) is significant on this count, cess collection are very unevenly 
distributed amongst the districts of the State. (WBSFC, 1995, pp. 19-20). In 
order to overcome such difficulty WBSSFC (2002)  recommend that powers 
to collect land revenue and cesses and to retain them be devolved to the 
local bodies. In that case it may be necessary for the local bodies to suitably 
strengthen their revenue collection machinery. (WBSSFC, 2002, p. 10) 
(iii) Problem of overlapping areas of tax domain of different tiers of PRIs  
The main problem of PSs and ZPs is that the functional domain of these 
two bodies are not clearly separated. Often it shows overlapping areas of 
taxes and duties imposed by both of these tiers which leads to confusion 
and passivity of utilising their financial power. Therefore degree of 
dependence of these two bodies on the State for funds and assigned 
revenues are much higher than GPs. However, Panchayat Samitis (PS) 
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have discretionary power to levy tolls on roads/bridges/ferries maintained by 
them. Besides that PSs can also levy rates on water and lighting where 
such services are provided by them. And fees for registration of vehicle, 
sanitary arrangements at fairs and license fees for markets.  Needless to 
say, such fiscal powers are hardly utilised at PSs level. Zila Parishads (ZP) 
in the State have no obligatory powers of taxation. The fiscal power of Zila 
Parishads are more or less in conformity with those Panchayat Samitis. 
They possess certain revenue raising powers which include tolls, rates and 
fees under the section of 181 of West Bengal Panchayat Act 1973.  
(iv) Other potential resource base of PRIs on account of agricultural 
development of the State  
Having been voted to power Left Front the government concentrated on 
breaking the impasse in agriculture through institutional change in rural 
area. But it seems that PRIs of the State has failed to exploit potential 
resources arose from the surplus generated in agricultural production. A 
cross section of villagers and the leaders expressed that people are willing 
to pay agricultural income tax if the responsibilities of collection is entrusted 
to PRIs. At present only agricultural income tax171 is imposed in plantation 
areas in the State. (Jena,  1999, p.98) 
Mukerji & Bandyopadhyay Committee, 1993, feels that in West Bengal 
agricultural growth has witnessed marketable surpluses. Marketable 
surpluses will go up in the future because agricultural development has 
been receiving organised thrust. Now in this context, if agricultural 
marketing arrangements cant keep pace with rising productivity they will act 
as constraint on growth of agriculture. However, it seems that organised 
agricultural market would not only conducive for agricultural growth but also 
it would create considerable potential for PRIs to mobilise resources 
through market fee.  (Mukerji & Bandyopadhyay Committee, 1993, p. 27) At 
present these markets are organised under statutory provisions and 
Panchayats do not receive any revenue out of it. (Jena, 1999, pp. 100) Only 
in Punjab agricultural markets contribute a portion to rural development as 
                                                          
171 K.N Raj Committee on Agricultural Wealth and Income (1972) first proposed direct tax 
on agriculture through ‘Agricultural Holding Tax’. After that Bagchi (1978) suggested 
modified view about the agricultural income tax. (Bagchi, A, “Agricultural Holdings Tax a 
Modified Scheme”, EPW, 23rd September, 1978) Later on Rajaraman & Bhende (1998) 
proposed another modified version of imposing tax on agriculture. (Rajaraman, I,  & 
Bhende M.J, A land-Based Agricultural Presumptive Tax Designed for levy by Panchayats, 
EPW, April 4, 1998) The necessity of imposing agricultural income tax is mainly due to the 
fact that there is a distinct trend over the last few decades of a declining proportion of direct 
taxes on agriculture (Land Revenue and Agricultural income tax) to the total direct tax 
revenue (Centre, State, Union Territories). Contrary to that, major share of agriculture and 
allied activities in total plan outlays of India over the Plan periods are being allotted in 
agriculture. (Mondal, S.K, Tax on Agricultural Income in India: An Estimate of Revenue 
Potential (1975-76 to 1981-82), Journal of Social and Economic Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1,  
January-March, 1985, pp.13-14, )  The group of economists suggested similar type of 
imposition of agricultural income tax in West Bengal. It is noticed that the farmers 
particularly belong to the  middle and upper income groups normlly enjoy various subsidies 
in agricultural provided by the State government. This subsidy coupled with institutional 
change in rural West Bengal contributed to agricultural growth in the State during the last 
two decades. Middle and upper income groups farmers benefited most due to this uptrend 
in the agricultural growth therefore this section should come under the tax net. (Ananda 
Bazar Patrika, Bengali Daily, Calcutta, 13th July, 2002)  
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Panchayats impose market fee and charges on transactions. Similar market 
fee and charges should be entrusted to Panchayats in West Bengal  with a 
view to augment the resource base of PRIs. (Jena, 1999, p. 100 ) 
However, WBFSFC (1995) had different suggestions in this regard. The 
Commission noticed that considerable resources are being generated 
through setting up Regulated Markets in many districts of the State 
following the West Bengal Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 
1972 by levying market fees. But such resource generated in the Regulated 
Markets, as WBFSFC feels,  should be brought within the purview of the 
statutory District Planning Committee (DPC) and the net proceeds of market 
fees be ploughed back into the hinterlands of such markets. (WBSFC, 
1995, p. 9)  
(v)Absence of any initiative taken by PRIs in respect to exploiting non-tax 
revenue potential of local fiscal domain 
Unutilised non-tax revenue sources also could provide considerable 
potentials to raise significant amount of revenue of different tiers of PRIs. 
For example, Zila Parishads (ZPs) have valuable lands and buildings 
inherited from the old District Boards which, efficiently and commercially 
managed could strengthen the revenue base of ZPs. Social forestry 
sponsored by the Panchayats has already generated assets that will keep 
growing and could provide GPs with steadily rising revenues. Due attention 
should also be paid to fishery schemes sponsored by the Panchayats that 
have also created assets. Which if professionally managed and exploited 
could not only benefit fishing community but could generate good revenues. 
(Mukerji & Bandyopadhyay Committee, 1993, p. 10)   Another source of 
non-tax revenue could be leasing out watershed and irrigation sources. A 
water rate on irrigation as per the Panchayat Act should be imposed by 
Panchayat and collected by them. Besides that non-tax sources like utilising 
“khas lands” and tanks for fishing, horticulture and social forestry, have the 
potential to contribute to Panchayat resources. These sources should be 
tapped efficiently. (Jena, 1999, p. 98) 
(vi) Lack of bylaws as regards optional fees 
Gram Panchayats (GPs) of West Bengal are also entitled to levy some 
optional taxes, levy of rates and fees such as rates for water, fee for 
providing sanitary arrangement,  lighting rate, fees on the registration of 
non-motorised vehicles, tolls on roads/bridges/ferries maintained by GPs.  
But most of these sources of revenue have not been properly exploited so 
far. (WBSFC, 1995, p. 19) As it was also acknowledged by the Second 
State Finance Commission of West Bengal (2002).  However, one of the 
major constraints of Panchaytas in West Bengal to  impose such  rates, tolls 
and optional fees was lack of by-laws. Therefore, resources as mentioned 
above could not be levied by GPs unless by-laws are constructed to put that 
financial power into effect. The State government has to fix minimum and 
maximum rate for the purpose. But this was so far delayed by the State 
government and the potential income of GPs could not be mobilised. 
As mentioned above there seems to be a considerable shift from the 
previous position of the State as regards talking initiative of constructing 
such by laws. Thus in order to provide a concrete guideline to GPs, West 
Bengal Panchayat and Village Development Department constructed a 
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standard instruction which were sent to all Panchayts of the State so that 
they can take an initiative to construct necessary by laws. That would in turn 
enable them to impose different rates, tolls and optional fees on villagers. 
Therefore, lists of prospective areas of tolls and optional fees and the rate 
at which these could be imposed was also attached to this circulation. 
Which is, however, supposed to be sanctioned by each Village Council 
comprises total number of electorates of a village in order to empower GPs 
to impose tolls and optional fees in respective villages. 
Evidently, protest from different sections of people including main 
opposition political parties of West Bengal prevented this circulation from 
being implemented till date. It was argued that the government of West 
Bengal unduly imposing non-tax burden on vulnerable section of villagers 
while bypassing the attempt of taxing rural rich. According to knowledgeable 
sources the Left Front government will make an attempt to encourage GPs 
to construct such bylaws necessary for exploiting aforementioned resources 
optional fees in their respective jurisdiction soon after the Parliament 
election which is scheduled to be held in May 2004.  
However, it remains to be seen how many Gram Panchayats (GPs) in West 
Bengal finally managed to get such bylaws sanctioned by Village Council of 
a particular village. What kind of resistance were faced by GPs in 
constructing such bylaws i.e., which provisions of optional fees were 
acceptable to village people and which seemed to hurt the vulnerable 
section as complained by poor villagers as well as opposition parties. After 
exploiting different optional fees, rates and tolls what would be potential 
revenue base of GPs. To what extent it would minimise their dependence  
on the State government for funds i.e., what would be the proportion of own 
revenue (tax and non-tax) to total revenue collection of GPs. 
 
Conclusion 
 
West Bengal is among  the second generation of States in Panchayat 
movement and introduced politicised Panchayat with conducting election at 
regular intervals. Such political decentralisation coupled with administrative 
decentralisation i.e., adequate emphasis on curbing the role of bureaucracy, 
perceiving rural poor as active participants rather than passive agents in the 
process of execution of the rural programmes and introduction of 
decentralised planning,1985 marked the beginning of revitalisation of the 
PRIs since the late 1970s and significantly put this State ahead of other 
State governments of India.  
However, in course of time it was increasingly felt that West Bengal PRIs 
had failed to live up to the expectation and consequently lagging behind 
some States in terms of degree of decentralisation. The criticism of West 
Bengal PRIs has given rise to two types of debates. One is the point of view 
of ‘feasibility frontier’ introduced by Lieten, Datta and West Bengal 
government itself and another one is that of self governance. The 
advocates of the ‘feasibility frontier’ argued that West Bengal, having to 
operate under Indian union facing several limiting factors--constitutional, 
structural and so on which limits the State government in furthering the 
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process of decentralisation to the PRIs. Therefore, the performance of West 
Bengal’s PRIs should be judged in the light of such constraints rather than 
any ideal conceptualisation of self governance as Gandhi and the 73rd & 
74th amendment to the Constitution, 1993 had envisaged. Subject to this 
limitation or feasibility performance, they felt,  West Bengal’s PRIs 
performed quite well and hence may be considered to have elevated to self 
governance. On the other hand the position harping on self governance 
debate mainly has two ramifications. One group Bhattacharya and Maiti 
focused on true enfranchisement of the rural poor i.e., adequate 
representation, participation and decision making power of them in the PRIs 
of West Bengal. And another group of self governance dwells on the 
functional and financial empowerment of PRIs. The advocates of self 
governance in terms of political empowerment of PRIs however, argue that 
grass root democracy is yet to take place in West Bengal where real 
decision making power is not enjoyed by the common people. By and large 
PRIs are being perceived as implementing agencies of programmes 
handed down from above as it has been existing since independence in the 
rest of India and also in other States. The notion pursued in West Bengal is 
not really different on any account. The decentralisation is more in form 
than in essence and this developmental agency role of PRIs of West Bengal 
can not be considered as end in itself. PRIs are mainly perceived as a 
means of strengthening the political base of the Communist party and so 
that they can exercise complete control over it. Decentralisation and 
centralisation are thus two parallel process  in West Bengal.  
 
The self governance debate advocating financial and functional  
empowerment, however, centres around the notion that West Bengal PRIs 
have been suffering from two limitations--conceptual and programmatic. It is 
argued that the PRIs in West Bengal were not provided with sufficient 
financial and functional power and hence have failed to be elevated to the 
level of self governance. While self governance is synonymous with 
financial and functional self reliance. The conceptual limitation as described 
by the Mukarji and Bandyopadhyay Committee is not a mere limitation of 
the State that could be overcomed in course of time.  The present study, 
however, reveals that such limitation are legitimised by the logic of 
‘feasibility frontier’ which leads to further programmatic limitation. In other 
words, programmatic limitation is an extension of the conceptual limitation. 
In this context it would worth noting that the degree of functional, financial 
and administrative decentralisation achieved in other Indian States subject 
to the structural limitation faced by the States is significantly higher than that 
in West Bengal.  
 
The discussion of decentralisation of power is, however, relevant against 
the backdrop of severe financial crisis facing by all the States during the last 
one and half decades. Such financial crisis resulted in allocation of 
inadequate funds for public services to be provided in the rural sectors. 
Such lack of fund coupled with low level the supervision and lack of 
involvement of the PRIs deteriorated further the quality of these public 
services. It is argued that decentralisation of power to the PRIs would not 
only improve these services but also would relieve the burden on the State 
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government of running these departments of local nature. Furthermore,  if 
the establishment cost of the PRIs are borne by these bodies themselves 
the burden on the State governments as well as on Central government for 
running PRIs will be substantially reduced. That is particularly relevant in 
the light of the fact that the Centre also has been facing severe economic 
crisis resulted in low level financial flow from the Centre to the States.  
 
Against this urgent need of decentralisation of financial and functional 
power to PRIs, West Bengal government following the notion of feasibility 
frontier tend to pursue the path of indirect hence insignificant financial 
empowerment of PRIs and limited administrative and functional 
decentralisation. As regards the financial power decentralisation the 
government starts with the axiom that local bodies should be helped with 
adequate funds from above and consequently asked the Centre to provide 
funds to the State for helping PRIs to function as self governance. Thus the 
State focused on providing grants and pursuing indirect form of financial 
empowerment of the PRIs  such as decentralisation of revenue mobilisation 
scheme, voluntary contribution of the PRIs instead of taking adequate 
administrative, legal, organisational measures to tap unexploited revenue 
potential for the PRIs. The West Bengal State Finance Commissions seem 
to have mainly followed the notion pursued by the West Bengal government 
so far. It has confined itself primarily to revenue sharing formula in the form 
of ‘Entitlement’. Which is nothing but redeployment of funds along with 
some suggestion in regard exploiting of existing potential of resource of the 
PRIs.  
However, recently the government of West Bengal took an initiative to 
enhance the fiscal power of the PRIs as regards imposing user charges 
which was so far remain unutilised due to lack of necessary guidance to be 
provided by the State while leaving vast potential of resource mobilisation 
by PRIs unattended.  Whatever little the effort may be such attempt should 
be heartily welcomed and can be expected that it would eventually further 
the process of fiscal decentralisation of the PRIs of West Bengal.   
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Conclusion 
 
Discrimination against a State is itself a value judgemental and a subjective 
term which is quite difficult to quantify to any one’s satisfaction. Such 
discrimination, however, could on the one hand be deliberate, State 
specific, politically motivated or guided by other motives. On the other hand 
it could be part of the general discrimination faced by all States (of course in 
different degree) belonging to a particular unfavourable structure. 
Therefore, this discrimination may not necessarily be directed against a 
particular State but against the States as a whole.  
 
As far as fiscal federal relations in India and hence functions of two multiple 
resource transfer agencies are concerned they seem to discriminate against 
the States in general by providing more power to the Centre. Moreover, the 
Centre exercises enormous control over these bodies through the terms of 
reference dictated to the Finance Commission and through other directives 
to the Planning Commission in order to retain more fiscal power. This 
consequently leads to centripetal bias in the Indian federation. Such 
centralised tendency was guided by the notion of giving greater power to 
the Centre by depriving States in general; in this deprivation all States are 
treated equal. Therefore, it seems to us that it is mainly directed against the 
States as a whole in an attempt to strengthen the Centre and not directed 
against a particular State.  
 
In this omnipotent Centripetal bias of the Indian federation which tends to 
accentuate the vertical imbalance i.e., the imbalance of fiscal power 
between the States and Centre, less developed States are more adversely 
affected than the richer States aggravating inter-State i.e., horizontal 
imbalance in the Indian federation. This is despite the fact that the Finance 
Commission and the Planning Commission within their limited autonomy 
are constantly on the look out for suitable criteria for resource devolution 
among the States in order to redress the ever widening regional imbalance.  
 
The reason behind such widening regional disparities is found in the 
structural constraints of the Indian economy. Deep-seated regional 
imbalance existing from the pre-Independence days due to different land 
settlement, and public investment policies coupled with different degrees of 
commercial penetration into different regions ,however, shaped the future 
development of the States during the post-Independence days. Therefore, 
the States started their journey since Independence  at  different 
development stages and variations of the resource mobilising potential. 
Such a legacy of inter-State imbalance combined with the operational 
failure of federal fiscal relations in India seems to have aggravated the pre-
existing inter-State inequality further.   
 
Among the major operational failures of fiscal federal relations of India, it 
should be noted that discretionary budgetary transfers along with other 
institutional transfers disbursed through Centrally controlled financial 
institutions have a high degree of regressivity. Conversely statutory 
transfers made through the Finance Commission and formula based Plan 
transfers made through the Planning Commission are said to be less 
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regressive than other transfers. But such limited progressivity of statutory 
transfers and formula based (Gadgil Formula introduced since 1969) Plan 
transfers are being offset by the situation that over time non-formula based 
discretionary transfers along with transfers made by the Centrally controlled 
financial institutions have been gaining importance over such formula based 
transfers and statutory transfers. Evidently, the larger the volume of 
discretionary transfers in federal fiscal devolution the more unequal would 
be total transfers among the States per se. Thus richer States are quite 
expectedly  in a better position to attract financial assistance made through 
the Centrally controlled financial institutions, large allocation of Plan outlay 
and other forms of budgetary transfers.  
 
Regional inequality which has been deeply rooted in India’s economy can 
not be eradicated by only injecting limited progressivity in  the statutory and 
formula based Plan transfers (Gadgil formula has been changed three times 
since its inception (1969) in order to inject more progressivity into it) But it 
needs a radical approach to deal with this problem. Seemingly, the 
objective of attaining  regional equality could be achieved not only through 
devolving more fiscal resources through better criteria for the devolution of 
resources among the States but also providing more fiscal power to the 
States in general and less developed States in particular. This would 
eventually enhance resource mobilising potential of the less developed 
States and enable them to catch up with the high income States and also 
would bring parity in the stage of development of different States.  
 
Without having such a radical approach to address such deep seated 
regional imbalance, the laws of market will obviously take upper hand. It 
would be the market that would eventually determine the volume of financial 
transfers among the States. Therefore, in spite of the professed goal of the 
Indian federation to be guided by the egalitarian motive, ultimately it is the 
market which would  be the main determinant of the allocation of resources 
among the States. The more advanced the economy, the more 
industrialisation and the more trading and economic activities and hence a 
higher level of allocation of institutional finance and thus better provision for 
infrastructure.  This would automatically lead to the high resource mobilising 
potential of these rich income States and hence larger Plan allocation and 
other forms of financial assistance. Furthermore, this would result in a 
higher level of resource mobilisation potential of these advanced States 
compared to the less developed States.  
 
It should not be overlooked that there is of course some room for political 
influence and manipulation  in attracting investment both from private and 
public purses into respective regions through manipulating either 
government’s policies, financial assistance from Centrally controlled 
financial institutions and commercial banks and/or attracting private 
investment, through better connections and influence. In addition, an 
advanced region with same political party both ruling at Centre and the 
State seems to strengthen such non-economic factors determining the 
degree of favour enjoyed by that particular State. But there seems to be no 
omnipotent political influence in the matter of attracting larger volumes of 
financial assistance into a particular region. On the other hand, economic 
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influence appears to play a dominating role. This study reveals that there is 
a strong positive association between stages of development and total 
resource disbursed.  
 
Since the early 1980s, it has been perceived that some States are ruled by 
Parties which were in opposition to the party ruling at the Centre. Such 
political opposition, however, could not stop them from making progress. 
For example, southern States have been since the late 1970s and the early 
1980s belonged to strong anti-Centre block and witnessed anti-Congress 
government since 1980s. Despite such political opposition, these States 
registered considerable growth in terms of all economic indicators during 
the  last several decades. Conversely, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar which have 
for longer time ruled by the same political party i.e., Congress, both at the 
States as well as at the Centre, remained in the same position as before. In 
some areas they even registered sharp declines. Therefore, by and large 
some States were relatively advanced and made stronger  progress than 
others irrespective of their political colour. Thus there hardly appears to be 
any strong positive association between political parties and economic 
development through comparatively larger allocation of resources to these 
States. However, it would be worthwhile to undertake inter-disciplinary 
study in order to deepen our understanding whether there is any, whatever 
negligible it may be,  correlation between political opposition and volume of 
resource devolution among the different regions.  
 
Considering the State of West Bengal, we can observe that from the very 
outset the State carried the legacy of deeply rooted structural constraints of 
its economy which accentuated its deterioration in terms of almost all 
economic indicators since the mid-1960s. Until then the State was grouped 
under the rich income States and managed to secure a relatively better 
position in terms of attracting resources. But eventually the State registered 
decline much more sharply and consistently compared to other States over 
the last several decades and started being grouped under the middle 
income States. As the State deteriorated, total transfers of resources 
deteriorated. The State witnessed such deterioration not only since 1977 
when the Left Front government came to power but also during the pre-Left 
Front era when the same political party ruled both at the State and the 
Centre. But, it is worthwhile to note that at the same time the State secured 
much better position than that of poor income States. Therefore, West 
Bengal being a middle income State in the Indian federation since the late 
1970s became the victim of regressive structure of the Indian federation 
while at the same time managed to be far ahead of other less developed 
States. Evidently, these less developed States seem to be much more 
victimised and attained much worse position both compared to the rich 
income States as well as the middle income States in the regressive 
structure of resource transfers of the Indian federation.  
 
Economic deterioration of the State’s economy was further accentuated due 
to its typical structural constraints i.e., absence of regionally committed 
industrialists who play a catalyst role in the Indian federation to attract 
resources into respective region. Therefore law of market hence economic 
factors and other non-economic factors were hardly in favour of the State. 
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Eventually, the sharp deterioration of its economy was interpreted in terms 
of being politically motivated discrimination against the State since the Left 
Front government came to power.  
 
The discourse of discrimination thus could be viewed against two different 
constraints constituted on West Bengal, one is economic and historical and 
other one is related to centripetal bias of the Indian federation. Therefore, 
continuous economic deterioration of West Bengal could be interpreted in 
terms of regressive structure of federal fiscal set up of India on the one 
hand and on the other basic historical conditions which constituted 
constraints on West Bengal’s development such as the export orientation of 
Bengal’s economy, absence of regionally committed enterprises. 
Furthermore, after Independence protectionism and import substitution 
policy were imposed on the whole country. And thus benefited such States 
which had even earlier concentrated on production for the home market. 
Whereas Bengal would have benefited from a policy favouring export-led 
growth.   
 
So far as the existing institutional mechanism for the transfers of resources 
from the Centre to the States are concerned, such transfer of resources is 
basically unjust and contains centripetal bias. Moreover, such institutional 
mechanism for the transfers of resources from the Centre to the States 
clearly discriminates against poor and middle income States in which West 
Bengal belongs to. Therefore, existing federal financial system of India did 
not actually discriminate against West Bengal as such but imposed uniform 
rules. On account of which West Bengal was not negatively discriminated 
against but the existing mechanism also does not permit positive 
discrimination in favour of the disadvantaged States including West Bengal.    
 
The State, however, argues that the cause of the present deterioration of 
West Bengal is mainly due to politically motivated and discriminatory 
Central policies pursued since 1977 when the Left Front came to power. 
Ashok Mitra, the then Finance Minister of West Bengal, argued that the 
State was discriminated against while it was denied enough budgetary 
resources, adequate share of industrial licences, and financial assistance 
which resulted in low level of economic activities and low level of resource 
mobilisation potential of the State.  Moreover, on the pretext of low level of 
resource mobilising potential of the State further low level of allocation of 
Plan outlay was made which led to poor infrastructural development, low 
economic activities hence further low level of institutional assistance. Which 
resulted in further low level of resource mobilisation potential of the State. 
So the vicious circle was complete.   
 
Therefore, the short term theory of discrimination as presented by the State 
since 1977 tend to single out itself from the economic, historical reality of 
the State as well as from the regressive structure prevailing in the Indian 
federation which is, as mentioned above, directed against all States and 
more particularly all less developed States instead of a particular State. In 
addition it seems the State hardly exploited its limited resource base with 
better management of its economy. For last two decades the State has 
been practising fiscal imprudence and a low level of economic management 
 345
which eventually made the State’s budgetary position worst among almost 
all States. Therefore, fiscal  indiscipline exercised by the State seems to be 
overlooked if we only concentrate on State specific constraints and 
regressive structure of the Indian federation. 
 
The State appears to have also failed to pursue its alternative industrial 
policy, of the 1977, which placed due emphasis on enhancing small scale 
sectors and intended to reduce the dependence of the State on large scale 
industries. Because these industries are said to be more recession prone 
and that apart, the profitability and expansion of these large scale industries 
depend on factors which are largely beyond the control of the State. 
Moreover, the State also failed to exploit resources from increased 
agricultural production which has taken place since 1977 through the 
massive structural change in the rural economy of West Bengal. The 
misconceived principle of ‘feasibility frontier’ represented the idea that the 
States belonging to the Indian federation are inhibited from devolving 
adequate fiscal power to the local governments while they themselves 
hardly possess it. Therefore, the State seems to have made little effort to 
enhance its resource base wider by either exploiting the resource potential 
and widening its revenue base within its limited fiscal power or with a more 
efficient management of its economy. On the contrary, persistent poor 
economic management of the State made the situation further worse and 
put the State in a disadvantageous position in the Indian federation to 
attract resources from different sources. Needless to say, this further 
reinforced the perception of discrimination against the State. Therefore, as 
against the concept of short term discrimination which is said to be time 
specific, State-specific and politically motivated, we can present the model 
of long term structural constraints of the State operating under regressive 
structure of resource allocation of the Indian federation on the one hand, 
and inability of the State  to widen its revenue base either through exploiting 
untapped resources and/or through checking the practice of fiscal 
imprudence and profligacy on the other. This will be evident from chart 4. 
 
Therefore. following the discourse of discrimination as was felt time to time 
by erstwhile Bengal and now West Bengal the question immediately arises 
in our mind how far such discrimination as accused by Left Front 
government was time specific, State specific and politically motivated 
discrimination. And how far continuous economic deterioration of West 
Bengal could be interpreted in terms of regressive structure of federal fiscal 
set up of India at the one hand and on the other basic historical conditions 
which constituted constraints on West Bengal’s development such as the 
export orientation of Bengal’s economy, absence of regionally committed 
enterprises. Furthermore, after Independence protectionism and import 
substitution policy were imposed on the whole country. And thus benefited 
such States which had even earlier concentrated on production for the 
home market. Whereas Bengal would have benefited from a policy 
favouring export-led growth.   
 
The main thrust of my argument, however, was that existing institutional 
mechanism for the transfers of resources from the Centre to the States are 
basically unjust and contains centripetal bias. Moreover, such institutional 
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mechanism for the transfers of resources from the Centre to the States 
clearly discriminates against poor and middle income States in which West 
Bengal belongs to. Therefore, existing federal financial system of India did 
not actually discriminate against West Bengal as such but imposed uniform 
rules. On account of which West Bengal was not negatively discriminated 
against but the existing mechanism also does not permit positive 
discrimination in favour of the disadvantaged States including West Bengal.    
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